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ABSTRACT 
 
The dissertation involves a study of the emerging international norm of ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect’  which states that citizens must be protected in cases of human atrocities, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and genocide where states have failed or are unable to do so. According to the 
work of the International Commission on the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS), this response can 
and should span a continuum involving prevention, a response to the violence, when and if 
necessary, and ultimately rebuilding shattered societies.  The most controversial aspect, however, 
is that of forceful intervention and much of the thesis focuses on this aspect.   
The history and context of the Responsibility to Protect are examined as an evolving norm in 
international law. The study thus serves as an analysis of how a fundamental and controversial 
international principle has been established: its promotion, creation, formulation, acceptance, and 
ultimately its implementation.  The dissertation identifies five critical sociopolitical issues of 
significance affecting the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect in international law and its 
implementation and considers remedies where appropriate.   
Analysis of an application of the principle through force is undertaken in the context of the UN 
sanctioned intervention into Libya in 2011. This case study provides a clearer picture of what the 
Responsibility to Protect means as a legal basis for international intervention in genocidal 
situations.  The study finds that international law is but one factor in the substantiation of the 
Responsibility to Protect – legitimacy counts as well as legality and for it to be implemented the 
self-interest of states must acknowledge ‘universal’ legal and ethical principles of a humanitarian 
nature.  Also contributing to the success of a Responsibility to Protect intervention are 
nongovernmental actors as part of transnational governance who in a particular situation cry out 
for action in the face of evolving humanitarian atrocities in spite of rules of sovereignty and state 
hegemony.  The more general significance of this research is in its understanding of existing and 
new forms of hard and soft governance and how they adapt in the international and transnational 
arena. 
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
By withdrawing, I had undoubtedly done the wise thing.  I had avoided risking the lives 
of my two soldiers in what would have been a fruitless struggle over one small boy.  But 
in that moment, it seemed to me that I had backed away from a fight for what was right, 
that this failure stood for all our failures in Rwanda.1 
What I have come to realize as the root of it all, however, is the fundamental indifference 
of the world community to the plight of seven to eight million black Africans in a tiny 
country that had no strategic or resource value to any world power.  An overpopulated 
little country that turned in on itself and destroyed its own people as the world watched 
and yet could not manage to find the political will to intervene.  Engraved still in my 
brain is the judgment of a small group of bureaucrats who came to assess the situation in 
the first weeks of the genocide:  ‘We will recommend to our government not to intervene 
as the risks are high and all that is here are humans.’2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The above quotes refer to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 when the majority Hutu tribe, through 
murder, rape, and maiming, eliminated as many as one million Tutsi civilians in the culmination 
of years of ethnic competition for political control. This was a bleak period in the history of the 
United Nations (UN), and hence the international community in general, for though it had a 
small peace-keeping force on the ground (the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda --UNAMIR) it 
was instructed not to interfere.  This tragedy generated considerable discussion about whether the 
international community could do more in such situations of internal national strife to stop such 
intended annihilations of one segment of the population by another.  Romeo Dallaire, the 
Commander of the UNAMIR troops, accused the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) 
                                                            
1 Romeo Dallaire, with Major Brent Beardsley Shake Hands with the Devil.  The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda 
(Canada:  Vintage Canada, 2003) at 4 [Dallaire, 2003].      
2 Dallaire 2003 Ibid at 6. 
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and France of ‘shirking their legal and moral responsibilities' by simply allowing the combatants 
to fight it out regardless of the conflict's impact on the civilian population.3 
Subsequently, the United Nations attempted to strengthen its ability to intervene to protect 
civilians in times of civil war through its support for the doctrine of the Responsibility to 
Protect.4 This concept states that the international community may intervene in a national 
conflict if large numbers of its civilians are being targeted by one or more of the combatants for 
extermination as part of the adversarial process. This provided the basis for intervention in 
Libya, though it has so far not provided the basis for international action with respect to the 
current civil war in Syria in which it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of civilians have so 
far perished. There have to be compelling legal and humanitarian reasons for the international 
community to intervene in cases such as Rwanda, Syria, Kosovo and Libya  -- and it is these 
rules, regulations and reasons that the thesis turns itself toward.  
In the words of Ramesh Thakur, the Responsibility to Protect is a remarkable narrative of 
empathy, reasoning and moral sensibility that forces us to consider what we have learned from 
the past.   To Madeleine Albright it is the most fascinating principle in international law.5  To me 
it represents hope.   So let me take you into the world of the Responsibility to Protect that I have 
explored, struggled with and interpreted.  
This dissertation involves a study of the evolution of the international norm of ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) from an idea or concept toward a legal norm. It traces its 
                                                            
3 Romeo Dallaire, Kishan Manocha, and Nishan Degnarain “The Major Powers on Trial” (2005) 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 877 [Dallaire, 2005]. 
4 While it has become quite common to refer to the Responsibility to Protect principle in short form as R2P, I have 
refrained in the thesis from doing so.  The term R2P in my view is robotic in nature and detracts from the very 
seriousness of its purpose.  
5 CCR2P Conference, March 29, 2014. 
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formative development and application in the international world and enters into the debate 
regarding its legal status. Such a study uncovers the controversies that surround the meaning of 
and implementation of this norm, particularly in terms of forceful intervention, the most 
contentious, and raises questions regarding the supremacy of states’ rights versus ‘universal’ 
humanitarian laws.   
The principle of the Responsibility to Protect  came to light as a result of the work of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS -highly influenced by 
Canadians) although the history of the idea goes back much further in time.6 The ICISS 
developed the Responsibility to Protect as a guiding principle for the international community 
that rested on a wide range of legal obligations and political responsibilities already in existence.  
While the original ICISS report did not explicitly call for legal reform, it did lean toward the 
view that international morality and international law should be more closely aligned.   
The World Summit Outcome Document, the formal document articulating the Responsibility to 
Protect adopted by resolution A/60/1 of the UN General Assembly (GA) on 24 October 2005 
contains the provisions for the responsibility of states to protect population from four 
international crimes: war crimes, genocide, human atrocities and ethnic cleansing. It was agreed 
by consensus by all participating member states and the provisions were reaffirmed in UN 
Security Council resolutions 1674 (28 April 2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict 
                                                            
6 The Responsibility to Protect I.1.5 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
December 2001, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, at 11. http://www.idrc.ca  The ICISS was 
launched at the UN Millenium Assembly in September 2001 in response to Kofi Annan’s challenge to the 
international community to act upon future violations of human rights and humanitarian law. (Kofi Annan, Annual 
Report to the General Assembly, press release SG/SM 7136, 20 Sep. 1999 cited by Jennifer M.Welsh, From Right to 
Responsibility:  Humanitarian Intervention and International Society (2001) 8 Global Governance, 503-521; pp 520 
[Welsh 2001].The Responsibility to Protect:  Research, Bibliography and Background, Supplementary volume to 
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa:  International Development 
Research Centre for ICISS, 2001), 410 pp. United Nations, 2004, at 65, para 201; see also United Nations World 
Summit 2006 Resolution 1674 April 28, 2006 which reaffirmed paras. 138 and 139 of the World Summit 2005 
Outcome Document.   
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and 1706 (31 August 2006) calling for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to Darfur.7 
The consequences of resolution A/60/1 are different from those of a treaty that becomes effective 
through a required number of ratifications which then become binding.  The GA resolution is 
recommendatory rather than binding.8  However, it has high political and moral significance and 
the obligations come from well-established rules and principles of customary and treaty 
international human rights law (IHRL), and international humanitarian law (IHL), which are in 
fact universally binding.  The thesis provides a more detailed description of international law and 
its relevance to the Responsibility to Protect in Chapter Two.    Genocide, however, is outlawed 
by the Genocide Convention, a treaty so widely endorsed that it is regarded as fundamental 
international law, binding on all.”9  
The Outcome Document, however, is most readily categorized as ‘soft’ law.  Soft laws can 
signal the direction of future legal development, act as a precursor of treaties or ‘harden’ into 
custom in relation to the Responsibility to Protect and it is the evolutionary path of this norm that 
will be explored in subsequent chapters.  Even if the Outcome Document is not legally 
enforceable “it does represent an important step in the evolution of international protection 
law”10 and the Responsibility to Protect principle.  Many states, however, refuse to accept ‘soft 
laws’ in that they may turn into enforceable rules, while other states claim these principles carry 
universal effect as a restatement of existing custom.    The Responsibility to Protect is a powerful 
principle which begs the question of whether it gives rise to legal obligations.  My own study of 
the evolution of the norm enters into a debate concerning the ambiguous nature of the 
                                                            
7 Dorota Glerycz, The Responsibility to Protect:  A legal and Rights-based Perspective (2010) 2 Global 
Responsibility to Protect, 250-268 [Glerycz, 2010] at 250. 
8 Glerycz 2010 ibid at 251. 
9 Michael Doyle, International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect (2011) 13 (International Studies Review, 72-
84 at 73. 
10 Doyle 2011 supra note at 230. 
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Responsibility to Protect as a new norm of customary international law.  In order to fully grasp 
the status of the norm I draw on international law, international humanitarian law (IHL), 
international human rights law (IHRL) and legal scholarship as well as apply a broadened 
theoretical interdisciplinary framework to explain the controversy.  While one may ultimately 
conclude it remains an example of soft law, it nonetheless can exert significant influence on how 
states interpret their legal obligations towards preventing and responding to mass atrocities.11 In 
addition it appears to be still evolving in ways I will demonstrate throughout the thesis.  
Consequently, the research considers what it would take for the Responsibility to Protect to 
become legally binding and what factors are holding back or promoting this development.    This 
requires a perspective on how international law is created and maintained which will be provided 
in the thesis to come. 
Overall, it a story of norm entrepreneurship – the norm has been conceptualized, articulated and 
is being progressively refined in expert and scholarly reports, in detailed responses by the 
Secretary General and in Security Council Resolutions.  The thesis revisits the existing set of 
legal standards, institutional structures and the jurisprudence underpinning the principle in order 
to see how it can best be understood and applied – as a means of protecting the person and not 
only as a military doctrine aimed at justifying intervention.  Human rights, for example, are not a 
part of the mainstream activities of the Security Council, but the Responsibility to Protect brings 
together international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the context of the 
Security Council.12   
                                                            
11Jennifer M. Welsh, and Maria Banda International Law and the Responsibility to Protect:  Clarifying or 
Expanding States Responsibilities (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect, 213-231 [Welsh and Banda. 2010]. 
12 Glerycz supra note 7 at 251. 
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According to my analysis, I am prepared to affirm the principle as a new international norm on 
its way “to becoming a rule of customary international law.”13 I also agree with Kofi Annan who 
tended to see it as a way to strengthen existing international humanitarian law, such as the 
Genocide Convention and the further implementation of existing commitments.14     The analysis 
requires an understanding of how norms become become ‘soft’ law (lex ferenda) or ‘hard’ law 
(lex lata) and I strive to unravel exactly how this principle has evolved and its legal status to 
date.15   
The question of whether the Responsibility to Protect has transitioned into law is important for 
theory and practice.  For one thing, states are more likely to act if it is legal. The law also 
emphasizes precedents and practice over national interest and preferences; as a result “legal rules 
may exert a greater ‘compliance pull’ because of the legitimacy associated with the obligations 
they outline.”16  In addition legal obligations as opposed to moral obligations have specific 
remedies if they are not fulfilled which soft law does not allow.17 
The thesis further locates the Responsibility to Protect doctrine as an aspect of transnational law 
and global governance.  The role of nongovernmental actors as contributing to its place in 
transnational law is researched and explored. The study therefore serves as a unique analysis and 
a case study of how a fundamental and controversial international norm can be created, 
promoted, and accepted at the level of transnational governance and finally implemented. In 
general terms, the research is of an interdisciplinary nature involving the study of transnational, 
                                                            
13 Louise Arbour as cited in Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect:  Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and 
for All (Washington DC:  The Brookings Institution Press, 2008) 349.   
14 Jennifer M. Welsh, and Maria Banda International Law and the Responsibility to Protect:  Clarifying or 
Expanding States Responsibilities (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect, 213-231 at 227 [Welsh and Banda, 
2010]. 
15 Welsh and Banda, 2010 ibid at 227. 
16 Welsh and Banda, 2010 ibid at 228. 
17 Welsh and Banda, 2010 ibid. 
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international and global forces in relation to human peace and security.  The broader significance 
of this research is in its contribution to the understanding of existing and new forms of hard and 
soft law and global governance and how norms and laws can evolve and survive in the 
international and transnational arena. 
In academic writing, governance is often associated with the state, but the paradigm change 
underlying the study of governance does not centre on the state, but usually more broadly 
includes a research question on the nature of the relationship between the state and non-state 
actors or citizen groups.  This relationship can be expressed through a change in the authority of 
the state, its sovereignty, and globalization.  Under these conditions, we find the distinction 
between national and international governance has changed.  As the thesis engages in its 
consideration of whether the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has evolved into either 
international law and/or an international soft law norm, it firstly determines what the 
impediments and the factors that support and enhance its evolution and implementation are.  
Secondly, it investigates whether there are cases where it has been implemented. To consider 
both of these questions, the investigation has utilized an interdisciplinary approach drawn from 
mainly international law, international relations, anthropology, and political science.  
Five sociopolitical issues of significance are identified and elaborated on that impede as well as 
support its acceptance in the international environment. The issues include the following:  1) the 
tension between the principles of state sovereignty and state responsibility to the individual; 2)  
the legality and legitimacy of the Responsibility to Protect; 3) the self-interest of states versus  
altruistic principles; 4) the inclusion of non-governmental actors as players; and, finally,  5) the 
UN and its limited institutional authority for resolving conflicts.  
  8 
 
The thesis also illuminates one other major impediment that has grown and continues to exist 
today; i.e., that of fear and mistrust, exacerbating the tensions with regard to state sovereignty.  
The suspicion on the part of non-western states of the motivation of western states remains a 
major challenge for the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in its soft form.  Some 
states oppose the crystallization of the Responsibility to Protect into law for fear of excessive 
interventions, and reject the idea that the Responsibility to Protect has evolved into a new 
customary rule. 
In addition, the thesis will examine the role the Responsibility to Protect has played and is 
playing in humanitarian crises.  It will trace its history and context as both an evolving norm and 
as potentially customary international law.  An analysis of the first true application of the 
principle will be carried out as a case study of the UN-sanctioned intervention into Libya in 
2011. There will also be a discussion of other cases where the Responsibility to Protect has been 
attributed incorrectly as responsible in principle for international action -- that is Iraq (a US led 
action) and Kosovo (a NATO intervention) -- because they were not UN sanctioned. In this way 
we will gain a clearer picture of what the Responsibility to Protect means as a legal basis for 
international intervention in genocidal situations, and thus gain a clearer picture of its growth and 
prospects as well as barriers to its implementation. 
In UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s report entitled In Larger Freedom:  Towards 
Development Security and Human Rights for All, he states that “The protection of human rights 
is a collective responsibility.”18 One of the obstacles, however, is that the support of the 
Responsibility to protect is influenced by cultural beliefs, historical circumstances, ideological, 
                                                            
18 Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom:  Towards Development and Human Rights for All A/59/2005, at 37, para. 140. 
[Annan, 2005]. 
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national and political identities in spite of any international agreements already achieved on 
human rights and the acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect.  The problem of 
accommodating regional or cultural differences in a universal human rights framework is part of 
“the disagreements between the Western developing states, on the one hand, and the Eastern 
Bloc and many developing states on the other.”19   These latter groups fear the dominance of the 
post-war human rights agenda of Western liberal ideologies.  Tensions remain with the Universal 
Declaration and the covenants seen as largely Western constructs.  Ideally, human rights 
advocates would like to see human rights interpreted and applied in a consistent way which also 
accommodates their own local traditions and cultural norms.20  This renders the application of 
truly universal human rights problematic.  The 1993 United Nations World Conference on 
Human Rights attempted to address this controversy through the adoption of a Declaration and 
Programme of Action. 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.  The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on 
the same footing, and with the same emphasis.  While the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be 
borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 21 
The thesis thus moves into highly contentious territory as the Responsibility to Protect claims 
that, while sovereign governments have the primary Responsibility to Protect their own citizens 
from human atrocities, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide, when they are unable or 
unwilling to do so their responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community.  
According to the work of the International Commission on the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS), 
“this response can and should span a continuum involving prevention, a response to the violence, 
                                                            
19 John H. Currie, Public International Law, second edition (Toronto:  Irwin Law Inc., 2008) at 440 [Currie, 2008]. 
20 Currie 2008 ibid at 440. 
21 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 
(1993) at para. 5. 
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when and if necessary, and ultimately rebuilding shattered societies.”22  The Report also sets out 
three pillars (to be elaborated on in Chapter Two). The most controversial issue, however, is that 
of the international reaction to forceful intervention and much of the thesis focuses on this 
aspect.   
To date, work in the area of the Responsibility to Protect principle has focused on the roots and 
rationale for the Responsibility to Protect, but little has been done on the evolution of the norm 
and its status in international law, along with the ethical principles involved in making soft law 
work, as well as the role of non-state actors in its promotion and implementation.  This 
dissertation contributes to the literature in such a way as to fill those gaps.  Due to the nature of 
the Responsibility to Protect as soft law, lex ferenda bordering on hard law, lex lata, I also show 
how ethics, values and principles, norms, good faith and shared expectations about appropriate 
social behavior held by the community of actors must continue to be taken into consideration.  
In the investigation of the principle, I am therefore not only concerned with international law as 
it has existed and does exist, I am  also concerned with the values that international decisions 
(legal and otherwise) hold, and the ethical basis upon which decisions are made.  The research 
explores in more depth both the moral perspective and the perspective that it is in the interests of 
the state, as well as the broader international community, to act ethically, and to account to civil 
society and other states for its actions.  Sovereignty, non-intervention, self-determination and 
self-interest must sometimes take a back seat to crises of a humanitarian nature. Ostensibly, the 
nub of the controversy is the clash between the norms regulating state sovereignty and the 
question of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention to protect human security.  
                                                            
22 ICISS supra note 6. 
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In order to understand the significance of the Responsibility to Protect as a shift in international 
norms, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are discussed in historical and legal 
terms.  Sovereignty and non-intervention have been the basic principles around which the 
international environment has operated and are the cornerstones of the UN Charter and its 
attempts to achieve world order.  While  my study to date has persuaded me that there is  solid 
justification for the objectives of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, I have 
investigated arguments that do not support humanitarian intervention and/or the Responsibility to 
Protect in order to aid my understanding of existing impediments to its success. 
Research shows that some countries continue to oppose the Responsibility to Protect principle, 
particularly the notion of intervention, by emphasizing non-intervention’s connection with self-
determination and sovereignty.  By emphasizing what to some extent can be considered as both 
an ethical and a legal principle of self-determination, some countries attempt to protect 
themselves from stronger powers who they regard “at minimum as furthering their selfish 
interests and at maximum neo-colonialists. The Chinese, for example, in reaction to the Kosovo 
campaign (1996), regarded this as an attempt “to legitimate interventions designed to force 
countries to change their political systems.”23  (Similar objections were voiced by Russia and 
India in the debates leading up to the approval of the Responsibility to Protect and continue to 
affect more recent decisions and/or actions in support of the Responsibility to Protect). By 
raising these roadblocks, however, they raise questions about their own motivation. While I do 
not deny the history of colonialism and the current functioning of capitalism, I argue that it is 
                                                            
23 Jennifer Welsh,, From Right to Responsibility:  Humanitarian Intervention and International Society (2001) 8 
Global Governance, 503-521; at 504 [Welsh, 2001].  The debates that I will review are generally played out in 
discussions at the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN, and sometimes carried over into media 
accounts and comments in the more public domain. 
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vital to recognize that the Responsibility to Protect, as a principle that must go through the UN to 
maintain legitimacy, is meant to provide something beyond state self-interest.   
I do accept that international law can be used for imperialist purposes but I do argue the 
Responsibility to Protect, when interpreted and exercised properly, can be a check on 
imperialism and hegemony.  The Responsibility to Protect as a principle, approved at the United 
Nations, was designed to protect the world from unilateral action from the West as well as from 
the North and South.  The Security Council process, through the use of the veto, offers the 
opportunity for the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council (Permanent Five 
or P5) to have their say and functions as a corrective to imperial intervention.24 A problem does 
arise, however, when one state allows its vested interests to dominate the humanitarian purpose 
of intervention.   
While there has been a growth in the literature on the Responsibility to Protect, I have 
approached the literature in new and different ways.  There has not been any extensive study of 
the evolution of the norm in international law nor of non-state actors involved in the analysis and 
support of the overall the Responsibility to Protect principle.  I have met with and interviewed 
some of the more established NGOs as well as the founding authors of the Responsibility to 
Protect in order to understand what their contribution is and what they understand to be the 
problems or impediments to the development of the norm at the international level. I have also 
considered the role of international institutions, particularly the UN, in the development and 
implementation of the norm.  This research has helped me to reach some conclusions regarding 
its ability to survive. 
                                                            
24 The P5 include China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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The end point for norm development is institutionalization (usually through customary law).25 
Chapter Nine  presents an analysis of a case study concerning the legitimacy of the intervention 
in Libya in 2011where the Responsibility to Protect was invoked in the Security Council and the 
international community came together sufficiently to move forward with a military intervention. 
Chapter Nine is original in that it presents what may be argued to be the only bona fide instance 
of the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in its pillar three form.  I develop a novel 
framework of legitimacy and test the Libyan intervention against it, and illustrate the necessity of 
the Responsibility to Protect operating within the context of not necessarily a legal but at 
minimum a legitimate authority.   
The analysis also shows, however, how easily implementation can be judged by the international 
community in a negative light, increasing skepticism and fear of imperialism and neocolonial 
intentions.  In this way it also illustrates that geopolitical interests remain very near the surface in 
international affairs and emphasizes the vulnerability of the principle. These concerns may push 
opportunities for implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in future situations backwards 
for a time, serving political interests, rather than ethical considerations. The impact of the various 
impediments affects the international community in its responses to other areas of great concern, 
particularly the three to four year old conflict in Syria.  While a deeper analysis of the Syrian 
situation is not a goal of the thesis, I will go so far as to suggest the Syrian case demonstrates that 
political interests can still trump humanitarian concerns in the UN Security Council and that the 
quest for a disinterested regime or a neutral, principled and unbiased international organ is 
elusive. 
 
                                                            
25 Welsh and Banda supra note 11 at 226. 
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 II. Theoretical Perspectives, Concepts and Arguments 
Concepts such as norms, morals, ethics, values, universal principles, intervention, humanitarian 
intervention, foreign policy, human rights, human security, human cultural security, international 
and transnational law and global governance are used and elaborated upon in the course of the 
discussion. To elucidate the context for the different norms, laws and principals involved at the 
international level in the Responsibility to Protect debate and the meaning and significance of the 
conceptual framework referred to above, the relevant literature and theoretical perspectives are 
explored and articulated.   The dissertation identifies some of the ways in which these theoretical 
approaches or ideologies have affected and continue to affect decisions for intervention.  
The theoretical perspectives stem from international law, conflict resolution, ethics, 
anthropology and international relations, with support from philosophy and political science, 
particularly through those theories of Realism and Idealism, Constructivism, the Logic of 
Appropriateness and the Logic of Consequences.   
Briefly: (i) Realists will consider the power and interests of states and how zero sum or 
distributional conflicts are resolved; (ii) Neorealists and neoliberals conceptualize states as 
rational, autonomous actors; and (iii) Constructivists focus on the logic of the appropriateness of 
a set of norms and values which constitute the order of society and which determine the 
authorities and the actions of actors in the system; and (iv) those propounding the logic of 
consequences see political action as rational, calculating behavior designed to maximize 
preferences.26 
                                                            
26 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen   Rediscovering Institutions:  The Organizational Basis of Politics, (New 
York:  Free Press, 1989), 24-26; [March and Olsen 1989). March, James .G. A primer on Decision Making:  How 
Decisions Happen, (New York:  Free Press, 1994), 57-58; [March 1994]. James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen “The 
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In the political theory literature, the classic tripartite division separates Realists, Liberals and 
Socialists.  These theoreticians posit differing views on the actors in international politics. The 
Realist School sees State interests as the essential determinant of public policy.  State security is 
inherently under threat and therefore primary.  States should only intervene when it is in their 
interest.27  In theoretical terms my own view of the place of the Responsibility to Protect in 
international relations is best explained by Constructivism, Idealism and the Logic of 
Appropriateness - those theories that illustrate the importance of eclectic international law 
located between the theory of consent and natural law rather than that of Realism or Socialism or 
the Logic of Consequences.28  The Responsibility to Protect is deeply familiar to Liberal 
international ethics, but even the Realist and Marxist traditions include “commitments to human 
respect that make humanitarian concerns far from foreign.”29  Constructivist notions of norm 
entrepreneurship, norm socialization and related theories of social movements have found their 
application across a variety of political phenomena for which the previously dominant theories of 
International Relations, Realism and Neo-liberalism had no analytic models.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” (1998) 52 International Organization, 943-69) [March 
and Olsen 1998]. 
27 Doyle 2011 supra note 9 at 74. 
28 Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 94. 
29 Doyle 2011 supra note 9 at 72. 
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III. Methodology  
The study of the Responsibility to Protect also contributes to the larger theoretical understanding 
of conflict resolution.  The research into the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect serves as a 
vehicle for the exploration of larger questions, including those concerning governance, 
international normative theory, norm entrepreneurship, the role of the United Nations and the 
role of non-state actors in international governance. 
The study relies on classical research methods, e.g., bibliographical research, but of an intensely 
interdisciplinary nature, as well as the collection and review of documents, reports, resolutions, 
agreements, conventions, and statutes from international organizations and bodies located at 
regional, national and international levels.  The methodology applied to the study of the 
Responsibility to Protect searches for motives behind the support of the principle as well as 
outcomes as it is considered by key players and its advocates.  Interviews are carried out by 
means of the pursuit of a social science methodology which is designed to achieve a deeper 
meaning or “thick description.”30  Due to the importance of non-state actors the qualitative 
research was carried out in the form of policy interviews. The interviews involved collecting 
information more generally on political and advocacy groups, other members of civil society, 
and international organizations, particularly the UN. 31  Overall, two qualitative research methods 
have mainly influenced the interview questions:  (1) the anthropology of policy; and (2) norm 
entrepreneurship.  These methods incorporate ways of doing research in different fields; they 
                                                            
30 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description:  Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture” in Clifford Geertz The 
Interpretation of cultures:  selected essays (New York:  Basic books, 1973) at 1 [Geertz 1973]. 
31 For example, Sally Engle Merry refers to “transnational consensus building” which involves “the global 
production of documents and resolutions that define policies such as major treaty conventions, and policy 
documents that come out of global conferences and resolutions and declarations of the UN General Assembly.”  
Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence:  Translating International Law into Local Justice 
(University of Chicago Press, 2010) [Merry 2010]. 
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relate to and complement each other in fundamental ways representing the interdisciplinarity of 
the theory.   The examination of norm formation and implementation requires an 
interdisciplinary approach that combines the tools and techniques of the international lawyer and 
political scientist with those of the sociologist and anthropologist, who offer insight into the 
analysis of social movements, and social change.32  
The qualitative research helps to expand our understanding of these factors, and aids us in 
achieving a “thick description” of the meaning of the norm, while legal theory and the theory of 
norm entrepreneurship provides the framework for its historical development. While on the 
theoretical level the thesis considers whether intervention (and the Responsibility to Protect) is a 
moral entity or a legal entity, or both, and what this means in terms of implementation, additional 
research focuses the thesis on norm development.  Many of the non-state actors who are 
concerned with human rights and human dignity and the protection of human security33 act as 
proponents of the Responsibility to Protect. Social movement organizations are central in the 
promotion of UN initiatives and to the movement of UN decisions with relation to the principles 
of the Responsibility to Protect.  Without these organizations, the Responsibility to Protect 
would likely not have achieved the level of acceptance that it has.   Some commentators have 
gone so far as to suggest that “the roots of contemporary ethical foreign policy are to be found in 
the evolution of the NGO movement…” 34   
The thesis provides a description of the views, perspectives and actions of key actors with regard 
to the norm in both positive and negative ways as it has emerged.   Issues of policy, 
                                                            
32 Julie Mertus, “Considering Nonstate Actors in the New Millenium:  Towards Expanded Participation in Norm 
Generation and Norm Application” (1999-2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics,  
537 at 545 [Mertus 1999]. 
33 Responsibility to Protect, supra note 6 at 6. 
34 See e.g. David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul:  Human Rights and  International Intervention (London, 2002)]  
204 [Chandler 2002]. 
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communication, legitimacy, impact and effectiveness, moral issues and realpolitik are 
investigated.  Key areas of agreement and disagreement are also highlighted. The research also 
involved collecting information more generally on leaders in the formulation of the 
Responsibility to Protect, other members of civil society, and international organizations, 
particularly the UN, including documents produced by the Secretary General of the UN as they 
pertain to the evolution of the doctrine itself.35 
III.1 Introduction to Norm Entrepreneurships  
One important theoretical and methodological approach which helps us to understand the 
development of the Responsibility to Protect as a norm is that of norm entrepreneurship.  The 
NGOs, their organizations and the ICISS itself can be regarded as classic examples of norm 
entrepreneurs in the creation and development of the Responsibility to Protect.  The significance 
of the relationship of norms to social behaviour parallels in some manner the relationship of 
normative action to norm entrepreneurship. Johnstone states that “...norm entrepreneurs are 
actors with a cause who mobilize support for their cause and seek to have it crystallized as an 
accepted standard of behaviour.”36  Finnemore and Sikkink describe norm entrepreneurship as a 
process that works in three stages: In Stage 1, individuals call attention to issues and try to 
persuade state leaders to become proponents.  These norm entrepreneurs are usually involved 
with organizations like NGOs, government or international organizations; Stage 2 comes about 
when a tipping point has occurred and the norm is spreading quickly in a ‘norm cascade.’ This is 
mostly an exercise in persuasion – not coercion, although such things as sanctions can be used to 
                                                            
35 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence:  Translating International Law into Local Justice 
University of Chicago Press, 2010 [Merry 2010].  
36 Ian Johnstone, “The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur” in Chesterman, Simon (Ed.)  
 at 126. 
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persuade.  Finally, in Stage 3, the norm is almost automatically accepted and followed and 
becomes entrenched in national and international institutions.37  “At the far end of the norm 
cascade; i.e. the third stage, norm institutionalization occurs; norms acquire a ‘taken for granted’ 
quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate.”38  Not all norms reach this final stage, 
however, and there is some question whether the Responsibility to Protect has achieved this final 
status.  The controversy surrounding efforts to make legal or political decisions in humanitarian 
crisis situations according to the Responsibility to Protect holds back its ability to harden into 
law.  
Finnemore refers to norm entrepreneurs as “meaning managers” and introduces the term “moral 
proselytism” to describe the activity.  The language they use to construct these, “cognitive 
frames,” is an essential component.   New norms must challenge the current “Logic of 
appropriateness” and create new ones.39  In the case of the Responsibility to Protect sovereignty 
is to be replaced by responsibility. Overall, however, these three phases are not necessarily 
sequential; it is a dynamic process that occurs through discourse and deliberation where ideas are 
promoted, defended, explained and justified as the thesis will demonstrate. 
Platforms for the discussion of the norm often include NGOs or standing international 
organizations.  Motivations for norm entrepreneurs are usually based on values that include 
empathy and an interest in the welfare of others with a shared commitment to humanity because 
of a “belief in the ideals and values embodied in the norms.”40  This is a very important point in 
terms of understanding the values and ideals that form the basis of the Responsibility to Protect 
                                                            
37 See Martha Finnemore and Kathy Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) vol. 52 
International Organization, p. 887 [Finnemore and Sikkink 1998]. 
38 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 ibid at 895. 
39 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 ibid at 897. 
40 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 ibid at 898. 
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principle and those entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial organizations that promote and support it 
as a moral and possibly legal principle rather than for any hidden purpose. 
One of the central tenets of the thesis is that norm entrepreneurs do function as “moral 
watchdogs” and are free to advocate for moral concerns in the middle of a crisis where states are 
more often constrained by conflicting interests.  NGOs hold some of the tools needed to promote 
the Responsibility to Protect. “One prominent feature of modern organizations and an important 
source of influence for international organizations in particular is their use of expertise and 
information to change the behavior of other actors.”41    NGOs in the case of the Responsibility 
to Protect were critical to the development of the norm.  At some point, however, norm 
entrepreneurs have to gain the support of state actors.  
Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that norms that make universalistic claims “about what is good 
for all people in all places have more expansive potential than localized and particularistic 
normative frameworks.”42 They are more likely to gain transnational acceptance.  This 
‘universalistic nature’ is an essential part of the obligation the Responsibility to Protect and its 
underlying network of legal conventions and covenants imposes on nations to protect citizens 
(both their own and others).  Three principles relevant to the norm tend to be persuasive:  
“universalism, individualism, and world citizenship.”43   Universalism is necessary in that each 
country must buy into it.  Individualism underlies the Responsibility to Protect norm as it is an 
extension of human rights principles.  World citizenship is relevant in the sense that it applies to 
citizens of every country - not just our own. 
 
                                                            
41 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 ibid at 899. 
42 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 ibid at 907. 
43 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 ibid at 907. 
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Thus, the key principle of the Responsibility to Protect is to protect innocent persons who are 
being subjected to serious or fatal bodily harm.  Such a norm must be universal in that it needs to 
transcend cultural differences and must be understood and accepted across cultures.  This 
struggle for universality is a key impediment in the achievement of any kind of intervention and 
will be discussed further in the thesis.  A major constraint is the diversity of values and priorities 
awarded to civilian protection that exists.  In order to reach such a universal understanding, 
acceptance of the new norm is related to the fit of the norm within existing normative 
frameworks.  Activists work hard to utilize this fit between existing norms and developing ones.  
The Responsibility to Protect’s principle represents a shift from the “rights of states” to the 
“responsibility of states” and the participation of activists has been significant toward the 
international community’s ability to achieve this shift.44 
III.2 The Anthropology of Policy 
In addition to norm entrepreneurship, I also adopt an approach which applies the anthropology of 
policy as a qualitative research method. Proponents of the anthropology of policy look at the 
conceptual vocabulary of policies and what can be understood from the rejection or acceptance 
of ideas and map the actors who influence the policies. Policy is seen as an organizing concept in 
society, similar to the way family may have been seen in traditional anthropology. In the 
anthropology of policy “Field and site are no longer coterminous” and anthropologists follow a 
flow of concepts or ‘policies’ or ‘norms’ as they move across the field.45  In this case the field 
pertains to a transnational network that encompasses nongovernmental civil actors at the 
domestic or local level, international organizations and states as the norm is created and evolved.  
                                                            
44 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 ibid at 908. 
45 Susan Wright, “Anthropology of Policy,” Anthropology News, Nov. 2006, 22 [Wright 2006]. 
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Susan Wright calls this “studying through”46 - events are followed through different sites to 
reveal the policy process and the way in which concepts, ideas, policies or norms are negotiated 
which in total illustrate “forms of governance and regimes of power.”47  Researchers such as 
Sally Engle Merry, Annelise Riles, Sally Falk Moore, Arjun Appadurai, Dorothy Smith and H. 
Gusterson provide methodological models for this research.48   
Sally Engle Merry suggests “the transnational circulation of people and ideas is transforming the 
world we live in, but grasping its full complexity is extraordinarily difficult.  To do so, it is 
essential to focus on specific places where transnational flows are happening.”49 By focussing on 
the norm I have been able to find key individuals involved with the Responsibility to Protect and 
either spend time with them and gain their views and insights through interviews or to hear their 
personal accounts of their own experience with the norm.  This has presented me with a unique 
opportunity to gain an original perspective on the evolution of the norm and to see it through the 
eyes of the people who live and work with it. 
The study of the Responsibility to Protect illustrates that the growth of the acceptance of the 
Responsibility to Protect lies not only in a traditional international legal environment with a 
dependence on traditional institutions such as the UN and the Security Council, but also non-
state actors and individuals within a transnational legal environment. Transnational law is 
regarded here in effect as an institutional framework for cross-border interaction beyond the 
nation state.50 Along similar lines to the methodology used by Sally Engle Merry in her study of 
                                                            
46 PhD thesis “Local Conflict an Ideological Struggle, ‘Positive Images’” in Wright 2006 ibid. 
47 Wright 2006 supra note 45 at 45. 
48 Merry 2010 supra note 35. 
49 Merry 2010 ibid. 
50 Gralf Calliess, -Peter Law, Transnational Osgoode Hall Law School/Comparative Research in Law and Political 
Economy Research Paper No. 3/2010 [Calliess 2010]. 
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human rights,51 my own research is intended to provide a vehicle for understanding how new 
categories of meaning emerge and are applied to social practices (in this case at the national and  
the  international level and within groups who advocate for the Responsibility to Protect).  In 
order for the Responsibility to Protect principle to achieve the broad acceptance it requires to be 
successful, it needs to be accepted within local contexts of power and meaning as well as by state 
leaders and those already persuaded (i.e., the activist groups).  National leaders, of course, 
require the support of the citizens and are sometimes influenced by these citizen groups in taking 
humanitarian action.  
Activist groups can be regarded as intermediaries between different sets of cultural 
understandings of what is ethical in the behaviour of states who are making crucial decisions in 
the global environment; i.e. as intermediaries between the ordinary citizens and the international 
organizations and transnational law.  Policy research was conducted through these interviews in 
such a way as to allow me to explore subtleties of group perspectives and collect detailed 
descriptions of experiences, to explore how concepts are actually understood, and how political 
relations are being played out.   I sought to understand what, from the perspective of those 
involved, have been the successes of the policy, the failures, and the impediments that might 
stand in the way of further success along with the ethical commonalities or conflicts that may be 
underlying any underlying tensions.  I have been interested in gaining a “thicker” comprehension  
of the relationship between the political public sphere and the self-legitimating claims of 
organizations in support of the Responsibility to Protect.  In order to accomplish this I have 
examined statements made at the national and international levels as well as the potentially 
critical or supportive views of citizen interest groups apart from the political stance of state 
                                                            
51 Merry 2010 supra note 35. 
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actors.  This investigation has provided insights into the discourse that is taking place (directly or 
indirectly) at the international level.  As expected, there are areas of agreement and areas of 
conflict as part of the discourse.  Such findings of conflicting discourse or criticism of the 
political position would be expected in a democratic system. 
 My interest is in the  professional organizations  and  the translocal relationship – and even 
further the transnational level where decisions are being made that are pre-empted or influenced 
by bodies such as those Nongovernmental Organizations interviewed.  We will see from the 
interviews that many of the NGOs approached have formed coalitions or have at least cooperated 
with one another in order to strengthen their positions.  This is the area that is covered by 
questions asking interviewees about their joint or collaborative efforts and if they find them 
worth pursuing.   My intention is to show how norms develop and grow through the influence 
and cooperation of norm entrepreneurs.  Text-based discourses are central in this development. 
We will see how transnational organizations shape global governance through their advocacy 
strategies.  The interviews with individuals constitute an investigation into their transformative 
potential to show how the discourse is framed, particularly in relation to the five issues 
identified, and becomes part of a chain of action mediated by documentary forms of knowledge 
to social action.  Documentary data were also collected through website research or written 
reports or attendance at events where the Responsibility to Protect was the main topic of 
discussion. 
The interview questions were unique in their formulation based on documentary evidence, 
information gathering, rules and regulations, history and current events.  The interview included 
the intention to find a balance between directing the interview toward the researcher’s goals and 
encouraging those being interviewed to add information or views that might not have been 
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included in the original set of questions.  These interviews plus material evidence help to provide 
a 'thicker' description of the evolution of the concept as it develops toward the prospect of 
becoming a legal norm. 
Ultimately, the thesis aims to clarify the problematic relationship between the Responsibility to 
Protect and international law.  Overall it accepts the view that the World Summit agreement did 
not create new law and that the Responsibility to Protect is still best understood as a political 
commitment to act upon shared moral beliefs, much of which is embedded in already existing 
international law.  That is not to say, however, that the Responsibility to Protect is devoid of 
legal content nor that there are not signs that it is evolving toward hard law.  This growth will be 
evidenced throughout the thesis in documents, resolutions, reports, practice, Security Council 
resolution and International Court decisions.  In relation to the legal responsibilities of states the 
Responsibility to Protect principle involves the state’s responsibilities towards its own 
population.  These responsibilities are deeply embedded in existing international law, much of 
which is considered jus cogens.  As Louise Arbour, former Commissioner for Human Rights, 
suggests there is an emerging legal duty to prevent genocide which suggests an emerging area of 
legal innovation that may strengthen the application of the Responsibility to Protect over time.52   
In the final analysis, the Responsibility to Protect requires a global order where the legal 
structure is based on legal rights as well as responsibilities.  Its basis in international human 
rights law is extremely important to its evolution.  In a soft legal environment, it is likely that the 
Responsibility to Protect will always run into obstacles in terms of implementation.  Presently, 
                                                            
52 Louise Arbour, The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice, (2008) 34 
British International Studies Association, 445-458 [Arbour, 2008]. 
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for it to succeed, the Responsibility to Protect must be treated as not only a legal and political 
doctrine, but as a moral one which stands to protect civilians in conflict in the case of the failure 
of states to protect their own population.   In my view, however, there is no need yet to despair - 
regardless of impediments, the Responsibility to Protect has evolved and continues to evolve and 
is implementable.  It is not a flawed principle but an essential one in today’s environment of intra 
state conflict.  State sovereignty can and must give way to state responsibility when citizens are 
in extreme jeopardy.   
IV. What Follows  
The following chapter, Chapter Two, provides the reader with a greater sense of the immediate 
history and context surrounding the formal approval of the Responsibility to Protect.  The story 
of its approval commences within the context of the supremacy of state sovereignty and then 
moves toward a recognition of the concerns regarding human security and human rights in 
international affairs. The story proceeds with the involvement of Canada, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the acceptance of a limited form 
of the proposed norm in 2005 in the UN by the General Assembly.   This represents a transition 
of historical, legal and moral significance that has taken place since the Peace of Westphalia.  
International law is introduced in this Chapter to begin to outline the framework of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, along with a history of international legal scholarship 
and the place of the sovereignty rights of states.  The legal regime of the UN Charter is also 
described to introduce the reader to the acceptance of its formal approval and later means of 
implementation.  Finally, the four sources in international law are presented to illustrate the 
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options that exist for declaring a norm as law.  To aid in the tracking of the evolution of the 
norm, the concept of soft law is explored, especially as it relates to the Responsibility to Protect. 
Chapter Three discusses the importance of human security to the development of the 
Responsibility to Protect after the Cold War and the International Criminal Court (ICC).  It also 
introduces the controversies that surround the notion of forcible intervention and the Laws of 
War and humanitarian intervention.  On the legal side, it clarifies the legal foundation of the 
Responsibility to Protect in the four crimes:  war crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic 
cleansing.  Because of the difficulty in establishing the exact legal nature of the Responsibility to 
Protect, the Chapter outlines the importance of legitimacy arguments as distinct from legal 
determinations, as either soft law (lex ferenda) or hard law (lex lata).  
Chapter Four, addresses moral behaviour and moral philosophy as underlying values and ethical 
principle among nations, cultures and religions.  It emphasizes the necessity for common moral 
principles as opposed to actions in the international community taken by states in their own self-
interest which emphasize their sovereignty rights as opposed to their responsibilities.  It suggests 
that the achievement of a coherent system of conventions has in some ways already been 
accomplished in the human rights legal framework and provides examples of foreign policy 
where such ideals can be found.   
Chapter Five, lays out the theoretical foundations of the Responsibility to Protect, particularly 
focussing on the need for morality, ethics, universal principles and idealism to take precedence 
over realist notions of the state acting in its own self-interest.  It suggests, however, that even in 
an established environment of human rights, realpolitik still serves to guide state actions along 
with fears of neocolonialist and imperial motivations.  Along with realists who see actors as only 
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acting in their self-interest are those who support Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL).  Their basic mistrust of international law and its colonial underpinnings lead some to 
reject it altogether. Other theoretical perspectives are discussed from international relations 
(institutional and liberal theorists), political science, and law perspectives as they reflect on the 
way in which the principle is approached. 
Constructivist theories, which reject rationalist explanations but stress the place of norms and 
shared understanding, emphasize the dominance of normative discourse in decisions being made 
in the development of the principle. Finally, two other forms of these two basic theories (actor 
oriented versus structuralist) - the logic of appropriateness (in which norms and values dominate) 
and the logic of consequences (actions are conducted to realize material interests) - are posed 
against each other to help us understand the contrast between rules and roles versus the 
maximization of self-interest.  The thesis emphasizes the necessity of collaboration and 
consensus in ethical choices affecting the preservation of human rights. 
 Chapter Six focuses on how the responsibility to protect has evolved in the global governance 
context, with a particular focus on the role of Non-governmental organizations. The chapter 
introduces Nongovernmental Organizations that have taken hold of the Responsibility to Protect 
principle along with the rights of the individual and that call on governments of the world to 
adopt the moral choice and protect civilians in violent conflict.  These organizations tend to be 
freer to adopt the moral high ground which has enabled them to advocate for the Responsibility 
to Protect with less reservation.  The cooperation of NGOs and international organizations and 
states suggest the consideration in greater depth of transnational or supranational forms of 
governance and of what form of governance is best suited (either from a practical or idealist 
vision) to address some of these issues.  
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Chapter Seven discusses the theory of norm entrepreneurship as a framework for taking a deeper 
look at International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGO) activities and programs.  It 
provides a description of the role of INGOs as well as early influential entrepreneurs such as 
Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham and Michael Ignatieff as a testimony to their own involvement.  
Questions pertaining to the sociopolitical issues of significance to the principle have been posed 
in the field work to those interviewed and their responses analyzed. The responses have been 
considered in order to gauge the significance of each issue as it influences the evolution of the 
norm in transnational law and any attempts to implement the principle. 
Chapter Eight continues the analysis of the responses from those being interviewed with regard 
to whether they see the Responsibility to Protect as a moral or a legal entity, a fundamental 
question with regard to its status as lex ferenda or lex lata and customary international law. It is 
the perception of those experts working with the Responsibility to Protect that I sought to assist 
in the purpose of deconstructing the evolution of the principle from an idea or concept to a legal 
norm. It also seeks the views of those interviewed on the UN and its role as either a facilitator or 
an obstruction to the implantation of the Responsibility to Protect. 
Chapter Nine presents a case study of the implementation of the norm in its most controversial 
aspect; i.e., military intervention into an internal conflict without the permission of the state. 
When I first began the work of tracing the development of the norm, no legitimate case of 
forceful implementation of the Responsibility to Protect had yet occurred.  In 2011, however, the 
Libyan revolution began and the Responsibility to Protect was invoked at the UN Security 
Council.   Resolutions 1970 and 1973 were passed which enabled forceful implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect.  Ultimately it brought down the government and brought an end to the 
conflict. The steps taken are described and the legitimacy of the action explored.  The impact of 
  30 
 
this action on the future of the Responsibility to Protect is also considered in terms of its success 
or failure. 
Chapter Ten presents the conclusions of the work, and suggests whether the principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect is likely to thrive, adapt or wither away.  It also discusses the 
responsibility of the international community when the conflict has been brought to an end 
regarding any rebuilding - perhaps even restructuring a new system of government.  The 
concluding part of the thesis, therefore, focuses on global governance (recognized as a system of 
political and social authority relationships in the exercise of power and policy) at a national, 
international, and supranational level.  In the final analysis, the place of the Responsibility to 
Protect in the governance of states after intervention and in peace building and the achievement 
of stability needs to be more rigorously addressed.  In this context the full spectrum of the 
Responsibility to Protect principle will be reviewed in terms of not only its reaction to human 
atrocities but in its prevention and rebuilding efforts.  
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Chapter Two:   History, Text and Legal Context of the Emerging Principle of 
the Responsibility to Protect 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Before delving more deeply into the analysis of the norm of the Responsibility to Protect, its 
ultimate acceptance at the UN and its subsequent evolution, it is useful for the reader to have a 
greater sense of the immediate history and context surrounding its formal approval.  The story of 
its approval commences within the context of the supremacy of state sovereignty and then moves 
toward a recognition of the concerns regarding human security and human rights in international 
affairs.  Human rights and human security concerns gradually began to shift the sovereignty of 
states away from exclusive rights over their own domain to increased responsibility to and for 
their citizens and accountability to external states and governance bodies.  This represents a 
transition of historical, legal and moral significance that has taken place since the Peace of 
Westphalia. The story proceeds with the involvement of Canada, the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the acceptance of a limited form of the 
proposed norm in 2005 in the UN by the General Assembly.   
II. Canada, the Responsibility to Protect and Human Security 
 
In this climate of concerns regarding human security, states began to seek a legitimate way to 
prevent human atrocities from occurring.  Beginning in the mid-1990s, a small group of states, as 
members of the Human Security Network (HSN), developed a foreign policy of human security.  
An enthusiastic and outspoken champion of this policy was Canada.   The Canadian government 
and its state-based human security fellows were networked, in turn, with a diverse coalition of 
  32 
 
International and Nongovernmental Organizations in what former Foreign Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy characterized as the ‘new diplomacy.’53 This eventually led to the formation of the 
ICISS, and adoption by the UN of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect.  
During Lloyd Axworthy’s term (1996 -2000) as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Canada, he 
identified “human security as encompassing three main aspects:  conflict prevention, conflict 
resolution and peace building.”54 These principles gained even greater substance in the 
Responsibility to Protect principle. Conflict prevention, for example, includes strategies such as 
mediation between potential combatants, preventive diplomacy and early warning systems. 
Conflict resolution involves intervention in ongoing conflicts including peacekeeping and other 
military forms of intervention.  Peace building refers to what happens when the conflict comes to 
an end - at the conclusion of a conflict there may be nothing or there may be peace building or 
transitional justice.  These three principles are infused in the ICISS document and illustrate how 
the principle can be seen through the larger lens of conflict resolution. (While military 
intervention is the most controversial aspect, I will in the conclusion of the thesis address the gap 
in the literature regarding conflict resolution as well as jus post bellum and peacebuilding. In 
Chapter Seven I also give thought to alternatives to intervention and what happens after the 
fighting stops).    
The Canadian foreign policy at that time contained a lot about the Human Security Agenda, 
especially in the work done under the leadership of Axworthy from January 1996 to October 
2000.  Much of the inspiration of the work comes from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the 1994 World Development Report which took the position that the 
                                                            
53 In response to Kofi Annan’s challenge to the international community to act upon future violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law. 
54 Stephen Clarkson, and Stepan Wood A Perilous Imbalance:  The Globalization of Canadian Law and Governance 
(UBC Press, Vancouver-Toronto, 2010) at 143 [Clarkson and Wood 2010].   
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primary referent of security should be shifted from the state to the individual and that human life 
and dignity should be the main concern.  (It also included within human security such elements 
as food, health, environmental and economic dimensions which are not covered in the qualified 
approval of the principle).  Security, therefore, was meant to provide a guarantee of human 
rights.  This human security agenda has been associated with the Landmines Convention 
(another Canadian initiative), the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the 
ICISS Report, as well as the Kimberley Process to control trade in blood diamonds.55  
Axworthy prioritized peace building and the ban on anti-personnel landmines in an effort to 
promote disarmament and the need for coherence in policies surrounding human security in 
“freedom from fear” as well as “freedom from want.”56 Thus, by 1999, the focus had narrowed 
to “freedom from fear” as Canada’s particular conception of human security.  Specific priorities 
focused on: protecting individuals from threats (including public safety, and terrorism); 
protecting civilians in war zones and areas of landmines; and, in extremis, military deployments 
to halt atrocities and war crimes, conflict prevention and the economic destruction of civil wars. 
This would involve accountability from the global level of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to national and local levels, as well as peace operations.57  In this context, then, the 
principle of the Responsibility to Protect was conceived and brought to life. 
 
 
                                                            
55  David R. Black, Chapter 5 ‘Mapping the Interplay of Human Security Practice and Debates:  The Canadian 
Experience” in A Decade of human security:  global governance and new multilateralisms, MacLean, David R. 
Black, Timothy M. Shaw (Aldershot, England:  Ashgate Publishing, 2005) [Maclean, Black and Shaw 2005] 56. 
56 Black 2005 ibid at 5. 
57 Black 2005 ibid. 
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III. The Report of ICISS (2001) and the Formalization of the Responsibility to Protect  
 
The principle of the Responsibility to Protect was formally conceptualized and advocated for in 
2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) with 
Canada as a major player. The Commission’s goal was to deliver “practical protection for 
ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect 
them…”.58  The doctrine represented in the ICISS Report is not solely restricted to military 
intervention for protection purposes, but  more broadly relates to the responsibility to prevent -- 
“to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises 
putting populations at risk;”  the responsibility to react -- “to respond to situations of compelling 
human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and 
international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention;” and,  the responsibility to 
rebuild -- “to provide,  particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, 
reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was 
designed to a halt or avert.”59    
The Responsibility to Prevent is regarded as the single most important principle according to the 
Commission and envisages disparate actors working together (including States, the UN, 
international financial institutions, regional organizations, and NGOs among others) to achieve 
these objectives.60  It also requires that prevention options be exhausted and less intrusive and 
coercive measures be considered in the first instance before forceful intervention options are 
contemplated. Discussion of peace talks and political solutions should be common at this stage.   
                                                            
58  ICISS Report The Responsibility to Protect (2001) supra note 6. 
59  ICISS Report ibid, p. xi. 
60   ICISS Report ibid Para. 3.36 The Report indicates it is the most important principle; however, it is not the 
portion of the report that has received the most attention and has generated the most concern.   
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As stated earlier, the most controversial aspect, however, and the one that has drawn the most 
attention, and the one that this dissertation in greater part addresses, is its provision for coercive 
intervention when human atrocities occur and no peaceful methods seem to work.  Drawing this 
line, however, is often contentious -- witness the political situation (September 2013) with 
Obama’s “red line” over the use of chemical weapons in Syria61 versus Putin’s protection of 
Russian interests in earlier Security Council resolutions and the failure of the Security Council to 
act in Syria.  
The Report recognizes the concept of sovereignty as “the legal identity of a state in international 
law” as well as the norm of non-intervention codified in the UN Charter.62  However, the Report 
also suggests that the “authority of the state is not regarded as absolute.”63  There are 
constitutional power sharing arrangements and obligations that states share as members of the 
international community.  These obligations raise questions about the principle of ‘sovereignty 
as control’ and arouse ethical questions about the importance of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ 
within the state and external to the state.64    The basic principles of the Report are, firstly, that 
state sovereignty implies responsibility and the primary responsibility for the protection of its 
people lies with the state itself; and secondly, where a population is suffering serious harm as a 
result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
principle of the Responsibility to Protect.65 
                                                            
61 News Conference at the White House August 20, 2013. 
62 ICISS Report supra note 6, para. 2.7 and 2.8. 
63 ICISS Report ibid, para. 2.14. 
64 ICISS Report ibid, para. 2.14. 
65 ICISS Report ibid, page xi.   
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This new concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ requires states to accept their responsibility 
to protect their citizens.  These principles bear some relationship to existing standards of state 
conduct with regard to human rights and humanitarian protection.  In fact, the foundations of the 
Responsibility to Protect lie in established international laws and principles “(1) obligations 
inherent in the concept of sovereignty; (2) the responsibility of the Security Council, under 
Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security; (3) 
specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and 
treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; and (4) the developing practice of 
states.”66  These rights and obligations will be outlined in greater detail later in the chapter. 
The development of the norm is not a simple one.  For example, the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect is treated differently in four main texts: i.e., the ICISS report (2001), 
the High Level Panel report (2004),67 the Report of the Secretary General (2005),68 and the 
Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit,69 the most comprehensive treatment being the 
ICISS report. The main document is the Outcome Document but the others contribute to its 
interpretation. The intent of all of these was to solve the legal and policy questions of 
humanitarian intervention.70   
The UN High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change spoke of an “emerging 
norm of a collective international responsibility to protect and linked shared responsibility 
                                                            
66 ICISS Report ibid, page xi. 
67 A More Secure World:  Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High‐Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, UN Doc A/59/565 at 56‐57, para. 201 (2004) available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/un‐reform/un‐
reform‐initiatives/highlevel‐panels/32369.htmlj [High‐Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004]. 
68 High‐Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004 ibid. 
69 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1, para. 138-39 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Outcome Document]. In 
September 2005, the concept of the responsibility to protect was incorporated into the Outcome Document at the 
high –level meeting of the General Assembly. 
70 Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect:  Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?  (2007) 101 Am. J. Int’l.  102. 
[Stahn 2007] 
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directly to the UN.” 71   The report stipulated that the Security Council can authorize military 
action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare the situation as a threat 
to international peace and security under Chapter VII.  It also called for more responsible use of 
the veto.  The Report, unlike the Commission, did not allow for coalitions of the willing and I 
have maintained this position with regard to the legitimate use of the norm. 
In March 2005 this finding was endorsed by the Report of the UN Secretary General entitled In 
Larger Freedom:  Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.  The Report of the 
Secretary General stressed the need to use diplomatic and humanitarian methods to help protect 
the human rights and well-being of civilian populations.  However, the use of force was an 
ultima ratio measure to be taken by the Security Council, if necessary. 72 
Overall, the Responsibility to Protect has two primary reference points:  the first is the ICISS 
Report (2001), and the second is the formal acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect in the UN 
Summit Outcome Document in 2005 – a qualified version of the principle proposed in the 
Report.  The Draft Negotiated Outcome document distributed on 12 September 2005 was 
approved by the UN General Assembly unanimously.  The consensual text reads: 
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity 
138 Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  This responsibility entails the prevention of 
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.  We 
accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.  The international community 
should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility and 
support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
                                                            
71 High Level Panel supra note 67. 
72 In Larger Freedom:  Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary General, 
UN Doc. A/59/2005.  
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139 The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility 
to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing an crimes against humanity.  We stress the 
needs for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law.  
We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out.  
140 We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on the 
prevention of Genocide.73 
This document was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly in its Resolution 60/1, 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document which incorporated the concept of the responsibility to 
protect. 74  Some states questioned the legal nature of the Responsibility to Protect and sought to 
frame it as a purely moral concept.75  The final text is an effort to bridge the different positions 
and to look beyond pure morality.  Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document represent 
a rather curious mixture of political and legal considerations, which reflects the continuing 
division and confusion about the meaning and nature of the concept.76     
The Security Council first referred to it in Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict. In April 2006, the UN SC reaffirmed the Responsibility to Protect and agreed to 
                                                            
73 UN Resolution (UN) General Assembly at the UN 2005 World Summit adopted a resolution embodying the 
position of forty-six heads of state.  The Resolution A/Res/60/1 (October 24, 2005) was adopted by 174 states 
represented at the summit. Richard H Cooper, and Juliette Voinov Kohler Responsibility to Protect The Global 
Moral Compact for the 21st Century  (New York :  Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) at 31 [Cooper and Kohler 2009]. 
74 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1, para. 138-39 (Oct. 24, 2005).  
75 U.S. Ambassador John Bolton wrote a letter on Aug. 30, 2005 saying the U.S would not accept that the UN or the 
Security Council or individual states had an obligation to intervene under international law.   
76 Stahn 2007 supra note 70 at 108.  UN Resolution 1674, 28 April 2006. 
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adopt appropriate measures where necessary.77 On 12 January 2009, the UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon issued a Report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) which 
helped to set the tone and direction for the principle and further contributed to its evolution in 
international law.  His Report established a framework for the implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect which has become widely known and accepted as the “three pillar 
approach.”   Pillar One represents the protection responsibilities of the State to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in 
accordance with paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome 2005.  Pillar Two is the 
commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting those obligations.   Pillar 
Three is the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive 
manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection (not necessarily by using 
force, although it does not exclude the use of force).   All three must be ready to be utilized at 
any point.78  In terms of the status of the principle, the Secretary General’s Report has 
interpretive power and has been persuasive in the eventual adoption of the norm in its legal 
context.  
In 2009 the General Assembly subsequently adopted a unanimous resolution noting the report 
and agreeing to continue consideration of the Responsibility to Protect.79 
                                                            
77 Alex J.Bellamy, and Ruben Reike, The Responsibility to Protect and International Law (2010) 2 Global 
Responsibility to Protect, 267-286 [Bellamy and Reike 2010]. See SC Res. 1674, para. 4 (April 28, 2006) 
(“reaffirm(ing) the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1 of the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
cries, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” 
78 Excerpt from the Report of the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 
January 2009 (accessed at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/SGRtoPEng%20(4).pdf 6 March 2013) 
79 UNGA Resolution A/63/L.80, 14 September 2009. 
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This development is part of a growing transformation of international law from a state 
and governing-elite based system of rules into a normative framework intended to protect 
certain human and community interests.80 
These reports issued by the UN Secretary General and certain expert bodies and subsequent 
resolutions lend some weight to the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 2005 
although the text of the Outcome Document is the most authoritative in terms of its legal value.  
Let us then consider the wider legal context for this principle.  
IV. International Law  
	
IV.I  Introduction 
 
When considering the legal status of the Responsibility to Protect, it is important to understand 
and enter the debate on international hard law (lex lata) versus soft law (lex ferenda). Much of 
the debate regarding international law versus soft law centers on a bifurcation of the two.  Most 
agree soft law (lex ferenda) is a reality and is an instrument of contemporary governance in terms 
of its effect on hard law.81  It is a recurrent (legal) practice in contemporary international society. 
Defining soft law is a task in itself.82   Goldman claims soft law functions as so-called hard law 
by operating through formalized decision-making procedures.  On the other hand, it can be 
suggested much hard law functions like soft law.  Goldman argues for an expansion of the 
concept of law to account for this.  Given some of this ambiguity and the desire to locate the 
Responsibility to Protect in international law, I will start a discussion of the common 
understandings of the important aspects of both international law and international soft law.  
                                                            
80 Stahn 2007 supra note 70.  
81 See Mathias Goldmann, We need to cut off the Head of the King:  Past, Present, and Future Approaches to 
International Soft law (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law, 335-368 [Goldmann 2012]. 
82 Jean D’Aspremont, and Tanja Aalberts, Which Future for the Scholarly Concept of Soft International Law?  25 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 330-334 [D’Aspremont and Aalberts 2012].  
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The question of whether the Responsibility to Protect norm does or can be viewed as 
international law is a muddy one and not one that can be answered with a definitive ease.  
Clearly, the Responsibility to Protect is part of the framework of international humanitarian and 
human rights law of the ICC and the Rome Statutes. There is also a tension in the literature on 
the place of International law, soft law, politics and morality in decisions at the international 
level.  I am concerned with both as in my view any foreign policy always has a political and an 
ethical component. There is no escape from the acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect as 
being a moral and political choice as well as a legal one.  Law, morality and legitimacy tend to 
be bound together when analyzing the implementation of the norm.   It would be fair to say I take 
a more eclectic approach to international law in that I borrow elements of both consensual and 
natural law theories.  
There is no central or constitutionally authorized legislature or law-making authority in 
international law.  The United Nations Charter is not a constitution – it is an international treaty 
and has no law-making powers of its own.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
‘principal judicial organ of the United Nations,’ only has jurisdiction to give advisory opinions 
and agencies and to decide cases submitted to it with the consent of the parties.   It has no power 
to create binding precedent. The UN Security Council, however, is given the power to impose 
binding measures in matters of international peace and security but can only bind member states 
that are party to the UN Charter.   
IV.2. History of International Legal Scholarship 
 
The main schools of thought in international legal scholarship are natural law and positivism and 
there have been three main periods in the evolution of international law:  the “primitive” period, 
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(scholarship pre-dating the Peace of Westphalia in 1648;) the “classical” or “traditional” period, 
(between 1648 and the close of the First World War); and the “modern” period, beginning with 
the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919. 
The ‘Primitives’ included Vitoria, Gentili, Suarez, and Grotius who posited all law could be 
deduced from some “innate, pre-existing normative order that was not dependent for its authority 
on the will of its subjects.”83  Law was pre-ordained by God or “nature” and for Vitoria and 
Suarez (Catholics) law was universal in scope.   Gentili and Grotius (Protestants) held a more 
secular view of law whereby human reason was the source of authority. Grotius (1583-1645) a 
Dutch scholar is known as the ‘father’ of modern international law.  His major work, De Jure 
Belli Ac Pacis is one of the earliest attempts to provide a systematic overview of the Laws of 
War and Peace.84  Grotius was preceded by Gentili (1552-1608) at Oxford University who wrote 
De Jure Belli (1598) and Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546) a Spanish theologian.85 Samuel 
Pufendorf followed (1632-1684), a German scholar, and suggests that natural law was the source 
or basis of international law.86 
The ‘Classical or Traditional Period’ brought a quasi-empirical approach which focused on 
behaviour which was not the result of a pre-ordained or intrinsic legal or moral order. Positivism 
asserted that “Law simply consisted of whatever was articulated as such or consented to by its 
subjects” according to the theory of consent..87   The English legal scholar, Richard Zouche, 
                                                            
83 Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 85 
84 Thomas Buergental, and Murphy, Sean 5th Edition   Public International Law in a Nutshell (West Publishing Co., 
2013) 
85 Buergental and Murphy 2013 ibid at 14‐15 
86 Buergental and Murphy 2013 ibid Samuel Pufendorf De Jure Naturna Gentium, 1672 
87 Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 88 
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(1590-1660) was one of the early positivists who looked to state practice as the source of 
international law, based on the consent of states – its subjects.88 
Modern international legal scholarship rejected the positivists and the unconditional theory of 
consent.  States instead became lawmakers, judges and executioners. 89  In the twentieth and 
twenty first century legal scholars attempted to combine both schools of positivism and natural 
law.  Positivism was used for unconventional matters while natural law was referred to in more 
difficult cases like states freedom to perpetuate human abuse against their own citizens.  This 
pick and choose approach was dubbed as ‘eclecticism.’ “Most 21st C. international lawyers and 
judges are eclectics in that they borrow for various purposes and in different contexts elements of 
both consensual and natural law theories…”90  This kind of approach also helps to unravel the 
Responsibility to Protect. 
Philosophy tries to answer the question of why it is binding by proposing it is driven by the 
human desire for order. “The law is not externally imposed but self-imposed by humanity based 
on its self-perceived needs or interests.”91   Other scholars, realists or sceptics, focus on power 
politics which marginalize the significance of binding force.  
IV.3 National Sovereignty 
 
The concept of national sovereignty is crucial to the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect 
and to the complex structure that defines the relationship between actors, ideas, norms and values 
at the international and domestic level.  The beginning of the sovereign state system has been 
conventionally associated with the Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, which brought the 
                                                            
88 Buergental and Murphy 2013 supra note 84. 
89 Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 91. 
90 Currie 2008 ibid at 94. 
91 Currie 2008 ibid at 92. 
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Thirty Years War to a close.  The two treaties that comprised the Peace, Osnabruck and Munster, 
permitted the prince to set the religion of his own territory, cuius region eius religion. 
The most important right of states is sovereignty which means “exclusive power of jurisdiction 
over territory and population, fettered only by the requirements of international law.”92 Next to 
this is equality, enshrined in the UN Charter, which means that every states possesses the same 
basic legal rights and obligations.93  States have a right to be free from intervention and a duty 
not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states.  “…aggression or the use of threat or force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state is categorically outlawed 
in the UN Charter” and in customary international law. 94  “This prohibition is considered a 
‘peremptory norm’ of international law.’’95 
The concept of sovereignty is not static or uniform and its meaning has changed over time. It   
assumes different guises in different locales.  One central tenet, however, is the right to the self-
determination of a government which began as the foundation of the right of a ruler to rule as he 
saw fit, rather than the self determination of the citizens to be ruled as they chose. Krasner, in an 
effort to clarify this complexity identifies three central aspects (or categories) of sovereignty 
which helps us to understand the significance of the shift that has occurred and the remaining 
tension between the two principles – sovereignty versus human rights and the Responsibility to 
Protect.96   
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(i) International legal sovereignty:  States mutually recognize each other but at the same 
time recognize their right to voluntarily enter into international agreements or treaties.  States are 
juridically independent territorial entities which are legally free and equal. Most international 
organizations limit membership to states.97 The Responsibility to Protect accepts this concept of 
sovereignty, but goes beyond it to establish state responsibility for its civilians and international 
responsibility for the citizens of that state if the state is failing in its duties. 
(ii)  Westphalian sovereignty, or Vattelian sovereignty:  As states are juridically independent 
and autonomous, they are not subject to any external authority.  A key corollary to this in 
international relations and law is that “one state does not have the right to intervene in the 
internal affairs of another state.”98 Each state has the right to independently determine its own 
institutions of government.99  The Responsibility to Protect clearly challenges the right of the 
institutions of government to act in violation of key international regulations and rules re its 
citizens and establishes the right of intervention.  This is a fundamental shift. 
(iii)  Domestic sovereignty refers to a state’s ability (and authority) to control activities both 
within and across its borders. It refers to the institution by which states are governed; e.g.  by 
democratic or autocratic, federal or unitary, parliamentary or presidential systems.  In addition, 
there must be a locus or final source of power. Failed states are those considered to be unable to 
govern themselves regardless of their formally legitimated authority structures.  The type of 
government, whether democratic or autocratic or other, is not intended to enter into the decision 
                                                            
97 Krasner 2009 ibid at 15. 
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making. 100  The determination of a state as ‘failed’ is very important in intervention arguments 
and is a cornerstone of the Responsibility to Protect.   
Krasner’s main interest is in sovereignty and the effect that certain situations or actions have on 
sovereignty; i.e. intervention, threats from weakened states, conflict prevention, the stabilization 
and management of weak post conflict states, and the increasingly interconnected international 
system.  These issues are also all relevant to my own work and its attempt to comprehend the 
significance of the relationship between sovereignty rights of states versus obligations of the 
state to override such rights in circumstances of extreme humanitarian crises.  The manner in 
which Krasner categorizes sovereignty emphasizes its importance to states and helps to show 
why it remains critical in international relations today.  It also emphasizes why a norm which 
allows and even obliges states to override the rights of other states in the case of humanitarian 
intervention remains so contentious and is frequently repelled.   
Vattel argued in favor of the hegemony of sovereignty when he wrote that while a nation is 
obliged to promote “the perfection of others,” it cannot force such principles on them in violation 
of their natural liberty. “Nations are absolutely free and independent.”101  Interventions did take 
place nevertheless.  An early instance of intervention in the domestic affairs of another state to 
protect civilians came about with British Prime Minister William Gladstone in the Ottoman 
Empire in 1898 (a century before the Responsibility to Protect was approved).  It was considered 
to be ‘a duty to protect the vulnerable.’  America also went to war with the Spanish Empire in 
1898 claiming its abuse of its own subjects and that the behavior was ‘shocking to the conscience 
                                                            
100 Krasner 2009 ibid. 
101 Emerich De Vattel, Principles of the Law of Nature applied to conduct and affairs of nations and sovereigns 
(Philadelphia 1852): prelim. 4. [De Vattel 1852]. 
  47 
 
of mankind.’102  The Nuremberg Trials introduced a new category of crime and the concept of 
‘crimes against humanity.’  The Charter of the UN holds ‘faith in human rights’ in its preamble.  
Humanitarian intervention has become “perhaps the most dramatic example of the new power of 
morality in international affairs.”103  
So far in the discussion of states and sovereignty we have been talking about states and their 
external and internal sovereignty and their power to operate and make decisions.  But quite often 
it is the ‘failed’ state that needs to be identified for the responsibility principle to be called into 
play.  When states fail, they are no longer able to control their own territory or internal conflict. 
Krasner points to four kinds of internal political crises that bring about state failure and 
subsequent interventions.  He categorizes these as ‘revolutionary’ wars, ethnic wars, adverse 
regime change, and genocide. Sometimes the states themselves are the perpetrators.   
Krasner refers to the many failed, weak, incompetent, or abusive national authority structures 
that exist, which limit their citizens access to social services, including health care and education, 
as well as providing for their physical security and its impact on the sovereignty of states.  He 
notes these instances weaken or threaten sovereignty as a universal norm.    Endemic violence 
often erupts with exploitative political leaders, leading to low life expectancy, economic hardship 
and even state sponsored genocide.  These poorly governed states can generate conflicts that spill 
across international borders, where transnational criminal and terrorist networks can flourish, 
posing threats to international peace and security. 104   
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In recent years we have seen, through the Arab Spring uprisings and large revolts against 
oppressive leaders, efforts by citizens to gain freedom and democracy and to establish their 
human rights.  Such efforts have frequently led to further repression and subsequent violence and 
questions of intervention.  In fact, a clear cut case of the implementation of the doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect in Libya was prompted by such a revolt and will be presented and 
analyzed in Chapter Six as a case study in the Responsibility to Protect.  
 
IV.4 International Legal Personality:  The Subjects of International Law 
 
Many international institutions have legal personality and can exercise legal powers on the 
international plane, including the UN and specialized agencies of the UN, as well as the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU).  
A subject or person is an entity which possesses international rights and duties and has the 
capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.105 States and organizations are 
the normal persons on the international plane.  Various entities, including non-self-governing 
peoples and the individual, have a certain personality.  States and some organizations have legal 
personality with respect to making claims for breaches of international law, making treaties and 
agreements and privileges from national jurisdictions, but the primary subjects of international 
law are states.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its landmark Advisory Opinion in the 
Reparations Case defined the criteria for international legal personality as a subject of 
international law. 106  The Court stated that a subject of international law is “capable of 
                                                            
105Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law Seventh Edition (Oxford:  Oxford University Press 2005)  at 
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106 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.  Advisory Opinion [1949]  I.C.J. Rep. 174. 
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possessing international rights and duties, and…has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims.”107 
Individuals traditionally existed only “as an object, rather than a subject, of international law,”108 
with no international legal rights nor legal obligations.  However, certain rules of conduct in 
times of armed conflict have emerged for the protection of individuals (such as civilians, 
combatants, prisoners of war, the sick and wounded, and so on).  These codes of conduct are 
regarded as directly binding upon individuals and not merely the states.  International criminal 
law is concerned not only with violations by individuals of the laws of armed conflict but also 
other large scale atrocities such as crimes against humanity and genocide.  Thus international 
criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court have been established to prosecute 
individuals accused of large scale atrocities. 109 
IV.5 The United Nations 
 
The United Nations came into being with the entry into force on October 24, 1945 of the UN 
Charter – a multilateral treaty that serves as the UN ‘constitution.’  At the time of its conception, 
it had a membership of 51 states, although there are now many more.110  The UN is an 
international organization both in terms of its membership and the purposes it is designed to 
advance.  It is charged with peacekeeping; developing friendly relations between states; and 
international cooperation regarding economic, social, cultural, humanitarian and human rights 
concerns.111 
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108 Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 73. 
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IV.5.1 The Legal Regime of the United Nations Charter 
 
The UN Charter and the Security Council are critical to the development and implementation of 
the Responsibility to Protect. The Charter has equipped the UN with organs and tasks and 
charged it with the maintenance of peace and security and cooperation in solving problems. It 
has international legal personality but it is not a State nor a super state, but rather is a “subject of 
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties.” 112 It has capacity to 
maintain its rights by bringing international claims.  
In the Advisory Opinion in the Reparation case…The International Court held 
unanimously that the UN was a legal person with capacity to bring claims against both 
member and non-member state for direct injuries to the Organization.113 
Generally parties to a treaty are the only ones bound by it.  However, the UN Charter provides an 
exception in accordance with the UN responsibility for peace and security.   
The Organization shall ensure under general international law that States which are not 
members of the UN act in accordance with principles so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.114 
 
IV.5.2 The Prohibition of Force 
 
The UN Charter’s Prohibition of Force and Customary International Law 
Article 2 of the UN Charter binds the members to:  
a) settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner the 
international peace and security and justice are not endangered;115  
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113 ICJ Reports (1949), 184‐5, 187. 
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b) “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.”116  
The collective right of self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter) was agreed to in general 
international law but it was given express recognition in Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51 of 
the Charter provides the right of a Member to self-defence.117   Article 51 reserves the right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occur against a member of the UN until 
the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security. This is 
seen as an inherent right.118  
The International Court indicated two conditions for the lawful use of self-defence: 1) the victim 
state must declare itself as a victim and 2) the second condition is that the wrongful act must 
constitute “armed attack.” 119 
…when the United States Expeditionary Force began military operations against Iraq in 
March 2003, the letter to the Security Council of 20 March relied upon Security Council 
resolutions as the putative legal basis of the action, rather than the principles of general 
international law.120   
 
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force against any state, not only member states.  
The prohibition against the use of force also exists in customary international law in the Friendly 
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Doc/5/2003/352. 
  52 
 
Relations Declaration, a UN General Assembly resolution adopted in 1970121  which repeats this 
prohibition). 122  According to the International Law Commission, the general prohibition on the 
use of force, “a universally applicable customary rule, [it] is also a rule of jus cogens, or a 
peremptory norm of international law – one from which no derogation is permitted.”123  
The Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN make recommendations and 
decisions relating to specific issues, which involves the application of general international law.  
Such practice “has considerable legal significance.”124   There is no compulsory regulation or 
system review required by external bodies to allocate responsibility.  General international law, 
however, provides criteria to which an international organization may be held to be unlawful.  
Also, particular acts may be deemed void if they are contrary to a principle of jus cogens (rules 
so fundamental to the legal order they cannot be set aside by treaty; peremptory norms, non 
derogable).125 
V. Sources of International Law 
 
The fact that there is no law-making authority at the international level begs the question of what 
the sources of international law are.  In a sense, normal sources such as a constitution or legislative 
enactment, do not exist in international law.  As a substitute, the general consent of states creates rules of 
general application which become custom in international law. What is necessary is evidence of the 
existence of consensus among states concerning particular rules or practice.  This being the case, the thesis 
will examine certain decisions as material evidence of the attitude of states toward the Responsibility to 
                                                            
121 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
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Protect, assessing how often it has been recognized and the resulting impact. An accumulation of the 
Resolutions (as will be discussed in Chapter Eight) invoking the Responsibility to Protect helps the norm to 
gain in uniformity, consistency and custom.  
True sources of international law are those sources or rules to which states are willing to subject 
their sovereignty.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established in 1945 as the judicial 
organization of the UN:  Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice covers 
the following sources or rules to which states are willing to subject their sovereignty which are 
considered to be the most authoritative: 
A.  International ‘conventions or treaties,’ whether general or particular;  certain types of 
customary rules (jus cogens) cannot be displaced by treaty; 
B. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
C. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
D. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of various 
nations (scholarly writing) are considered as law finding, but not law making. “This 
distinction is frequently referred to as the difference between “formal” (law-creating) 
sources and “material” or ‘evidentiary’ (law-finding) sources…”126  
Some say Article 38.1 generally supports the positivist theory of consent.  Some conclude there 
is a hierarchical order; others do not.  Most agree, however, that the two principal sources are 
treaties and custom and general principles and judicial decisions play only a secondary role. 
Law-making treaties, the conclusions of international conferences, resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly, and drafts adopted by the International Law Commission as drafts have a direct 
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influence on the content of the law.  What we do have in relation to the Responsibility to Protect 
is an ample amount of scholarly writing which seeks to find the law-creating aspect of the 
principle. It is in soft law and in these judicial decisions and the scholarly writing and material or 
evidentiary sources that we will find evidence of the Responsibility to Protect’s legal nature 
along with formal sources which form the basis for international humanitarian law and human 
rights law. Let us examine these four sources more closely. 
V.1 International Conventions and Treaties 
Treaties that create general norms for the future conduct of the parties with the same 
requirements for all create law.  The Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 are examples of 
this type of treaty.  The widespread ratification of a treaty can bring into existence a rule of 
customary international law by which case all states, not only those  party to the treaties, become 
bound by the rule. “Accompanied by opinio juris and a degree of generality, the treaty can have 
the effect of creating a new, corresponding customary international norm.”127 Treaties set out 
clear and precise obligations.  
For example, Article 1 of the Genocide Convention provides that the “Contracting Parties 
confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law.”  “Such language is evidence of what a group of states considers customary 
international law to be.”128  While the UN Charter is in fact a treaty, the Responsibility to Protect 
cannot be considered so.   
V.1.1 Customary international law 
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Customary international law arises from the sustained conduct of states which they themselves 
believe (for whatever reason) to be legally required. “…customary international law, unlike 
treaties, is with very few exceptions universally binding.  It is thus a common basis for 
international legal relations among all states.”129 Rapid change in the law does not occur in 
customary law and is frequently the object of profound disagreement.  Customary international 
law involves rules and principles which bind all states whether or not they agreed to them in the 
first instance.  International Custom may be defined as k“A general recognition among states of a 
certain practice as obligatory.”130    
Customary international law continues to be widely accepted along with treaties “as one of the 
two principal sources of international law.” 131  Customary international law is universally 
binding on all states.  No particular duration of practice is required and a long practice is not 
essential to establish international law. What is most important is uniformity and consistency of 
the practice.  Complete uniformity is also not required, nor is universality.132  There is also no 
threshold number of examples of state practice required to achieve this level of customary law.   
Each instance is evaluated independently according to the meaning attributed to it so that 
sufficient general practice is on a case to case basis.  An issue of interest to a large number of 
states such as the use of force requires participation by many states.  
Two actions are necessary before a rule of customary international law, however, can be said to 
exist: 1) state practice – the material or objective element of customary international law visible 
in the general and uniform behavior of states; and 2) opinio juris sive necessitates (or opinio 
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juris) – the action of the state is only considered legally significant if it is accompanied by a 
belief on the part of the state that it is legally obligatory.133    
(a) Opinio juris sive necessitates requires the sense of legal obligation as the basis of evidence of 
a general practice or consensus in the literature.as opposed to motives of “courtesy, fairness, or 
morality.”134  Opinio juris sive necessitates was coined in 1899 as the subjective element of 
custom.135  In the case of Nicaragua v. United States (Merits) the Courts stated that not only must 
the acts concerned ‘amount to a settled practice’ but they must be accompanied by the opinio 
juris sive necessitates for a new customary rule to be formed.136  The need for such a belief, i.e. 
the existence of a subjective element, must be implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive 
necessitates.”137 
Motive being difficult to establish with regard to the opinio juris requirement,  the Courts rely on 
the express views of states themselves which can often be found in “government press 
statements, conferences, summit reports and speeches before UN bodies and government 
statements in national legislatures and so on.”138  Such statements and reports as they concern the 
Responsibility to Protect are presented in the thesis, particularly in an attempt to establish the 
intention behind the use of the norm. 
By looking at practice and UN resolutions later in the thesis regarding the Responsibility to 
Protect, we will consider its place under international customary law. The Security Council of 
the UN was intended for implementation of the Responsibility to Protect rather than 
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implementation by means of unilateral activity which would violate the fundamental principle of 
the sovereign equality of states and the principle that no state can dictate the law to another. 
Custom may be achieved as long as  
a sufficient number of states adhere to a given practice and opinio juris is present and 
states are acting from a sense of legal obligation (and the other requirements of 
customary international law are met).  If that is the case,  a corresponding rule of 
international law can be said to exist that binds all states, not merely those engaging in 
the practice.”139  
Further, the practice according to the Court need not be in absolute rigorous conformity with the 
rule in order to establish customary law.   Instances of State conduct may be inconsistent with a 
given rule and are generally treated as breaches of that rule, not as a new rule.140    
(b) Jus Cogens. Doctrinal and judicial opinion both support the notion that there are certain 
overriding principles of international law, forming a body of jus cogens (“rules of customary law 
which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent 
customary rule of contrary effect.”) 141  The least controversial are the prohibition against the use 
of force, the law of genocide and crimes against humanity.142 A peremptory norm of general 
international law is defined as a “norm accepted and recognized by the international community 
of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”143   
The concept of jus cogens (or peremptory norms) first appeared in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT)144 where it as defined as a ‘norm accepted’ – recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
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and which can be modified only by subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.” (Art. 53 VCLT) Today jus cogens is regarded as a general definition in 
international law.145  
For a norm to be considered jus cogens it must meet the following three conditions: 
1. Must be a norm of general international law which makes it binding for a great majority 
of states; 
2. Must be accepted and recognized as non derogable by the international community of 
states.  The vast majority of states must bind a minority; and  
3. No derogation is permitted from the peremptory norm.  Deviation is not generally 
accepted.  
States cannot undertake actions which go against the norm of jus cogens.  Jus cogns comes at the 
top of a hierarchy of norms in international law. 
For example, in the ICJ Advisory opinion concerning reservations to the Genocide Convention, 
the Court emphasized the binding character of the prohibition of genocide, even on a state that 
did not subscribe to the Convention.  It determined since the peremptory character of an 
international norm has important legal consequences, the exact content of the prohibition of 
genocide needs to be established.  The main aspect of the peremptory prohibition of genocide is 
the bar on derogation from it in treaties or customary international law.146  
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(c) An obligation erga omnes. The concept of obligations erga omnes first appeared in the 
Barcelona Traction Case before the ICJ.147 In the famous obiter dictum the Court held that 
“obligations toward the international community as a whole (obligation erga omnes) exist, in 
which all states have a legal interest in their protection in light of the importance of the rights 
involved.”148  
There is some relationship between the norms of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes in the 
case law.  Wording used in the Barcelona Traction Case refers to Article 53 VCLT.  Both refer to 
the international community as a whole and in his separate opinion Judge AMMOUN mentioned 
jus cogens linked to the concept of obligations erga omnes.149 
Also in the Furun Zija Case, “the ICTY held that the prohibition of torture is an obligation erga 
omnes and a peremptory norm of general international law.”150  “…while jus cogens deals with 
the hierarchy of norms and international public order, obligation erga omnes refer to the 
enforcement of these peremptory norms.”151 Violations of peremptory norms and obligations 
erga omnes allow states not directly concerned to bring action against the offending state before 
the ICJ.  “…every State of the international community has an interest in the legal protection of 
rights and obligations which by their content are the fundamental rules of the international 
community.”152 When such a rule is violated, even if they are not directly affected it endangers 
the legal interests of every member.  Before countermeasures are taken every avenue provided 
under international law should be taken and the measure should be legitimate and proportion to 
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the original wrong.  Also, third states should not be injured.  States are usually cautious, 
however, not to take illegal counter measures and therefore usually only react in clear cut cases 
of breach such as genocide or aggression.153 
States that are not directly affected by a breach can bring a case before the ICJ if it can establish 
a basis for jurisdiction or though other countermeasures.  Part of the ‘weakness’ of soft laws is 
the inability to take countermeasures against states not agreeing to the invocation of the 
Responsibility to Protect. 
A.  General Principles of Law:  Article 38(1)(c) 
According to Brownlie, questions are often raised about whether “general principles” refers to 
international or domestic law.  He suggests General Principles of international Law refer to  
“rules of customary law, to general principles of law as in Article 38(1) (c)or from judicial 
decisions on the basis of existing international law and municipal analogies.”154   According to 
Currie, domestic systems of law are often used for inspiration in formulating international laws 
and ‘principles of law’ generally refer to general principles of domestic law rather than general 
principles of international law.155  
Modern international law relies less on general principles of law as a source of law but they are 
still used to fill gaps, primarily for procedural matters.156  
V.1.2 Judicial Decisions and Scholarly Writing 
                                                            
153 Wouters and Verhoeven, 2005 ibid at 415, 
154 Brownlie 2005 supra note 105 at 19. 
155 Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 101. 
156 Buergental and Murphy 2013 supra note 84.   
  61 
 
The International Court of Justice or bodies such as the World Trade Organizations or the 
International Criminal Court or other international tribunals tend to be relied upon in determining 
what law is.157 While judgments and scholarly writings on international law may be relied upon 
to understand or even discover the content of international law, they do not in themselves 
“create” the law.   
The material sources of evidence include diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press 
releases, opinions of office legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, drafts produced by 
the International Law Commission, state legislation, judicial decisions (international and 
national), patterns of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organizations, and 
resolutions relating to legal issues in the UN General Assembly.158  The Writing of Publicists 
includes the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations or ‘la 
doctrine.’  Such a source only constitutes evidence of the law but can be influential.159  As 
suggested, the review of such documents later in the thesis provides a rich source in 
understanding the legal status of the Responsibility to Protect.  
More recently, resolutions and similar acts of international organizations have acquired “a very 
significant status both as sources and as evidence of international law.  This is true with regard to 
some Security Council resolutions.”160  If a UNGA resolution is adopted unanimously or by an 
overwhelming majority, which includes the major powers of the world, and if it is reported in 
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subsequent resolutions over a period of time and relied upon by states in other contexts, it may 
well have become declaratory of international law.161 
VI. International Human Rights Law  
 
Some of the features of the Responsibility to Protect are imbedded in contemporary international 
human rights law (IHRL).162  Hugo Grotius maintained it would be just to resort to war to 
prevent a state from maltreating its own subjects.163 John Locke viewed the relationship between 
the state and its citizens as one of “trust.”164  “The most influential modern representatives of this 
tradition of ‘conscience’ as the enemy of sovereignty are the international human rights and 
criminal law movements.”165  The claim to be representing humanity strengthens the authority of 
new actors and justifies the use of force which is one of the reasons the moral or ethical element 
of the Responsibility to Protect principle arises frequently in the literature.   
International human rights law “is a set of rules established by convention or custom, codified in 
international treaties and national bills of rights and focuses on the protection of the 
individual.”166  It applies in times of war and peace.167 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) spells out the right to life, liberty and 
security of person and bans torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and slavery.  The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) obliges state parties to respect and 
ensure the rights to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. 
Human rights law sits as a challenge to international laws concerned with the rights of states and 
sovereignty. 168   One of the most significant developments in international law since the Peace of 
Westphalia has been the growth of human rights along with the prohibition of the unilateral use 
of force.  The fundamental principles of human rights form part of customary or general 
international law.169  Human rights rose mainly in the work of legal philosophers such as John 
Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montesquieu and others.170 Later on the horrors of the Second 
World War of what some states did to their own populations led to the placing of provisions for 
human rights in the UN Charter.  This placed human rights at the centre of the international 
agenda, giving importance to the rights of individuals as well as states.171 
1) The first stage was a draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was later 
adopted. 
2) The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the form of a resolution of 
the General Assembly was widely regarded as a first step toward the preparation of a 
Covenant that would be in the form of a treaty.” In 1966 the GA adopted the 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which came into legal 
force as treaties constituting a detailed codification of human rights.172  
The premise of international human rights law is that individuals have basic rights that are 
recognized.  Implementation and enforcement remains underdeveloped, however, and there is a 
lack of robust enforcement mechanisms. 173  In this way lex lata operates more like lex ferenda. 
Human rights range from torture and fair trial to the third generation of rights (the right to 
economic development and the right to health).  The UN Charter provides the baseline for human 
rights. Article 55 states that the UN shall promote… “universal respect for and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all…” and Article 56 requires all members to pledge 
themselves “to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the 
achievement of the purpose as set forth in Article 55.”174  
The Security Council began to use its power for peacekeeping and on the basis of Chapter VII of 
the Charter to provide humanitarian assistance through such mechanisms as the creation of safe 
areas and forceful protection of those areas. There is a lack of enforcement mechanisms, 
however, in the UN, although it can recommend sanctions.  The lack of enforcement 
mechanisms can lead to failure of the intention to protect.   
UN efforts to codify human rights led to two International Covenants adopted by the GA on 10 
December 1948. The Commission on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights established by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defines the nature and 
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extent of human rights.  While not legally binding as such, the Declaration provides evidence of 
the acceptance of certain principles as principles of customary or general international law. 175 
The main corpus of human rights standards consists of an “accumulated code” of multilateral 
standard-setting conventions.  One of the four general categories is the conventions dealing with 
specific wrongs, such as genocide, torture or racial discrimination.176   The domestic legal 
systems of the State Parties to the given convention are the vehicles of implementation which are 
monitored in the form of reports.177  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Optional Protocol)178 allowed for 
direct complaints by individuals.  In response to apartheid was the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1966,179 the Genocide Convention 
(1966) and the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) 180.  These 
were followed by the Convention against Torture (1984)181 and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1989)182 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities183 and the 
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance.184 
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A state violates human rights and international law if it practices, condones or encourages any of 
the following atrocities:   genocide, slavery or slave trade, the murder or causing the 
disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, or a consistent 
pattern of gross violation of the internationally recognized human rights.185 
VII. International Humanitarian Law (Laws of War) and Humanitarian Intervention 
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) is the branch of international law that regulates armed 
conflict (jus in bello).  The objective of these laws is to limit the effects of armed conflict on and 
alleviate the suffering of persons who are not participating in the hostilities or are no longer 
involved.  It does so through the use of restrictions on the means and methods of warfare.  It 
includes the Geneva and the Hague Conventions as well as certain treaties, case law and 
customary international law.  The Geneva Convention186  and the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907 were drawn up as treaties relating to war and conflict.187 
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Both international humanitarian law and human rights law are intended to protect the life, health 
and dignity of human beings.  Whereas international humanitarian law applies only in times of 
armed conflict, human rights law applies in times of both war and peace. 
In the 19th C. war was often represented as a last resort; that is, as a form of dispute settlement.188  
This is the view adopted by the League of Nations Covenant drawn up in 1919.   The General 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War was established (often referred to as the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact) in 1928 as a legally binding multi-lateral treaty.  The Kellogg-Briand Pact comes into 
prominence as the foundation of the State practice and the background to the formation of 
customary law.  International legal rules governing the use of armed force by states is a twentieth 
century development which is closely related to the establishment of the United Nations and the 
UN Security Council.  Rules such as jus ad bellum (‘right to war’) and jus in bello (‘law in war’) 
determine the manner in which armed force may be used.  These rules constitute another body of 
law.   
St. Augustine of the early fifth century has generally been credited with injecting the Roman 
“just war” theory into early Christian theological doctrine.  For St. Augustine, conquest can be 
justified under certain conditions. Saint Augustine purported that an act of war requires a just 
cause189 while Thomas Hobbes saw war as a necessary evil for states to protect their citizens.190 
St. Thomas Aquinas, eight centuries later, argued that ‘just war’ required an (objective) just 
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cause and (subjective) right intention.191  De Vattel in the eighteenth century and other writers 
placed ‘just war’ theories in the status of moral, rather than legal considerations.192 
Hugo Grotius On the Laws of War and Peace argued war was only to be used in self-defence and 
that peace is a natural state for human beings. 193 Pre-1945,  Chesterman observes the origins of 
humanitarian intervention can be traced to the concept of a just war put forward by the jurist 
Hugo Grotius  and the emerging legal restraints being placed on states ‘entering into a society of 
eq105uals.’  These and others laid the basis for today’s international morality.  After the Treaty 
of Versailles, sovereign states became the major players in the international arena and national 
interests tended to take precedence over broader international concerns.  Regulations also 
developed, however, for codes of behavior decreeing war; for example the Lieber Code which 
helped to found the Red Cross.194  
This brings international law into to the realm of international morality.195  With regard to the 
writings of Emmerich de Vattel and Christian Wolff, Chesterman argues that by the early 
twentieth century the Vattelians and the modern doctrine of non-intervention had won out over 
the Grotians.196  In addition peaceful means of resolving conflict were strengthened by the 
League of Nations Covenant197 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.198  There are prohibitions against 
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the use of armed force in the covenant of the League of Nations, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928.  Prosecutions at Nuremburg of German leaders were founded on the principles of UN 
Charter article 2(4) which states that “all members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state... ” Article 2(3) requires that members settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.199  
Chesterman again asserts there is essentially no coherent body of law200  that can or does exist 
for the international system. 201  While he accepts that bodies of international law may develop in 
specific issue areas, there is no overall authority that is legitimate; i.e. accepted by the relevant 
parties.  Not even the rule of sovereignty itself can control the behaviour of states.   
Keith claims that international law determines the body of law governing the right of a state to 
use armed force against one another – jus ad bellum – and the body of law governing the manner 
in which states and individual may engage once armed conflict begins – jus in bello.   Keith also 
argues “the legality or illegality of the right to use force has no consequence for the application 
of international law.” What prevails is international humanitarian law.202  As Chesterman notes, 
existing treaty law on the use of force does not permit military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes.203  According to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, the use of force is illegal.  
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Qualifications to this rule, however, are made in the name of self-defence (Article 51) or 
collective security (in which case the Security Council may authorize the use of force if it does 
so explicitly through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII).  Nevertheless, legal analysts 
themselves often disagree on the status of the law in particular actions and whether new 
exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force have emerged.204 Some legal scholars have 
suggested that UN Article 2(4) of the Charter could support the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes if it did 195not violate the ‘territorial integrity or political independence’ of the target 
state (narrowly defined) or by consideration of the objectives related to human rights and 
freedom listed in Article 1(3) .  However, this argument does not overcome the UN Charter’s 
purpose: “to delegitimize individual acts of war by vesting sole authority for the nondefensive 
use of force in the Security Council.” 205 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.  Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported by the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.206   
These provisions are the substance of debates on the question of force for humanitarian purposes 
(humanitarian intervention); e.g. Kosovo and the pre-emptive or precautionary use of force as an 
act of self-defence and Bush and Iraq.  The Kosovo case and other similar situations (Uganda, 
Rwanda, and Somalia) led to the Canadian Government’s development of the Commission on 
the Responsibility to Protect and introduced the shift from right to responsibility and from 
intervention to protection.  Kosovo and Iraq will be presented later in this chapter as examples of 
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humanitarian intervention which have been labelled wrongly as examples of the Responsibility 
to Protect (being in fact neither legal nor legitimate cases of its implementation). 
VIII. Soft Law  
 
Up to this point we have been mainly talking about the sources of lex lata or “hard law” and I 
have referenced the Responsibility to Protect as ‘soft law’.  This is consistent with the many 
legal scholars who distinguish between lex lata (“hard law”) and lex ferenda (“soft law”).  Lex 
lata refers to those laws included in the formal sources (as cited above) of binding international 
law which provide  
a reservoir of evidence of state practice, opinio juris, or general principles, rather than a 
formal source of law in itself. This evidence can then be called upon to support an 
argument that some new norm is emerging or has emerged and should therefore be 
recognized as lex lata or hard law in accordance with the requirements of the formal 
sources of law reviewed above.207  
Currie et al describe the concept of “soft law” as “principles with potentially great political, 
practical, humanitarian, moral, or other persuasive authority, but which do not strictly speaking 
correspond to extant legal obligations or rights.”208 
As stated earlier, draft multilateral law-making treaties are generally considered as hard law.  
Most important to this discussion, however, is that UN General Assembly resolutions are 
generally not seen to have binding force of their own but purport to be “declaratory” of 
international law.  Codes of conduct prepared by UN organs, reports, official communiqués or 
declarations and statements of principles which emerge from the work of non-governmental 
organizations, academic institutions, and think tanks such as those already presented in the 
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description of the development of the Responsibility to Protect can generally be seen as ‘soft 
law’ or lex ferenda.  In addition, “the International Law Commission (ILC), an international 
commission of jurists established in 1947 by the UN General Assembly, is an important source 
of lex ferenda.” 209  In many fields of international law – such as environment, human rights, 
trade and arms control –important principles and nonbinding norms are contained in resolutions 
or other decisions of states and intergovernmental organizations.”210 
Soft law remains controversial because some international practitioners do not accept its 
existence.  However, for most international practitioners, development of soft law is necessary to 
the work of the international legal system.  Soft law instruments also hold much potential for 
morphing into hard law.  In this case non treaty agreements are intended to have a direct 
influence on the practice of states and if successful may lead to customary law.  Soft law is also 
convenient for good faith negotiations.  It is also more flexible in avoiding uncompromising 
commitments made under treaties.  It is also faster than the slow development of customary law.  
In addition and of importance to the development of the Responsibility to Protect, soft laws are 
useful to NGOs, organizations and courts to influence governments with frequent usage till they 
begin to resemble legal norms.211 
In principle a breach of a legal obligation gives rise to responsibility in international law, 
whether the obligation rests on treaty, custom or some other basis. The responsibility of states 
may be identified in the context of resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN and in a 
number of judicial settings. “The law may require compensation for the consequences of ‘legal’ 
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or ‘excusable’ acts as well as illegal acts.”212  Objective tests are usually applied to the breach to 
determine responsibility.  
In spite of well-developed rules, there are insufficient enforcement measures or institutions to 
implement them and controversies remain even in the case of established law, rendering recourse 
mostly theoretical.    It is not only soft law such as is the current nature of the Responsibility to 
Protect that relies on the will of states.  Implementing human rights remains as one of the 
greatest challenges to this area of international law, and thus remains at the root of difficulties in 
establishing the Responsibility to Protect as a legal norm.213 
It is important nevertheless that legal obligations regarding human rights are almost universally 
accepted.  There is widespread reliance on the Universal Declaration, the covenants and the other 
specialized universal human rights treaties.  At the same time, serious breaches under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter only are dealt with coercively by the Security Council on a very selective 
basis.   Ad hoc geopolitics with little regard for human rights often interfere with the ability of 
the UN to apply human rights law. 214  These power politics can overshadow the legal standards 
of human rights and the matter of enforcement or the agreed-upon Responsibility to Protect 
principle which continues to prove critical to the protection of civilians.215 
Soft law may evidence the formation of customary law, guide the interpretation of treaties, 
authorize the actions of international organizations such as the agreement in the Outcome 
Document re the Responsibility to Protect, and give rise to ‘good faith’ duties such as a duty to 
consider. Soft laws also have the advantage of testing some rules before concluding a treaty.   As 
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indicated, the breach of soft law, however, does not entail the same legal consequences as 
binding international law or lex lata.   
Although some soft law is relegated to political or moral rules that are abstract and general, 
Goldmann makes the point that they often resemble much more a refined legal regime.216  He 
suggests soft law can more be seen as a governance instrument which acts as a functioning 
equivalent to binding international law.217   Perhaps this is an exaggeration of the force of soft 
law, particularly in the case of the Responsibility to Protect which is subject to the Security 
Council veto.  The continued ambiguity of the Responsibility to Protect as soft law is part of the 
need for a recognition of the connection between law and legitimacy when it comes to justifying 
the authority of certain actions.  
The next chapter discusses the importance of human security to the development of the 
Responsibility to Protect after the Cold War and the International Criminal Court (ICC).  It also 
introduces the controversies that surround the notion of forcible intervention and the Laws of 
War and humanitarian intervention.  The Chapter also clarifies the legal foundation of the 
Responsibility to Protect in the four crimes:  war crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic 
cleansing.  While I have argued the Responsibility to Protect is moving toward hard law, 
legitimacy arguments are often important to support its legal status (see Chapter Nine on the 
legitimacy of the Libyan intervention).  Because of the difficulty in establishing the exact legal 
nature of the Responsibility to Protect, the Chapter outlines the peace of legitimacy arguments as 
distinct from legal determinations. 
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Chapter Three:  The Bedrock of the Responsibility 
 to Protect -- Legality and Legitimacy 
 
I. Human Peace and Security 
 
In my view, one of the primary and necessary principles at the heart of the Responsibility to 
Protect debate is that of ‘human security’ as was referred to in Chapter Two regarding the 
creation of the ICISS Report.  The principle of human security is not viewed by all in the 
international environment in the same way, or with the same degree of importance, however.  
One of the confounding issues is that international institutions tend to be intergovernmental with 
states that are politically as well as culturally diverse.  Nevertheless, the human security 
paradigm shift requires a common principle involving cooperation, governance and diplomacy at 
the transnational level. In fact, it is within this need for commonality and cooperation that many 
of the impediments to the progress of the Responsibility to Protect principle lie. I am adamant, 
for instance, that if the Responsibility to Protect principle is to be successfully implemented in 
country specific situations, it requires not one nation, or even a group of nations, but broad and 
effective global cooperation and institutional governance.  Such cooperation cannot be developed 
without some form of universality. If states act solely in their self-interest and/or unilaterally, the 
threshold for agreement and legitimacy is diminished. Cooperation is essential to protect against 
one or a few states taking action outside the confines of the UN Security Council if the action is 
to be considered legitimate.  The question of legitimacy will be exemplified further when we 
look at some unilateral interventions which have taken place outside of the UN umbrella. 
The human security discourse has provided a context for the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.  
The term “human security” is not new and was used in the first instance by the United Nations 
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during the early 1990s.  The significance of this concept is its recognition of the importance of 
individual rights in addition to the rights of the sovereign state.  The concept has been recognized 
in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various conventions, 
including the Genocide Conventions and the Geneva Convention to name a few, and thus is well 
established.218   Human security recognizes human beings as distinct from the ‘state.’  Narrower 
interpretations of the concept apply to the protection of civilians in conflict zones.219  The most 
authoritative expression of the concept of human security appears in the UN Human 
Development Report (UNDP, 1994) which refers to “safety from climate threats as hunger, 
disease and repression, as well as protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns 
of daily life.”220 The UNDP Report acknowledges that state-centric analysis is no longer 
sufficient to deal with transnational threats. “Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, 
terrorism, ethnic disputes, and social disintegration are no longer isolated events that are 
confined within national borders.  Their consequences travel the globe.”221 It is the tension 
between these two concepts (responsibility and sovereignty) that frequently leads to conflicting 
positions and acts as an impediment to the endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect. 
 In the Commission’s Report, it specifically states that human security goes beyond state security 
to include individual security to civilians within the state.  “Human security means the security 
of the people – their physical safety, their economic and social wellbeing, respect for their 
dignity and worth as human beings, and protection of their human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms.”222 One of the issues at the centre of the human security debate and at the core of my 
analysis is whether states are still the key agents of response.  Although sovereignty has been 
central to international law and international relations, new global realities have aroused 
concerns in the ‘global community’ about states’ ability to govern their internal and external 
affairs. While sovereignty and non-intervention have been inextricably linked, human rights 
issues have increasingly gained prominence in decisions regarding intervention in State’s affairs.  
The ICISS Report represents changes in international norms where a state’s right to ‘non-
intervention’ is contingent to some degree on its ability to protect its citizens from ethnic 
cleansing, mass killing and other human atrocities.223  
As a result, the shift that occurred from the Cold War’s protection of the territorial integrity of 
the state toward the individual as the basic referent of security underlies the Responsibility to 
Protect Commission’s Report.  The acceptance of the Report was qualified in that it particularly 
did not include such human conditions as disease but was instead narrowed to four specific areas.  
This acceptance represents a change in values and practice in international society.224  People 
become the focus, rather than the State.  The intent was to empower people.  The Commission on 
Human Security Report, Human Security Now, focused on protection and empowerment.225  The 
Responsibility to Protect Report suggested that inaction in conflict situations such as Srebenica 
and Rwanda renders the rest of the world ‘complicit bystanders in massacre, ethnic cleansing, 
and even genocide’ and refers to  “gross and systemic violations of human rights that offend 
every precept of our common humanity.”226  This is the strength of the conviction needed for 
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states to take action to proceed and, while I may not agree with the United States’ willingness to 
act alone and to take unilateral military action in the face of the Syrian government’s chemical 
attack on its own people, I fully support and understand Obama’s outrage.227  It is just such an 
appalling situation that the international community committed itself to ensuring would never be 
permitted to happen again.    
When we consider in the thesis the need for acceptance of such a principle, one question will be 
what motivates states or national and other participants in the international community to move 
from self-interest based decisions to perhaps more moral precepts concerning the ‘other’ in the 
absence of hard law?  One answer may lie in the Commission’s Report itself in its reference to 
moral outrage.  And then, at what point does that outrage occur and what are the standards or 
guidelines that must be used to make a decision to intervene on the basis of reason? I investigate 
in the thesis how legitimate decisions are made in the context of the Security Council and the P5 
veto. 
II. The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
 
In human rights and humanitarian law, people become the focus, rather than the State. At a 
conference presented by the Responsibility to Protect Center for International Human Rights at 
Northwestern University School of Law in 2008, participants argued that the United States 
should more actively participate in the International Criminal Court and in a hybrid legal system. 
Whitley, rapporteur on the conference, noted: 
As a new and emerging framework in interstate relations, R2P is grounded in the rule of 
law that builds on the international legal and judicial systems. It is not, however, a legal 
                                                            
227Lee Ann Goodman, “Obama Urges Americans to Support Him to Punish Syria” Canadian Press, September 10, 
2013 http://globalnews.ca/news/832317/obama-assads-use-of-chemical-weapons-caused-him-to-reconsider-us-
involvement-in-syria/ (accessed September 11, 2013). 
  79 
 
construct that imposes legal responsibility on States or international organizations that 
fail to uphold R2P criteria. Rather, it shares with the ICC (International Criminal Court) 
a moral commitment to ending atrocity crimes (Italicised words added)228  
 
The International Criminal Court was established by the Rome Statute. Article 1 of Part 1 of the 
Rome Statute states:  
An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall be a 
permanent  institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons 
for the most serious  crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and 
shall be complementary to  national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and 
functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.229  
 
Article 5 of Part 2 of the Rome Statute details which crimes are eligible for investigation and 
prosecution by the court: 
 The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the  
international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
Statute with respect to the following crimes:  
(a)     The crime of genocide;  
(b)     Crimes against humanity;  
(c)     War crimes;  
(d)     The crime of aggression.230 
 
The ability to link the Responsibility to Protect with strengthening the rule of law through the use 
of the International Criminal Court or some sort of hybrid legal system has the potential to 
greatly improve the coordination and cohesiveness of international structures. 231 The ability to 
build on existing structures to permit individuals to access redress mechanisms on the 
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international stage through the ICC can significantly improve the international's community's 
tools to effectively respond to mass human rights abuses or mass atrocities. (We will see in 
Chapter Six on the Libyan 2011 intervention how the Responsibility to Protect and the ICC can 
in fact be tied together by Security Council Resolutions and what the impact of such a ruling can 
be.)  This might be borne in mind when in conflict situations there are arguments made for the 
referral of State Heads to the ICC, which may in fact inhibit political solutions.  Mechanisms like 
the International Criminal Court and the legal system seeking justice for crimes to humanity are 
important.232  But making the decision to refer is not yet solely based on any legal precedent, 
neither through hard law nor customary law.  
III. Sources of controversy since 1945 
 
Since the adoption of the UN Charter, forcible intervention has been particularly controversial.  
Controversy surrounds:  
(a) “the alleged right of forcible intervention to protect nationals;”233 
(b) Hegemonial intervention by regions without Security Council approval;234 and  
(c) “Forcible intervention in the form of assistance to national liberation movements 
conducting armed conflict to achieve independence.”235  
However, Article 39 of the UN Charter provides for a power of determination of the existence of 
a threat to, or breach of the peace or act of aggression and permits the Security Council to 
recommend measures to restore peace and security or to decide upon measures to be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 (non-forcible measures) or 42 (forcible measures) to maintain or 
                                                            
232 ICISS supra note 6 1.22, 1.6. 
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restore peace and security.236  In consequence “…the effect of a Security Council 
recommendation under Article 39 is to raise a presumption of legality in respect of the actions of 
states complying with that recommendation.”237  
But there is resistance to decisions in the Security Council regarding “…the ideological divide 
between ‘East’ and ‘West’ each represented on the Security Council by permanent members 
wielding vetoes over non procedural matters during the Cold War.” 238 This resistance hampers 
the Council from fulfilling its collective security responsibilities spelled out in Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. It continues to paralyze the Council’s ability to act.  The Security Council is made 
up of only fifteen states at any one time, including five permanent members as well as ten 
additional members elected on a rotational basis by the UN General Assembly for two-year 
terms.  Article 27 stipulates that “decisions” of the SC on non-procedural matters require the 
“affirmative” vote of nine members, including the “concurring” votes of the five permanent 
members.  According to the “veto” power, if any one of them votes against a non-procedural 
resolution, it cannot be adopted.  “Each permanent member, in other words, individually wields 
disproportionate power in the UN system of peace and security.”239  The veto will be discussed 
further in the thesis as a continued obstacle to the Responsibility to Protect deliberations and 
decisions when states act solely in their self-interest on a Responsibility to Protect resolution that 
has not yet reached the status of hard law.240 
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IV.  The Four Crimes  
As has been stated the Responsibility to Protect is rooted in existing customary and Human 
Rights Law (HRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL).241  The Responsibility to Protect 
currently sits at the intersection of four different legal regimes:  sovereign equality, the use of 
force, non-intervention and the protection of civilians.  The Responsibility to Protect offers an 
opportunity to improve the implementation of existing legal obligations to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. While the ICISS 
report threshold was broader, the Outcome Document limits the application to four specific 
crimes that already form part of existing international legal instruments.242   
Since 1945 there have been a number of international treaties proscribing certain violations of 
human rights such as the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948), the Genocide Convention, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1965), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), the 
Convention against Torture (1984) and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action.243 “It is clear, therefore, that states at least since 1945 have been willing and able to agree 
on certain universal human rights laws.”244  Of course, compliance has been erratic so that the 
problem is putting them into practice and enforcement.  The protection of civilians regime – 
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human rights law, humanitarian law, international criminal law and refugee law, evolved through 
milestones such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); four Geneva 
Conventions and two Additional Protocols on international humanitarian law in armed conflict; 
the two 1966 International Covenants – on Civil and Political (ICCPR) and Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights (ISECR); the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), and the Ottawa Convention on landmines.245   
Under article 1, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations246 the Organization is mandated 
to “achieve international cooperation in …promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms.”  However, fundamental principles of the UN Charter such as 
“sovereign equality,” the non-use of force and non-intervention in “domestic jurisdiction” have 
been invoked to preclude any action. 247 
Most observers conclude that the Responsibility to Protect has not yet become a binding norm of 
international law.248  I suggest, however, as does Strauss, that if used for the development of a 
continuum of civil and military action to prevent and halt only these exceptional crimes, the 
necessary practice and opinio juris might be created over time sufficient  to establish the 
Responsibility to Protect as a norm of international customary  law.249 The universal and 
unconditional nature of the legal obligation reflected in the World Summit Outcome Document 
of 2005 to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other crimes 
against humanity is clear.  This obligation is primarily binding on states, but also, if these are 
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unable to act, on intergovernmental organizations and other actors exercising control over a 
given territory.  
In spite of this, as pointed out above, the Security Council cannot be relied upon to uphold these 
obligations with regard to the Responsibility to Protect which represents an opportunity to give 
force to human rights.  We should not conclude, however, that the Responsibility to Protect 
principle that emerged from the 2005 World Summit along with subsequent writing and actions 
is too weak or insubstantial to be encumbered with legal responsibilities. 250 The scope of the 
Responsibility to Protect regarding the four crimes has fairly precise legal meaning grounded in 
existing international law.  The principle is a product of the “largest ever gathering of heads of 
state and government” in the World Summit and carries immense political weight.251  
The four crimes, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, associated 
with the Responsibility to Protect fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and evoke serious legal consequences. Protection of the individual against atrocities is a 
primary responsibility of states.252  Many of today's human rights crimes violate protection 
against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  They are defined 
under Article 6 (Genocide), Article 7 (Crimes against humanity) and Article 8 (War Crimes) of 
the Statute.253 
Certain types of wrongdoing are punishable as crimes before both national and international 
criminal courts, including: 
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 Crimes against peace – waging a war, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labor, 
killing hostages, plunder of public or private property, and wanton destruction; and  
 Crimes against humanity  (Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other 
inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecution on political, racial or 
religious grounds).254 
The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was signed on 17 July 1998.  The Court’s         
jurisdiction (Article 5) extends to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and the crime of aggression.255  “The provisions of the Statute of the Criminal Court constitute 
good evidence of the offences forming part of general international law.”256  
While the extent of customary international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts is 
less certain, a minimum includes the provisions of Common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions – the obligation to treat humanely all persons taking no active part in hostilities.257  
Further provisions derive from the Additional Protocol II to the Conventions.  According to the 
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, many of the customary rules applicable in international armed conflict are also applicable 
in non-international armed conflict. As concerns war crimes, the 1949 Geneva Red Cross 
Conventions require states to pass legislation to provide penal sanctions for grave breaches of the 
convention and to seek out offenders and bring them to justice.258  Individual states may be said 
to be burdened with a duty under customary law to enforce the obligation, just as with the 
Genocide Convention.259  While the Security Council might not be able to issue binding 
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decisions simply on the basis of its duty to implement an obligation in the area of human rights, 
it can adopt an active coordinating and recommendatory role that carries long legitimacy.”260  
IV.1.  War Crimes (Article 8) 
War crimes are enumerated in international humanitarian law. The most accepted definition of 
war crimes is found in Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute, which reflects customary international 
law.  According to the Statute, a ‘war crime’ comprises   
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (and their subsequent protocols) 
such as willful killing, torture, causing of great suffering or extensive destruction not 
justified by military necessity and (b) other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflict, such as attacks on civilians, humanitarians and 
peacekeepers, ethnic cleansing, the use of rape as a weapon of war, forced starvation, 
and the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering.261   
The prohibition of ‘grave breaches’ of these rules is a preemptory rule with jus cogens status. 
War crimes include serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law such as inhumane 
treatment, forced prostitution or forced pregnancy, subjecting detainees to mutilation, medical or 
scientific experiments and enlisting and using child soldiers, causing great suffering or serious 
injury, willfully extensive destruction and appropriation of property; compelling a prisoner of 
war to serve in the forces of a hostile power; depriving a prisoner of war of a fair trial; unlawful 
deportation; taking of hostages; and/or Intentionally attacking civilian objects. 
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IV.2.   Crimes against humanity (Art. 7 of the Rome Statute) 
Crimes against humanity are deemed to be part of international jus cogens and as a result 
constitute non-derogable rules of international law. This category of crimes has been included in 
the statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR and the Special Court of Sierra Leone.262  States are obliged 
to ensure that officials do not commit crimes against humanity nor must states assist other states 
by supplying weapons that are used in committing such crimes.    
Crimes against humanity were first mentioned in the London Charter (Article 6) establishing the 
International Tribunal for the prosecution of major war criminals in the aftermath of the Second 
World War where it defines crimes against humanity as  
[N]amely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds…whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated (Article 6(c)).263 
Any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
any civilian population constitute crimes against humanity:  Murder; Extermination; 
Enslavement; Deportation; Imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
Torture; Sexual violence: rape, sexual slavery or enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy or 
sterilization; Persecution; Enforced disappearance; Apartheid; or Other inhumane acts. 264 
IV.3. Genocide (Art. 6 of the Statute) 
Provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide oblige 
the United Nations to act to prevent genocide. Beyond this, there is an erga omnes obligation (an  
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obligation of such importance to the international community that all states have a care towards 
its fulfillment by the United Nations to the international community to prevent gross violations 
of human rights).265  As a consequence, the United Nations is legally and morally obliged to 
address genocide.   
For the purpose of the Statute ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy…a national, ethnical, racial, religious group: (a) killing; (b) causing serious bodily 
harm (c) inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction; (d) preventing births 
within the group and (e) forcibly transferring children to another group.  The legal responsibility 
of states in relation to genocide is clearly codified in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and is generally considered to be jus cogens and therefore 
part of customary international law.  Under the Genocide Convention resolution 96(1) of the 
General Assembly Dec. 11th 1946 it was the intention of the UN “to punish genocide as a crime 
under international law.”  The principles underlying the convention are binding on states.  
The Convention prohibits genocide, provides a clear definition of the crime, and articulates the 
duty to prevent and punish perpetrators.  Article 1 of the Convention prohibits the crime of 
genocide, and establishes the duty of states to actively prevent the crime and punish perpetrators.  
Article 2 provides the definitive definition of genocide that has been subsequently adopted by the 
International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY, ICTR) and Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).266 
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The crime of genocide derives from the Advisory Opinion of the International Criminal Court on 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 
1951 in which the Court held that the provisions of the Convention express pre-existing 
customary international law and obligations erga omnes.  “Furthermore, the Court held that the 
norm prohibiting genocide constitutes jus cogens and, thus, was binding upon all States 
regardless of their ratification or signature of the Convention.”267   
I argue, as Strauss has done, that paragraph 138 in the Summit Outcome Document created an 
additional obligation to protect civilians and in this way the Responsibility to Protect is a new 
international norm separate from existing legal obligations by configuring a permanent duty to 
protect civilians.  The onus of protection falls on the international community and all states are 
now burdened with the responsibility to take action.268   In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro specific obligation of States to prevent and punish genocide were 
identified. If there is in fact a collective legal obligation of the international community, “failure 
to implement would entail some legal sanctions.”269  The obligation to prevent genocide was a 
duty of conduct of States involving positive obligations under international law.270 
IV.4. Ethnic Cleansing 
While ethnic cleansing has no legal significance, certain actions are understood to constitute the 
act of ethnic cleansing such as the “destruction of houses, crops or wells, widespread sexual 
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violence or killings.”271 The crimes associated with ethnic cleansing (forced displacement of 
civilians) have been prohibited as war crimes and crimes against humanity.  There are no 
specialised conventions that clarify their scope and established a duty to prevent them and punish 
the perpetrators.   
V. 'Humanitarian Intervention' and the Legitimacy/Legality Debate 
Law itself, however, is not always sufficient.  The English School of International Theory 
suggests that law is not infinitely malleable and a justification must be plausible to others.272  
There are important normative restraints and states do recognize the need for legitimacy.  
Governments recognize the importance of accountability and do strive to give reasons for their 
action to be defensible within the existing rules rather than saying the rules are irrelevant.273  As 
we will see, an action that is considered illegal may still be considered as legitimate by some, 
affording the action greater weight and authenticity in spite of its illegality.  By looking at 
examples of interventions in Kosovo and Iraq prior to the existence of the Responsibility to 
Protect, we will see how this works. 
As has been described, in the 20th century there was a proliferation of international institutions 
with power to intrude into the autonomy of states and individuals which has provided increased 
opportunities for the separation of the exercise of power from the will of the state.   In the 
national context there is often demanding scrutiny given to the systems of law which provide 
assurance in democratic countries that the exercise of power is legitimate.274  But at the 
international level this is not so much the case and much debate is carried on about what may 
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constitute “the legitimate exercise of power beyond the nation state.”275 In addition, more 
recently, unlike in the past, philosophers, lawyers and social scientists have recognized the 
importance of legitimacy to justify forms of power leading to questions about why people should 
comply with international law given its sketchiness, ambiguity and lack of authority.276 
The language of legitimacy and of crisis are often linked.  Sometimes the crisis can be addressed 
by international law and sometimes international law constitutes the crisis.277  As will be shown, 
the NATO bombing of Kosovo raised a lot of questions about “the legitimacy of international 
actors, international norms and the international legal system as a whole.”278  One of the 
concerns of international law is its ability to be used subjectively which renders the application 
inconsistent.279  Something may be called legitimate or illegitimate not because they are in 
concurrence with a particular normative framework but because of subjective reasons which are 
being used authoritatively.280  The concept of legitimacy appeals to international law scholarship 
and lawyers to consider how the tools of their trade are being and should be used.  Lawyers have 
a responsibility to reflect on motivations for their action and on their role as propagators of 
power and subjugation.281 
The etymology of the term ‘legitimacy’ derives from the Latin legitimus (lawfully, as derived 
from lex (law).282  There are generally two main legitimacy categories:  legal legitimacy and 
moral legitimacy.283  Legal legitimacy assesses actions according to particular normative 
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frameworks and provides “an exclusionary reason for compliance even in the face of opposing 
moral considerations.”284 Legal validity in international law is not always easy to determine, thus 
the focus of the thesis includes moral legitimacy as well as to strict legality.  Legal validity, like 
positivist law, requires the law to be created in accordance with the correct legal process and is 
entirely separate from moral obligation; rather it is established as a perfectly formal fact.285  The 
natural law tradition, on the other hand, requires law to be true to the laws of nature and justice. 
“Although laws that lack moral legitimacy retain their status as law, they are defective in that 
they fail to achieve the quality of moral obligation that should be experienced in relation to 
law.”286 
Moral legitimacy raises issues about who has the right to rule and how the exercise of power of 
one actor over another can be morally justified.  Moral legitimacy is therefore central to the 
description and evaluation of the exercise of power through law.287  It makes an argument about 
why a certain international law is worthy of compliance (although admittedly there are 
sometimes competing normative rules that are meant to govern action).  A determination of 
legitimacy can give cause for a belief in an action independent from coercion or mere self-
interest.288 In the final analysis one may consider arguments for legitimacy, in enforceability and 
in compliance.289    In Harold Koh’s and Abram Chayes work290 “legitimation is the process by 
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which actors come to believe in the normative legitimacy of an object.”291  “A legitimate order 
deserves recognition.”292  
Much of the literature regarding legitimacy and international law addresses the legitimacy of the 
use of force across state boundaries.293  Legitimacy arguments can show why certain regimes 
may or may not be worthy of support and help to explain what may appear to be an inconsistency 
in normative decisions.  The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis in current 
international customary law, and, as will be shown, this sometimes renders Security Council 
action legally questionable.294   
The issue of humanitarian intervention is very complex, not only from the ethical and political 
point of view but also (and possibly particularly) from the legal point of view. The issue of the 
legitimization of humanitarian intervention with the aim of stopping massive human rights 
violations are under scrutiny in the thesis.   Those who do not support humanitarian intervention 
tend to be cultural pluralists, while those in support of it argue for its legality and legitimization 
on the basis of moral universality rather than relativism.295  The debate on the universality of 
human rights “... spans civilizations and scientists from the Islamic world, sub-Saharan Africa, 
and the Far East take part in it...” and there is no unanimity in thinking even in Western 
thought.296 And I would suggest this is also true for the acceptance of the Responsibility to 
Protect principle.  Decisions that an action in the name of the Responsibility to Protect be 
denounced as illegitimate will render it more difficult to be used the next time.  This provides a 
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challenge for the legal argument alone, and pushes the need for arguments for legitimacy in 
action.  In addition, the war on terrorism has increased the number of questions and skepticism 
about humanitarian intervention with fears that intervention is motivated by strategic national 
interests.297 Realpolitik means that it is not just a cultural pluralism/universalism debate but that 
there are concerns over resource grabs, ongoing neo-imperialism and other such concerns.   
However, while some have argued that intervention is a cover for colonial and religious motives, 
I would agree with Wheeler that “present day interventionism is aimed mainly at “saving 
strangers.”298  In the doctrine of international law, the definition of humanitarian intervention is 
limited to  
those actions of military and forced character determined by humanitarian motives and 
aims of the intervening states group of states, or international organizations without the 
permission of the state within whose territory intervening takes place.299  
Interventions at the international level are sometimes interpreted as legitimate actions, but there 
is no legal justification given for doing so. In my own definition of legitimacy and its application 
in Chapter Nine, I argue that a strong definition of legitimacy for intervention should include at 
minimum the soft law of the Responsibility to Protect.  Some cases, such as Kosovo below, have 
gained some legitimacy through the international community, even though they were illegal at 
the time.  I am convinced that such decisions undermine the current standing of the 
Responsibility to Protect as it was intended, leaving the international community defenceless 
again in the face of human atrocities and genocide.  Ethics, politics, and law together must be 
considered when analyzing humanitarian intervention.  “Only a holistic approach makes it 
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possible to elaborate a position free of internal considerations.”300  To demonstrate how 
important interventions of the past prior to the Responsibility to Protect have been interpreted I 
have elaborated on two cases below:  Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003).  There is no doubt in my 
mind that these two interventions strengthened the international community’s need for a norm 
that articulated criteria for intervention.   
V.1 Kosovo (1999)  
One example of the contest between what has been regarded as legitimate and/or what has been 
regarded as legal is illustrated through an analysis of the Kosovo intervention in 1999.  Kosovo 
was ultimately deemed to be illegal but legitimate.  Britain argued it was legal.  However, its 
legality proved to be questionable in the absence of Security Council approval.  George 
Robertson, Secretary of State for Defense, (Br.) also argued NATO was acting within 
international law.   
Legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme 
circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.  The use of force can be justified as an 
exceptional measure in support of purposes laid down by the UN Security Council but 
without the Council’s express authorization when that is the only means to avert an 
immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.301   
Britain tried not to make this a precedent by referring to specific Resolutions of the UN (1199 
and 1203)302 that Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region and that there 
was a major humanitarian crisis.  They referred to Chapter VII resolutions in cases where the use 
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of force is acceptable when it is the only means available to prevent or end a humanitarian 
catastrophe.  NATO had in fact breached the specific UN Charter Provision in Article 2(4) and 
51 and Russia, China and India opposed.  Russia, China and Namibia tried to stop the bombing.  
Their resolution was opposed by the others on the grounds of the need to end humanitarian 
crises. In many ways this sets a precedent for the later establishment of the principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect and further attempts to clarify and legalize humanitarian intervention 
under specific circumstances. 
NATO’s intervention in 1999 into Kosovo set a precedent (prior to the Responsibility to Protect) 
which prompted numerous discussions regarding legality/illegality and legitimacy versus 
illegitimacy.303  NATO launched an airstrike and invoked the “necessity to save the innocents 
and to react to atrocities in the FRY’s province of Kosovo.”304   It invoked UN Security Council 
Resolution 1199 in September 1998 which expressed grave concern over the fighting in Kosovo 
and the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian Security forces and the Yugoslav 
Army which was causing large numbers of civilian casualties.305 Serbia had essentially begun an 
act of ethnic cleansing. The key issue in the intervention between the government of the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovar Albanian rebels (Kosvo Liberation Army or KLA) in 
1998 is that NATO began military action in Kosovo without UN Security Council approval.   
The common question asked is whether the military intervention into Kosovo is justified 
according to a legal and/or a just war perspective.  The legality and the morality of the decision 
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to wage the war (jus ad bellum) and the morality of the means used in the war (jus in bello) 
needs to be considered in making such an international law determination.306 
In legal terms, NATO’s intervention without UN Security Council authorization was technically 
“a breach of international law as codified by the 1945 UN Charter.”307   Article 2(4) reads: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.308 
NATO’s failure to seek Security Council authorization since agreement was unlikely to have 
been obtained and the Responsibility to Protect provision did not exist has received criticism in 
spite of the fact it provided three legal justifications for the use of armed force (refugee flows, 
inter-ethnic violence, and human rights and minority rights violations, as referred to in the 1948 
Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions). 309 The claim of legal 
legitimacy has been widely disputed.310 
As mentioned, an aid to determining the legitimacy of an action is through just war theory.  It 
was clear something had to be done and proponents claim that “the humanitarian imperative did 
indeed outweigh the legal constraints according to just war criteria.”311  Those in favor of 
intervention argue that diplomatic efforts were exhausted and only military action was left.   
There was no reasonable alternative.   Critics claim the diplomatic efforts were confusing and 
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NATO acted too rashly leading to questions about NATO’s credibility.  Did NATO have no 
alternative but to intervene?312  Supporters of the action argue that the humanitarian imperative 
was more compelling than the legal constraints. Critics argue that the level of violence was not 
yet severe enough and intervention would set a precedent for future military intervention without 
Security Council approval.313  My argument is that the Kosovo intervention mainly served to 
stress the need for a new international norm to help clarify the legality and legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention and to help prevent atrocities in the future.  In my view the action in 
the absence of legal authority and the new norm of the Responsibility to Protect is both illegal 
and illegitimate.  
V.2 Iraq (2003)    
Similarly, the Iraq war occurred prior to the approval in the United Nations in 2005 of the 
Responsibility to Protect and has been said to have been illegal but legitimate.  The primary 
justification for the invasion of Iraq and the use of force was Iraq’s development of weapons of 
mass destruction (wmd) in defiance of 12 years of UN resolutions demanding Iraq’s 
disarmament.  The British Prime Minister Tony Blair also supported regime change in Iraq on 
humanitarian grounds and wanted to rid the world of Saddam Hussein.  (I will later show in 
Chapter Nine how the motive of regime change can also prove to be a strong impediment to 
building any sort of nationwide trust in the Responsibility to Protect).  The British Prime 
Minister disagreed with President Bush who argued the UN was irrelevant.314  In late January 
2003 the UK agreed with the US that Iraq was in breach of Resolution 1441 but France, Russia 
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and Germany believed inspection should be given more time.315 It must also be recognized that 
the war on Iraq was prompted by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States 
which brought about a change in US foreign policy in the form of the ‘Bush doctrines.’ The 
change, according to the US, allowed for it to take pre-emptive action in anticipatory self defense 
rather than simply responding, as called for in the 2005 agreement. 
However, Article 51 and the right to self defense does not apply since Iraq did not attack the 
United States and there was no proof an attack was imminent.316  UN Security Council 
Resolutions also did not provide for the use of force but simply required compliance from 
Iraq.317 The US and the UK used Iraq’s noncompliance as a ‘quasi-legal’ justification. The 
Security Council Resolution 1483, approved on May 22, 2003, two months after the beginning of 
military operations in Iraq, did not condemn the operation. Rather, it verged on providing a 
justification for the intervention and providing some legitimacy.318  Security Council Resolution 
1511 approved October 16, 2003 came the closest to justifying the intervention ex post facto.  It 
authorized a “multinational force to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance 
of security and stability in Iraq.”319 In spite of this, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan scolded 
the US for attacking Iraq without UN approval.320 
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V.3 The Kosovo and Iraq Fall-Out 
Wheeler points to the difference between illegal acts that can be legitimate and legal acts that are 
also illegitimate in reference to Kosovo and Iraq.  While Russia and China argued intervention in 
Kosovo breached international law, the Security Council voted 12-3 that “an imminent threat of 
genocide amounted to mitigation by virtue of exceptional circumstance.”321  This provided for 
legitimacy but not necessarily legality.  On the other hand the Security Council voted against 
US/British action in Iraq, making it illegal and illegitimate.322  A substantive consideration of the 
meaning of legitimacy along with the determination of legitimacy appears in Chapter Nine in the 
analysis of the Libyan intervention. 
On the one hand, Chesterman argues that the notion of humanitarian intervention which emerged 
in the nineteenth century was not necessarily a legal right, but was mainly a matter of politics, 
policy, or morality.323 On the other hand, international lawyers such as Fernando Teson and 
Christopher Greenwood,324 draw attention to the notion of an intervention which runs parallel to 
the Charter, citing cases from the 1990s,325 largely carried out by Western governments as state 
practice supportive of a new customary rule which privileges custom over treaty – a 
controversial move from the perspective of the Vienna Convention.326 However, this appears to 
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favor Western states over those such as China, Russia and India. Divergent views held by China 
and Russia and sometimes India are, as we shall see, serious impediments to the implementation 
of the Responsibility to Protect.   Chesterman’s reading of these alleged cases of humanitarian 
intervention lacks “the necessary opinio juris that might transform the exception into the rule.”327  
The main point is that the right of humanitarian intervention challenges traditional legal 
approaches to sovereignty in international law and brings to the fore the human rights legal 
regime.328 Chesterman also raises concerns that humanitarian intervention is likely in practice to 
license self-interested interventionism under the guise of humanitarianism; and secondly, could 
jeopardize the international rule of law.  In my view unilateral intervention or intervention as a 
‘coalition of the willing’ in support of the Responsibility to Protect should not be considered as a 
legitimate alternative to collective action under the Charter. Some interventions in the post-Cold 
War period involved host-state consent and Security Council resolutions that invoked Chapter 
VII.  This condition may support Pillar Two of the Responsibiliy to Protect but Pillar Three 
becomes necessary when the state itself is the perpetrator and the international community 
decides it must act to save civilians.   
The purpose of the ICISS was to give some legitimacy to the negative views and experiences of 
humanitarian intervention without consent through a new principle of responsible sovereignty.  
Nicholas Wheeler329 and the ICISS both argue that there is a consensus on humanitarian 
intervention and its development in international relations which was reached through a more 
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expansive definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security.  There is an 
increasing awareness of conflict and suffering around the world due to an expansion of 
communication and information technology as well as human rights norms.330  The growth in 
awareness can also be seen in the presence of non-state actors who support the principle.  Welsh 
suggests the ICISS has three  goals:  “(1) to develop the debate on humanitarian intervention; (2) 
to find a global consensus on how to take action; and (3) to find new ways of reconciling the 
principles of intervention and state sovereignty.”331 
In Wheeler’s book, Saving Strangers, he makes an argument that pluralism in the international 
area has been overcome through the recognition of the norm of humanitarian intervention.332  I 
would argue that humanitarian intervention can be a legitimate exception to the rules regarding 
non-intervention and the prohibition against the use of force if it follows the principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect as it was first created. This supports the larger constructivist claim (see 
Chapter Five on theoretical perspectives for further explanation) that state actions will be 
constrained if they are not legitimate but new norms, if brought into existence, can enable new 
practices to develop. 
Both Wheeler and the ICISS support the norm of humanitarian intervention when all other 
diplomatic actions have failed.  This permits states to legitimately employ military force against 
another state in order to protect civilians in danger. As has been substantiated earlier, this 
represents a shift in the norms of international relations from the rights of states to claim 
sovereignty as authority toward a new moral stance of sovereignty as responsibility.  The 
problem with the earlier humanitarian interventions is that they were conducted without UN 
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approval and no rule or norm was available to allow for a legal decision.  State responsibility 
obliges the state to assure a minimum standard of human rights, not only internally, but within 
other states. The challenge is that both must adopt some sort of universality to be implementable.  
As has been suggested, the question of ‘universality’ in the international milieu is disputed by 
some.  
According to the ICISS, sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: 
Externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the 
dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state.  In international human rights 
covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as 
embracing this dual responsibility.  Sovereignty as responsibility has become the 
minimum content of good international citizenship.333  
For the ICISS, this moves beyond the ‘right to intervene’ to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and 
takes into account the individual or citizens as well as the state.  Neither Saving Strangers nor the 
Report of the ICISS actually provide a legal argument that overcomes sovereignty of the state.   
The ICISS and Teson admit that it is not possible to claim the emergence of a new principle of 
customary international law.   Rather, they lay claim to ‘an emerging guiding principle.’ 334  
However, as the thesis argues this emerging norm may be said to be evolving toward that legal 
end. 
There is also a connection between the rights of an individual and self-determination.335  When 
an individual is so threatened that he or she can no longer be truly self-actualizing, then their 
rights have been infringed upon.  This is an occasion for the principle of Responsibility to 
Protect to be drawn upon, particularly in a case where a population is suffering serious harm as a 
result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state involved is either 
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unwilling or unable to stop the harm.  In such a case the principle of non-intervention must yield 
to the international responsibility to protect.336   But this does not mean that the protection of 
populations must involve or lead to an intention to reshape societies in a Western, liberal 
democratic image, as is feared by many states.  The concept of regime change, and the actions of 
rebuilding and peace building along with the nature of a new government will be discussed in 
greater depth in the concluding portion of the thesis. 
One of the questions that must be asked in these circumstances as an aspect of the criteria for 
legitimacy is whether there is ‘sufficient harm’ to justify action.  As Wheeler argues, the 
threshold of suffering needs to be high enough for other states to even consider the risk to their 
own armies and the reaction of their own citizens.  The ICISS Report recommends intervention  
“where there is a large-scale loss of life –with or without genocidal intent – that results either 
from deliberate state action or the immense failure of state capability, or where there is large-
scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ which takes place in the form of killing, rape, torture, or mass 
expulsion.”337 In the UN Outcome Document this was further refined to the four crimes. 
In the transnational nature of today’s security threat and although the potential for interstate war 
should be guarded against, it is arguably not the most significant threat to humanitarian values in 
modern international society. The ICISS Report notes that most of the threats of war today are 
not interstate but rather occur with the killing of civilians and these numbers have increased 
dramatically.338   The Report favors the United Nations as the body for managing international 
peace and security and this type of contemporary conflict.  Wheeler also suggests that in the 21st 
century there is a greater degree of agreement on the meaning of moral principles concerning 
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sovereignty, human rights and intervention than the pluralists would admit to.339  As I have 
suggested, however, skepticism and mistrust of the West still remains a compelling impediment 
to unified action – Syria in 2012 and onward being a tragic example.  Several Security Council 
Resolutions to intervene in Syria have been blocked by Russia and China.  
Both Wheeler and the ICISS rely on the traditional ‘just war’ framework for their arguments in 
favor of humanitarian intervention.  While Wheeler suggests adherence to universally applicable 
moral rules is more acceptable than the ‘particularist, case-based’ reasoning that provided the 
groundwork for early modern just war tradition, Welsh suggests the just war reasoning is still the 
most useful approach for deciding what is the moral way to deter a war and when humanitarian 
intervention is required.   As such, it remains a vital resource for those who wish to legitimate the 
use of force for humanitarian purposes. 340 The manner in which Just War Theory can be applied 
to an intervention is explored in Chapter Nine as a methodology for determining the legitimacy 
of the Libyan intervention in 2011 with regard to the Responsibility to Protect. 
The Security Council authorization of Kosovo after the fact suggests to some that ad hoc 
‘coalitions of the willing’ acting without UN endorsement can be deemed legitimate 341 but the 
ICISS,  Chesterman (2001) and myself agree that developing a consensus on military 
intervention involves the full collective mechanisms of the UN.  While this is a very difficult 
task and perhaps one of the major impediments to the implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect, I feel strongly that it is advisable.  The objective becomes not to find alternatives to the 
Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work much better 
than it has.  The historical basis of the veto as well as some ways in which the Council could be 
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improved is considered in the thesis along with the concern that unilateral actions can threaten 
the legitimacy of international law itself.  
Although the veto exists for valid historical reasons, the fact that the Permanent Five have veto 
power and can block intervention and other UN actions for narrow political reasons is obviously 
a prohibiting factor in cases of possible implementation of the responsibility principle.342  Today, 
of course, the Security Council is viewed by some states as unrepresentative and a poor proxy for 
‘international will.’ 343 A ‘code of conduct’ for the use of the veto could possibly help to resolve 
the problem.  
Welsh suggests one of the important alternatives would be unilateral action, based on the 
expectation that  it can be more timely and effective, especially if undertaken by a regional 
power with the right mix of knowledge and capability.  Interventions from the Cold War period – 
Tanzania in Uganda, India in East Pakistan, and Vietnam in Cambodia – would support this 
view.  Even where UN Security Council authorization has been given, it is clear in these cases 
that UN action would have been unlikely without the strong nation taking the lead.344 It is 
unlikely, however, in my view that unilateral action is a satisfactory solution, given the concerns 
of some states who are already extremely wary of the Responsibility to Protect and of 
imperialism and/or colonialism.  Such action, without the consent of the state concerned, will 
only exacerbate the tensions. 
  
The next chapter addresses moral behaviour and moral philosophy as underlying values and 
ethical principle among nations, cultures and religions.  It emphasizes the necessity for common 
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moral principles as opposed to actions in the international community taken by states in their 
own self-interest which emphasize their sovereignty rights as opposed to their responsibilities.  It 
suggests that the achievement of a coherent system of conventions has in some ways already 
been accomplished in the human rights legal framework and provides examples of foreign policy 
where such ideals can be found.   
  
  108 
 
Chapter Four:  The Place of Morality 
 
Humanitarian intervention has become “perhaps the most dramatic 
example of the new power of morality in international affairs.”345 
 
This chapter focusses on what can be unpinned as universal or common principles in human 
rights and the Responsibility to Protect, and what lies beneath these principles in the way of 
moral values and ethical principles.   The thesis itself seeks to uncover shared values across the 
globe.  Rather than pluralist arguments focussing on our differences it focuses on common moral 
principles and lays the groundwork for what can be shared by states.  It suggests that only 
common expectations about appropriate behavior can bring about shared actions at the 
international level.  It further looks at some common elements of foreign policy as an example of 
shared principles.    One of the roots of moral values lie in religious belief and this chapter 
comments on the commonalities between world religions.  It also takes the opportunity to 
introduce NGOs as another set of players beyond the state and how they support the moral 
principles which engage those in favor of the Responsibility to Protect.  
With the Responsibility to Protect in place, it is my intention to look more closely at how 
morality influences the way that actors respond to the prospect of the application of the principle 
to a crisis situation. In the absence of hard law, the perspectives, constructs, values and/or 
interest of the actors play a significant role in the decisions that are being made to protect 
civilians in crimes against humanity. One of the more influential legal and moral drivers are the 
NGOs and civil society which will be discussed in Chapter Eight with regard to the history and 
development of the Responsibility to Protect.  Individuals and organizations are pursued in 
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greater depth through individual interviews with major founders along with testimonies of 
members of Nongovernmental Organizations. The important point is that Canadian and other 
NGO groups have been playing an important role through soft power, moral suasion and norm 
entrepreneurship and constructing and popularizing the moral and legal premises of new 
international norms regarding human security.346   
In terms of expanding on the norms and enhancing the dialogue around the Responsibility to 
Protect, Canadian Nongovernmental Organizations have promoted several initiatives, policies 
and strategies to incorporate the foundations of the Responsibility to Protect into their doctrines 
and practices. Included in their work are the numerous workshops and papers that have been 
done since the release of the original report.  We will see more of their efforts and views in the 
analysis of the interviews in Chapter Eight.  Before delving into these interviews, it is useful to 
explore further the moral system that supports the tenets of the Responsibility to Protect. 
I. Morality, values, ethics, universal principles 
Moral concerns have often been referred to in this document as an ‘alternative to state self-
interest’ and I would like at this point to expand on what is meant by ‘moral concerns’.  The 
following section addresses the dichotomy between state interest and moral principles as it is 
often seen in the literature and as it plays out in political action.  The distinction between 
morality and self-interest is an important one since my argument is that for the Responsibility to 
Protect to be successful in intervention decisions as soft law, moral objectives must pay a greater 
role than the self-interest of states.  While some of the literature attempts to tie the two together - 
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moral values and self-interest – from my point of view these efforts are generally weak and 
unconvincing.   
After WWII human rights, as well as the sovereignty of nations, became a central concern when 
human beings began to be considered in their own right and not just as citizens of a state.  The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was approved by the General Assembly 
of the UN in 1948, was concerned with people everywhere.  Article 1 of UDHR declares that: 
"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”  This moral position is 
reflected clearly in the recent Report of Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threat, 
Challenges and Change (2004).347   
The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia, Herzgovina, Rwanda, Kosovo 
and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the immunities of sovereign 
governments but their responsibilities, both to their own people and the wider 
international community. 348 
There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the ‘right to non-intervention’ of any state, 
but the moral and legal responsibility to protect in every state when it comes to people suffering 
from catastrophe.   
And there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign governments have the primary 
responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable 
or unwilling to do so their responsibility should be taken up by the wider international 
community – with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if 
necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies.349 
Possible use of collective action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter suggests it is in our 
interest to act ethically, and to account to ourselves and others. Here self-interest and ethics can 
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be made to coincide, but where states are perceived to be acting in their self-interest only (as 
historically has been the priority) human rights can easily be trampled upon.     
Notwithstanding the different views across countries over what constitutes ethical behavior, the 
question then becomes whether ethical norms can come to be shared by states.  The logic of 
appropriateness, constructivism and structuralism, which will be explored in Chapter Five, say 
they can.   This would represent a set of “shared expectations about appropriate social behavior 
that is held by some communities of actors.”350  A further question is whether ethical views can 
be shared at the international level and my argument is that universal norms have been 
established in the past by the international community and the Responsibility to Protect has been 
designed to further such norms in an ethical system built on individual human rights.  
There needs to be a better understanding of the role ethics can and should play in deliberations 
about policy choices, and especially about the impact of foreign policies ultimately decided upon 
in the case of human crises. 351 Ethics may be defined as: 
a complete and coherent system of convictions, values and ideas that provides a grid 
within which certain sorts of actions can be classified as evil, and so to be avoided, while 
other sorts of actions can be classified as good, and so to be tolerated or even pursued.352  
The achievement of such a coherent system of convictions at the world level is immensely 
challenging due to cultural differences, however, but not necessarily impossible.  Even ancient 
laws and treaties have been designed to impede or bring aggression to an end.  There are also 
laws that support peace, cooperation and justice between states (jus gentium) and laws that 
protect the rights of the individual.  
                                                            
350 Martha Finnemore, and Kathy Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) vol. 52 
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However, there are those who disagree with the possibility of the development of universal 
norms or rules in the international environment; e.g. Krasner (2009).   According to Krasner, the 
norms and rules of any international institutional system, including the sovereign state system, 
will always be subject to challenge and controversy because of certain logical contradictions; e.g. 
the lack of  institutional authority for resolving conflicts, unequal power among principal actors, 
and differing incentives confronting individual actors, notably states.   He argues that in the 
international environment actions will not closely conform to any given set of norms.353 In terms 
of theory, then, this places him very much into the realist school which suggests the 
improbability, if not the impossibility, of uniformity and/or universal agreements. 
What does this mean for the principle of the Responsibility to Protect?  Will sovereignty issues 
always conflict with humanitarian purpose and are there other aspects of states that also 
contribute to this conflict?  This represents a key question of the thesis:  Do we conclude, as 
Krasner does, that the lack of an authoritative structure, the power imbalance, and differing state 
incentives make it 'impossible' for the Responsibility to Protect principle to be firmly upheld?  I 
have acknowledged there are impediments to its development as a legal norm, and indeed the 
objective of the thesis is to explore these impediments, but ultimately I argue that there are 
countervailing possibilities for cooperation and universal norms, some of which have already 
been established in the domain of human rights (in spite of the continuing controversy over some 
of them).  In other words, while there are serious challenges to the Responsibility to Protect’s 
implementation in its soft law form, these challenges are not insurmountable.  The norm follows 
a universal theme in accordance with human rights principles which have already become law.  
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Nongovernmental organizations, as referred to above, have capitalized upon this as the norm 
evolves. 
In the introduction to their book, Macdonald, Parker and Patman define foreign policy as “the 
area of politics that seeks to bridge the boundary between the nation state and its international 
environment:” 354 It consists of independent actors (usually the state) and other actors in the 
international arena where they have limited control, as opposed to the domestic arena.  Foreign 
policy also can mean ‘no action,’ such as in the case of Rwanda, which provided a strong 
incentive to develop a mechanism for states to respond to situations of human atrocity.  
Phil Goff refers to moral principles as "... soft thinking which has no place in the real world.”355  
Other arguments are made by realists who argue that ethics and the behaviour of nations have not 
much in common since the business of the nation is to defend itself and maximize its power. In 
addition, differences in culture, religion and other hurdles are too great to be shared in such a 
way that could lead to a single set of ethics strong enough to maintain or manage the world’s 
order which is needed for the Responsibility to Protect to be enacted.356  On the other hand, 
Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary, 12 May 1997, like myself, places the ethical dimension 
of foreign policy in the human rights context.357 
In the first instance, the role of the sovereign state is to provide for the wellbeing and security of 
its people.   I believe we can all agree that genocide and human rights atrocities must not be 
allowed to develop.  Fortunately, there have been leaders with a vision beyond their own 
including but not restricted to Lloyd Axworthy.  For example, Roosevelt in the US Congress on 
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1 March 1945 states that “The structure of World Peace cannot be the work of one man, or one 
party, or one nation.  It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole 
world.”358   Such norms in fact lie beneath the development of the principles of human rights.  
Other substantive agreements include: the six core Human Rights International Treaties; the 
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change; arms control treaties; the War Crimes tribunal; and, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).359  This would suggest, in favour of those who argue for a 
universal norm (or norms), the possibilities that may arise from strong efforts to conquer the 
obstacle of ‘difference.’  Success may include long term interest.  New Zealand Foreign policy 
states, for example, that long term security lies in a world of ethically-based rules.  A 
commitment to resolve conflicts can indeed be worth striving for.pr360  
While some argue politics is morally neutral, it seems that the era of globalization is bringing 
ethics to the forefront of our minds and its influence in foreign policy agendas is increasingly 
apparent.  As we are faced with disparities between worlds as well as extreme situations of 
human suffering at the hands of others, moral suasion becomes particularly important. We are 
seriously challenged by a globalized world where many still try to reach state-centric solutions to 
its problems.  The concept of national security is still present in foreign policy, but it may be 
anticipated that as the world in some ways becomes smaller, the notion of national interest will 
have to be altered to address the moral concerns or norms of an increasingly interconnected 
world.361   
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Lepard and Hoffman have studied the role of religion in international law and principles, and 
claim that the ethical framework for humanitarian intervention can be found in the world’s 
religious traditions, and not only in those of the West.362 Lepard categorizes the ethical principles 
from a number of world religions, including Christianity, Bahai faith, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism and Chinese ‘folk’ religions and illustrates how these principles and the law that 
exists in the UN Charter and international law have some congruence.  He shows how some of 
the principles of human rights can be found in religious texts such as the Bhagavad Gita, 
Buddhist scriptures, Confucius, the Qur’an, Baha’i writing, as well as the Declaration of Human 
Rights and the UN Charter.363   This suggests that some of these texts share common principles 
in terms of ethics and human rights and that these worlds are not necessarily so far apart. 
In Lepard’s view there are signs, such as an increasing acceptance of ethics in international 
relations, of interdependence, of the positive role religion can play in influencing international 
law, and of the promotion of moral education and democratic leadership that suggests that 
humanitarian intervention is being rethought.364 States do sometimes behave in ways contrary to 
human rights principles, commit war crimes and promulgate human atrocities and other states are 
often unwilling to commit resources to their responsibility to protect civilians in these 
circumstances.  The purpose of the Responsibility to Protect is to eradicate this type of 
behaviour. 
Lepard ultimately expresses the need for ethical principles in the policies of government leaders.  
The difference (according to Hoffman) in Lepard’s approach from the ICISS is that Lepard looks 
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to ethical and religious principles for answers, whereas the ICISS looks at the possible political 
compromises that may be achieved.365  I would suggest that both as well as its political legality 
must be considered in any attempt to endorse the Responsibility to Protect which in itself 
involves a moral principle but also requires political cooperation. In the long run, negotiations 
take place.  Unfortunately, in an examination of the history of the Responsibility to Protect, one 
discovers it was just as the Commission’s work on the Responsibility to Protect was coming 
forward that the terrorist attacks of September 11 took place and attention was drawn away from 
the ICISS’s efforts to develop a new consensus on humanitarian intervention.  In fact, the 
Commission itself tried to draw distinctions between two different kinds of military action:  one 
that may be regarded as an act of self-defence designed to respond to terrorist attacks in one’s 
own state; while the other is military action in another state for humanitarian protection 
purposes.366   
 Hoffman (2006) suggests that the post 9/11 climate left little room for ethical grounding in 
humanitarian intervention, and it is evident that much of the focus in contemporary security 
policy is on the threat of terrorism.  Nevertheless, there are situations and will continue to be 
situations where mass murder and war crimes scream out for attention and a legal and moral 
principle to counteract such a situation is essential. 
II. States' Perspectives 
States in fact do frequently include in their foreign policies some form of moral imperative - at 
the minimum responsibility to their own citizens. Examples of policy are offered below of how 
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moral principles sometimes do enter into foreign policy.  The examples also show, unfortunately, 
how such policies are sometimes perceived by outsiders.  For example, while the US purports to 
be a ‘good’ or moral country, this by no means is accepted whole heartedly by others.  David 
Macdonald tells us that American policies are often based on their notion of America as a ‘good 
country’ with good values, which leads them to the conclusion that their policies must be good.  
States like the United States, however, are capable of creating a heightened positive illusion of 
themselves.  Joseph Nye cautions that moral values and ideas are good, but they can be used to 
mislead.  Recent claims of exceptionalism with respect to moral values in the West since 9/11 
demonstrate for some the existence of American self-righteousness and a sense of moral 
superiority.367   
	
Japan provides an example of one of the Asian countries where it has been suggested their values 
do not necessarily correspond with those of the West.368 In 1993, the ASEAN Ministers met in 
Singapore and discussed their approaches to human rights standards.  The overall feeling was 
that they differed from those of the West.  According to the ASEAN Ministers, human rights, 
environmental protection and humanitarian intervention were of less importance than economic 
and security concerns.  According to Simon Tay, “Ethical concerns regarding foreign affairs took 
second place to realist and state-centred concerns.” 369  This type of divergence can be an 
important reason for states to be unable to come to a universal agreement in the Security Council 
when a Responsibility to Protect motion is put forward for a country where extreme human 
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rights atrocities are taking place. In such cases, the role of the international community must be 
to speak forcefully in support of human protection obligations and duties already agreed to and 
for Security Council members to act accordingly (something that is critically needed in the 
Syrian conflict with close to 200,000 deaths). 
On the more encouraging side, Tay tells us that members of the Asia-Pacific region are working 
to integrate highly diverse cultures into one coherent voice.370  Nevertheless, both are influenced 
by their domestic and regional security policies and the ASEAN does have a historical tendency 
to perceive ‘interdependence’ as a euphemism for ‘interference.’371 But states are not the only 
players in this arena. As noted earlier there are other important players – the norm entrepreneurs 
and nongovernmental actors - that must be recognized and understood and who have become 
increasingly important in furthering ethical and legal principles such as and including the 
Responsibility to Protect.   
III. Making Moral Decisions 
This bring us again to the question of the ability of international actors, whether they are states or 
non-states or a cooperative of both, to come to moral decisions at the international or 
transnational levels.  Decisions at those levels are influenced, I would argue, by certain moral 
and legal issues such as trust, justice, peace, and liberty as well as sovereignty, self-
determination and identity.  Fear and mistrust among states with relative power and political and 
cultural differences interfere with attempts by the international community to come to a 
consensus on the humanitarian principle of protection, seen to some as ‘interference.’  The key to 
success of the Responsibility to Protect lies partly in the development of trust between the parties 
                                                            
370 Chapter 12, Macdonald, Patman and Mason-Parker 2007 ibid at 202. 
371 “Conclusion,” Macdonald, Patman and Mason-Parker 2007 ibid at 239. 
  119 
 
and with powerful states who are prepared to work at it.  However, powerful states may have 
their own factions within that favor one side or the other, making it difficult for them to come to 
any agreements.  Agreements must be acceptable not only to the parties involved but to the 
society at large.372  This is where we will see that nongovernmental actors in the transnational 
environment have become an important driving force for universal principles.  We shall also see 
the need for strengthening the Responsibility to Protect legal status. 
Buchanan’s work supports my own argument in that it articulates a systematic vision of an 
international legal system grounded in the commitment to justice for all persons.373  My thesis 
asks about the desirability as well as the feasibility of such a system and whether the vision may 
be more of a utopian one than one of any political substance. It concludes that actors in the 
international milieu can make decisions on the basis of moral principles and soft law that exists 
and have been agreed upon rather than solely on the basis of self-interest.  It provides an example 
in the case of Libya in Chapter Nine where in fact they have done so.  Furthermore, for the 
Responsibility to Protect to be effective and to evolve further they must continue to do so.  I 
come back to Buchanan who provides a probing exploration of the moral issues involved in 
disputes about secession, ethno-national conflict, and the right of self-determination, human 
rights, and the legitimacy of the international legal system itself and argues that the international 
legal system should make justice, not simply peace, among states a primary goal.  Buchanan 
ultimately rejects the view that it is permissible for a state to conduct its foreign policies 
exclusively according to what is in the ‘national interest.’ 
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The next chapter, Chapter Five, offers a look at the Responsibility to Protect from a theoretical 
perspective, particularly focussing on the place of morality, ethics, universal principles and 
idealism as opposed to realist notions of the state as acting in its own self-interest.  In an 
environment of humanitarian principles, actions of states taken in their own self-interest as well 
as fears of neocolonialist and imperial motivations serve to stultify international cooperation 
geared toward the protection of civilians and frustrate the needed cooperation between nations.  
Along with realists who see actors as only acting in their self-interest are those who support 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).  Their basic mistrust of international 
law and its colonial underpinnings lead some to reject the Responsibility to Protect altogether. 
Other theoretical perspectives are discussed from international relations (institutional and liberal 
theorists), political science, and law perspectives as they reflect on the way in which the 
principle is approached and understood and serve to either support or undermine the application 
of the principle. 
The negative views bring us back to the global context and historical precedents and how 
realpolitik has served to allow millions to die in Bosnia, Rwanda and the Congo while the world 
sat by.  This opens the door to consideration of governance and the change in relations between 
government networks and transnational networks as they have been evolving and the tensions 
arising between state sovereignty and collaborative nongovernmental systems in ‘a new world 
order.’  
  121 
 
Chapter Five: Discussion and Critique of Theoretical  
Perspectives Underlying the Implementation  
of the Responsibility to Protect 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Given the depth of the ethical support for the Responsibility to Protect, and the range of NGOs 
that have gathered around its banner, what are the theoretical perspectives that influence the way 
in which we may analyse the Responsibility to Protect situations, and how do these perspectives 
stand up to critical analysis?  Because international law is largely created by the actions of states 
and their organizations, there is inevitably a strong relationship between international relations 
and international law.  One sees the development of theories based on social policy and 
international relations/politics, theories of critical legal studies as well as theories developed in 
response to oppressed aspects of international law.  All of these theories raise important voices, 
while only a few will be discussed here briefly to provide an understanding of the international 
law landscape.  What is important is the extent to which theory becomes crucial not only in 
dictating the direction of the law but the set of politics that is intrinsic to it.  In part this is due to 
the fact that “the ideology adhered to by a state or group of states influence their approach to 
international relations in turn or ‘state practice,’ [and] assists in the development of custom, 
which itself leads to the creation of international law.’374 
The theoretical perspectives considered here include actor-oriented approaches such as realism 
and the logic of consequences and structuralist or institutionalist approaches such as idealism, 
liberalism, the logic of appropriateness and constructivism. The differences between these 
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theories are based on two fundamental approaches: an actor-oriented approach, as in the case of 
realism and the logic of consequences; and, institutional or structural approaches as in the case of 
idealism, liberalism, constructivism and the logic of appropriateness.    The critique will 
comment on the arguments of actor-oriented approaches which view the current international 
system as anarchic with individual states acting as sovereigns in their own self-interest, and 
structuralists who view the structure to have been built by social practice and social action. 375  
Structuralist approaches are therefore not only more helpful in supporting universal principles, 
including the Responsibility to Protect, they are the most compelling.  It is these structuralist 
approaches that bear the most weight in the analysis of the Responsibility to Protect and its focus 
on values, morality and ethics in the form of universal principles rather than power politics and 
the self-interest of states.   
To clarify these differences, I have included a diagram in Figure 1 that distinguishes between the 
two basic schools of thought; i.e. individual actor oriented versus structurally or socially oriented 
theories.  Aspects of both, however, can in fact be seen in the behaviour of those involved in the 
Responsibility to Protect discussions.  As a result, both are described in some detail.  
Nevertheless, I will show how the structural approaches are more likely to support universal 
principles at the international level and provide better explanations for how the Responsibility to 
Protect has emerged and ought to be applied.  I do not accept that actor-oriented approaches are 
the only possible explanations for action at the international level, and this will be demonstrated 
in Chapter Nine when we see the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in the case of 
Libya. 
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Table 1:  Relevant Theoretical Approaches 
Actor Oriented Approaches Institutional or Structuralist Approaches 
Realism, neorealism Constructivism, liberalism, idealism 
Power politics and state self-interest Universal principles and moral and ethical 
value systems 
Logic of consequences Logic of appropriateness  
  
II.  Theoretical Perspectives 
II.1 Realism 
Realists treat states as the principal actors in international politics.  These actors interact in the 
absence of any central government which is expected to keep peace or enforce agreements.  
Power or power differences are usually identified as the main explanatory factors and realists 
concentrate on interactions among major powers and on matters of war and peace rather than on 
related, secondary issues such as human rights. 376  While they do not ignore the place of 
international cooperation and international law, they assume states will cooperate of their own 
volition solely when it is in their interest to do so.  Quite frequently the interests of more 
powerful states dictate the way in which cooperation takes place.  In fact, from their viewpoint, 
international rules and institutions have little effect on state behavior.377  Realism became the 
dominant framework during the Cold War and realists were skeptical about any idea of world 
peace.  The ‘Will for power’ dominated the ‘Will for good.’  The world was seen as an 
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anarchical international system driven by self-interested nations.378   Realism holds that states 
live in an anarchical system without a central governing authority.  War, conflict and competition 
are natural outcomes to this state.  While cooperation is rare and likely to give way to the 
exigencies of national interest, self-help and self-interest dominate and so it is necessary to 
maintain a balance of power between states.379   If all states act according to these interests we 
are left with a troubling view of international law.  The likelihood of cooperation and positive-
sum actions becomes very low.380  
Neorealism and neoliberalism deploy a logic of consequences, with states conceptualized as 
rational, autonomous actors.  E.H. Carr and the realists reject values, morality and ethics in favor 
of facts, power and politics. (In Canada, the following politicians may be considered as realists:  
Brian Mulroney, Mike Harris, Ralph Klein, Steven Harper; and in Britain, Margaret Thatcher).  
According to MacDonald, Parker and Patman, “The UN at its core was based far more on great 
power politics than on universal principles.”381 This position is supported by Krasner who favors 
actor-oriented theories, and realism based on power and interest governing the interactions 
among states as opposed to institutional, structuralist or constructivist approaches.   
How far should we go with this realist perspective?  There is no doubt states do act in their self-
interest – but does this dominate all actions at the international level? Realists are skeptical of 
humanitarian action, seeing the self-interest and imperialism of the Western World in the 
Responsibility to Protect norm.  If we take this position to its logical conclusion, the international 
community will never act in the face of humanitarian crises unless the action concurs strictly 
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with the self-interest of independent states.  Krasner, unlike myself, is not persuaded by 
constructivist arguments and does not agree that there is a set of norms and values that is shared 
by all participants in the international sphere.382  However, Krasner does recognize that with the 
EU, for example, member states have used their international legal sovereignty, which gives 
them the right to voluntarily enter into any agreement they choose, to forego their domestic 
autonomy and create supranational institutions such as the European Court of Justice and the 
European Central Bank.  As a result, member states can be bound by a decision such as the 
Responsibility to Protect with which they do not agree.  In doing so, the state has permitted itself 
to be subjected to an external authority where certain norms and rules, such as those of the UN, 
will predominate without the power of enforcement.  I suggest it is these rules - based on 
altruistic principles beyond the self-interest of states - that have allowed states to develop laws in 
the protection of human rights at home and abroad. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the creation of these institutions, Krasner argues disagreements about 
norms are determined by the power and interest of actors, rather than through discourse. In 
addition, in the international system actors differ on their understanding of appropriate norms 
and there is no authoritative structure to resolve these differences.  This permits power and 
material interests to become the most important determinants of action. Norms in the 
international system are weaker than domestic ones and therefore domestic norms and interests 
dominate.  One exception might occur in post conflict situations where states are often highly 
dependent on international assistance.383 While the thesis shows how the self-interest of states 
can act as an impediment to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, there is no 
evidence that this must be the case in the face of atrocities.  I am much more in favor of 
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arguments such as those posed by liberals and constructivists who reject realism and states as 
solely acting in their own self-interest with an over reliance on power dynamics.   
II.2 Liberalism 
Liberal theorists hope to transcend anarchy and conflict in the international arena, arguing that   
“human nature is manageable and that order, justice and freedom can be achieved through the 
creation of the right economic conditions and institutional mechanisms.”384  They hold a post-
Cold War belief in the ability of democracy to prevail.  Along with other interdependencies, 
“Liberal institutionalism” suggests institutions, regimes and norms of conduct and regulation 
create stability.  Therefore, the liberal tradition fosters the creation of ethical norms and 
regulation.     
“Transnational liberals” highlight the activities of private individuals and groups across national 
boundaries and presume interest groups independently help to develop international rules and 
institutions. Transnational liberals therefore disagree that law creation is limited to states.385  
Transnational liberals would therefore see the non-state actors or advocacy groups involved with 
the Responsibility to Protect as instrumental in developing new norms and new laws, either 
independently or in correspondence with states. In my view, Transnational liberalism provides a 
persuasive explanation of the way in which a norm such as the Responsibility to Protect is 
created, grows and is given recognition by social actors.  
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II.3 Constructivism and International Society 
Key tenets of constructivism can be found in the work of mainstream international political 
science theorists in the 1950s.386  “Constructivist” theorists also reject rationalist explanations 
that claim that states or other actors have independent interests and use strategies to achieve their 
goals, but rather consider that these actors operate within a social context of shared 
understandings and norms.  These norms become the source of their identities and roles and 
define appropriate forms of conduct.  The meaning of actions are contingent on the context. 387 
For example, Dirk Nabers takes a constructivist perspective, focusing on norms, morality and 
expectations of foreign policy.388   He considers as an example Germany and Japan who pride 
themselves in being moral actors, renouncing the use of force and promoting multilateralism and 
equality.389    
Constructivists, such as Hedley Bull and Alexander Wendt see sovereignty as constitutive of the 
system as a whole.  Constructivists have in fact allowed that some norms have been contested 
and in some case differences have been resolved through normative discourse, even without the 
aid of an authoritative arbiter. Actors must make choices even though it is within the boundaries 
of their normative viewpoints. 
II.4 Idealists 
Critical from my point of view to the debate and to the success of the Responsibility to Protect  
are the idealists. Woodrow Wilson and the idealists believed that internationalism rooted in 
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moral values and legal norms “was the key to a more peaceful world order.”390  Idealist theory 
supports a belief in a global community or international society. The world is not anarchical and 
states are constrained by expectations of good behaviour.  (Hugo Grotius, Leslie H. Gelb, 
Michael Walzer).   
II.5 The Logic of Appropriateness and the Logic of Consequences 
These theoretical perspectives (the logic of consequences versus the logic of appropriateness) 
exemplify the actor-oriented approach versus the structuralist approach.  The logic of 
appropriateness supports the notion that ‘good’ humanitarian principles can prevail and argues in 
favour of morality and norm conformity and the nature of normative agreements based on moral 
values.   Norms are rooted in a specific culture (“the sum of beliefs, norms, and identities of a 
group of social actors in a particular place and time”).391 This is very much part of the challenge 
which determines what is valued as ‘good’ and what is considered ‘bad’. Culture serves as the 
background for shared interpretations.392     
Beliefs and attitudes about one’s own nation, and about other nations, and about the relationship 
between the self and other actors in the international arena “influence important decisions on the 
international agenda.” 393  Here we find culture, identity, norms and moral beliefs inextricably 
linked to one another.  Culture helps to form both the individual and collective identity that is 
                                                            
390  Introduction to MacDonald, Patman and Mason-Parker 2007 supra note 102 at 4.   
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imbedded in the individual as a morally conscious human being.394 Culture influences an 
individual’s thoughts or behaviour as well as that of a nation.  
According to Nils Brunsson (1989) and the ‘logics of appropriateness,’ the rules and norms 
associated with a specific institution may be inconsistent with the ‘logics of consequences’, 
which recognizes what actors must do to maximize what they understand to be their utility.    
When sovereignty rules are violated, these violations are always justified by an appeal to other 
principles and norms, “such as the right to protect or the need to further freedom.”395 The logics 
of consequences perceives  political action as rational, calculating behavior designed to 
maximize preferences, (Classical game theory and neoclassical economies are well known 
examples) whereas the logic of appropriateness understands political action as a product of rules, 
roles and identities that stipulate appropriate behavior in a given situation, much as 
constructionists do.   
March and Olsen claim that when there is a contradiction a logic of consequences will prevail.396  
Neorealists and neoliberalists deploy a logic of consequences, conceptualized as rational, 
autonomous actors.  A logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, understates the importance of 
power and gives more emphasis to international roles and rules as opposed to domestic ones. 
While it is understood, in my view, that constructivism, like the logic of appropriateness, does 
not wholly explain how different states have responded in the international system as a whole, it 
goes a long way toward explaining the development of human rights norms and the influence 
that common norms may have on state behaviour.  It also helps to explain why NGOs may be 
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freer to act according to a social conscience.397 It discounts Krasner’s view that actor-oriented 
arguments, realism and liberal institutionalism provide the most powerful insights.  
March and Olsen describe the two logics of action:  the logics of expected consequences and the 
logics of appropriateness.398  According to those upholding the logics of consequences, there is 
no authority structure in the international system to adjudicate controversy.  In most cases 
domestic interests will be more compelling than international ones and power asymmetries in the 
international system create an imbalance and raise fears for developing countries regarding 
imperialism or colonialism.399  The logics of appropriateness determines action as a product of 
rules, roles and identities.  The identity of the individual represents the state.  The question is not: 
“How can I maximize my self-interest?” but rather, given my role, “How should I act in this 
particular circumstance?”400 
According to those supporting the logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, because norms in 
the international system are less constraining than in the domestic setting,  the need to adhere to 
the logics of appropriateness and competing rules becomes even stronger since rulers are easily 
encouraged to break the rules in their own interest.  Confounding elements to the logic of 
appropriateness do exist, however, in the form of:  1) power imbalance 2) fear of colonialism 3) 
domestic interests; and 4) self-determination.  Such self-interested decisions can impede moral 
action so that institutional norms such as the Responsibility to Protect must be developed and 
strengthened to overcome them. 
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An actor-oriented approach, as in the logic of consequences, must make some assumptions about 
the underlying preferences of actors.  “Rulers want to stay in power and, being in power, they 
want to promote the security, prosperity, and values of their constituents.  The ways in which 
they accomplish these objectives will vary from one state to another.”401   
These arguments help to explain why the basic rule of international sovereignty is so important. 
Sovereignty can be used to support human rights arguments but it can also be used to block 
action in the UN and by doing so can provide a rationale which ignores human atrocities. 
However, we do know that agreements have been reached in the international humanitarian arena 
and that Westphalian sovereignty can and has been violated through both intervention and 
invitation.  Even in the absence of international hard law, the more powerful states, or groups of 
states, have found it necessary or desirable to intervene, coercing weaker states to accept external 
authority.  Sometimes it is done at their own invitation, for example, by signing human rights 
accords or entering into international agreements.   In the case of intervention without invitation 
the norm of autonomy, the core of Westphalian sovereignty, has been overridden on the basis of 
a concern for international peace and security and the logic of appropriateness.  In these cases, 
justifications in the form of alternative principles or rules have been offered, leading to a 
determination of legitimacy if not legality.   
But the problem remains that in the international system the logic of consequences and the logic 
of appropriateness often come into conflict with each other (Krasner calls this organized 
hypocrisy) and there is no clear authoritative structure to resolve this or to enforce principles.  It 
is true that the logic of appropriateness can be overpowered by rulers from different 
constituencies holding different values and material interests.  Both international legal and 
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Westphalian sovereignty are best conceptualized as examples of organized hypocrisy. According 
to Krasner both have clear logics of appropriateness, but these logics are sometimes inconsistent 
with a logic of consequences.  Given the absence of authoritative institutions and power 
asymmetries, rulers can follow a logic of consequences and reject a logic of appropriateness.  
Principles, though enduring, are still violated.402 He regards coercion and imposition as examples 
of violations of Westphalian sovereignty through intervention rather than invitation. 
Ideally, one could have a situation where doing the ‘right’ or ‘ethical’ thing is consistent with an 
actor’s self-interest.  According to Krasner, however, this is unlikely to happen in the 
international system. Organized hypocrisy, when saying one thing but doing another, and while 
acting in ways consistent with a logic of consequences, prevails.    The lack of an authority 
structure to resolve the conflict among competing norms, (the admonition against intervening in 
the internal affairs of other states, on the one hand, and sovereign rule and the promotion of 
human rights, a principle endorsed in many international conventions on the other), have no 
authority mechanism for resolution.403  
What we can see in relationship to the Responsibility to Protect is the need to strive for ways in 
which realist concepts of the national interest – power, security, independence – can be 
overcome by broader ideals in an extension of universal liberal norms. Here I would refer to 
Andrew Linklater who argues “governments should put the welfare of international society 
ahead of the relentless pursuit of [their] own national interests.” 404    On the other side, Barr 
Cooper suggests that national interest lies in state survival and security and to think otherwise is 
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utopianism.  Politics are conducted in an amoral world and the state is founded in violence.405  
For consequentialists, sovereign states are unlikely to agree on general principles and hence are 
unlikely to agree when interventions to change societies would be justified.406  This bleak picture 
of international politics in my view discounts much of the developments toward peace and 
security that have become part of our international climate since the end of the Cold War and the 
Responsibility to Prevent provides a modern example of efforts to deal with illegal actors. 
II.6 The TWAIL Critique 
After the 2nd World War, human rights and later the ICC were seen to be major advances in 
humanitarian law.  International institutions and civil society have been working together to 
prosecute offenders who contravene international humanitarian law.407 These advances 
demonstrate the superiority of the structural arguments.   In spite of this advance, critiques 
emerged in the 1980s who questioned the legitimacy of international law and pointed out the 
need for cross-cultural dialogue as well as common principles.  Such critics from the Global 
South frequently point out binaries such as Civilised/Barbarian, Believer/Infidel, White/Black or 
Advanced/Primitive that under pinned international law during and after colonisation.  
According to this view, these binaries are still in operation under the contemporary labels 
Developed/Developing, Centre/Periphery, Advanced/Emerging or Rich/Poor.  These dualities 
were intended to reveal the larger Eurocentric ethos of international law. 
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TWAIL scholars represent a variety of perspectives and theoretical strands.  Some were more 
moderate than others and did not deny the relevance of international law as it had developed.408  
Others, like David Kennedy and Martti Koskenniemi, emphasized the internal inconsistency of 
mainstream international law, and the “ideological and political bias of supposedly ‘Neutral’ 
legal rules.”409  Feminist and international race theory also criticized the gendered and racist bias 
of what is considered as the ‘objective’ legal categories and instead advocate for an approach 
which includes social and gendered conditions.410 
The acronym TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) first came from the New 
Approaches to International Law (NAIL) movement in the mid-1990s in the United States. 
TWAIL was then developed by some of the NAIL scholars who wanted to support Third World 
interests411 and marginalized states or people who “lag behind in terms of economic growth and 
prosperity as well as political power and influence.”412 In particular, TWAIL scholars emphasize 
the Eurocentric origins of mainstream rules and institutions which they claim marginalize non-
European experiences and practice. This in some ways supports realist theory which argues that 
states act only with respect to their own interests.  
TWAIL, therefore, focuses on the boundaries between the colonized and colonizer countries and 
between the Third World and the West and works to eliminate these boundaries.  During the 
initial stages, TWAIL scholars wanted to make a contribution to international law and global 
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order413  and therefore participated in the law-making process by emphasizing the state’s right to 
self-determination, and by eliminating apartheid and racism in modern international law.414  
Efforts of the Third World states to make some changes through resolutions in the UN General 
Assembly to address the UN Charter, however, were not very successful415 which led some to 
conclude that reform within the existing international law framework was impossible. They came 
to the view that the system itself “is complicit in the subjugation of formerly colonized 
peoples.”416  The principles of non-intervention and sovereignty were considered to bear greater 
prospects for empowering Third World states.  Proponents believe the struggle for sovereignty 
over natural resources is responsible for the problems including oil which seriously affects 
military intervention, military and financial aid, foreign direct investment, sanctions, embargoes, 
and other such foreign policy issues. 417 
Thus, TWAIL represents “an attempt to understand the history, structure and process of 
international law from the perspective of third world states.” 418  A critical third world approach 
goes further and “gives meaning to international law in the context of the lived experiences of 
the ordinary peoples of the third world in order to transform it into an international law of 
emancipation.”419 What brings these disparate views together is the “alienation of international 
law from the peoples of the third world.”420 
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TWAIL looks at the past to help formulate the future.  The historical critique of international law 
and humanitarian laws, a recent instance being the criticisms of the attack on Iraq, sees the 
Western world as representative of a divisive universalism.421 Anghie in “Sovereignty, 
Imperialism and the Making of International Law” considers colonialism to be at the base of 
international law along with the ‘civilized/barbarian separation’422 and suggests unless these 
constraints are understood the problem with international law cannot be fully addressed. In the 
TWAIL approach the colonial origins bring about the alienation of third world peoples from the 
present world order.  Slaughter admits that even international human rights law is constrained by 
the global economy which may allow an imperialist global law to prevail.423   
TWAIL advocates suggest international lawyers need to learn “the grammar of global justice.”424 
It is time that the abstractions of international law are rooted in the empirical world of ordinary 
life and its travails.425 The lawyers in the TWAIL stream are encouraged to take on the role of a 
conscious social actors and to seek acceptable solutions for third world social problems.426 
TWAIL scholars also theoreticize that the problem with contemporary international law is that it 
does not address the everyday divisions of wealth and poverty.  In this way the lawyer would be 
changed from a rule maker to a policy maker to facilitate interstate/intercultural dialogue.    “The 
role of the critical lawyer is to make the oppressive character of international law the weapon of 
the oppressed instead of that of the oppressor.”427  Third World Theory “is a framework within 
which legal scholars argue for the need for international law to reflect a consensus amongst the 
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international community, including newly emerged states.”428  While the Outcome Document 
may not address all of the TWAIL concerns, the original ICISS report was in fact broader in its 
intention to deal with such social justice issues.  This view was ultimately narrowed and 
deepened by the 2005 agreement. 
Overall, the TWAIL historical work contributes to our understanding of the “culture” of 
international law and enhances our appreciation of the relationship between law and culture, law 
and history and law and society as well as drawing our attention to Third World voices.429    I 
would argue, however,  that the analysis of culture and history does not necessarily provide by 
itself resolutions to contemporary problems which requires not only an understanding of non-
western culture but  aspirations in the third world to gain human rights and human dignity in 
what is often an oppressive and murderous government.430  I suggest international law can still 
be a positive force in an international order that is attempting to deal with terrorism, religious 
intolerance, social injustice, numerous violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and 
poverty.431   
The rules and principles that have been developed, if they are acted upon for the values they 
were meant to exhibit makes every sovereign state subject to the same rules it consented to. The 
Third World countries must demand from powerful states equal respect for their sovereignty, but 
also need to continue to ensure they aspire to standards of human rights that have been accepted 
and are worth being accountable to.432  We do not necessarily need to reach a ‘deep’ universality 
on cultural, religious or ideological factors, but we do need a political consensus on some 
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minimum substantive rules that encourage respect for the ‘other,’ across cultures, religions, and 
genders.”433 In effect, let us recognize diversity but let it not result in the end of international 
law. Minimum rules can be a source of inter-cultural debate.  The major objective is not to 
‘throw out the baby with the bathwater’ but to continuously strive for a cross cultural 
understanding of atrocity in the area of human rights.434  Norms provide reasons for action and 
the norm of the Responsibility to Protect, if used as it is intended, holds the possibility of saving 
millions of lives and protecting the rights of oppressed and threatened members of society 
exposed to human atrocities. 
The intention of the thesis is to give consideration to how the international structure needs to 
function in the future and to the kinds of governance and humanitarian values that are necessary 
to support the Responsibility to Protect.    One way however to achieve agreement to act is with a 
preponderance of states in agreement in the international community.  States that agree on the 
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter for humanitarian intervention do so when the 
violations of human rights are of an order that the principles of sovereignty and non intervention 
need be trumped.  Support for interventions may include the following:  (1) the anti-
interventionist regime is out of sync with modern notions of justice (2) without air strikes there 
would have been a large refugee movement that threatened the peace and security of other 
regions (3) all peaceful means had been tried (4) better to uphold basic principles selectively than 
not at all (5) the policy was norm driven (according to international humanitarian law) rather 
than interest driven.435  The decision, however, must include active consultation with key Third 
World States, must be transparent and the international community must be involved and 
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decisions must be made on a case by case basis.  In Chapter 10, B.S. Chimni suggests the 
promotion of human right matters less in terms of a critique of the doctrine of sovereignty but on 
the “elimination of neo-imperial economic policies and practices.”436 He says the conflict 
between sovereignty and the commitment of the international community to prevent gross human 
rights abuses can be resolved by adhering to a legitimate non-unilateral intervention within the 
UN.437  
The next chapter focuses on how the responsibility to protect has evolved in the global 
governance context, with a particular focus on the role of Non-governmental organizations. The 
chapter introduces Nongovernmental Organizations that have taken hold of the Responsibility to 
Protect principle along with the rights of the individual and that call on governments of the world 
to adopt the moral choice and protect civilians in violent conflict.  These organizations tend to be 
freer to adopt the moral high ground which has enabled them to advocate for the Responsibility 
to Protect with less reservation.  The cooperation of NGOs and international organizations and 
states suggest the consideration in greater depth of transnational or supranational forms of 
governance and of what form of governance is best suited (either from a practical or idealist 
vision) to address some of these issues. 
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Chapter Six:  Sovereignty, NGOs,  
Globalization and Governance 
 
I.  Introduction 
Up until the 1990’s the possibility that any action could be taken against sovereign states through 
intervention in order to address massive bloodshed (call it genocide or ethnic cleansing) was 
nearly inconceivable.438  When the 'Cold War' ended in 1991, military confrontations between 
states became less of a threat.  The U.S. emerged as the main superpower and open financial 
transactions flowed along with worldwide communication under the umbrella of globalization.   
Keohane and Nye define globalization as a “state of the world involving networks of 
interdependence at multicultural distances.”439  Falk describes ‘globalization’ as transnational 
social forces concerned with environmental protection, human rights and peace and human 
security from below.”440   
One type of globalization is social/cultural and others are economic, military and 
environmental.441  Increased community interdependencies, new threats and weakened states as a 
result of globalization prompted consideration of the need for ethical action. One of the main 
ways in which ethical concerns have been brought to the fore is through humanitarian 
intervention and human rights.  The UN concern for human rights increased, and steps were 
taken to protect the rights of people through humanitarian intervention in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, 
Bosnia and Kosovo (although not all interventions were legal).  This increased attention to 
                                                            
438 Macdonald, Patman and Mason-Parker 2007 supra note 102.   
439 Robert Keohane,  and Joseph Nye, ‘Globalization:  What’s New?  What’s Not?  (And so What)” (2000) Foreign 
Policy, 118  p. 105 –Macdonald, Patman and Mason-Parker 2007 at 9 supra note 102 [Keohane and Nye 2000]. 
440 Julie Mertus, “Considering Non State Actors in the New Millenium: Towards Expanded Participation in Norms 
Generation and Norm Application” (New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 32 No. 2. 
Winter 2000) p. 547. 
441 Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, (2000) supra note 439 at 9. 
  141 
 
human rights illustrates how the world can in fact respond to moral and ethical issues.  Along 
with this was the promotion of democracy.  
In 1994 the Clinton Administration in its Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 had stated it 
would only participate in peacekeeping operations if they were in the national interest.442  This 
adherence to realpolitik of the West permitted millions to die in Bosnia, Rwanda and the Congo 
while the world sat by.  Later, however, Clinton realized the new wars could cause international 
security problems and could indeed affect their domestic interests which helped to bring idealism 
and realpolitik together.443     
The approval of the Responsibility to Protect in 2005 to address human atrocities and the 
tensions regarding the self-interest of autonomous states was aided by changing governance 
structures.  The current system of governance in which the Responsibility is important to its 
continued evolution. 
II. Governance 
For such a challenge as the acceptance or implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, where 
there is a great deal of disagreement, there needs to be some form of governance that can ensure 
the fairest distribution of the burdens imposed, as well as a means for making a collective 
decision that all persons and states who are members will regard as binding upon them.  This 
means that such an institution will have legitimacy – the right to rule over this issue, with 
morally binding force on the decision for even those who disagree and must sacrifice.  And this, 
of course, is the crux of the problem.  While we have those who facilitate achievement of this 
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goal, there are those who definitely detract from and impede its success.  The successful 
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect norm will require the legitimacy of the UN to be 
strengthened and defended against actions that lead to skepticism and mistrust.   
Kahler defines governance simply as ‘a set of authority relationships’ but argues that the scope 
of governance has expanded from being concentrated in national governments to the increasing 
influence of organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).444  Rhodes suggests governance pertains to a 
new process or method for governing.445 Policy is not determined by central government and is 
not imposed from above, and no one actor has all the information or the complete overview – 
rather, there is an interdependency.  Governance is more encompassing than government because 
not only governmental organizations are involved but so are informal, Nongovernmental 
Organizations.446  According to my definition, governance is about networks which are self-
organizing, autonomous and not accountable to the state but in some ways interdependent. 
Governance is ultimately a system of social and political authority relationships in the exercise of 
power and policy.  The new governance is presumably working to dissolve the distinction 
between state and civil society and is empowering citizens.  
Slaughter, for example, has a vision, in fact a grand vision, of ‘a New World Order which can 
provide for broader, more cohesive decision making.'447  The building blocks for this new world 
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order would not be states but parts of states: e.g. courts, regulatory agencies, ministries, and 
legislatures.  The new world would still include traditional international organizations such as the 
UN and WTO, and states would continue to interact as unitary states on important issues such as 
security.  Slaughter then speculates, with a kind of ‘governance idealism’ that seems to include 
no enforcement mechanism, that the new world order of government networks would be more 
effective and more just. The primary political authority would remain with states, except where 
they delegate their authority to supranational institutions.  National government officials would 
be operating at both the domestic and the international level to implement their international 
obligations while representing the interests of their country.  They would ideally work with their 
foreign and supranational counterparts to disseminate and distill information, cooperate in 
enforcing national and international laws, harmonize national laws and regulations, and address 
common problems.  Cooperation is obviously essential, and the mechanisms for obtaining 
adherence or for enforcement unclear.     
Slaughter refers to the globalization paradox identified by Robert Keohane - that while 
international institutions are regarded as outdated and inadequate, world government is not 
desirable.  The EU, she suggests presents an alternative ‘transnational option’ – rather than a 
‘World Government.’  To many, of course, world government is a frightening concept.  Global 
governance is championed as a much looser and less threatening conception of collective 
organization and regulation, without coercion. A major element of global governance, in turn, 
has been the rise of global policy networks. 
Slaughter also introduces the concept of the ‘disaggregated state’ which she explains differs from 
the unitary state which performs unitary actions by independent nations.  In an international legal 
system premised on unitary states, cooperation is negotiated over many years and eventually 
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signed and ratified through the establishment of an international secretariat. The states 
participating in these negotiations are presumed to speak with one voice.  Slaughter writes that 
“Looking at the international system through the lens of unitary states leads us to focus on 
traditional international organizations and institutions created by and composed of formal state 
delegations.” 448  A disaggregated world order would have numerous government networks.  
They would be bilateral, plurilateral, regional or global.  Taken together, they would provide the 
basis for global governance.  Regulation would occur by networks at the global level represented 
by citizens rather than the state.  And it is among these networks that NGOs gain their voice. 
Those with links between counterpart national officials across borders are labeled as ‘horizontal 
government networks.’ ‘Vertical government networks’ are those between national government 
officials and their supranational counterparts where the rare decision has been made by states to 
delegate their sovereignty to an institution above them with real power – a court or a regulatory 
commission.  More traditional international organizations would also exist alongside government 
networks. Slaughter confines the use of the term network to government units and defines 
networks as a “pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working 
across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the ‘domestic’ from 
the ‘international’ sphere.”449  She does not really take into account the wide range of NGOs, 
civic and corporate entities, which to my mind, are essential to any transnational governance 
arrangement and in particular instrumental in supporting the principle.  As such, I would include 
them in any notion of global governance.   
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Slaughter’s new world  order has a utopian vision – it would present  “a system of global 
governance based on cooperation that would sufficiently contain conflict that the world might 
achieve greater peace and prosperity,  and reach minimum standards of human dignity.”450  
While the goals are laudable, the mechanisms for governance might not be sufficient.  Another 
alternative is to give more consideration to the structure and function of the UN and international 
organizations which will be discussed later in the thesis.  In addition, states will continue to 
evolve mechanisms for reaggregation and continue to act with each other as unitary actors.   
But what is the power behind international networks, and what sort of enforcement mechanism 
might that be for their involvement in decision-making?  How does Slaughter imagine these 
various networks can actually influence political, economic, and social outcomes to achieve 
substantive results?  It is commonly understood that much of the work of horizontal government 
networks, for example, depends on soft power – the power of information, socialization, 
persuasion and discussion.  She suggests that government networks, both as they exist now and 
as they could exist, nevertheless have access to traditional hard or coercive power, since the 
power to implement already exists at the national level.  But some fear that that the informality 
and flexibility of networks is a way to avoid the formal constraints of representation, rules and 
negotiating procedures of traditional international organizations.  A major question occurs about 
how accountability, legitimacy, and/or democracy is achieved. Who would be the watchdog? 
There is a perceptual concern that powerful nations may overpower weaker ones, which already 
happens.  Slaughter proposes, particularly in response to these concerns, that government 
officials be held accountable for their activities, not only to specific national constitutions but to 
a hypothetical global polity.   
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This brings us back to the importance of the logic of appropriateness and constructionist 
arguments.  Five basic principles are proposed by Slaughter to ensure an inclusive, tolerant, 
respectful and decentralized world order.  I agree that these principles are indeed important and 
need to be honoured in any transnational system that includes international organizations and 
civil society:    
1) Global deliberative equality is to be achieved by the principle of inclusion and the 
maximization of the possibilities of participation, both by individual and groups at the level 
of national and transnational society and by nations of all kinds at the level of the state; 
2)  Ministers, heads of state, courts, legislators and bureaucrats from distinct cultural 
traditions, and demographic and geographic entities must recognize the validity of each 
other’s approach -  the notion of legitimate difference and the principle of pluralism; 
3) Positive comity and the principle of affirmative cooperation;  
4) Through the implementation of checks and balances whereby the distribution of power is 
always fluid on both horizontal and vertical axes; and 
5) Subsidiarity and the principles of locating governance at the lowest possible level, whether 
local, regional national or supranational.451  
Such values would represent a ‘Just World Order.’   The state is not disappearing, it is 
disaggregating.  Regulators, judges and legislators are finding their domestic jobs have a 
growing international dimension where they encounter their foreign counterparts. 
In summary, part of Slaughter’s blueprint for the future addresses sovereignty, which she 
suggests could be disaggregated and attached to specific institutions such as courts, regulatory 
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agencies and legislators. The core characteristic of sovereignty would shift from autonomy from 
outside interference to the capacity to participate in transgovernmental networks of all types.  
This would strengthen the government institutions and in return they could help rebuild states 
ravaged by conflict, weakened by poverty, disease and privatization or stalled in transition from 
dictatorship to democracy.  This theoretical position may be seen as a ‘solution’ or ‘response’ in 
many ways to Krasner’s organized hypocrisy where agreement means that sovereign, diverse and 
independent entities are bound to remain beyond reach. 
While the intent of my thesis is not to imagine or conceptualize a new world order, it is 
concerned with analyzing the current system of governance in which the Responsibility to 
Protect exists and is operationalized and to draw out the strengths and weaknesses of  the system 
in relation to its evolution. Edgar Grande’s and Louis W. Pauly’s work entitled Complex 
Sovereignty:  Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty first Century tackles two central 
issues of the thesis (those of sovereignty and international and transnational governance).452 In 
Chapter I Reconstituting Political Authority:  Sovereignty, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy in a 
Transnational Order three basic concepts are introduced:  political authority, statehood, and 
sovereignty.    The main thrust of the book is directed toward the tension between the reassertion 
of political authority by sovereign states and the emergence of dilemmas that cannot be resolved 
by radically decentralized decision-making structures.  
The weakness in Slaughter’s model is that it involves a concept of disaggregation which in my 
opinion goes too far away from the central unity of the UN (at least in theory if not always in 
practice).  What are the consequences of this type of tension for Grande and Pauly?   For Grande 
                                                            
452 Edgar Grande and Louis W. Pauly Complex Sovereignty:  Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty first 
Century University of Toronto Press (Toronto:  Buffalo, 2007) [Grande and Pauly 2007]. 
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and Pauly, this tension leads to a consideration of new forms of governance, and to the key 
question of whether there are any new instruments for coordinating political activities that may 
cross traditional territories and functional borders.  They emphasize, nevertheless, that states 
seem to be more important than ever for the production of public goods such as security and 
welfare and are therefore not a thing of the past.  They use as an example the attack by Bin 
Laden on the World Trade Center and the ensuing war against the Taliban and the invasion of 
Iraq as evidence that the security state has re-emerged.  In doing so, they conclude that 
sovereignty still exists as a relevant attribute of states.  It certainly has raised its head in Russia 
and Syria’s fight against any external intervention in the prolonged and unfortunate civil war and 
now in the battle over the Ukraine. 
In spite of the continuing importance of states, they suggest the conceptualizations and practices 
of sovereignty are undergoing a period of transformation and the internal and external 
dimensions of the sovereignty of the state are emerging. This leads to a transnational polity that 
is based on a high degree of coordination, both internal and external.  We might note, however, 
that they do not go so far as to call this ‘a new world order,’ or even a transformed world order, 
but they do see the change as a “significant deepening in the complexity of sovereignty.”453  
They also note new modes of cooperation between public and private actors (policy networks 
and public private partnerships) although they do not spend a lot of time illustrating the role of 
private actors, which to my mind is a gap in the work.   
While authority until recently tended to be centred in the state, the shift that is occurring affects 
the basic institutions, principles, norms and procedures of contemporary policy making,  public 
authority and power across territorial levels.  Grande and Pauly note that although there are new 
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types of governing arrangements evolving, the key locus of political authority remains the state. 
A key feature of the modern state is its monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force which 
excludes individuals, groups and organizations from actively participating in legitimate means of 
exercising coercion.  This is delineated through four principles (which in fact are essential parts 
of Weber’s conception):  the principle of sovereignty,  implied by the ‘monopoly of legitimate 
coercion; the principle of territoriality, which keeps the exercise of authority within the 
territorial boundaries of the state (except in self defense); the principle of rational legitimacy, 
which requires that political authority must necessarily (although not exclusively) be based on 
formal rules and a consistent, codified legal order, rather than on traditions of charisma; and, the 
principle of bureaucratic institutionalization that “guarantees that sovereign powers are 
exercised permanently, reliably and uniformly within a given territory.”454  
A key argument for them is that if a fundamental transformation of the modern state is taking 
place, one would expect these principles to be significantly affected.  They accept that the state 
and sovereignty is highly contested, but their argument is that sovereignty and the state are two 
sides of the same coin.  Sovereignty is what distinguishes the modern state from its feudal 
predecessor.  The real change can be described in more complex terms. They criticize recent 
analyses of the modern state where sovereignty and governance have tended to be 
conceptualized in zero sum terms (i.e. as fully present or entirely absent from a given political 
structure).  Any evidence of change must be associated with state decline.  They view the 
practice, expression and theoretical conceptualization of sovereignty as an evolving, changing or 
more flexible concept which is subject to change.455  It seems reasonable to view the state-
sovereignty versus transnational polity dichotomy as a continuum with shifts in balance rather 
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than a complete split.  Rather than tying sovereignty to the state alone, we might broaden it to 
include the state and other forms of governance as discussed earlier in this chapter.   
It is important for the reader to keep in mind that the Responsibility to Protect only comes into 
relevance when the State is “unwilling or unable” to protect its own citizens.  The state in that 
situation is failing in its sovereign duty.  Of course, when a decision re the Responsibility to 
Protect is required in the Security Council, states may be less concerned with the case at hand 
than they are about future cases which might infringe on their own sovereignty. Grande and 
Pauly develop a more refined concept of sovereignty that is based on the following propositions:  
1) Internal and external sovereignty must be distinguished.  The internal relationship lies 
between state and society (i.e. the state’s autonomy from society) and the external 
dimension refers to the state’s external relations in the international system (i.e. the 
state’s independence from other states).   Internal sovereignty relies on domestic 
consensus, while external sovereignty is premised on recognition by other states.   In 
summary, sovereignty can be divided and transformed without losing its substance. (This 
is reminiscent of Krasner). 
2) The two dimensions of sovereignty, internal and external – can develop separately from 
one another, and can have separate trajectories of development.  In the matter of 
transition of governance, we are more concerned with the external rights of the state and 
its internal performance of its duties.456 
In the case of the Responsibility to Protect, external sovereignty must predominate when internal 
sovereignty has failed.  The three essential elements of the doctrine of external sovereignty, 
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beginning in the 19th C. are as follows: states are defined as the basic units of the international 
system; all states are considered to be legally equal; and, state sovereignty is understood to mean 
freedom from external interference. The separation of state powers into external and internal 
sovereignty is important when we contemplate the question of intervention.  States are concerned 
with external sovereignty when they look at situations of crisis in other states and decide the 
appropriate action. Grande and Pauly note there is already the emergence of a transnational 
human rights regime that has gradually been superseding the legitimacy of states and their 
insistence on non-interference.  The developing paradigm of a ‘Responsibility to Protect 
vulnerable human beings, regardless of any resistance put forward by local government 
authorities,’ is part of what they see as a shift toward ‘transnational sovereignty.’  This type of 
sovereignty differs in at least two respects:  1) In principle it weakens the role of traditional 
states in international relations; and 2) It qualifies, at times even suspends, the immunity of states 
from external influence.    
This in fact provides a good description of the transnational sovereignty as it exists, or needs to 
exist, for the Responsibility to Protect to be implemented.  Are Grande and Pauly in fact positing 
a third type of ‘sovereignty,’ which transcends the internal and the external and moves to the 
transnational level and sustains a third level of hierarchical authority or power? Among scholars 
of international relations, the observation and analysis of such developments is central to key 
debates within the field and to our comprehension of the principle of the Responsibility to 
Protect as the fundamental principle of the thesis. 
Certain dimensions of what is taking place at the international level depends on a framework that 
goes beyond the usual internal-external understanding of sovereignty as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon that comprises territorial, functional, and political aspects of the contemporary 
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experience of governance.  This reconstitution occurs because  "The Nation state has lost its 
monopoly on collectively binding decision-making in the production of public goods”457 --  that 
is,  private actors now play a greater role in the production of public goods; there is a continuous 
reassessment and redefinition of public functions leading to a functional reconstruction of public 
authority; and, there are new and unique issues of democratic legitimacy in governance due to  
shortcomings in  participation, representation and control.     
The significance of this to my own work is in Grande and Pauly’s attention to the increasing 
importance of regional and transnational levels of governance; the increased significance and 
influence of private actors along with an increasing reliance on non-hierarchical and majoritarian 
methods of conflict resolution at the national, regional and international levels.  As a 
qualification, however, they do suggest that the emergence of new forms of governance does not 
necessarily mean that they will become the dominant or exclusive forms in the 21st C, nor does 
this emergence imply that they will be stable, effective and ultimately legitimate.  At the 
moment, the state remains the key locus of authority and international law holds the authority.  
The persistence of the idea of sovereignty is historical and serves as a construct that permits 
weaker states to protect themselves from more powerful ones. But we do need to recognize the 
changes in and alternatives of power nodules that are taking place. 
In certain situations polities are conquered and occupied and the occupying power attempts to set 
up a new governing structure.  (Contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq are cases in point.)  
Transitional administration and foreign assistance to improve governance are presumably based 
on the principle that states will ultimately function effectively on their own, once local 
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authorities are empowered to assume the responsibility for their own sovereignty. 458  
Occasionally such interventions are touted as examples of the Responsibility to Protect at work; 
they are not – and I will show why they are not, particularly in Chapter Seven of the thesis which 
sets out the criteria for the legitimacy of the Libyan intervention. The Iraq war, for example 
rested on the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self defense (PESD) and the assumption that there 
were weapons of mass destruction (wmd) in Iraq.  Bush’s doctrine was tied to democratic 
sovereignty and international peace and stability. Nineteenth century international law allowed 
for the sovereign state recourse to force and emphasized a distinction between civilized and 
uncivilized states.  Uncivilized states were therefore not sovereign and lacked rights and thus 
could be legally attacked and conquered in an effort to civilize them.459   “Bush’s PESD doctrine 
attempted to expand the legal use of force and is intimately connected to the concept of illegal or 
rogue state against which such force may be directed.” 460  
As suggested, when we look more closely at processes or methods for governing the 
interdependent relationships between the multitude of players in the national, international and 
transnational level we find new forms of governance which function in self-organizing, 
autonomous and interdependent networks using soft principles such as negotiation, cooperation 
and alliance formation as opposed to coercion, command and control. What Anne-Marie 
Slaughter adds to this debate is the importance of not only states in the matter of international 
decision making regarding rules and norms, but of other key governmental players in the 
network and of their role in decision making.  This analysis encourages us to look at how the 
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networks of nongovernmental or non-state actors may function to make the Responsibility to 
Protect principle as a soft law more effective as part of a new form of governance.   
In A New World Order (2004), while Slaughter primarily speaks of networks involving 
governments, officials, national regulators, judges and legislators as well as terrorists, arms and 
drug dealers, she points out they all operate through global networks, through the exchange of 
information and the coordination of activity.  She adds that these government networks are 
underappreciated, under supported, and underused to address the central problems of global 
governance, as we may say are NGOs and civil society generally.  This is one of the grounds for 
the thesis’ focus on the role of NGOs and civil society as actors in governance networks; that is 
to show how NGOs have had a significant role in its development and any decisions toward 
implementation as they currently may occur.  Evan if the Responsibility to Protect does evolve 
into common law I suggest these networks will still remain important.    
While aims and subject areas may differ, Slaughter suggests there are certain functions common 
to them all:  they expand regulatory reach; build trust, establish relationships and are motivated 
to establish a good reputation – the conditions necessary for long-term cooperation - and, 
exchange information, and build databases.  The networks of nongovernmental actors are also 
expanding their soft power (the power of persuasion and information) –the kind of soft power 
that Joseph Nye has been exhorting the United States to use along with their hard power.461  
Pauly speaks to the transnational cooperation state or the network state.462 He, like the others, 
attributes part of this change to the human rights regime and the Responsibility to Protect which 
are superseding the legitimacy of the state, resulting in a shift toward transnational sovereignty.  
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As a consequence, there may be a new historical cluster of power.  Where the nation state has 
lost its monopoly in the production of public goods, international organizations have gained 
strength. If the world is to accept the responsibility to act in a cohesive manner when it comes to 
international crises these networks must be instrumental at the global level. 
The value of these three authors’ work (Slaughter, Krasner and Pauly) to the thesis is the focus 
on the tension between  the political authority of the state and centralized decision making at the 
transnational or international level;  e.g. a form of global governance or transnational polity 
based on cooperation - or is it coercion? - With questions about its authority, stability and 
legitimacy.  Indeed, cooperation and coordination is an essential aspect of the transition to global 
governance.    According to Pauly, states are not a thing of the past, but are transforming.  This 
leads to a new transnational polity based on coordination representing a new model of 
cooperation between public and private actors; i.e. a new form of governance.  But he stresses 
that the new form of governance does not replace the state.  All three envisage the future of the 
international regime.  Pauly perceives the possibility of a transnational cooperative state with the 
state remaining the locus of authority.  Krasner also predicts that the state will remain the key 
locus of authority.  Slaughter has the grandest vision, however - A New World Order – leading 
to peace and prosperity.  
My own work and its prospect for the future of the Responsibility to Protect governance requires 
a form of cooperation in which the Responsibility to Protect can function in all three aspects - 
preventing, reacting and rebuilding - and concentrates on the tension between cooperative forms 
of governance at the international or transnational level and competition or conflict between 
states which still goes on.  My overall concern is the need for the Responsibility to Protect to be 
successful - without a high level of cooperation and/or a supranational authority structure it is 
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subject to failure in the current political structure.  With changes in global values and global 
governance away from the sovereignty of the state as a primary principle (which assures the right 
of self-determination, state autonomy and protection from intervention), toward the public good 
of responsibility of the global system to protect human life and the citizens of the world, 
however, there exist tremendous possibilities.  We need to continue to understand, however, 
more fully the impediments and the drivers to the challenge of cooperation when it comes to the 
acceptance of any form of “humanitarian responsibility.”  Ultimately we need to continue to 
emphasize the critical importance of the humanitarian principles we have established.     
The next portion of this Chapter takes us deeper into the changing relationship between the state, 
sovereignty and global governance by exploring in greater depth the role of civil society actors 
and NGOs in the development of the Responsibility to Protect.  As we track the norm in more 
detail, its evolution and those impediments that have stood in its way, the thesis provides a ‘thick 
description’ from key actors and civil society organizations which facilitate better understanding 
of the evolution of the norm and its complexity. 
III. International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) as Nonstate Actors (NSAs) 
International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) as Non-States Actors includes a variety 
of entities.  In this thesis NGO refers to the group of private transnational actors with both 
private and public purposes. The Acronym NGO is most widely used.  The term actor is part of 
international legal terminology.  The inclusion of the state as subjects of international law did not 
include the development of a legal theory pertaining to ‘transnational actors.’  However, 
International Relations and Political Science are more generally receptive to transnational actors 
and in the 1980s multi-actor models expanded the State-centric one.  This led to the “policy 
network approach” which operates on the assumption that policies are not formulated or 
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implemented or enforced by governmental actors only. Interaction occurs between state, market 
and civil society, although state-centric views of the relative importance of states and NSAs such 
as Realism and Neo-realism continue to exist.463  The recognition of NSAs has led to an 
increased dialogue between NSAs, international law and international relations and any analyses 
of the dialogue tend to be interdisciplinary.  
Distinguishing INGOs from other NSAs focuses the legal discourse on ‘international legal 
personality’; their role in international law-making processes; and their institutional 
arrangements with international governmental organizations (IGOs).464  Michael Byers focuses 
in the role of INGOs on the development of customary international law, especially in the field 
of human rights, although he refers to it as an ‘indirect’ or ‘secondary’ role.465   
III.1 Conceptual frameworks outside personality 
Some scholars, for practical and doctrinal reasons do not focus on recognized formal legal status 
when considering transnational actors.  They deal with ‘international actors’ instead of ‘legal 
persons.’  Byers argues that NGOs do not have legal personality, however which enables states 
to consider each other as equal sovereigns. I am interested in NGOs as actors in the international 
and transnational legal framework.  This does not wholly avoid the question of state sovereignty 
but the standpoint is outside the existing doctrinal law scheme of state-centered international 
law.466   
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Nye refers to the soft power and the political and moral influence that ‘global civil society’may 
gain in formulating evolving norms and institutions of law.467  Another approach examines the 
limits of international personality and assesses the possibilities for its expansion.468  
Discussions of the normative position of INGOs whether de lege lata (regarding existing law) or 
de lege ferenda (regarding soft law) are entwined with the general debate on the scope of state 
sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world.  It is often legitimacy rather than legality 
that may be the defining factor and “the legitimacy in turn may be based on the capacity for 
effective [rather] than the possession of a decisive legal case.”469 
There is a range of legal capacity for subjects of international law including those recognized by 
international customary law and secondly those entities that are dependent on the agreement of 
the former.  The first category includes states while the second category includes international 
organizations and institutions.470   
Prior to the First World War, sovereign states were the sole members of the international legal 
order which was categorized as “European, Christian, mercantilist and imperialist.”471  The 
promotion of the right of peoples to self-determination was intended to allow for an increasingly 
universal regime which reinforced the relationship between the State and individual.472  The new 
order included three agents: the State, the Community of Nations and transnational civil society.  
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International law was intended to become the law of a world community which in some ways 
undermined the sovereignty of these states.”473  
…Globalization has created new forces, new non-territorial actors whose influence 
partially deterritorializes the notion of state sovereignty.  Globalization brings a concept 
no longer limited to to territorial control, but which extends to participating functions in 
an overriding, non-territory-based system.” 474 
Higgins rejects the traditional concept of subjects in international law and suggests adopting the 
concept of ‘international legal participants’ which includes individuals, corporations and 
INGOs.475 The notion of international legal personality implies that the entity has an “active 
position in international relations and takes part in the law-making process.” 476 
Investigation of what INGOs actually do and how they do it is indeed important in order to 
properly evaluate their status of legal capacity – both de lege lata and de lege ferenda.” 477 
III.2 Defining INGOs 
Charnovitz defines NGOs as  
groups of individuals organized for the myriad of reasons that engage human imagination 
and aspiration, which can be set up to advocate a particular cause, such as human rights, 
or to carry out programs on the ground, such as disaster relief, and who can have 
membership ranging from local to global.478   
The UN system describes the INGO as non-profit entities whose members are citizens or 
associations of one or more countries and who activities are determined by the collective will of 
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its members in response to the needs of the members of one or more communities with which the 
NGO cooperates.”479   
IV. Role and Relevance of INGOs 
It is difficult to quantify or measure the activity of INGOs.  Therefore evaluations must draw on 
subjective assumptions.  Kofi Annan suggests loose coalitions of international institutions, civil 
society, and private sector organizations and national governments merge together “in pursuit of 
common goals.”480  One way to see this movement towards ‘commonality’ can be seen through 
their efforts toward cooperation and collaboration. 
Slaughter uses a paradigm of international relations to analyze the role of INGOs in international 
law-making.  She suggests NGOs take part in “international law making by providing political, 
technical, and informational benefits to States.”481  INGOs constitute transnational society 
according to this model.  Preuss argues “Mankind is evolving into a social community that 
provides the moral community with the means to protect its moral principles” i.e., through INGO 
activity.  He suggests these transnational actors may play a key role in the protection of human 
rights.”482 
For Otto, too, INGOs “not only play a dominant constructive role, but also a moral one.483  
Mertus acknowledges the role of non-State actors in the development of international norms and 
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Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 285 (2000) at 9. 
480 R. Ann “We the Peoples:  The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century – Millenium Report of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations” para. 336-338. 
481 Slaughter 2000 supra note 479 at 33. 
482 U.K. Preuss “The Force, Frailty, and Future of Human Rights Under Globalization” in Conference on Judgment 
in the Shadow of the Holocaust, Theoretical Inquiries in Law (Vol. 1, No. 2 July 2000, Tel-Aviv University) p. 283, 
301  
483 D. Otto, “Non-governmental Organizations in the United Nations System:  The Emerging Role of International 
Civil Society, Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 18, 1996) 107, p. 129-136. 
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identity formation and explains that “by using the language of international human rights treaties 
and other governmental documents,” INGOs become ‘interpretive communities’ for norms that 
may not have gained the same level as the status of law.484  Mertus does not claim NGOs are at 
the same level as States in customary law formation, but does conclude they play a significant 
role in how laws and norms develop. 485  “Their interpretation and behavior accord meaning to 
legal norms, and also contribute to the “legitimacy of the principles and rules which are 
adopted.”486 
Gamble and Kim recognize the role of INGOs in international law-making487  through “judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most legally qualified publicists.” (e.g. scholars and 
experts).488  NGOs also submit information and arguments to the Court (the ICJ) which can lead 
to the long-term development of international law.”489  Overall, Ben Ari concludes that INGOs 
have mastered so-called soft law instruments as part of contemporary international law.490  I am 
interested in their participation in international law-making and proponents of emerging soft and 
hard law. 
One of the problems of INGOs is the prospect of their remaining neutral which may be 
jeopardized by the receipt of government and private funds.  It has also been argued that many 
INGOs are Western-based.491  On the positive side INGOs may provide links between the global 
and local participation and provides alternate channels to the government for excluded minority 
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groups.  More transparency is recommended which would reveal and discourage the exercise of 
influence by national governments. 
V. The Legal Status of INGOs 
A point of reference to the current legal status of INGOs under public international law appears 
in Article 71 of the UN Charter, regional mechanisms and Treaties.492 The relationship between 
the UN and NGOs is formalized through Articles 63 and 64 of the UN Charter which specify that 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) “is responsible for consulting with international 
and, where appropriate, national organizations.”  The only official mention of ‘NGO’ comes in 
Article 71, where it states ECOSOC “may make suitable arrangements for consultation with 
Nongovernmental Organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence’.”493 
NGOs have been granted ‘consultative status’ in the United Nations and other IGOs such as 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe have 
incorporated NGOs into their frameworks and established guidelines for cooperation.494   Article 
71 of the UN Charter 1945 introduced a new standardized form of cooperation between actors in 
an international society.495   In accordance with Article 71 certain resolutions define how the 
relationship should work.  (See for example Resolution 1996/31, the Consultative relationship 
between the United Nations and Nongovernmental Organizations, sections 9 to 13).496   Martens 
suggests there is no codified legal status nor widely adopted international convention on the law 
                                                            
492 The European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International INGOs, 1986. 
493 Anthony McDermott, (1998):  The UN and NGOs:  Humanitarian Interventions in future conflicts, (19) 3 
Contemporary Security Policy, 1-26 at 2 [McDermott 1998]. 
494 Kerstin Martens, “Examining the (Non-) Status of NGOs” (2001) 10.t2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 
1-24 at 6 [Martens 2001]. 
495 UN Charter art. 71 (“The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with 
Nongovernmental Organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.  Such arrangements may 
be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with 
the Member of the United Nations concerned".) Martens, 2001 ibid at 15. 
496 Resolution 1996/31, sections 9 to 13) accessed at 
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/Resolution_1996_31/Part_1.htm 
  163 
 
of NGOs.497    “As a result, NGOs are obliged to accept the national legislation of the state in 
which they have been established and where they are based.”498    Since national laws differ, 
their status also varies from country to country.  The only recognized agreement on NGOs is the 
European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International 
Nongovernmental Organizations which provides for the general recognition of the legal 
personality of an NGO in any state that is party to the convention.499 
When we consider patterns of governance in transnational NGOs their significance becomes 
clear as a purposive activity which I have chosen to illustrate by conducting interviews with 
transnational NGO individuals and coalitions.  The empirically-based portion of the research 
shows that a number of NGOs have formed coalitions with other NGOs in order to be more 
influential in global politics.  The amount of state cooperation with NGOs and the devolution of 
responsibility to NGOs is considerable and growing.500  NGOs try to influence political actors 
through the way they frame and steer issues.   
A consideration of norms is particularly relevant in situations of power asymmetries, 
such as those between NGOs and IFIs, where framing and steering can to some degree be 
facilitated by normative appeals by the less powerful to influence the more powerful.501   
Nevertheless, governance is not backed by formal authority in the manner in which governments 
are.502 
Rosenau refers to governance as post internationalist, contending that governance “encompasses   
the activities of government, but it also includes the many other channels through which 
                                                            
497 Martens 2001 supra note 494 at 19. 
498 Martens 2001 ibid at 21. 
499 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/124.htm Martens, 2001 supra note 494 
500 Helen Yanacopulos, “Patterns of Governance:  The Rise of Transnational Coalitions of NGOs” Global Society, 
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501   Yanacopulo  2005 ibid at 250. 
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commands flow in the form of goals framed,  directives issued and policies pursued.”503    
Governance includes the state, non-state or intergovernmental actors.   The literature on 
transnational relations (regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is 
a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental 
organization)504  has been used to explain the enhanced standing of non-state actors.  Both 
transnational relations literature and governance literature discuss how a principle commenced at 
the transnational level can have a major impact on the global diffusion of values, norms and 
ideas. 
Cognitive framing is a necessary component in the political strategies of networks.  The way in 
which issues are framed affects governance activity.505    NGOs tend to bring perspectives that 
differ from other actors and present evidence and arguments that offer alternate perspectives 
which states sometimes adopt.506  We can see this as steering which is a fundamental aspect of 
governance.507  NGOs therefore influence through steering or persuasion and by offering added 
value.  Because governance is of a voluntary nature, norm structures provide legitimacy and 
political support. 
Civil society is increasingly defined as a field populated by political subjects whose 
autonomy, expertise and ability to responsibly channel political will-formation has 
become crucial to the tasks of governing.508 
Civil society is altered from a passive object of government to an entity that is both an object and 
subject of government.509  Civil society actors can in this way be seen to hold both power and 
                                                            
503   J. Rosenau “Governance in the Twenty first Century”, Global Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995) 14 [Rosenau 
1995]. 
504  T. Kisse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back” in Non-state actors, domestic structures and 
International Institutions (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1995) [Kisse-Kappen 1995]. 
505 Yanacopulos 2005 supra note 500 at 260. 
506 Yanacopulos 2005 ibid at 260. 
507 Yanacopulos 2005 ibid at 262. 
508 Ole Jacob Sending, and Iver B. Neumann “Governance to Governmentality:  Analyzing NGOs, States and 
Power,” (2006) 59 International Studies Quarterly, 651-672 at 669 [Sending and Neumann 2006]. 
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autonomy. The regulation of landmines is cited as an example of “how nonstate actors have 
assumed a more powerful role in global governance” and civil society is seen as a key asset for 
the “formulation of new policies.”510  Neumann discusses the history of the landmines 
convention when certain Norwegian NGOs allied with other NGOs and  over time persuaded or 
‘shamed’ or in some other way made the Norwegian government support both politically and in 
a financial way the advocacy on behalf of the landmines ban.511  
Of course the relationship between state and civil society varies from country to country.  In 
some cases the state may control civil society and be unreceptive to their views.  In the 
landmines case, on the other hand, states and NGOs interacted as a “technology of agency” by 
which “non-state actors perform[ed] governance functions by virtue of their technical expertise, 
advocacy and capacity for political will-formation.”512  The Norwegian People’s Aid [NPA],  
and the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC) were key players in a process  that resulted in 
a large activism movement at the international level against antipersonnel land-mines.  The NPA 
acted therefore not only as an object of the state, but also as a subject and the NAC was a central 
actor in shaping official Norwegian policy.513 The Norwegian government drew on the practical 
knowledge and expertise of the NGOs.    Here civil society represented a variety of actors who 
bound together to advocate for a humanitarian principle as opposed to a state or a UN based 
disarmament process.514   
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Abeles refers to ‘global politics’ as a system which undermines the traditional view of 
government, and includes Nongovernmental Organizations which exert great influence on the 
power and actions of nation states, making nation states not the only actors in the system. He 
conducted anthropological fieldwork in transnational institutions including the NGO Oxfam.  He 
notes transnational organizations have partly taken charge of some of the key elements of 
governance.515  His main question is about the legitimacy of NGOs, particularly since they are 
not elected representatives.  He refers to them as “self-proclaimed spokespeople of ‘civil 
society.’”516  NGOs, in response, defend their position by arguing that they are close to the 
ground and see through their own eyes humanitarian crises because of their work in the field.517  
Other arguments in support of NGOs include their lack of political motivation plus their 
technical expertise. 518   These characteristics can be perceived as ‘virtues’ of NGOs as opposed 
to the State.  NGOs have been said to operate as ‘moral watchdogs’ on the activities of states.”519  
This leaves the image of NGOs as charitable and altruistic organizations, although this is 
certainly countered by some critics.520   
The next Chapter, Chapter seven, discusses the theory of norm entrepreneurship as a framework 
for taking a deeper look at International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGO) activities and 
programs.  It provides a description of the role of INGOs as well as early influential 
entrepreneurs such as Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham and Michael Ignatieff as a testimony to 
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their own involvement.  Questions pertaining to the sociopolitical issues of significance to the 
principle have been posed in the field work to those interviewed and their responses analyzed. 
The responses have been considered in order to gauge the significance of each issue as it 
influences the evolution of the norm in transnational law and any attempts to implement the 
principle. 
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Chapter Seven:  A “Thick Description” of a Principle  
 
On 21 April 1994 at the height of the genocide, UN force commander, General 
Romeo Dallaire had declared that he could bring the genocide to an end if they 
would give him 5000 men.  The UN Security Council responded the same day by 
reducing his contingent from 2,548 to 270 men.521 
 
In the face of such disasters and lack of response, the international community has since that 
time, at least in principle, accepted its responsibility to protect civilians and to even move in with 
force if necessary to stop massive human rights violations.  A soft, and sometimes inconsistent, 
“consensus now exists on the need to do something more.”522 The starting point in support of the 
principle is that humanitarian tragedies and massive human rights violations, where the 
government fails or is unable to protect civilians, cannot simply be left to resolve themselves. 
But is it being implemented when situations call for it and, if it is, how is it being perceived? 
I. Introduction 
This Chapter, through the assistance of policy interviews, critically examines impediments as 
well as supports for the Responsibility to Protect, with a particular emphasis on International 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), the role of International Governmental Organizations 
(IGOs) and early influential individual entrepreneurs as an aspect of global governance.  The 
representatives of NGOs and influential individuals have been systematically sought out and 
their responses to questions analyzed.523 This work advances a novel set of arguments which 
illustrate from a legal and moral perspective why the Responsibility to Protect is perceived as a 
needed principle to halt or prevent mass atrocities.   
                                                            
521 Thomas F. Keating, Andy W. Knight “Building Sustainable Peace” (The University of Alberta Press and the 
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The impediments as viewed by the community confronting the implementation of this agreed-
upon principle are addressed as well as the factors that work to support and enhance it. 
Interviews and the review of documents, reports and articles help to determine which issues are 
the most inhibiting or supportive and what the future likely holds for the Responsibility to 
Protect principle. While I am interested in a study of the principle itself, its evolution and 
implementation, by examining the life of the Responsibility to Protect we will also be able to 
understand further how international norms and laws can and do develop.   
Questions pertaining to the sociopolitical issues of significance to the principle have been posed 
in the field work to those interviewed and their responses analyzed. The responses have been 
considered in order to gauge the significance of each issue as it influences the evolution of the 
norm in transnational law and any attempts to implement the principle. The outcome serves as an 
empirical illustration of how a fundamental and controversial international norm can be created, 
supported, accepted and ultimately implemented in a transnational environment. The responses 
and research findings can be grouped under a series of headings including the steps that led up to 
the Commission; the mandate and work of the Commission; the relevance of moral principles 
and moral imperatives; the legality and legitimacy of the norm; the role of NGOs; the role of the 
UN; and finally the interviewees’ perception of the development of the principle.  
Methodologically, the chapter expands on the knowledge regarding the Responsibility to Protect 
by posing a predetermined set of questions (while at the same time allowing for unanticipated 
findings) to key players who have been or are in a position to influence the evolution of the 
norm.  The research will show that one of the most significant and influential revelations of the 
interviews is the role of nongovernmental actors as a positive force in norm entrepreneurship in 
the global governance structure.  It also shows that the tension between state responsibility and 
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state sovereignty continues to persist in international law and impedes decisions in the Security 
Council.  Realpolitik and state interest often impede the efforts on the part of states and non-state 
actors to make humanitarian decisions based on a universal principle.  Prevention measures also 
tend to be a low priority.   
Using analytic tools of inquiry, the analysis delves deeper into these factors to achieve a 
Geertzian ‘thick description’ that shows how the Responsibility to Protect norm has evolved and 
been nurtured from its inception to its acceptance and implementation in the transnational 
environment through the assistance of key norm entrepreneurs.524 Also discussed are (1) the 
basic ideas and principles that are constitutive of the Responsibility to Protect; (2) the processes 
(legal or otherwise) that have helped to produce and develop it; (3) the relationships and agencies 
that have brought the Responsibility to Protect norm to institutionalization within the UN and the 
Security Council; and (4) the perceptions, theories and actions that constitute the most 
substantive impediments and enhancers.  
While NGOs do not have the same authority in law formation as states, their influence is not 
insignificant. While they do not make customary law, they are able to give meaning to affect 
norms and international law.   
II. The Theory of Norm Entrepreneurship and the Evolution of the Norm	
 
The theory of norm entrepreneurship provides a framework in which to imbed the evolution of 
the Responsibility to Protect norm.  The analysis outlines the way in which the norm has moved 
from the international level to the local level and back again on the basis of historical 
information and personal accounts of key norm entrepreneurs who have become part of decisions 
being made for or against the Responsibility to Protect.  It will show how norm entrepreneurs in 
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social, political and legal thought and their organizations, sometimes collectively and sometimes 
independently, help to formalize the principle.  The sovereign equality of states makes the 
international system what it is. Mertus suggests “Those that break or seek to change the 
sovereignty norms can be viewed as norm entrepreneurs or “international law breakers.”525  
Application of the three phases of the theory of norm entrepreneurship (norm creation, norm 
institutionalisation and norm interpretation) 526 and its relationship to the Responsibility to 
Protect is represented in the following table:  
Table 2:  Stages of Norm Entrepreneurship527 
  Stage 1 
Norm Emergence 
Stage 2 
Tipping or threshold 
point 
Norm Cascade  
Stage 3 
Internalization 
Actors  Norm entrepreneurs 
With organized 
platforms  
States, international 
organizations, networks 
Law, professions, 
bureaucracy 
Motives  Altruism, empathy, 
ideational, commitment  
Legitimacy, reputation, 
esteem 
Conformity 
Dominant mechanisms  Persuasion Socialization, 
institutionalization, 
demonstration 
Habit, 
institutionalization 
The Responsibility to 
Protect 
ICISS and NGOs Summit Outcome 
document 
Cases as they arise in 
the Security Council 
 
Stage 1 or norm emergence is the circumstances  and activities that led up to the ICISS Report; 
Stage 2 indicates the process by which the report of the Secretary General, his presentation at the  
Summit Outcome, and the vote at the General Assembly led to an agreement as expressed in 
Article 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome document; and, Stage 3 or internalization is 
demonstrated by the cases that are introduced in the Security Council calling upon the principle 
                                                            
525 Mertus 1999 supra note 32 at 566. 
526 Simon Chesterman, (Ed.) Secretary or General:  The Secretary-General in World Politics University Press (20 
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527 Martha Finnemore, and Kathy Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) vol. 52 
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of the Responsibility to Protect.   These instances of the institutionalization of the norm are 
represented later in the Chapter through an examination of the Security Council resolutions 
references and strengthening the Responsibility to Protect.  It is through such an internalization 
or institutionalization process that the norm moves from the soft law area to that of lex lata.  
In the case of the Responsibility to Protect, the first stage of norm entrepreneurship involved the 
development of the thinking in terms of the need for a legal mechanism to deal with 
humanitarian crises that was not tainted by humanitarian interventions of the past.  This occurred 
with the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
sponsored by the Government of Canada and its report in 2001.     Persuasion by norm 
entrepreneurs is characteristic of the first stage and I consider the authors of this Report as 
‘founding entrepreneurs.’ They are introduced in this Chapter and their views and experience 
explored.  They include well known Canadian actors such as Lloyd Axworthy, Michael Ignatieff 
and William Graham.  
In the second phase, norms become institutionalized in organizations (domestic and 
international) and in new bureaucratic units whose function “is to advance the norm.”528   The 
second stage of the Responsibility to Protect in practical terms occurred with the presentation of 
the Report to the United Nations on 14th September 2005.  On that date Secretary General Kofi 
Annan addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations at the UN Headquarters in New 
York and opened the three day meeting of the 2005 World Summit, as follows: 
For the first time, you will accept, clearly and unambiguously, that you have a collective 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.  You will make clear your willingness to take the timely and 
                                                            
528 Ian Johnstone, “The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur” in Chesterman, Simon (Ed.) 2007 supra note 526 
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decisive collective action through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their own 
populations.  Excellences, you will be pledged to act if another Rwanda looms.529  
A number of drafts had been presented prior to this date contributing to its acceptance as a soft 
law norm.  For example, the earlier draft outcome document included the responsibility to 
protect in a section on human rights and the rule of law together with human security.  The main 
concern was related to the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention as well as unilateral 
action.  While Belarus, China, Egypt, India, Iran and Jamaica voiced their opposition, the 
African Union broadly supported the idea and noted similar provisions in the Charter of the 
African Union. (The contribution of the African Union was significant.)  
It is important to note that in 2000, African nations formed the African Union (AU), and in its 
Constitution Act included principles later known as ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ transferred 
from the AU founding document, which recognized a significant change from ‘non-interference’ 
toward ‘non-indifference’. The Constitutive Act included the following articles, while continuing 
to recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its Member States. The 
Act states that 
 Art. 4 (h) - the “Union has the right to intervene in a Member State (MS) pursuant a 
 decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances namely, genocide, war crimes 
 and crimes against humanity;” 
Art. 4 (j) “a MS has the right to request intervention from the Union for the restoration of 
peace and security.”530 
 
The consent of the state is not necessary for external intervention under such circumstances. To 
deal with this very controversial issue the Organization of African Unity operated on consensus 
                                                            
529UN Summit Outcome document 2005. http://www.un.org/summit  
530 The Responsibility to Protect Toolkit, ICR2P 4718-icrtop-launches-new-toolkit-on-the-responsibility-to-protect. 
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and stipulated that “military intervention without the consent of the state must be a last resort.”531  
These principles clearly helped to form the basis of the ICISS report.  An amended document 
regarding the Responsibility to Protect was produced in July, 2005.532  After much discussion, on 
5 August Jean Ping533 presented another revised draft outcome document.  After further revisions 
the Draft Negotiated Outcome document distributed on 12 September 2005 was approved by the 
UN General Assembly unanimously.  The consensus was approved as Article 138 and 139 of the 
Summit Outcome Document as outlined earlier in Chapter One.534 
The third stage of norm entrepreneurship is that of internalization where the norm is no longer a 
matter of broad public debate. In the third phase, according to the theory, ‘interpretation’ could 
be explicit in judicial opinions by authoritative bodies or may be implicit in the form of political 
and operational activities of governments or international institutions.535   In the case of the 
Responsibility to Protect, legitimate interpretation occurs in the United Nations Security Council 
and General Assembly in its operations in the form of discussion and the subsequent potential for 
resolutions implementing a range of the Responsibility to Protect tools. It also occurs among 
INGOs and persuasive volunteers. Although the Responsibility to Protect norm has been 
internalized to some extent, I would hesitate to say that it has yet achieved “a taken for granted 
quality” or became customary law.536  While the norm has been formally accepted and is 
established within the United Nations, it is still subject to much debate.   A great deal of 
criticism, on the one hand, and persuasion on the other, still goes on.    Even calls for sanctions 
                                                            
531 The Responsibility to Protect Toolkit ibid. 
532 Revised draft outcome document of the high level plenary meetings of the General Assembly of September 2005, 
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174 states represented at the summit. (Cooper and Kohler 2009 supra note 73, p. 31).n 
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are controversial and there is no mechanism for enforcement within the Security Council which 
is one of the factors to be considered as crucial to successful implementation. 
The Secretary General plays an instrumental entrepreneurial role and can be effective when 
building on existing interpretations of international law.  The United Nations is used as an 
institution to further those understandings of an evolving normative trend or idea and this is 
demonstrated by the strong and persuasive words of the Secretary General as he spoke in favor 
of the norm in his address to the General Assembly in 2005. While the Responsibility to Protect 
has followed this path successfully, problems remain.  The Special Advisor to the Secretary 
General on the Prevention of Genocide537 also plays an important role in the development and 
movement of the norm.538 The purpose of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide is 
to raise awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, and to provide warnings and to 
advocate and mobilize for appropriate action when there is a risk of genocide. There is also a 
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect.  The purpose of the Special Adviser is to lead 
the conceptual, political, institutional and operational development of the Responsibility to 
Protect.  The advice is required to alert the UN to the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity, enhancing the capacity of the organization to prevent 
these crimes.   
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Juan Méndez, an Argentinian, as 
Special Adviser in 2004, following the genocidal violence in Rwanda and the Balkans.  (The 
international system had virtually allowed these tragedies to go unchecked.) In 2007, Francis M. 
Deng, a Sudanese Scholar, was appointed to succeed Juan Mendez with a new title of 
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Undersecretary- General with ‘Mass Atrocities’ added to the title (the new title was eventually 
dropped, however).539  Ban Ki-moon also appointed Edward Luck, an international scholar, in 
December 2007 as the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. Both Special Advisers 
Francis Deng and Edward Luck ended their assignments with the Office in July 2012 and Adama 
Dieng of Senegal was appointed as UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.540  A 
recent step in 2013 is the appointment of Jennifer Welsh to the position to UN Special Adviser 
for the Responsibility to Protect. 
III. Background to the Formation of the Commission 
 
Throughout the 1990s, controversy raged between those who supported a right to intervene to 
protect populations (i.e. humanitarian intervention) and those who argued that state sovereignty, 
as recognized by the UN Charter, precluded any intervention in internal matters.541 Rwanda was 
cited as an example of failure to address atrocity crimes while Kosovo, where the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a military operation that was unauthorized by the UNSC, 
was regarded as an illegal intervention.542 Clearly an international consensus on when and how 
to take action to prevent and end mass atrocities was needed to protect the security of the 
community and the individual, as well as the state.   
                                                            
539 As a counterpoint to the criticism of The Responsibility to Protect as a neo-colonial approach, Kyle Matthews 
advised that the notion of Sovereignty as a Responsibility came from Francis Deng working with the Brookings 
Institution.  (Francis Deng is an expert on conflict management and U.S.-Africa relations, and served as 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons.  He is currently Special Adviser to the 
UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.)  Matthews stressed how in his view this fact counters the 
criticism of the Responsibility to Protect as a Western only doctrine.  
540The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.  
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/index.shtml  
541 The Responsibility to Protect Toolkit, ICR2P 4718-icrtop-launches-new-toolkit-on-the-responsibility-to-protect. 
[R2P Toolkit]. 
542 Toolkit ibid. 
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The debate that took place during that period regarding the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict began with the help of the media.  The public had begun to pay more attention to 
humanitarian situations than before. With the emergence of the so-called CNN effect, voters 
worldwide became more rapidly aware of war and humanitarian crises, making an international 
political response more urgently needed. 543 A critical moment in the debate occurred when 
NATO intervened in Kosovo without authorization from the UN Security Council as a result of 
Russia and China’s threat to veto which prevented a UN-backed intervention. In the 1999 UN 
General Assembly debate, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika expressed concerns and even 
defined sovereignty as “the last defence against the rules of an unjust world.”544  The Kosovo 
intervention constituted a clear violation of the basic principle of state sovereignty, and the right 
to intervene represented “a neo-colonial threat to the poorest defenceless countries.”545  In spite 
of the fact that the Kosovo crisis meant a significant setback with regards to public support, the 
debate on humanitarian intervention, energized by the media, was adopted by NGOs and in 
academic circles and was pursued sufficiently to lead to the endorsement of the Responsibility to 
Protect. 546 
 
The Kosovo report, when produced, recommended further steps on the question of humanitarian 
intervention: 
Experience from the NATO intervention in Kosovo suggests the need to close the gap 
between legality and legitimacy. The Commission believes that the time is now ripe for 
the presentation of a principled framework for humanitarian intervention which could be 
                                                            
543 Jean Garrigues, The responsibility to protect:  from an ethical principle to an effective policy  
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/responsibilidad.proteger.pdf  (Chapter for La realidad de la ayuda, Intermón 
Oxfam)X FRIDE.  
544UN General Assembly, 15 November 1999. http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf 
545 UN General Assembly ibid. 
546Garrigues supra note 543543 at 10. 
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used to guide future responses to imminent humanitarian catastrophes and which could be 
used to assess claims for humanitarian intervention.547  
 
Expectations began to increase for action and new standards of conduct in national and 
international affairs as well as many new international institutions.  There were new actors who 
brought their views to the table, many of whom were in the areas of human rights and human 
security.  It is those new actors that this thesis brings to light through its “thick description” of 
their views, work, action and thoughts.  As the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report states, the presence of these new non-state actors in 
international affairs helped to push the debate about intervention for human protection purposes 
to the front of the agenda. 548 International organizations, civil society activists and NGOs began 
to use “the international human rights norms and instruments as the concrete point of reference 
against which to judge state conduct.”549  
 
NGOs influenced the development of a new regime of national laws and international laws using 
the most recent advances in the development of international humanitarian law. The agreement 
reached in the Ottawa Convention on Landmines provides another excellent example of their 
influence as NGOs brought domestic and foreign public opinion to problems of security.550   
 Relief and development NGOs, national and international human rights groups, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), faith groups, academics, and the media also began to tackle 
early warnings of deadly conflict, aided by grass-roots organizations in different countries. 
                                                            
547 Garrigues ibid at 13. 
548 ICISS 2001 supra note 6 at 4. 
549 ICISS 2001 ibid at 14. 
550 ICISS 2001 ibid at 20. 
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Organizations such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) “monitored and reported on areas of 
the world where conflict appeared to be emerging and could result in violations of human rights 
or genocide." 551 The ICG during the late 1990s worked in Kosovo and brought attention to the 
crisis.552  
With the drafting of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945 came the recognition 
in international law of the concept of “crimes against humanity” which could be 
committed by a government against its own people and not necessarily just during 
wartime.  Then came the Genocide Convention of 1948, with its apparently explicit 
override of the non-intervention principle for the most extreme of all crimes against 
humanity. ‘553 
It was in this context and according to the need to address this emotional, intellectual and legal 
tension, that the Government of Canada promoted the creation of the ICISS.  While the ICISS 
Report recognized that political leaders are crucial in this respect, they recognized the 
importance of other actors as well. Political leaders are forced to be responsive to the demands 
and pressures placed upon them by their constituents and the media.  Because of the external 
pressures, NGOs have become increasingly needed to contribute to the decision-making process.  
 
IV. Foundations and Philanthropic Organizations 
If we consider foundations and philanthropic organizations as nongovernmental actors, or as 
supporters of NGOs, we can see how they too have been very influential at the early stages of the 
Responsibility to Protect movement.  For example, “The Carnegie Corporation, William and 
Flora Hewlett Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Simons Foundation, all supported the 
                                                            
551 ICISS 2001 ibid at 71. 
552Adele Simmons, and April Donnellan “Reaching across Borders:  Philanthropy’s Role in the Prevention of 
Atrocity Crimes” in Cooper and Kohler 2009 supra note 73at 168. The ICG receives some of its funding from 
foundations which will be considered in affiliation with NGO funding.  [Simmons and Donnellan 2009]. 
553 Simmons and Donnellan 2009 Ibid at 17. 
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International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).”554   The new doctrine 
shared a similar pattern to other achievements engineered by the human rights lobby. The first 
achievement was the Rome Statute in 1998, which created the International Criminal Court, and 
the second success, also supported by foundations and a coalition of Nongovernmental 
Organizations (NGOs), was the agreement for the Mine Ban Convention as mentioned earlier.   
The article by Simmons and Donnellan outlines what civil society groups and philanthropic 
associations can do, especially when governments lack the political will to act.555  Philanthropic 
associations have special tools they can employ with methods that differ from governments, 
including resources and influence, the possibilities of quick action and independence.   The 
Responsibility to Protect, the Mine Ban Treaty and the ICC provide important examples of the 
establishment of human rights norms with the aid of civil society groups.556   In fact, most of the 
attention to genocide since Rwanda has been brought about by NGOs funded by foundations; for 
example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International receive their funding from 
foundations and not from government.  It was in response to the challenge from Kofi Annan that 
the Government of Canada, together with a group of major foundations, announced at the 
General Assembly in September 2000 the establishment of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).  
 
V. The Contribution of Founding Entrepreneurs  
A number of important individuals can be attributed with a significant contribution to the 
founding and articulation of the Responsibility to Protect norm.  Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd 
                                                            
554 Simmons, and Donnellan 2009 ibid in Cooper and Kohler 2009 at 163. 
555 Simmons, and Donnellan 2009 ibid in Cooper and Kohler 2009. 
556 Simmons, and Donnellan 2009 ibid at 164-165. 
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Axworthy, for example, initiated the Commission and chaired the Advisory Board, and his 
successor John Manley carried it through.557  The Commission consisted of a group of 
international experts (not all from the West) led by two co-chairs, Gareth Evans and Mohamed 
Sahnoun. Other members included renowned academics and politicians: Gisèle Côté-Harper, Lee 
Hamilton, Michael Ignatieff, Vladimir Lukin, Klaus Naumann, Cyril  Ramaphosa, Fidel Ramos, 
Cornelio Sommaruga, Eduardo Stein, and Ramesh Thakur.558 
 
 A strategy for carrying out the mandate and an agreement that the work process should be 
transparent, inclusive, and global was agreed to by the Government of Canada.  A research 
directorate was established with the support of other governments and major foundations. The 
first meeting of the Commission took place on 5–6 November 2000, in Ottawa. A series of 
regional roundtables and national consultations were held in order that the Commission might 
hear a wide range of views.  Particular emphasis was placed on the need to ensure that the views 
of affected populations were heard and taken into account, in addition to the views of 
Governments, IGOs and NGOs, and civil society representatives.559 The Commission’s plan was 
to consult as widely as possible and within a year they had visited around the world, including 
the countries of all five permanent members of the Security Council.  The Commission also 
reached out to academics with a wide range of expertise.  Individual Commissioners and 
members of the research team were also invited to many conferences and seminars.  
                                                            
557 ICISS supra note 6 p, IX. 
558 ICISS ibid    (Note:  Gareth Evans is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.  In 2001 he was 
Cochair of the ICISS see other speeches and papers at http://www.crisisgroup.org, especially “From Humanitarian 
Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,” (2006) no. 3 Wisconsin International Law Journal 24, 101-20 and 
“Crimes Against Humanity:  Overcoming Indifference,” (September 2006) no. 3 Journal of Genocide Research 8,  
325-39). 
559 ICISS ibid at 2. 
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Eleven regional roundtables and national consultations were held around the world between 
January and July 2001.  
In date order, they were held in Ottawa on 15 January, Geneva on 30–31 January, 
London on 3 February, Maputo on 10 March, Washington, DC on 2 May, Santiago on 4 
May, Cairo on 21 May, Paris on 23 May, New Delhi on 10 June, Beijing on 14 June and 
St Petersburg on 16 July.560  
 
Usually both of the Co-Chairs attended with some other Commissioners as well. In order to 
obtain the broadest range of views of national and regional officials, representatives of civil 
society, NGOs, academic institutions and think-tanks were invited to each of the meetings. 
Discussions took place on the basis of a paper prepared by the Commission. Certain participants 
were also asked to prepare papers on specific aspects of the issue.  Each roundtable was selected 
to produce a summary report of the proceedings and outcomes of each of the discussions.   
The key Canadian domestic entrepreneurs in the early stages of the work of the Commission and 
the preparation of the ICISS Report were Bill Graham, Michael Ignatieff and Lloyd Axworthy.   
Efforts to gain an interview with Lloyd Axworthy have not been successful to date. I did, 
however, have the opportunity to hear Bill Graham and Michael Ignatieff speak in public about 
their role in the conception and birth of the Responsibility to Protect. 
V.1   Lloyd Axworthy    
During his time as Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy launched the ICISS on 14 September 
2000, stating that the goal was to begin a comprehensive debate on the issues, and to foster 
global political consensus on how to move from polemics, and often paralysis, towards action 
within the international system, particularly through the United Nations. He noted in an address 
in 2000 that during the time he had been Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister (for five years) the 
                                                            
560 ICISS 2001 ibid at 83. 
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meaning of security had changed.  This also meant a shift in the international affairs language 
from the discussions of states' rights and national sovereignty to the protection of civilians, war-
affected children, and language surrounding  the threat of “ terrorism and of drugs, open borders 
and infectious diseases.”561 This made the rights of individuals the primary concern and 
influenced the government’s human security agenda.  It was this shift in thinking that paved the 
way for the Commission on the Responsibility to Protect. 
As evidenced in his notes, Lloyd Axworthy was interested in the new way in which 
governments, civil society and Nongovernmental Organizations worked together in making 
changes in human security.  He confirmed that the government of Canada actively sought a 
partnership with civil society. Axworthy expressed the concern that sovereignty had protected 
the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, mass displacement in East Timor and Kosovo, and 
genocide in Rwanda.  “These crimes engage our conscience and responsibility,” he wrote.562  He 
suggested civilians had become the primary target and foreign policy needed to change.  This 
was reflected in the UN Charter, the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the Rome Statute of the International Court. He noted that the shift to human security 
did not mean the end of the state as it was the state that still held the authority over rules and 
regulations.563 
 
 
                                                            
561Notes for an address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars Washington, D.C.  June 16, 2000. 
562 Axworthy 2001 notes ibid. 
563 Axworthy 2000 notes ibid. 
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V.2   Bill Graham 
In his political career, Bill Graham served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National 
Defence, and Leader of the Opposition and Interim Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada.564  
Bill Graham described the development of the norm in a presentation at the Munk Centre at the 
University of Toronto from his own experience as a norm entrepreneur.565  He stressed the need 
to reflect and recognize that the concept is part of a larger human security agenda that emerged 
after the end of the Cold War with changes in international law, diplomacy, and international 
relations.  He described the process whereby they had to think about how to “recast their 
defence” and the concept of humanitarian intervention in that broader context.566  He pointed out 
that other changes were also taking place in security with the creation of the ICC, the Rome 
Statute and the Anti-personnel Landmines Convention.  He referred to these as the three pillars 
in the human security agenda.567  He further described how all moved together away from the 
idea of the Westphalian notion of state towards recognizing ordinary citizens as the ones that 
suffer the most in wars.  While mainly soldiers in the First World War were killed, in the Second 
World War it was mainly civilians and there was a recognition that the international community 
must come up with legal concepts and military tools to respond.568   
Bill Graham suggested that the Responsibility to Protect grew out of a specific conflict   – the 
Kosovo conflict and the genocide by Milosevic.  “We tried to intervene with UN authority but 
Russia threatened to veto.  NATO decided to intervene any way, even though it was understood 
                                                            
564 Bill Graham biography, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Graham_(Canadian_politician). 
565 “Ten Years After the ICISS: Reflections for the Past and Future of the Responsibility to Protect” Munk Centre 
November 12th, 2011Keynote speech:  Hon. Bill Graham. 
566 Bill Graham 2011 ibid. 
567 Bill Graham 2011 ibid. 
568 Bill Graham 2011 ibid. 
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this was illegal.”569  What developed was a notion of legitimacy instead of simple legality or 
illegality.  There was therefore a perceived need to develop a concept that would allow 
intervention that was both legal and legitimate.570   He noted the Commission was set up with a 
broad representation of the international community to give it legitimacy, and when he became 
Foreign Minister as Lloyd Axworthy’s successor he was asked by Kofi Annan “to sell it.”   He 
recalled there was considerable resistance to the fundamental idea of intervention. He advised 
that at every international meeting he went to he distributed the Report.  There were quite a few 
foreign ministers who were former professors like himself who thought this was a good 
principle.  Over time, it evolved into a doctrine that contributed significantly to the human 
security agenda along with the Landmines Convention and the International Criminal Court.571 
V.3   Michael Ignatieff 
Another key leader in the second phase of the development of the norm; i.e., the creation of the 
ICISS report involving the shift from state sovereignty to state responsibility, was Michael 
Ignatieff.572  I had the opportunity to hear him speak on the Responsibility to Protect at an event 
sponsored by Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights.573  He relayed to the audience 
his role in the evolution of the principle and informed the audience that in 2001 he was a member 
of the ICISS which released its report on the Responsibility to Protect.574  In recalling his 
participation, he reminded the audience that Canada has had a strong role in international 
                                                            
569 Bill Graham 2011 ibid. 
570 Bill Graham 2011 ibid. 
571 Bill Graham 2011 ibid. 
572 Michael Ignatieff is best known in Canada as the former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada.  He also has a 
distinguished academic career.  He has taught at the University of British Columbia, the London School of 
Economics, and Harvard University.  At Harvard he served as Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy 
at the Kennedy School of Government between 2000 and 2005.  He is the author of seventeen books, including “The 
Lesser Evil:  Political Ethics in an Age of Terror” (2004) and “True Patriot Love” (2009). 
573 Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights www.claihr.ca held on October 26, 2011 at Hart House, in the 
University of Toronto. 
574 In 2001 Michael Ignatieff while at Harvard was appointed to the Commission and they held a discussions in 
Quebec in 2001. 
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lawmaking and there are many distinguished Canadians in this area who have been especially 
influential.  He referred to the Responsibility to Protect as an example of “Canadian norm 
entrepreneurship.”575   He explained that law often starts as a norm, moves forward to become a 
principle and evolves from customary international law to statutory law. There is often a gap 
between legality and legitimacy, however, and the Commission wrote a report that tried to put 
legitimacy and legality back together.  He also mentioned that the Landmines Treaty was another 
example of imaginative leadership where efforts to prohibit the use of landmines were made by 
NGOs.   
Michael Ignatieff indicated that Kofi Annan said he would be glad to have a report and the 
Secretariat side was set up in Canada. The Commission included Mohamed Sahnoun,576 Gareth 
Evans,577 Ramesh Thakur,578 and others.  They toured the world since they recognized the 
entrepreneurship of the norm had to not only affect the global north, but India and Rwanda and 
other countries in the South.  They wanted a global consensus that on the one hand reinforced 
sovereignty as a moral value, but on the other hand enforced sovereignty as responsibility for the 
states’ population. They also wanted to be sure not to create an “interventionist” charter.579  He 
                                                            
575 Bill Graham Ten Years After the ICISS:  Reflections for the Past and Future of the Responsibility to Protect 
Munk Centre, November 12th, 2011:  Keynote Speech. 
576Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria) was Co-Chair of the Commission with Gareth Evans and Special Adviser to the 
Secretary General at the time.  He has previously served as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the 
Ethiopian/Eritrean conflict (1999); Joint United Nations/Organization of African Unity (OAU) Special 
Representative for the Great Lakes of Africa (1997); and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Somalia (March–October 1992). As a senior Algerian diplomat, he served as Ambassador to Germany, France, the 
United States, and Morocco. He also served as Deputy Secretary-General of both the OAU and the Arab League.   
577 Gareth Evans was foreign minister from 1988 to 1996 and is president emeritus of the International Crisis Group. 
He co-chaired the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which introduced the 
responsibility to protect principle.  He became Chancellor of the Australian National University in 2010 and was 
President of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group from 2000 to 2009.  He was active in Australian politics 
and served a number of years as Cabinet Minister.  He has written many books and published many articles in 
journals.  One of his more recent books is “The Responsibility to Protect – Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and 
for All” (Brookings Institute, Brookings Institution 2008).  
578 Ramesh Thakur is Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, and Professor of 
International Relations, at the Australian National University. He previously was the Senior Vice Rector of the 
United Nations University at the rank of Assistant Secretary-General.  
579 Michael Ignatieff, sponsored by ClAIHR, Hart House, University to Toronto, October 26, 2011.  
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remarked that they achieved harmony in Quebec in August 2001 when they came to agreement 
on the report.  For a Canadian this was an emotional moment.  Ten days later the planes went 
into the World Trade Center and the Responsibility to Protect disappeared off the political 
agenda.  Then there was Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect could not be legitimately used to 
show that there were weapons of mass destruction or that there were not.  There were indeed 
horrible human rights issues in Iraq but this was not the primary reason for the attack on Iraq.580 
 
VI. The Participation of NGOs and Non-state Actors  
The following section of this chapter is devoted to the role of NGOs and actors in the 
development and implementation of the norm.  In the selection of organizations and/or persons 
to interview, I determined that the term NGOs or human rights advocates, while excluding 
government bodies, includes a wide range of national and international organizations as well as 
the media, scholars and advocates. A clear distinction between them and other entities, however, 
is that the term NGO excludes government bodies.  To narrow the field, I chose to focus on 
NGOs that have declared some interest in the Responsibility to Protect, or more generally in 
humanitarian intervention. (See Appendix B and Appendix C for sample letters to interviewees). 
While these NGOs have played a role in Phases II and III of the entrepreneur framework, they 
are also an important and necessary part of the current transnational governance system.  NGOs 
work outside of and formally within the UN constellation of relations. NGOs are represented in 
large part by individuals who support and advocate for the ideal of the Responsibility to Protect 
principle itself, since they generally do not represent the state but rather push or shame the state 
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into action.  Some of the most prominent examples of NGO involvement are found in the fields 
of human rights.   
The data I have collected will help highlight the web of actors involved, their personal views, 
their written work and the institutions, where appropriate, that they are involved with.  In 
summarizing the interview data, the findings provide insight into the following areas: evolution 
of the norm, its legal versus moral states motives, goals or objectives, state or government 
relations, and priorities and concerns.  The purpose of the pursuit of these questions is to gain a 
sense of their understanding of and their relationship with the Responsibility to Protect norm. 
A table follows with a description of the organizations and individuals approached or reviewed 
and a categorization of institutions according to my own classification system.  A number of 
different organizations were approached, including advocacy groups for the Responsibility to 
Protect, research think tanks, humanitarian organizations, human rights groups and academic 
institutions along with prominent individuals who have been or are involved in the 
Responsibility to Protect.  A description of the most influential organizations (most often 
referred to in the literature and by other groups) which were approached and proved to be open 
to further inquiry follows. (See Appendix D for details with regard to non-governmental 
organizations). 
We will see to what extent the aims of these NGOs are humanitarian in nature and gain a deeper 
understanding of how they perceive the norm – its purpose and intent and how it functions in a 
transnational environment.  We will also see how they work independently from governments 
but at the same time work to influence governments in their decision-making.  The practice of 
‘responsible advocacy’ obliges NGOs to have the responsibility to remain independent from 
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governments and this gives them more freedom to  express views that may differ from current 
government policy and renders their influence significant in its development and interpretation.   
In a recent book entitled “Paved with Good Intentions” Nikolas Barry-Shaw and Dru Oja Jay 
criticize development NGOs for their closeness to state political positions.581  It is inevitable that 
NGOs, in addition to being altruistic, will also have interests to satisfy supporters, often because 
of the need to generate income and raise the profile of the group and enhance staff skills.  This 
may lead them to focus on more high profile cases or even to become closer to their respective 
governments.  This is the reason why international NGOs should use their resources to 
strengthen local NGOs whenever possible in order to aid them in their efforts to maintain a 
distance from government.    They can also assist, where appropriate, in the lobbying of the UN 
and other international organizations.  I remain convinced, however, that overall NGOs whose 
mandate it is to support the Responsibility to Protect are in a stronger position to advocate for a 
moral value than the state which suffers from too many conflicting interests, including from its 
own domestic population. 
We can also look to Canada where NGOs support the Responsibility to Protect in spite of the 
Canadian governments’ negative position.  I have often heard it said it is difficult to contest after 
reviewing the history that without NGOs or civil society the Responsibility to Protect would 
never have come into fruition.  This being the case, I wanted to gain as much information as I 
could first hand of their role in its development, implementation and evolution to customary 
international law.  Have NGOs, I asked, virtually co-opted the Responsibility to Protect?  While 
their original influence may be debated, there is little question of their importance to its 
                                                            
581 Barry-Shaw Nikolas and Dru Oja Jay Paved with Good Intentions (Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 
2012) [Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012]. 
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continued survival today. Although some NGOs wish to remain neutral and objective regarding 
military intervention and coercive measures, there are others who openly advocate on behalf of 
the Responsibility to Protect.  These activist groups are my main interest.   Interviews that I 
conducted with NGOs were illuminating in response to my request to describe their role in the 
development of the Responsibility to Protect.  The interviews not only show the role of 
individual organizations but of numerous collaborative efforts as well. 
The following table lists the Nongovernmental Organizations who participated in the study, by 
name of individual, category, location and date.  A brief description of these organizations and 
their purpose is interwoven within the narrative stemming from the interviews, although one or 
two mentioned that they spoke only for themselves and that their view did not necessarily reflect 
the views of the organization with which they were affiliated.  
As will be evidenced from the table below I have categorized the information according to the 
organization, the interview and/or the individual within the following five categories as follows:  
key persons, advocacy groups, applied conflict resolution, research thinktanks, conference 
proceedings, human rights and the federal government.   
Table 3:  NGO Representatives and Other Key Players Interviewed 
Type of  
Organization 
Name of 
Organization 
Persons 
Interviewed 
Date Interview 
Method 
Place 
Key 
Persons 
 Loyd Axworthy 
Bill Graham 
Carolyn McAskie 
Michael Ignatieff 
 
12/11/2011 
8/12/ 2011 
26/10/2011 
 
Conference 
Skype 
Conference 
 
Toronto 
 
Toronto 
Advocacy 
Group 
Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to 
Protect at the City 
University of New 
York 
Naomi Kikoler 9/11/2011 Face to 
Face (F2F) 
New York, 
New York 
  International 
Coalition on the 
Responsibility to 
Marion Arnaud 5/12/ 2011 F2F New York, 
New York 
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Protect (ICRTOP) 
  Montreal Institute for 
Genocide and 
Human Rights 
Studies 
Kyle Matthews 12/11/2011 
and 
Conferences 
F2F 
Skype 
Montreal, 
Quebec 
Applied Conflict 
Resolution 
International Crisis 
Group 
 
Heather Sonner 5/12/2011 F2F New York, 
New York 
  Global Action to 
Prevent War 
Bob Zuber 4/11/ 2011 Skype New York, 
New York 
Research 
Thinktanks 
Berghof Conflict 
Research Centre 
Veronique 
Dudouet 
31/10/2011 Email Berlin, 
Germany 
  Centre for 
International 
Governance and 
Innovation and 
Balsillie School of 
International Affairs
  
David Dewitt 
David Welch 
Louise Frechette 
Lucie Edwards 
Mark Sedra 
Andrew 
Thompson 
Evan Cinq-mars 
 
2/11/2011 
2/11/ 2011 
21/6/ 2011 
31/10/ 2012 
2/11/ 2011 
2/11/ 2011 
 
F2F 
F2F 
Skype 
Skype 
F2F 
F2F 
Waterloo 
Waterloo 
Quebec 
Ontario 
Waterloo 
Waterloo 
  NATO Watch Ian Davis 10/11/ 2011 Skype Ross Shire, 
Scotland 
  The Geneva Centre 
for Security Policy 
Khalid Koser 21/2/ 2012 F2F Geneva 
Switzerland 
Conference 
Proceedings  
Ten Years After – 
The Munk Centre 
Bill Graham 12/11/2011 Speaker Toronto, 
Ontario 
Human 
Rights 
Canadian Lawyers 
for International 
Human Rights 
(CLAIHR) 
Jillian Siskind 
 
Michael Ignatieff 
26/10/2011 
23/11/2011 
26/10/ 2011 
Speaker 
F2F 
Speaker 
Toronto, 
Ontario 
Toronto, 
Ontario 
Federal 
Government 
Canadian UN 
Ambassador  
Elissa Goldberg 20/2/2012 F2F Geneva, 
Switzerland 
 
Certain human rights organizations approached are not included in the analysis because their 
interests did not coincide.  Some found it to be a very worthwhile concept but explained it 
addresses military intervention while their work focuses more on the transformation of armed 
conflicts through negotiation, or nonviolent conflicts through unarmed resistance, or post-war 
peace building.582 
                                                            
582 Veronique Dudouet, interview, Berghof Conflict Research Centre, Berlin Germany, October 31, 2011. 
  192 
 
As stated earlier, the spreading of information and knowledge is essential to the development of 
soft law norms.  One of the primary functions of these non-governmental organization is the 
dissemination of information regarding the norm of the Responsibility to Protect through reports, 
conferences, studies, research analysis, op-eds, papers, and debates.  Also, as I have stated 
earlier, collaboration is an important aspect of transnational governance and of the operations of 
INGOs. One important strategy for the promotion of the Responsibility to Protect is through 
collaboration efforts and cooperation with other organizations.  Collaboration with other partners 
facilitate their objectives.  One of the themes that comes through in these accounts is the 
importance of collaboration and of cooperation.  
 
VI.1 Dissemination of the Norm. Cooperation and Collaboration 
The first NGO I sought to approach was the International Crisis Group (ICG).  While I was 
unable to obtain an interview with the organization, I am providing a description of the ICG New 
York and their operation which does have corresponding interests with the Responsibility to 
Protect.  The ICG is an applied conflict resolution group according to my classification.  They 
describe themselves as an independent, non-profit, Nongovernmental Organization committed to 
preventing and resolving deadly conflict.583  They provide a nonpartisan source of analysis and 
advice to governments, and intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations, European Union 
and World Bank, on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Its mission is to act as an 
indispensable source of information for governments and a wide range of institutions actively 
working towards peace and conflict resolution. “Crisis Group was founded in 1995 as an 
international Nongovernmental Organization on the initiative of a group of well-known 
transatlantic figures. The idea was to create a new organization that would act as the world’s 
                                                            
583 International Crisis Group, NewYork, USA.  http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
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eyes and ears for impending conflicts, and with an influential board that could mobilize effective 
action from the world’s policymakers.”584 
The Crisis Group “currently employs worldwide some 130 permanent staff, representing 
between them 49 nationalities and speaking 47 different languages, plus at any given time 
around 20 consultants and 40 interns.”585 It publishes reports and briefing papers, as well as the 
Crisis Watch bulletin assessing every month the current state of play in some 70 countries or 
areas of actual or potential conflict. Publications are distributed widely by email.586 They 
conduct field-based analysis, policy prescription and advocacy, with key experienced-in- 
government staff and an active Board of Trustees.  Louise Arbour, former UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda became Crisis Group’s President and CEO in July 
2009. She succeeded Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia (1988-96) who served 
as President of the organization between January 2000 and July 2009. 
Crisis Group claims to play a major role by ringing early warning bells in scores of conflicts or 
potential conflict situations around the world, helping policymakers in the UN Security Council, 
regional organizations, donor countries and others with major influence, and in the countries at 
risk themselves, to do better in preventing, managing and resolving conflict, and in rebuilding as 
well as offering new strategic thinking on some of the world’s most intractable conflicts and 
crises.587 
In my first interview with Kyle Matthews who works with The Montreal Institute for Genocide 
and Human Rights Studies (MIGS), alerted me to the existence of a strong collaborative network 
                                                            
584  Ibid http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
585  Ibid  http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
586  Ibid http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
587  Ibid http://www.crisisgroup.org/  This suggests it is not totally at arm’s length from government. 
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on the Responsibility to Protect. 588   "We work and train with the UN Office of Genocide, 
training diplomats from national governments.  These are ways we share our knowledge and 
authority."589  They carry out the work through networking, high profile events, coalitions, and 
civil society.  He added they want to build a larger network of people working on the issue. “We 
want to become a hub,” he said. 590    
Mr. Matthews also advised MIGS promotes the Responsibility to Protect through education and 
advocacy. The Will to Intervene Project (W2I) is a research initiative that focuses on the 
prevention of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes. Mr. Matthews regards it as an advocacy 
organization. Genocide experts “seek to understand how to pressure political leaders to act in a 
preventive manner to halt massive human rights abuses before they escalate into genocide.”591  
Consistent with the way in which norms evolve, the W2I team disseminates its research findings 
on genocide prevention amongst politicians, policy makers, global think tanks, scholars, the 
media, and the wider public. It promotes research findings through presentations, municipal 
outreach, policy briefings and training, new studies and conferences.   
The W2I Project seeks to understand how to operationalize the principles of the 
International Commission on Intervention and States Sovereignty on the Responsibility to 
Protect. Research focused originally on how to mobilize the will to intervene in Canada 
and the United States. Scholarly research and interviews highlight the cases of the United 
Kingdom and South Africa. The project’s fundamental goal is to identify strategic and 
practical steps to raise the capacity of government officials, legislators, civil servants, 
Nongovernmental Organizations, advocacy groups, journalists, and media owners and 
                                                            
588 Kyle Matthews Interview, Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Kyle Matthews is the 
Senior Deputy Director of the Will to Intervene Project at the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights 
Studies, Concordia University. He joined MIGS after more than five years of diplomatic service at the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  He is the President of the Canadian International Council in Montreal 
and a member of the Montreal Council on Foreign Relations. In 2011 he joined the New Leaders program at the 
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs and the advisory board of the Canadian Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect.588 
589 Kyle Matthews interview ibid. 
590 Kyle Matthews interview ibid. 
591 The Will to Intervene Project (MIGS)– The Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies). 
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managers so they can effectively pressure governments to take action to prevent future 
genocides.”592 
 
MIGS authored the report Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership & Action to Prevent 
Mass Atrocities (W2I) in 2009. The rationale of the report was to 'operationalize the 
Responsibility to Protect principles in Canada and the United States to parallel efforts being 
made in the international realm.593 Among the suggestions listed by the W2I report was a call on 
the government of Canada to create an interdepartmental Coordinating Office for the Prevention 
of Mass Atrocities, the creation of a Canadian prevention corps, and a call on parliamentarians to 
exercise their initiative to bring to the public's attention specific instances in which the 
Responsibility to Protect could be implemented.594 The authors of W2I argued 
The combined impact of poverty and inequality, rapid demographic growth, ethnic 
nationalism, and climate change on international peace and security make it strategically 
imperative to operationalize the principles of the Responsibility to Protect report. These 
underlying structural factors increase the risks of mass atrocities perpetrated against 
civilians and pose a credible danger to Canadian and American national interests, ...595  
 
Canadian Senator Roméo Dallaire created the All Party Parliamentary Group for the Prevention 
of Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity. Although the group provides a means by 
which Canadian parliamentarians can discuss matters pertaining to genocide and mass atrocities, 
it is not a formal, regular parliamentary committee.  As a result, the authors of W2I argued that it 
is imperative for this informal committee to be formally recognized as a parliamentary 
committee, with all of the rights, privileges and resources attached to regular committees.596  
                                                            
592  Ibid http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/W2I_Project.html 
593 Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. “Mobilizing the Will to Intervene Leadership & 
Action to Prevent Mass Atrocities,” Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (2009), viii. 
<http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/documents/ENG_MIGS_finalW2IAugust09.pdf> (accessed November 2 2010) 
594 Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. Ibid at ix. 
<http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/documents/ENG_MIGS_finalW2IAugust09.pdf> (accessed November 2 2010). 
595 Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. Ibid at 8. 
596 Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. Ibid at 23. 
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Jillian Siskind also reported that her organization Canadian Lawyers for International Human 
Rights (CLAIHR), conducts symposiums and raises awareness.  They also talk to students and 
lawyers, speak at conferences, publish articles as well as relying on other forms of 
communication.  “We get people talking about it and understanding it.  We are concerned with 
the protection of international human rights for people.”597    The mandate of Canadian Lawyers 
for International Human Rights (CLAIHR) is to raise awareness and promote human rights 
within Canada and abroad. 598  A roundtable report called “Engaging the Responsibility to 
Protect civil society” was produced in 2008. 599                                                                                                         
After the world summit they looked at how they could consolidate the network; moving the 
loosely affiliated groups to create a stronger group of NGOs who work actively in support of the 
Responsibility to Protect. CLAIHR is also working to increase its collaboration with other 
advocates engaged in human rights activities.  The purpose of this approach is to allow them to 
have a direct impact on policy and lawmaking and to help Canada regain its position as a 
forerunner in the area of human rights.  In this context, “CLAIHR strongly supports and 
promotes the use of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect.” 600 
Evan Cinq-Mars, speaking at a Conference on the Responsibility to Protect, suggested his 
organization (not identified) has a mandate to collaborate by bringing  together NGOs from all 
around the world and mobilizing  them to push for action in countries like Sudan.   
                                                            
597 Jillian Siskind interview Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights, Toronto, Ontario October 26, 2011 
and November  23, 2011 Jillian Siskind is President of CLAIHR. Jillian Siskind is Prosecution Counsel for Tarion 
Warranty Corporation and is the former Senior Policy Advisor for Ontario’s Minister of Community Safety and 
Correctional Services. She also worked at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia where she 
was involved with appeals concerning both the Yugoslav conflict and Rwandan genocide and participated in the 
drafting of the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic. 
598  Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights (CLAIHR)http://claihr.ca 
599 World Federalist Movement’s Project on “Engaging Civil Society” 21 Feb 2008. 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/AP%20Civil%20Society%20Consultation%20Final%20Report.pdf 
600  Ibid http://claihr.ca/wordpress/our-work/. 
  197 
 
We are creating global centres for R2P and attempting to establish a coalition of NGOs.  
The strategy to build a coalition requires extensive work on the part of numerous players.  
We need to raise awareness and support and develop partners.  We are fighting to make 
sure consensus is maintained and political will mobilized.  We work at the national level 
and at the regional level.601 
Lucie Edwards of the Centre of International Governance (CIGI) advised  
starting in 2007 the World Federation Movement held eight round tables in key regional 
places and had regional discussions of the Responsibility to Protect in places like 
Bangladesh, taking the opportunity to tap into regional philosophy and regional 
organizations.602  
NGOs also influence through publications, op-eds, social media, twitter, parliamentary groups, 
graduate students, TV, training for journalists on the Responsibility to Protect, and work with the 
UN Office.  NGOs jointly strategize and co-convene events.  They also pursue other avenues 
such as winning the support of mayors, and the Office of Genocide and influence how decisions 
are made.603  
 CIGI is a research centre/think tank located in Waterloo, Ontario, and is associated with the 
University of Waterloo.  CIGI produces “Policy briefs to develop information and analysis, 
followed by recommendations on policy-oriented topics” for the use of “policy makers, policy 
specialists, the media and interested scholars.”604  CIGI commentaries are designed to advance 
public understanding and influence public debate through providing expert analysis of current 
international governance topics, written in the style of newspaper op-eds. CIGI papers present 
                                                            
601 Evan Cinq-Mars “Ten Years After the ICISS:  Reflections for the Past and Future of the Responsibility to 
Protect” Munk Centre, November 12th, 2011. 
602 Lucie Edwards, interview Centre for International Governance and Innovation, June 21. 2011 Lucie Edwards 
served as Canadian High Commissioner to India (2003-06), South Africa (1999-2003) and Kenya (1993-95). She 
was awarded the Public Service Award of Excellence, its highest award, for her humanitarian work as Ambassador 
to Rwanda in 1995. She has also served at the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv (1977-1980) and in South Africa 
(1986-89).  
603 Lucie Edwards ibid; Centre for International Governance and Intervention, Waterloo, Ontario (CIGI).  
http://www.cigionline.org/ 
604 Edwards 2011 Ibid. http://www.cigionline.org 
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policy positions and/or research findings, insights or data relevant to policy debates and decision 
making. This category includes papers in series linked to particular projects or topic areas. 
 
The organization also holds conferences and produces reports that summarize and synthesize the 
main ideas, conclusions and recommendations from those conferences or meetings.  It also 
produces Special Reports which “include multi-author studies arising from CIGI projects and 
research conducted in collaboration with think tank partners.”605  “Op-eds showcase the expertise 
of CIGI researchers on a range of relevant global governance issues and are published in 
newspapers and websites.  Such op-eds reveal how their experts “interpret current trends in 
world affairs.”606  In addition, interviews with CIGI experts appear weekly on line and address 
time-sensitive topics and world events in international governance. CIGI also produces books 
which result from CIGI-sponsored projects or the work of CIGI fellows and scholars.   
 
In an interview with Marion Arnaud from the International Coalition on the Responsibility to 
Protect (ICRtoP) she spoke about how civil society was instrumental in taking the Commission’s 
work beyond the UN approval.  “In 2001, when the ICISS report was put together on the 
Responsibility to Protect, the government of Canada was one of the ones really supportive of 
these initiatives.  They approached World Federalist Movement (WFM) and asked if they could 
help them see if there was any appetite for this norm.” 607  (Which it did, of course).  In New 
York there was a group of five to six NGOs who started really pushing for its acceptance.  This 
group included Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, Refugees International, WFM and some other 
groups.  They started by talking about what it would take for the Responsibility to Protect to 
                                                            
605 Edwards 2011 Ibid. http://www.cigionline.org 
606 Edwards 2011 Ibid.  http://www.cigionline.org 
607 Marion Arnaud, International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, New York, Dec. 5, 2011. 
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become more than just an idea.  They really believed that without a bottom up process, and 
without strong civil society input, it would not succeed.  In that way it was similar to the 
Landmines Treaty, where it needed a strong network or organization and thereby acted 
accordingly.608   
The ICRtoP and the World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy, New York is an 
advocacy group that  
brings together NGOs from all regions of the world to strengthen normative consensus 
for the Responsibility to Protect, further the understanding of the norm, push for 
strengthened capacities to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and mobilize NGOs to push for action to save lives in the 
Responsibility to Protect country-specific situations.609   
ICRtoP is important in its focus on the norm and the dissemination of information surrounding 
the norm – its implementation and its potential use, including the three pillar approach.  It has 
produced multiple documents and advises on events as they occur in the United Nations, regional 
groups, other NGOs as well as think tank activities concerned with the Responsibility to Protect. 
Marion Arnaud (ICRtoP) suggested there was a two-pronged approach – relationship building to 
create a coalition and the creation of a more research-oriented and high level advocacy center.  
She explained that is why they have the global center which incorporates many more groups.  
WFM encouraged groups who worked on similar missions to push the idea of the Responsibility 
to Protect forward. NGO colleagues worked to be sure the Responsibility to Protect would be 
supported in the outcome document.   Governments from southern countries, such as South 
Africa and Mexico also influenced the General Assembly to adopt the world summit document.  
This was not a small accomplishment.  In fact, it was a historical achievement reached after 
                                                            
608 Marion Arnaud, interview, ibid. 
609  The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP). www.responsibilitytoprotect.org  
  200 
 
many weeks of negotiation.  Unfortunately, however, now it has become a partisan issue in 
Canada.610   
Marion Arnaud talked about their project on UN reform and UN elections.  She suggested it is 
beneficial in terms of looking at how civil society can lobby for better accountability, 
transparency and information.611  Reinforcing the idea that the Responsibility to Protect is not 
just ‘a Western idea.’  Ms. Arnaud also indicated that in West Africa it was very easy to 
introduce the concept because they already had been considering it but just did not have the right 
words to formulate it:   
 The African Union had endorsed the concept of R2P.    The culture of response is 
 different everywhere, however, which is a major question when it comes to the 
 universality of the concept.  We essentially tried to make the language part of the UN.    
 We think it is crucial to engage NGOs because they are the ones talking to the region.    
 We tried to have a consultative method of working with five goals for the coalition: 
 increase awareness of R2P among governments, NGOs and the public; push for 
 international, regional and sub-regional and national endorsements of R2P; encourage 
 governments, regional and subregional organizations and the UN to build the capacity to 
 prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;  
 help build and strengthen global support from governments for RtoP; and, push for action 
 to save lives in RtoP country-specific situations.612 
Now there are 40 organizations with very different mandates.    Some of ICRtoPs closest 
partners from civil society include the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 
Global Action to Prevent War, United Nations – Sweden, World Federation of United Nations 
Association, and Human Rights Watch, among others.  Although they have a variety of different 
mandates, these groups are embracing the Responsibility to Protect as a framework and linking 
their mandates to it.613  Naomi Kikoler of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at 
                                                            
610 Marion Arnaud, interview, International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, New York, Dec. 5, 2011. 
611 Arnaud, Marion interview, ibid. Marion Arnaud is the Senior Outreach Officer at the International Coalition for 
the Responsibility to Protect. Her Master's thesis focused on the Responsibility to Protect in Darfur.   
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the City University of New York spoke of the co-convening of events and the regular back and 
forth interaction.614  Having shared goals helps them to maximize their impact.  They also 
educate other NGOs on the Responsibility to Protect so they can be supportive of it.615    
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect was founded in 2008 by a number of 
supportive governments, as well as leaders who come from the human rights community.  Some 
of the main organizations involved include the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, 
Oxfam International, Refugees International, and WFM-Institute for Global Policy.616  The 
mission of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is to create the principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect into a practical guide for action in the face of human atrocities.  The 
Centre approaches its goal through the use of advocacy in the case of specific humanitarian 
crises, engages in research regarding the Responsibility to Protect, and helps states build 
capacity.  It works closely with other NGOs, governments and regional bodies whose goals are 
to implement the Responsibility to Protect.  The Global Centre serves as a resource and a forum 
for governments, international organizations and NGOs. 
With regard to his organization, Ian Davis of NATO Watch referred to mechanisms such as 
‘shadow summits’ to NATO’s own summit.617 NATO Watch Ross-shire UK is an independent, 
not-for-profit ‘virtual’ think tank which examines the role of NATO in public life and advocates 
for more openness, transparency and accountability within the Alliance. NATO Watch was 
                                                            
614 Naomi Kikoler, Director of Policy and Advocacy leads the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect’s work 
on efforts to advance the Responsibility to Protect.  She is the author of numerous publications.  Prior to her 
association with the Centre in 2008, she worked on policy for Amnesty International Canada.  She also clerked in 
the Office of the Prosecutor at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
615 Naomi Kikoler interview Global Center for the Responsibilty to Protect.   http://globalr2p.org/ 
616 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.  http://www.globalr2p.org/ 
617 Ian Davis, interview, NATO Watch, November 10, 2011 Ian Davis is the founding director of NATO Watch and 
is  also an independent human security consultant.  He has a background in government, academia and the 
nongovernmental sector.  He received both a  PhD and BA in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford in the 
United Kingdom.  He was Executive Direction of the British American Security Council (BASIC) from 2001 to 
2007. 
  202 
 
founded by Dr. Davis in 2009 and was launched at an inaugural Shadow NATO Summit in 
Brussels in the spring of 2009. NATO Watch engages in research and analysis of policy 
questions, provides a news briefing service, distributes a monthly e-journal of media stories on 
NATO policy and activities, provides opinions, sponsors conferences and events, including an 
annual shadow NATO Summit and provides consultancy and workshops. Its mission is to 
increase transparency, to stimulate engagement and increase participation in NATO’s policy 
making.  By creating networks of individuals and institutions it aspires to reform NATO in ways 
that include shared democratic and humanitarian values, including human rights and civil 
liberties, the Responsibility to Protect, transparency and the promotion of peace and cooperative 
security approaches as well as strengthening international law.618  
The vision for NATO Watch states that “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [is] at 
the heart of a new ‘moral, muscular multilateralism,’ a cooperative approach to world problems 
that uses international organizations and law to the fullest.”619   NATO Watch relies on voluntary 
associates and partners.  It receives no large-scale or government funding and depends on 
donations.  Its work includes policy input to strengthen NATO’s approaches to conflict 
prevention, crisis management, peace building, arms control and disarmament and cooperation 
with non-members (particularly Russia). 
 
Bob Zuber, Global Action to Prevent Wars, discussed how his organization interacted with every 
part of the UN system on a daily basis.  
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The interaction we have is informal.  We have off-the-record briefings and so on.  Clearly 
they do not give us credit for what we do but there are ways we can see a concrete impact 
from our work, whether it is in delegations or UN staffers.620  
Global Action to Prevent War is an emerging transnational network (according to my 
classification, an applied conflict resolution centre) dedicated to practical measures for reducing 
global levels of conflict and to removing the institutional and ideological impediments to ending 
armed violence and severe human rights violations. A few years ago they held a four day event 
on the ‘third pillar’ of the Responsibility to Protect, in part as preparation for an upcoming 
General Assembly Debate on that same topic. Global Action has been working to create 
collaborative activities in national capitals, and also occasionally co-organizes events in New 
York that “help diplomats to clarify responsibilities and allow fresh voices from diverse regions 
to address UN officials and diplomatic missions on their security concerns and interests.”621  
Their focus tends to be on both complementary (regional and secretariat) mandates for atrocity 
crime prevention as well as specific capacity requirements for the ‘early and decisive response’ 
to the threat of such atrocities. Two events they held focused on peace building strategies and the 
linkages between the gender and Responsibility to Protect communities.  New York partners 
include the World Federation of UN Associations, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the ICRtoP, 
the WFM as well as overseas participants from Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Nigeria, the UK and Venezuela.622 They have also produced an ‘E Book’ entitled 
“Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect: A Contribution to the Third Pillar Approach.” 
The book features essays by Melina Lito and Robert Zuber with contributions from Daniel Fiott 
of Madariaga College of Europe Foundation and Joachim Koops of the Global Governance 
Institute.  
                                                            
620 Bob Zuber interview, Global Action to Prevent War, New York, November 4, 2011. 
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622 Ibid. www.globalactionpw.org 
  204 
 
VI.2   Difference between the Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention 
Louise Frechette, also of CIGI, suggested one of the key distinctions between the Responsibility 
to Protect as a formal principle and humanitarian intervention is that human intervention started 
long before the term was coined with early interventions after the Cold War.  Somalia and 
Bosnia were two examples of the decision to deploy international forces - not to take control of a 
territory but to provide assistance to civilians in civil conflict.  Somalia was threatened and 
Bosnia attempted to provide humanitarian relief and protect citizens.   “Therefore, she notes, the 
notion of protection predates the concept itself.”623 
Kyle Matthews of the Montreal Institute for Genocidal Studies (MIGS) expressed some caution 
regarding the influence of academics regarding the Responsibility to Protect.   
 We have spent time looking at the academic field of inquiry.  We have found academic 
 input to be pretty general. They are much more categorical than the situation permits.   
 Their careers are about talking to other academics.  Most academics are at arm’s length 
 while our job is to get into the nuance of things.  We make that disclaimer to all the 
 academics who call us.624   
 
VI.3   NGOs and the UN 
While NGOs appeal to their own governments as well as governments of different nations, a 
very important part of their influence is with regard to the UN as a key international 
organization.  It is this relationship that is instrumental in furthering the doctrine and in rounding 
out the governance relations between civil society, state and international institutions.   
                                                            
623 Frechette, Louise Interview, Centre for International Governance and Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario, June 21, 
2011 Louise Frechette, (affiliated with CIGI) was also involved with the Responsibility to Protect in its early stages.  
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secretary-general.  Fréchette was the Deputy Minister of National Defence of Canada from 1995 to 1998. 
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Lucie Edwards (CIGI) spoke of a specific instance where NGOs influenced the UN.  
In Nepal during the Maoist insurgency a state of emergency was declared.  Political 
parties were suspended.  All of the NGOs systematically set up a large operation in Nepal 
and NGOs became their eyes and ears.625  
 
VI.4   NGOs and Global Governance 
What is interesting is that in the Commission Report there was some criticism of the place of 
NGOs in the development of the norm. The Report, in reference to NGOs, states 
 .”..they are seen often as lacking in policy making experience, frequently as unhelpfully 
divided...and sometimes reluctant publicly (as distinct from privately) to endorse coercive 
measures which may be necessary.”626 
In my view the authors failed in some ways to see the increasingly important role that 
nongovernmental actors would play, both then and now.  My own experience with the 
individuals I interviewed and their organizations and research on NGOs as norm entrepreneurs 
generally presents a different perspective of professionalism and cooperation along with an 
understanding of the need for coercive action under certain circumstances.  They have shown 
their strong support for a principle of great significance in a world that has now agreed to end 
genocide and other human atrocities. 
Because of the growth of civil society, international and global governance is no longer restricted 
to government or intergovernmental institutions like the UN and the EU.  Many institutions 
function in between individual citizens and family and government.627  The shift is from 
government to governance, or global governance and states.  Intergovernmental organizations no 
                                                            
625 Lucie Edwards interview supra note 602. 
626 ICISS supra note 6 at 78. 
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longer hold all the political power and NGO capabilities are growing rapidly.  Not only do they 
carry out traditional advocacy and humanitarian activities they also are involved in observing 
governmental institutions, lobbying, standard setting and monitoring.  Over 2700 NGOs are 
registered with ECOSOC.628   
Mertus explores the potential for “bottom up” democracy that means the participation of social 
movements in the development, articulation and application of international norms.629 According 
to this view, state structures are not the only organizational form in transformative social change.  
Transnational and non-state entities do wield influence over the development of new legal norms 
and participate in their acceptance as legitimate and authoritative.  These “interpretive 
communities  create law and give law meaning through their own narratives and precepts...not 
only do they have access to discourse over changing norms, but also to some extent they are the 
discourse.”630  The transnational activities and networks they are involved in are used 
strategically to support their own goals.631 Certain human rights treaties and other governmental 
documents form the basis of their advocacy and provide authority for international norms that 
may be conceived of as law.632 
While the Responsibility to Protect focuses on the obligations of states to provide meaningful 
human security, much of the concept and policy development, as well as the actual application of 
the concepts (prevention, reacting, rebuilding) is being carried out by these Nongovernmental 
Organizations and their coalitions. It is becoming apparent that the provision of human security 
has expanded beyond the borders of the state and has contributed to the improvement of the 
international community’s ability to prevent mass human rights abuses and genocide.   
                                                            
628 Logister 2007 ibid at169 
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Because of their participation in governance, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) have the 
potential to create a more democratic global government.  Ironically, however, states that could 
benefit most from the presence of NGOs are those that suppress them.  The son of Omar 
Gaddafi, for example, wrote in his PhD thesis that authoritarian governments do not represent 
their people’s interest because they exclude them from the decision-making process.633  Obiora 
Okafor (2004) reminds us that some NGOs are struggling under repressive governments making 
it harder for their influence to be heard or seen.  This does not mean that these governments are 
totally impervious to social pressure.  As a result of accessibility issues, however, such 
organizations have not been approached, leaving a gap in the research possibly to be filled later 
if the government situation changes as it has in Libya, for example.   
It is clear from the above that NGOs have taken their role of norm entrepreneurs in support of the 
Responsibility to Protect seriously and have been and continue to be critical in the understanding 
and evolution of the norm. Let us then take a longer look at the responses from those being 
interviewed with regard to whether they see the Responsibility to Protect as a moral or a legal 
entity, a fundamental question with regard to its status as lex ferenda or lex lata and customary 
international law. It is the perception of those experts working with the Responsibility to Protect 
that I sought to get that helps us to deconstruct the evolution of the principle from an idea or 
concept to a legal norm.  
                                                            
633 Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, (published under the surname Alqadhafi) The Role of Civil Society in the Democratisation 
of Global Governance Institutions: From Soft Power to Collective Decision Making? PhD Dissertation, Senate 
House Library, University of London, 2004).While the authenticity of the work of Gaddafi as of late has been 
questioned, the statements itself bears consideration. The Telegraph 27 April 2013. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8350867/Libya-LSE-should-strip-
Gaddafis-son-of-PhD.html 
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Chapter Eight continues the analysis of the responses from those being interviewed with regard 
to whether they see the Responsibility to Protect as a moral or a legal entity, a fundamental 
question with regard to its status as lex ferenda or lex lata and customary international law. It is 
the perception of those experts working with the Responsibility to Protect that I sought to assist 
in the purpose of deconstructing the evolution of the principle from an idea or concept to a legal 
norm. It also seeks the views of those interviewed on the UN and its role as either a facilitator or 
an obstruction to the implantation of the Responsibility to Protect. 
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Chapter Eight:  Is the Responsibility to Protect a  
Legal or a Moral Entity? 
 
I. Addressing the Main Question 
 
This Chapter focuses on the outcome of interviews with individuals and representatives of 
organizations regarding the legal status of the responsibility to protect.  The principle clearly has 
a legal formulation as well as a social and moral one as it evolves from an ‘idea or concept’ to a 
legal norm.  The objective of the thesis is to trace its evolution..  The research was designed to 
explore more fully the nature of the legality of the Responsibility to Protect by sounding out the 
interviewees on the basis of their knowledge and expertise.  I was particularly interested to 
discover how they perceived its development.  Do they see it as having achieved legal status or 
as a principle that relies upon moral values and ‘soft law.’  Also, I was interested to hear how it 
had evolved from their perspective.  What factors drive it closer to customary law. 
My question of whether the Responsibility to Protect is a moral or a legal entity solicited a 
number of different responses. Respondents tended to consider the question in different ways.  I 
interpret this difference in part to the way the question was phrased.  It might have been better 
posed as “Is it a moral or a legal entity, or both?” since to many, it was neither moral nor legal, 
but was a combination of aspects of both. I see this as illustrative of the ambiguity resulting from 
its soft law status. For some the definition of legality rests on the signing of treaties, or on 
customary international law.  Others consider if a resolution is passed which involves the 
authorization of the Security Council and the UN Charter this gives it sufficient legal validation. 
While interviewees were certainly pragmatic when it comes to the interests of states and highly 
aware of realpolitik, most hesitated to suggest this was the sole driving force behind the 
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Responsibility to Protect which stands, they felt, ultimately upon a ‘universal moral principle’.  
This emphasized in their mind it has not yet reached a strictly legal status.   
One of the consistent responses was that while there had been interventions that infringed on the 
sovereign authority of the state, with the introduction of the norm of the Responsibility to Protect 
the principle of a universal right of a state to sovereignty was formally challenged.  The problem, 
however, is that the Responsibility to Protect has developed baggage because of connotations 
associated with military and humanitarian intervention (for example Iraq in 1991; UNAMIR in 
Rwanda, 1994; and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999).   The Responsibility to Protect, in 
some persons’ minds, legitimates the idea of the militarization of human rights.  From this 
perspective, there is a lot of moral ambiguity, making any advance to legal status difficult.  Ian 
Davis (NATO Watch) noted that “in the south a lot of people see the Responsibility to Protect as 
a Trojan Horse which gives the colonial powers the right to intervene in their sovereign 
affairs.”634 
Kyle Matthews responded that he sees the Responsibility to Protect as a political concept or a 
policy, rather than a legal doctrine, although the responsibility to prevent or react is partially 
imbedded in the Genocide Convention.635  When genocide is taking place there is clearly a 
responsibility to act.  The ICISS report in 2001 is much more of a policy dealing with 
sovereignty in a responsible manner.  It is also tied to the ICC and the prosecution of perpetrators 
which places it in a legal framework.636  Jillian Siskind (CLAIHR) maintained a similar 
perspective.  There is law and politics, rules and realities.  The Responsibility to Protect is at the 
very early stages of international law.   “In order for anything to be recognized as international 
                                                            
634 Ian Davis interview supra note 617. 
635 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948 as General Assembly Resolution 260 
636 Kyle Matthews Interview supra note 588. 
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law it has to be based in convention or custom and you have to see how widely a practice is 
implemented.”637 
Bill Graham, speaking at the Ten Years After Conference, referred to the legal status of the 
Responsibility to Protect. He suggested the question in the Kosovo conflict was how they could 
justify what they were doing in terms of the legal status of the intervention.  It was said what 
they were doing was illegal.  What became more important, however, was a notion of 
legality/illegality versus legitimacy. The illegality of a decision emphasized the necessity of 
Security Council approval.  Some think the elasticity of the Responsibility to Protect makes it 
merely a principle, but one can argue it is one tool in the legal toolbox along with the ICC.  On 
the other hand, “R2P as a moral concept includes the concept of prevention, development aid and 
capacity building in relation to R2P.”638 
Louise Frechette (CIGI) pointed out when the Security Council takes a decision under Chapter 
VII it becomes mandatory but this does not mean it is mandatory on every member state.  A 
Chapter VII decision of the Security Council that authorizes an action taking all necessary means 
creates a legal directive but does not force on each member state the need to send soldiers.  The 
decision to participate in the military action is up to each individual state.639   
                                                            
637 Siskind, Jillian interview, Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights, Toronto, Ontario, October 26, 2011 
and November 23, 2011.  
638 Bill Graham Ten Years After the ICISS:  Reflections for the Past and Future of the Responsibility to Protect 
Munk Centre, November 12th, 2011:  Keynote Speech. 
639 David Dewitt (CIGI) suggested that increasingly there are normative and moral judgments being made, at least 
among the world of the privileged few and enlightened leadership.  “There is a genuine sense of belief that we 
should be trying to do or intend no harm.”  David Dewitt is vice president of programs at CIGI.  Previously he was 
at York University as vice president of research, social sciences and humanities, and professor in the Department of 
Political Science.  He served as director of York University's Centre for International and Security Studies from 
1988 to 2006.  He is author or contributing editor of numerous books, refereed articles and chapters.  He has led a 
number of policy focused research NGOs that have dealt with security and governance issues in the Asia Pacific and 
the Middle East. 
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On the other hand, Khalid Koser, the Geneva Center for Security Policy Studies (GCSPS) 
commented “You cannot have purely ethical motives for intervening.  There must be more.  
Motivations will always be mixed.”640 The GCSPS is a research think tank founded in 1995 as an 
international organization primarily for the purpose of promoting peace, security and stability 
through training, research and dialogue. The Centre trains diplomats, military officials, 
international civil servants and NGO staff in the fields of security and peace making. Through 
research. Publications, conferences and workshops, the GCSPS provides an international forum 
for dialogue for policy decision making.641   
GCSPS participants come from Foundation Council members, including countries in transition, 
in post conflict transition or at risk. Faculty and staff are composed of both academics and 
practitioners who come from a wide range of countries, disciplines and interests.  Their work 
includes a wide range of book publications, peer-reviewed journals and other specialised 
publications.  Faculty members also act as commentators and analysts in the media. 
 Naomi Kikoler described the Responsibility to Protect “as a political concept that has a moral 
basis and in the future might have a legal status but it does not to date.  There is no enforcement 
mechanism.”642  She considered the treaty aspect of international law and expressed doubt that 
the Responsibility to Protect would ever be treaty-based.  She added that it would have to 
become customary international humanitarian law which would require a consistent invocation 
                                                            
640 Khalid Koser interview, The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva Switzerland, February 21, 2011 Dr. 
Khalid Koser is Deputy Director and Academic Dean at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.  He is also Non-
Resident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, Associate Fellow at Chatham House, 
Research Associate at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, and Non-Resident 
Fellow at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. 
641The Geneva Centre for Security Studies.  http://www.gcsp.ch/About-Us/Contact 
642 Interview with Naomi Kikoler, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the City University of New 
York, New York, November 9, 2011. 
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of the language in situations where populations are at risk along with action taken to protect 
civilians as opposed to one-off situations.643 
As can be read from the responses, the legal status of the Responsibility to Protect may be said to 
be ‘open to interpretation.’  Nevertheless, the study of the principle of the Responsibility to 
Protect must consider its legal validity.  As outlined earlier, according to Article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, the sources of international law are “limited to international 
treaties, custom and general principles of law.  Customary international law requires a general 
practice of States accompanied by opinio juris.644  Resolutions of the General Assembly such as 
that applying the Responsibility to Protect in Article 138 and 139 do not create new rules of 
customary international law as such but rather function as a starting point, frame or concept for 
the establishment or creation of international law.   As I have stated, the responsibility 
framework is yet to be considered as customary law but may become so if it can be said to have 
been applied according to its fundamental principles of acceptance by the UN often enough. The 
review of Security Council resolutions which follows and the case study of its application to be 
conducted in the next chapter helps us to see more clearly how far it has come.   
The legal status of the Responsibility to Protect, while not necessarily imbedded in international 
public law as yet, is clearly an aspect of norm development and soft law transnationally.  Over 
and above international law, an example of state practice, especially as evidenced by some of the 
actions taken by the UN Security Council since 2005 and the reaffirmation of the principle 
illustrates the growing recognition that humanitarian crises, even if confined to one state, can be 
                                                            
643 Naomi Kikoler interview ibid. 
644 Strauss, E., The Emperor's New Clothes: The UN and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (Namos 
2009), 36 [Strauss 2009].  
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considered threats to international peace and security.  These threats justify the involvement of 
the international community and the need for legal measures.645   
II. Security Council Resolutions 
The following resolutions since 2005 provide examples of actions taken by the international 
community concerning the protection of civilians and the Responsibility to Protect, commencing 
in 2006 and subsequent to its approval in the UN Outcome Document in 2005. While there is no 
‘threshold number’ to identify when a norm becomes law, these resolutions do demonstrate that 
the Responsibility to Protect  is not yet an empty vessel, negated and forgotten by the 
international community.   
Table 4:  Responsibility to Protect Security Council Resolutions 
 
DATE  DOCUMENT #  SITUATION OR ISSUE  TEXT 
27 January 
2006 
S/RES/1653 DRC or Burunch “Underscores that the governments in the region 
have a primary responsibility to protect their 
populations” 
28 April 2006 S/RES/1674 POC “Reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document regarding the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity” 
31 August 
2006 
S/RES/1706 Sudan(Darfur)  “Recalling also its previous resolutions 1325 
(2000) on women, peace and security, 1502 
(2003) on the protection of humanitarian and 
United Nations personnel, 1612 (2005) on 
children and armed conflict, and 1674 (2006) on 
the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which 
reaffirms inter alia the provisions of paragraphs 
138 and 139 of the of the 2005 United Nations 
World Summit outcome document”  
11 November 
2009 
S/RES/1894 POC “Reaffirming the relevant provisions of the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document regarding the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict, including 
                                                            
645 Cooper and Kohler, “Introduction:  The Responsibility to Protect:  The Opportunity to Relegate Atrocity Crimes 
to the Past” in Cooper and Kohler (2009) supra note 73 at 3.  
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paragraphs 138 and 139 thereof regarding the 
responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity 
26 February 
2011 
S/RES/1970 Libya “Recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to 
protect its population,” 
17 March 2011 S/RES/1973 Libya “Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan 
authorities to protect the Libya population and 
reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the 
primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to 
ensure the protection of civilians.” 
30 March 2011 S/RES/1975 Cote d’Ivoire “Reaffirming the primary responsibility of each 
State to protect civilians and reiterating that 
parties to armed conflicts bear the primary 
responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure 
the protecting of civilians…” 
8 July 2011 S/RES/1996 South Sudan  “Advising and assisting the Government of the 
Republic of South Sudan, including military and 
police at national and local levels as appropriate, 
in fulfilling the responsibility to protect civilians.” 
21 October 
2011 
S/RES/2014 Yemen  “Recalling the Yemeni Government’s primary 
responsibility to protect civilians.” 
27 October 
2011 
S/RES/2016 Libya “…underscores the Libyan authorities’ 
responsibility for the protection of the population 
including foreign nations and African migrants.” 
12 March 2012 S/RES/2040 Libya “…underscores the Libyan authorities’ primary 
responsibility for the protection of Libya’s 
population 
19 December 
2012 
S/RES/2085 Mali “(d) To support the Malian authorities in their 
primary responsibility to protect the population;” 
6 March 2013 S/RES/2093 Somalia “Recognizing that the Federal Government of 
Somalis has a responsibility to protect its citizens 
and build its own national security forces.” 
12 March 2013 S/RES/2095 Libya “…underscores the Libyan government’s primary 
responsibility for the protection of Libya’s 
population, as well as foreign nationals, including 
African migrants; 
25 April 2013 S/RES/2100 Mali “Reiterates that the transnational authorities have 
the primary responsibility to protect civilians in 
Mali.” 
11 July 2013 S/RES/2109 Sudan/South Sudan “Recalling the Presidential Statement of 12 
February 2013 that recognized that States bear the 
primary responsibility to protect civilians as well 
as to respect and ensure the human rights of all 
individuals within their territory and subject to 
their jurisdiction as provided for by relevant 
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international law, reaffirmed that parties to armed 
conflict bear the primary responsibility to take all 
feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians 
 
  
Resolutions 1970, 1973 and 2016 concerning Libya will be discussed more fully in Chapter 
Nine. UN Resolution 1674646 was adopted unanimously on April 28, 2006, after reaffirming 
previous resolutions concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict and calling for co-
operation between the United Nations and regional organizations.  The Council stressed the need 
for a comprehensive approach to the prevention of armed conflict and its recurrence. 
The Council regretted that civilians accounted for the majority of the victims during armed 
conflict, and was concerned about the impact of the illicit trade in weapons on the population. 
The resolution recognized the role of regional organizations in the protection of civilians and 
reaffirmed that all parties to armed conflict had an obligation to protect the civilian population. 
Provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the Responsibility to 
Protect were reaffirmed.  The resolution demanded that all parties to armed conflict adhere to 
The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions including Protocols I and II ending 
impunity for all states to comply with their obligations in this respect. It further stated all 
countries had to comply with the demands of the Security Council.  The Council further required 
special attention be given to the protection of civilians in post-conflict situations during peace 
processes. 
                                                            
646 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674 Protection of civilians during armed conflict and in peace 
settlements post conflicts April 2006. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4459bed60.html; 
http://www.unrol.org/files/S-Res-
1674%20on%20protection%20civilians%20in%20armed%20conflict%20(28Apr06).pdf 
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The resolution recognized the important role of regional and intergovernmental organization 
regarding the protection of civilians. It indicated that steps would be taken in the case of the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674 Protection of civilians during armed conflict 
and in peace settlements post conflicts April 2006; deliberate targeting of civilians and protected 
persons.  It also reaffirmed Articles 138 and 139 of the Responsibility to Protect in the Summit 
Outcome document 2005.   Algeria, China and Russia initially opposed the resolution but 
objections from China and Russia were eventually overcome.   
Resolution 1706 determines “that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.”647  It agrees to a peacekeeping force of more than 20,000 UN 
peacekeepers on the ground to protect civilians in Darfur in the Sudan (August 31, 2006).  The 
resolution reaffirms the commitment to ensuring the security of women, humanitarian aid and 
UN workers, and children in Darfur and builds upon the existing UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
on the ground.  The resolution provides for a peacekeeping force on the ground to protect 
civilians, humanitarian aid workers and children.  Resolution 1706 also reaffirmed paragraphs 
138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome document regarding the Responsibility to Protect.  The 
resolution expressed deep concern over the recent deterioration of relations between the Sudan 
and Chad and called on the Governments of the two countries to abide by the agreement.  
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996 was adopted unanimously on July 8, 2011.648  
The independence of South Sudan from Sudan was recognized and the (UNMISS) established.649 
The mandate of UNMISS was to consolidate peace and security.  The resolution reaffirmed its 
                                                            
647 Resolution 1706 http://archive2.globalsolutions.org/files/general/issues/pdfs/sc_res_1706.pdf Citizens for Global  
Solutions. 
648 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996 post conflict peace building in Sudan. 
649 "With independence less than a day away, Security Council authorises United Nations Mission in Republic of 
South Sudan". United Nations. July 8, 2011. 
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strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of 
the Republic of South Sudan and affirmed national responsibility as key to establishing 
sustainable peace for post-conflict peace building. The resolution presented an approach to peace 
consolidation which addressed the underlying causes of the conflict and the principles of security 
and development. It expressed its displeasure with the effect on the conflict on the civilian 
population, and stressed the need for peace building. 
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter UNMISS was established for an initial period of one year 
with possible renewals. The focus of UNMISS was to be on security and development, peace 
consolidation and state-building, conflict resolution, the protection of civilians, establishing the 
rule of law and strengthening the security and justice sector.650 The resolution allowed for the use 
of "all necessary means" to enforce its mandate. It also noted “the importance of sustained 
cooperation and dialogue with civil society.”651 In ensuring the protection of civilians, the 
resolution referenced the delivery of core government functions, including settling political 
disputes peacefully, and the use of existing national facilities to stress national ownership of this 
process. The UN is intended to cooperate with national authorities to prevent a return to violence 
and support national peace building including human rights and the rule of law. The resolution 
demands that all forms of violence and human rights abuses against the civilian population in 
South Sudan be stopped, in particular gender-based violence, and abuses against children. It 
requires the renewal of the action plan signed in 2009 to end the recruitment and use of child 
                                                            
650 Varner, Bill (7 July 2011). "South Sudan to Get 7,900 UN Peacekeepers, Envoys Say". Bloomberg L.P. [Varner 
2011] 
651  UNSC Resolution 1996 supra note 648. 
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soldiers.  It promotes women’s leadership and women’s organizations and counters “negative 
societal attitudes about women’s capacity to participate equally.” 652 
Resolution 2014 expressed serious concern over the situation in Yeman yet reaffirmed the strong 
commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen.  It 
encouraged all sides to reach a peaceful resolution.  It expressed the need for a comprehensive, 
independent impartial investigation consistent with international standards into alleged human 
rights abuses and violations, with a view to avoiding impunity and ensuring full accountability.  
It condemned the use of force against unarmed demonstrators, and called for an immediate 
ceasefire and “the formation of a commission to investigate the events that led to the killing of 
innocent Yemeni people.”653  It called for the effective participation of women at all stages of the 
peace-processes and in conflict resolution.  It expressed concern for the existence of Al-Queda in 
the region with a determination to address this threat according to the UN Charter and 
international law including applicable human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.  It demands 
that action be taken to end attacks against civilians and civilian targets.  
These resolutions illustrate the growing recourse to the principle of the Responsibility to Protect 
and strengthens the argument for consideration of the norm as customary international law.  As I 
have stated earlier the UN is critical to its development.  According to this interpretation, 
unilateral action or even collective efforts do not award the principle with the needed legitimacy 
to move it from soft law to hard law.  For some, this lack of a legal framework continues to serve 
as an impediment.  For example, Carolyn McAskie commented:   
 To my mind the impediments are both legal and practical.  We still do not have a formal 
 legal framework that defines when and how you can intervene.  I do not think we will ever 
                                                            
652  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996 ibid.  
653 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2014 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6634th meeting, 
on 21 October 2011.  http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011) 
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 have a formal criteria.  What you will have instead is a case by case argument whereby a 
 situation will reach a point where some member states will lead a discussion and a decision 
 will be made that enough people can live with.  It is impossible to have that discussion in a  
 formal situation of member states.  Governments will not discuss conditions under which 
 they can intervene.  They are just too nervous.  Having the Commission study the question  
 and come up with the concept was the best way.  Perhaps we need a second commission 
 now.  We need a mechanism outside member states to look at what implementation 
 means.654 
  
III. The UN – A Facilitator or an Impediment? 
 
One of the interview questions directed toward respondents was about their perception of the 
UNs role in the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect.  In the question of the implementation 
of the Responsibility to Protect, I regard the UN as an institution that can potentially ensure the 
fairest deliberations to achieve a collective decision that all member states will regard as binding 
upon them. Developing a consensus on military or other forms of intervention involves the full 
collective mechanisms of the UN.  However, to be legitimate, the decision must include active 
consultation with key Third World States, must be transparent, and must involve the 
international community.  Decisions are made on a case by case basis according to whether the 
criteria have been met; i.e., actual or threatened large-scale loss of human life, human atrocities 
or ethnic cleansing or war crimes.655    
                                                            
654 Carolyn McAskie interview, Dec. 8, 2011 Carolyn McAskie, OC is described on the University of Ottawa web 
page as an “inspiring and influential model of Canadian values in the international community”, Carolyn McAskie 
has had an illustrious career with the United Nations, having served in various capacities including Assistant 
Secretary General for Peace building Support.   Prior to her appointment with the United Nations, Ms. McAskie had 
a distinguished career with the Federal Government of Canada as a senior executive.  She has earned a reputation as 
an effective international diplomat and negotiator in humanitarian affairs, peacekeeping and peace building. 
655 Chimni, B.S. “Sovereignty, Rights, and Armed Intervention:  A Dialectical Perspective,” Chapter 10.   In 
Charlesworth, Hilary and Jean-Marc Coicaud, (Eds) Fault Lines of International legitimacy (Cambridge University 
Press:  New York, 2010) p. 303. 
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At the same time it is clearly very difficult to get all states to agree.656  Pressure is often placed 
on states showing hesitation to respect human rights and to make the individual its moral and 
political subject. However, this has not always been effective.657   Russia and China, for 
example, have in the past argued in favor of diplomatic channels and mediation over peace 
enforcement (needless to say good principles) but as one can see in the case of the 2012 Syrian 
conflict thousands are dying in the interim leading to questions with regard to Russia’s true 
motivation.  Tensions have been further exacerbated by the struggle over Ukraine.  The fact that 
the Permanent Five (P5) have veto power and can block intervention and other UN actions for 
narrow political reasons can be a major impediment in cases of the potential implementation of 
the Responsibility to Protect.658  
A brief history of the veto will aid the reader in his or her comprehension of the significance of 
the veto within the Security Council.  The veto dated back to 1945 from the foundation of the 
League of Nations in 1920 where each member of the League Council, whether permanent or 
non-permanent, had a veto on any non-procedural issue. By 1936 there were in effect 15 vetoes, 
which proved to be one of the defects of the League by making action impossible.  When the UN 
came into being, it had already been decided at the UN's founding conference in 1944, that 
Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the United States, and, "in due course" France, should be 
the permanent members of any newly formed Council. France had been defeated and occupied 
by Germany (1940–44), but its role as a permanent member of the League of Nations, its status 
as a colonial power and its support for the allies gave it status with the other four.659  The five 
                                                            
656 Coicaud, Jean Marc 2010 Chapter 2. “Deconstructing International Legitimacy” in Charlesworth, 2010 ibid 
 p. 61. 
657 Coicaud 2010 in Charlesworth, 2010 ibid p. 60. 
658 See Romeo Dallaire and the Will to Intervene.  21 September 2009 http://www.usip.org/events/mobilizing-the-
will-intervene. 
659 Global Policy forum.  
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permanent members of the Security Council enjoy the privilege of veto power. Veto power 
means that any permanent member can prevent the adoption, by the Council, of any draft 
resolutions on "substantive" matters. 
Chapter 5 of the UN Charter was the official step in setting up the Security Council dominated 
by the five Great Powers that were the victors in World War II.  The majority prefer to enlarge 
the Council with additional nonpermanent members in order to achieve better representation of 
regions, and of diverse kinds of states – poor as well as rich, small as well as large, which can 
then create a Council that can act credibly and legitimately.660 Those who support the status quo 
often insist that the most powerful countries must be given special privileges at the UN to keep 
them involved in the organization.  Critics argue the power balances have shifted. 
Many reformers, like Colombia, New Zealand, Zimbabwe and Malaysia, would like to limit or 
do away with the veto and even with permanent membership itself believing “The right to veto 
undermines the principle of sovereign equality of states as provided in the Charter." 661  This 
power has been intensely controversial since the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945. However, 
without the veto privilege the United States and Russia would probably not have accepted the 
creation of the United Nations.  Many years later there is still active debate regarding the role of 
the Security Council, its membership and its work.662  
The Council has the authority to make decisions that authorize military action to deal with 
threats to the peace as well as acts of aggression:   
                                                            
660 James A. Paul, General Analysis on the Security Council Veto (Global Policy organization) February 1995 
(http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-as-an-institution/the-power-of-the-veto-0-
40/general-analysis-on-the-security-council-veto.html at 8. 
661 Hasmy Agam, Deputy Secretary General of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a speech to the General 
Assembly. 
662James A. Paul, “General Analysis on the Security Council Veto” (Global Policy organization) February 1995.  
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 ... although subsidiary responsibility arguably falls to the General Assembly,  the Security 
 Council was designed to serve as an instrument of action whenever a unanimous vote of 
 the great powers revealed the existence of a consensus, and a forum for negotiation 
 whenever the use of the veto revealed the absence of a consensus.  In the era of the Cold 
 War, the Council has had more frequent occasion to function in the latter capacity than in 
 the former.663 
The veto meant the Council was intended to have both executive and diplomatic functions.  
However, the veto can be abused by the permanent members in such a way when interpreting 
resolutions to allow them to abdicate their responsibilities for peace and security. This 
undermines the authority of the Council.664  
The veto allows the five Permanent Members to block action on all substantive issues, including 
appointment of the Secretary General and revisions of the Charter itself. 
The Council enjoys a unique authority under international law.  Its decisions stand largely 
unchallenged by the World Court or the General Assembly.  Its resolutions (unlike those 
of the GA) are binding on the UN member states and though they are not always obeyed 
– they define what is acceptable conduct (and what is not) in the international arena. 665   
Chances of changing the veto are slim since the Permanent Members are in a position to block 
the necessary changes in the Charter.  In the early years the Security Council mainly dealt with 
cases of war between states.  But today, it most often takes up conflicts or crises internal to 
member states which sometimes lead to intervention. 
When I inquired in my interviews what could be done about Russia and China’s veto regarding 
efforts to take a stronger stance by the UN Security Council on Syria, one of the main methods 
described as a possible response was “shaming” them into conformity through embarrassment or 
guilt.  Cognitive dissonance theory is often used to explain behavior of actors who experience 
                                                            
663 Claud Inis, “The Security Council” in E. Luard (ed.), The Evolution of International Organizations (1966), 646. 
664 White, Nigel D. “The Will and Authority of the Security Council after Iraq”, 17 (2004) Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 645-672 at 646. 
665 James A. Paul 1995 supra note 660 at 2. 
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dissonance and thereby try to reduce it by changing their behaviour.666  The difficulty presented 
by the veto, however, should not be seen as an immutable impediment to the implementation of 
the Responsibility to Protect – as we will see in Libya, it can work and even if nations are 
hesitant, they can abstain rather than vote against a resolution.  One successful application is 
better than none.667 
The lack of an institutional authority is an aspect of the discussions concerning global 
governance, international organizations and particularly the United Nations. As one of the most 
important international institutions, the UN is looked to for leadership.  Many of the NGOs, 
while wary of its weaknesses, acknowledge its central role.  At the same time they remain aware 
of its lack of authority to settle differences between states who must decide in the Security 
Council when an intervention must be made (and here I speak not only of military intervention 
but also of diplomatic endeavors and other soft methods of conflict resolution.)    
Problems can also arise when negative motivations are wrongly attributed to individual states or 
actors, however, particularly when motivations cannot be proven by empirical means.  One can 
listen to the arguments for intervening or can look at the outcome but it still often involves a 
subjective interpretation of the legitimacy of the decision or action. In order to achieve 
agreement at the UN in 2005 on the basis of the ICISS Report, it seems fair to say that states 
permitted humanitarian motives to trump the sovereignty principle. A preponderance of states 
reached an agreement which rendered international morality coterminous with international 
law.668  The achievement of such a coherent system of convictions at the world level was 
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immensely challenging due to cultural, social and political differences and thus a momentous 
occasion in its occurrence.    
However, when crises erupt such as that of Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2012 and when the 
Responsibility to Protect is invoked, the motives for action and the questions of legitimacy come 
under serious debate once again.  With regard to the Responsibility to Protect, whether motives 
are perceived to be on the basis of moral, human rights and humanitarian principles or in the 
perceived self-interest and imperialist actions of states, the matter is debated inside and outside 
the Security Council by states themselves, NGOs, academics, diplomats and international 
scholars.  These debates flood the literature surrounding the Responsibility to Protect.  
In deciding whether or not to act, the Council, guided by the broader international community 
and transnational organizations, must consider a number of criteria including the legality, fair 
substantive and procedural preconditions, as well as any peaceful and democratic means of 
resolving the conflict.669 In addition, however, the state is responsible to their constituents in the 
domestic environment.  This being the case, questions of self-interest versus morality, values, 
ethics and universal principles must inevitably enter into the deliberation.  If one argues that 
morality must prevail this opens the door to matters of universal morality and any statements 
such as neocolonialism or imperialism that oppose any such ideal.670   
The UN is a key international organization.  While it is understood that it is not perfect, it is in a 
strategic position to contribute to the legitimacy of any effort to implement the Responsibility to 
Protect. Could we bypass it?  No.  Can we improve it? Yes.  Clearly the Security Council 
approval is seen by many as essential.  Kyle Matthews and others interviewed addressed the 
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limitations, and the need for expansion of the Security Council to include countries like India, 
Brazil, South Africa and India as political interests change.  As the Council currently stands, it 
can be very difficult to get the agreement necessary for a Responsibility to Protect resolution and 
there is no overarching authority to enforce it.  The veto stands to bring talks of action (even 
non-military action) to an end, as has been the case, for example, with Russia and China 
regarding any action in Syria.  In terms of improvement, one of the proposals one hears is that 
there should be some agreement that member states cannot apply their veto in cases where 
genocide is taking place.  Kyle Matthews admits, however, to being a realist about the likelihood 
that countries won’t want to let go of that power which both shields and protects them.671 
Those interviewed spoke of some of the weaknesses of the UN, including the absence of an 
enforcement capacity, a standing army, peacekeeping missions, and the equipment and resources 
necessary to deal with mass atrocities.  Michael Ignatieff addressed the problem of 
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect and stated the UN Security Council has a terrible 
track record and referred to the vetoes by China and Russia.   
In Montreal I learned when there is proof that atrocity is going on often states do not 
want to take the political risk.  There is a lack of political will.  Sovereignty was used to 
justify inaction in the case of Rwanda. We need to act early on so that we are not forced 
to use the military response.  The UN does not have a strong enforcement capacity.672 
Carolyn McAskie was pragmatic about the future of the UN, claiming  
you are not going to get any structure in the UN other than the current one.  The Security 
Council has been built up since the Cold War in unimaginable ways.  It already has 
evolved enormously.   What you can have is new ways for the Council to work and new 
ways to involve other groups.673  
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She also sees the legitimacy of the UN and the international community as the vehicle in the 
broader sense for solving crises.  
 
This is a legitimate role for the UN.  The whole concept of the UN is to put an end to 
poverty, and create peace and security.  This is also the intention of the framers of the 
Charter. If the Security Council is charged with working on behalf of the broader 
membership to intervene and decides this is the place to do something then it has to be a 
legitimate decision. (That does not prevent it from being a bad decision, of course).674 
Marion Arnaud, in mentioning the goals of the coalition of NGOs, talked of the need to 
encourage governments, regional and sub-regional organizations and the UN to build the 
capacity to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.675 
IV. Reaching Consensus 
Towards the conclusion of the interviews, individuals were asked what they considered to be the 
major impediments to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect at the international 
level.  One individual remarked that one of the most serious impediments to its implementation 
is the negative view held by some individuals and some countries of the Responsibility to Protect 
as a tool to be used by Western neo-imperialists or new-colonialists.   Ian Davis commented 
“R2P can be seen as Western interference.”676  Louise Frechette noted  
Some countries, although they have signed on to the 2005 Summit Declaration, have 
strong reservations regarding a law that allows other nations to meddle in their countries’ 
affairs.  There is a significant number of countries that are quite hesitant about the 
concept because they are developing countries.677 
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This lack of trust can play out in a number of different ways, but often impedes crucial decisions 
at the international level through the Security Council veto, and engenders a lack of political 
will.  This can be defensively framed as” the protection of state sovereignty.” 678  Kyle Matthews 
also suggested one of the impediments to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect is 
sovereignty and particularly the veto by China and Russia. He cited Rwanda as a terrible 
example. Even when there is proof that atrocity is going on nations often do not want to take the 
political risk.  There is a lack of political will.  Sovereignty was used to justify inaction in the 
case of Rwanda; the problem was the prospect of infringing on Rwanda’s international 
sovereignty.  He also stated that, even when mass atrocities are taking place, states still use their 
veto.679  Lucie Edwards suggested one of the major strategies for success is for there to be one 
country that becomes the champion of the cause and that is willing to commit resources.680  
The criticisms of the Responsibility to Protect are exacerbated by previous views of 
humanitarian intervention.  As a result, one of the impediments is the difficulty of gaining 
consensus.  “On a case by case basis getting consensus is the biggest stumbling block,” 
commented Jillian Siskind.681  Another impediment concerns a misunderstanding of what 
constitutes ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ where there is a belief that the Responsibility to Protect 
necessarily means military action.  The Responsibility to Protect military action is at the far end 
of the spectrum in terms of the tool kit; there are sanctions, preventative deployment, and 
mediation, among other means that come before that.  While I have not explored these tools in 
depth, they will be discussed in Chapter Ten, the concluding portion of the thesis, when we talk 
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about conflict resolution in general and in particular and its relation to the Responsibility to 
Protect. 
V. Can the Responsibility to Protect Principle be Firmly Upheld? 
 
Do we conclude, as some have done, that the lack of an authoritative structure, the power 
imbalance, the existence of the veto  and differing state incentives make itmpossible for the 
Responsibility to Protect principle to be firmly upheld?’  It seems that there are indeed 
impediments and the objective of the thesis is to explore these impediments, as well as to 
illustrate the interplay between what is intended to be a universal norm or a customary law and 
the differing state incentives as they play out in the changing international environment. A 
decision to implement the Responsibility to Protect is not a simple matter of invoking a universal 
norm based upon an agreed upon moral value; the purpose behind the principle and the principle 
itself can be easily overcome by realpolitik and the self-interest of states.  Instead, cooperation is 
essential to strengthen the universal norm but is often unattainable.  In spite of its complexities 
and the challenges that exist, Libya shows it can be achieved and that it does and should remain a 
fundamentally important humanitarian world norm in the face of continued violence perpetrated 
against civilians today in the case of weak or even oppressive governments.  
E. H. Carr argues realism ultimately fails because it excludes moral judgments and emotional 
appeals and the question of social purpose and legitimacy.  The thesis thus addresses itself to 
transnational actors and ways in which they are influenced by and make an impact on norms and 
ideas.  We can see where norms and rationality are intimately connected, particularly when we 
examine the action of NGOs who consciously choose to take a moral position on a principle of 
humanitarian intervention and then go about acting as its proponents in a strategic way. 
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Utilizing a broadly constructivist approach of norm entrepreneurship, this chapter shows how 
these NGOs have helped foster change in international law and politics.    Subtle alterations – 
even transformations – have occurred in the nature of the ‘logics of appropriateness' and 
sovereignty that had earlier been prevalent. 682  Understandings have been reformulated through 
the efforts of NGOs.  As a result of the work of civil society groups, legal norms, and principles 
have been altered.683 While it is difficult to measure the impact that NGOs have (norm 
entrepreneurship is not a science) and almost impossible to talk about causal outcomes; it is more 
realistic to speak of factors in the human rights reformulations.   
VI. The Responsibility to Protect and Jus Post Bellum 
Another area included in the interviews pertains to rebuilding after the fighting stops – what 
should be the interveners involvement in rebuilding?  These responses will be presented and 
discussed in the last chapter as we look at what comes after the conflict ends (ius post bellum).   
An important question pertains to the long term impact of military intervention and what will 
happen when the military leave.  The French way has been described as “Go in, do the job and 
get out” – but is this the best way?  The Rights Crises report finds that local NGOs are likely to 
consult other international NGOs outside their own country if a crisis occurs.  “Local NGOs and 
organizations, particularly those that promote tolerance and create space to mediate social 
tensions, need to be supported.684 A military force may not be properly trained to take on the task 
of maintaining law and order in the long run and may even be reluctant to take on policing 
duties.  Human rights abuses may also need to be brought to justice, particularly if tribunals have 
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been established.685  This can be particularly difficult if the military supporting the government 
are themselves responsible for war crimes.  
Long term commitments - plans to avoid future conflicts - are too often neglected.  More 
attention is given to exit strategies.  State building is a costly and complex task and brings with it 
fears of long term commitment.  Local NGOs are often pushed by international NGOs because 
they have more resources and more experience and often bring in their own programs.  They also 
have access to government and sometimes hire away local agency workers which further 
weakens local NGOs.686  In the long run, a major question pertains to what are the post conflict 
responsibilities of the interveners. 
The next chapter, Chapter Nine, provides a case study of the implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect in Libya in 2011 according to bona fide resolutions adopted by the UN 
Security Council. It illustrates that the Responsibility to Protect remains a live principle and can 
be agreed to in the UN (because of or in spite of) powerful states right to the use of the veto. The 
conditions, however, in which the 'can' may be realised are, as the Libyan case illustrates, 
extraordinarily complicated and raise questions about the legitimacy of an action in support of 
the third pillar of the Responsibility to Protect that must be addressed. 
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Chapter Nine:  On the Legitimacy of the Libyan Intervention 
 
 Adopting Resolution 1973 (2011) by a vote of ten in favor and none against  with 
 five abstentions (Brazil, China,  Germany, India, Russian Federation) the Council 
 authorized Member states, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
 arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect all civilians under threat of 
 attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force 
 of any form on any part of Libyan territory – requesting them to immediately inform 
 the Secretary General of such measures.687   
 
I. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether Security Council Resolution 1973 and the 
subsequent intervention into Libya in 2011 can be regarded as a ‘legitimate’ instance of the 
forceful application of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.  The determination of its legitimacy 
involves an examination of the legitimacy of the ruling as well as its implementation and 
outcome.  In order to systematically examine the case, a legitimacy framework will be 
established and a number of fundamental matters addressed concerning the primary factors 
necessary to ascribe legitimacy to a ruling or action of this nature.  Following this discussion, a 
subsidiary set of concerns will be examined relating to motives and/or intent, legality, process, 
and humanitarian outcomes.688   
The first part of the analysis involves establishing the criteria that can be used to qualify an 
action such as a humanitarian intervention as legitimate, beginning with a description of the 
meaning of legitimacy. Different theories lead to different conceptions of the legitimacy of 
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humanitarian intervention.  In particular, pluralist and solidarist theories regarding the notion of 
international intervention will be explored. The second question in this particular case will be 
whether the action was taken according to the approved principle of the Responsibility to 
Protect, as agreed to by the General Assembly at the 2005 UN Summit, and whether it can be 
regarded as successful. The third question asks whether we can classify the 2011 intervention in 
Libya as legitimate.  Finally, why Libya and not elsewhere and does this really matter? 
Other subsidiary questions arise in the process.  Should military action that attempts to alleviate 
humanitarian suffering, but fails, be considered as legitimate?689 Is the determination of 
legitimacy a purely legal determination?   Does it involve a moral determination?  Is it “the 
ostensibly humanitarian ‘outcome’ of the intervention or the humanitarian motivations of 
interveners that legitimate the act?”690 Do motivations matter if the outcome is good?    What if it 
is conducted with moral zeal but results in worsening the situation for those in need? The 
discussion will outline the debate between motives and outcomes.   In regard to these, we will 
consider the doctrine of double effect: 
 The doctrine of double effect means that any action can have two possible effects – one 
 that is intended and one that is not.  For example, in the case of self defense, an 
 individual may be attempting to save himself and in the process kills the attacker.  
 However, the lawful act of self defense is subject to the rules regarding proportionality; 
 otherwise, the killing of the other may be deemed unlawful.  In the case of a war, those in 
 defense must be sure that the response is proportional to the attack.  In humanitarian 
 intervention, the intent must be to save the lives of those under threat.691. 
 Are the motives totally ethical or are they in the interests of the nation?  Does the action have 
appropriate authority? Must it be UN-sanctioned or can it be a unilateral or a coalition of the 
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willing?  Can it be legitimate without the authorization of the Security Council? Must the 
persuasive authority of the Secretary General within the UN be initiated?692  
Overall the analysis of Resolution 1973 can be captured under three main questions: was the 
intervention in Libya subject to due process, was it legitimate, and was it successful?  I will 
argue, as does Evans, that ultimately decisions in favor of the Responsibility to Protect must be 
made on the basis of all three and must involve a combination of ideal values (idealism) and 
hard-headed realism. 693  We will see that humanitarian intervention is thus caught up in the 
“practical application of ideal standards in a flawed world.”694  The analysis concludes that Libya 
represents such an instance of the practical and legitimate application of the Responsibility to 
Protect.  
II. The Concept of Legitimacy 
 
Schuman (1995) defines legitimacy as:  
A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions.695   
It is really about who can do what and when and takes into consideration the context and moral 
community in which the action occurs.  The main thrust of this definition is toward the 
institution that wields the power.  My identification of legitimacy is concerned with assessing the 
legitimacy of a ruling or approval of a particular resolution toward Libya made within the 
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context of the UN (in this case concerning Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and events surrounding 
them.)  According to Koppell, in order for there to be normative (or moral) legitimacy “there 
must be a shared set of beliefs.” 696 Without agreement among the players “moral legitimacy is 
effectively impossible.” 697   The normative argument suggests that  “(1) humankind are bound 
together as a single moral community which transcends the sovereign state and a violation of 
rights in one part of the world amounts to a violation of rights everywhere and   (2) this world 
requires a commitment to those people outside our own national boundaries in an ‘ethos of 
responsibility.’”698   To some extent the existence of such a moral community which transcends 
sovereignty represents the crux of the problem in the process involved.   Some may critique this 
as a very ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ notion of community, but I am following the school of 
thought that has led to agreement in the international and transnational community on the 
existing principles of human rights, humanitarianism and indeed the Responsibility to Protect.  
While they may not be absolutely ‘universal,’ they form the basis of much of current 
international humanitarian law as described in earlier chapters. 
One aspect of the determination of legitimacy is an emphasis on process. “The legitimacy of a 
scientist or a scientific institution, for example, depends in large measure on a demonstrable 
consistency with norms regarding the scientific method.”699  Legitimacy requires that the process 
be in accordance with legal requirements and in this context the rules and regulations of the 
UN.700  Our task is to consider, therefore, the action within the current international environment. 
In addition to process, one can also talk about inputs versus outputs. We are concerned not only 
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with the motivation or intent of a Responsibility to Protect decision but with the outcome and the 
delivery of a public good ‘as promised.’701    
Application of the Responsibility to Protect principle at the Security Council permits states to 
legitimately employ military force against another state in order to protect civilians in danger.  In 
principle, the contemporary international society has come to view humanitarian intervention in 
exceptional circumstances as a legitimate exception to the non-intervention rule through the 
vehicle of the Responsibility to Protect principle.   While the principle has been in acceptance 
since 2005, its implementation remains contentious.    I contend that the Libyan case is the first 
time, in fact, the Responsibility to Protect has been truly applied as a forceful intervention into a 
state’s sovereignty and that the action was successful; i.e. that it accomplished its purpose of 
preventing genocide or further war crimes.   It therefore becomes an important case study not 
only in itself but in terms of its historical significance and the possible development of 
customary law which ensues.   
Due to its contentious nature, determining the legitimacy of a humanitarian intervention by the 
application of a fixed formula of empirical standards is difficult and reaching a conclusion 
without ambiguity almost impossible.    Rather, it involves taking into account a broad set of 
values and principles that can be applied and used to interpret the legitimacy of the action.  This 
process can be attributed to the complexity of the problem as well as the varied motives of the 
parties concerned.  Determining whether a particular humanitarian intervention is justified 
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involves empirical analysis along with the consideration of moral, political and legal 
perspectives.702   
Furthermore, the obligations of states toward humanitarian intervention are still open to dispute. 
As acknowledged, there is no absolute normative consensus.  While the Responsibility to Protect 
has shifted the possibilities in favor of humanitarian intervention, it is still necessary to argue a 
compelling value or principle to create an exception to the rule of non-interference with state 
sovereignty and to the peremptory principle of the non-use of force beyond the norm of self 
defense articulated under Chapter VII in the Charter and in international law.     And further, 
while the Responsibility to Protect principle exists, agreement to act still requires a 
preponderance of states in agreement in the international community. 
 States must agree on the violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter for humanitarian 
intervention, in response to two critical questions  (1) When are the violations of human rights of 
an order that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention can be trumped? And (2) through 
what process is this determination to be arrived at?   In making these arguments, scholars must 
consider the practice of international relations and the question of normative legitimacy and the 
normative basis for the use of force rather than solely the specific content of international law.  
In the framework which I will establish, legitimacy in the case of Libya will be analyzed 
separately from strict legality and formal agreement with international law, and as a consequence 
will engage an ethical vocabulary and appear in a language of justice and acceptability.  This is 
consistent with other such analyses where legitimacy takes precedence in discussions over 
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legality (e.g., as in the legitimacy, but illegality, of Kosovo).703 Legal scholars such as Fernando 
Teson adopted the position that international law is based on individual rights and popular 
sovereignty.704  Elliott notes that Kant “was opposed to intervention” and “took the view that if 
states did not voluntarily recognize the principle of cosmopolitan right, there was little that other 
states could do to compel them.”705   Michael Walzer argued, on the other hand, there are times 
when “it is morally justified to send armed men and women across a border” for the purpose of 
defending “an act of solidarity.”706  The principle of the Responsibility to Protect corresponds 
more to the Walzerian School of Thought. 
Historically, the principles rooted in the Westphalian model - sovereign equality of states and 
non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of other states - set out the basic tenet that the 
evolution of the international system cannot be separated from the state.  This basic principle 
applies to the rise of principles in the post-Westphalian model; e.g. the principles of self-
determination, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, and cooperation.707   
However, there were challenges to state supremacy, including the defense of human rights after 
the Cold War.  “In this regard, with the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s and the seal of 
approval with the notion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ received in 2005, the state agreed to 
the notion that people, not states are the ultimate beneficiary.”708  The legitimacy of the state 
came to rest primarily on its being responsible and accountable to individuals.   
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Pressure was placed on the state to respect human rights and to make the individual its moral and 
political purpose.  However, this has not worked as smoothly as some would hope.  Russia and 
China, for example, claimed to favor diplomatic channels and mediation over peace enforcement 
and the use of force in support of humanitarian and human rights concerns and it is very difficult 
still to get all states to agree. 709 While the pursuit of peace through conflict resolution techniques 
such as diplomacy, negotiation and mediation are highly desirable and should be the 
Responsibility to Protect’s first strategy, it is not always sufficient to bring the killing to an end. 
We will discuss this further when we consider the criteria of ‘last resort’ in this chapter and in 
the final chapter.  In reality, one of the major obstacles in reaching agreement among states is the 
self-interest of states as opposed to any moral reasoning that may be offered.  Agreement is 
thwarted by the lack of trust among opposing states.   
A key theoretical debate regarding humanitarian intervention can be found in solidarist theory 
versus pluralist theory. Pluralism and solidarism are competing approaches to the legitimacy of 
intervention.  Pluralists are skeptical about the homogeneous moral values involved in 
humanitarian intervention.710  Pluralist international society theory defines humanitarian 
intervention as a “violation of the cardinal rules of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of 
force.”  States and not individuals are the principle bearers of rights and duties.711  Pluralists 
suggest that attempts at individual justice through unilateral humanitarian intervention 
jeopardizes the inter-state order. 712 
Solidarists, on the other hand, try to strengthen the legitimacy of international society by 
deepening its commitment to justice. Individuals have rights but they can only be enforced by 
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states.713  States accept not only moral Responsibility to Protect their own citizens, but also 
guardianship of human rights everywhere.  In order for states to accept the Responsibility to 
Protect principle, they must accept this moral responsibility that goes beyond their borders.  
Solidarism is committed to upholding certain minimum standards of human rights which places 
the victims of human rights abuses at the centre of the theory.  This leads to a different emphasis 
on motivation.  Teson, however, challenges the motives-first approach, but remains in the 
solidarist school because he believes that governments that violate human rights give up their 
rights to protection of their sovereignty.714  My own argument in support of the Responsibility to 
Protect lies comfortably within the solidarist school. 
Pluralism and solidarism are therefore competing approaches to the legitimacy of intervention.  
Pluralists are skeptical about moral values of humanitarian intervention.715 In R.J. Vincent’s 
writings in the mid-1980s he sets out to "develop a comprehensive framework for deciding what 
is to count as a legitimate humanitarian intervention and how pluralist and solidarist conceptions 
shape dialogue over humanitarian intervention.716 He argues that humanitarian intervention is a 
moral duty.  Pluralists regard the rule of sovereignty as inviolable and a preemptory rule of 
international society.  Solidarists, on the other hand, claim global ethical and legal values permit 
a right of intervention in extreme cases.  They argue “diverse communities can and do reach 
agreement about substantive moral standards and that international society has moral agency to 
uphold those standards.” 717 
                                                            
713 Wheeler 2000 ibid at 11. 
714 Wheeler 2000 ibid at 38. 
715 Wheeler 2000 ibid at 12. 
716 Wheeler 2000 ibid at 12. 
717 Bellamy 2004 supra note 688 at 19 and see Hedley Bull “The Grotian Conception of International Society” in 
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds. Diplomatic Investigations. (London:  Allen and Unwin, 1966) 51-73 
Teson 1996 in Bellamy at 219.  
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In Saving Strangers, Wheeler suggests that pluralism in the international arena has been 
overcome through the recognition of the norm of ‘humanitarian intervention.’718  Humanitarian 
intervention exposes the conflict between order and justice.719  Pluralists fear that states acting on 
their moral principles will weaken the international order.  Bull, however, sees the need to 
protect individual wellbeing.  Realists, as discussed in Chapter Five, raise further objections:  
humanitarian intervention will become a doctrine the strong will use against the weak.720 Unless 
there are vital interests at stake, states will not risk their own soldiers’ lives -- the best we can 
hope for is a situation where the “promotion of national security also defends human rights; and, 
states have no right to risk their soldiers’ lives for strangers -- citizens are the exclusive 
responsibility of the state and outsiders have no duty (or right) to intervene even in the case of 
lawlessness.” 721 
On the idealist side, we are really talking about an ethic of ideal values under the label of 
‘responsibility.’ This standard must include a clear concept for legitimate multinational 
intervention in instances of gross human rights violations in the form of mass atrocities. These 
encompass fundamental human rights such as the right to life and liberty.722   The Responsibility 
to Protect principle represents a shift in the norms of international relations from the rights of 
states to claim sovereignty as authority toward a new moral stance of sovereignty as 
responsibility.  State responsibility obliges the state to assure a minimum standard of human 
rights, not only internally, but within other states. According to the ICISS, sovereignty implies a 
dual responsibility – internal and external.  The challenge, however, is that both must adopt at 
                                                            
718 Wheeler 2000 supra note 298. 
719 Wheeler 2000 ibid at 28. 
720 Wheeler 2000 ibid at 29. 
721 Wheeler 2000 ibid at 30. 
722 Cooper and Kohler 2009 supra note 298 at 134. 
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least some sort of rudimentary universality to be implementable and can easily come into conflict 
with one another.   
 
For some, questions of legitimacy have been treated as irrelevant or moralizing propaganda and 
the moral or legal dimensions of policy tend to be ignored.   The horizons of hierarchy must be 
replaced by horizons of necessity. But if we are among those who do accept the value of moral 
reasoning, how do we ascertain that motives exist and what they are or should be?     
Bellamy outlines three Augustinian tests to ascertain motives: explore the reasons the state gives; 
compare them with other potential explanations for its actions; and, infer intentions from acts – 
what measures are taken, for instance, to reduce the risk to non-combatants?723 For example, if 
some infer the motivation is oil, is it sufficient to conclude if the US obtains most of the oil that 
that was the motivation all along?  Or if China or Russia abstained in the resolution is it because 
they are trying to assure the oil for themselves?  And so the question of motivation in a particular 
instance, apart from the normal deliberation of humanitarian intervention and the morality of 
such, is a complex one and hard to verify.   
To what extent does the process used in addressing the legitimacy matter?  When determining 
the legitimacy of any action in response to human atrocities, I argue it is necessary to have broad 
agreement and collective action.  The action must be UN-sanctioned rather than it being 
unilaterally devised or a coalition of willing states.  To be legitimate it must have the 
                                                            
723 Bellamy 2004 supra note 688. 
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authorization of the Security Council. Within the UN the persuasive authority of the Secretary 
General that must be initiated.724 
It is my contention that individual nations or coalitions of nations, like NATO, can perhaps act 
more quickly than the UN, but such actions should not be said to achieve full legitimacy. The 
UN, as imperfect as it may be, is in the best position at present to allow its members to maintain 
the necessary rules and legal options that are required to fulfill legitimacy.  By doing so, the 
credibility of the UN may be maintained and thus its legitimacy recognized.  Legitimate actions 
require cooperation, and the UN is best poised to reach agreement, to monitor the action and 
ultimately to participate in rebuilding (the latter topic to be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter and the concluding chapter).  
Where there is likely to be a great deal of disagreement, such as in the acceptance or 
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, there needs to be an institution of some form of 
governance that can ensure the fairest deliberations available to achieve a collective decision that 
all member states and others will regard as binding upon them.  UN actions offer the best chance 
of legitimacy – the right to make a ruling with morally binding force (even in the face of the few 
who may disagree).   International organizations and NGOs also have the power to influence 
and/or to shame which sometimes works to discourage nations from breaking the rules, which 
can work for or against humanitarian intervention. 
The ICISS and Chesterman (2001) also agree that if we are to achieve both legality and 
legitimacy, developing a consensus on military intervention involves the full collective 
                                                            
724 Gareth Evans, “The Responsibility to Protect:  From an Idea to an International norm’ at 22 in Richard H. 
Cooper, and Juliette Voinov Kohler Responsibility to Protect The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century (New 
York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) at 26. 
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mechanisms of the UN.725 While there may be problems in acquiring consensus, the objective 
becomes not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the 
Security Council work effectively and fairly.   The Secretary General should assist by providing 
clarification of the actions expected from intervening forces.726  The decision must include active 
consultation with the Global South and must be transparent.    Decisions must be made on a case 
by case basis according to whether the criteria has been met; i.e., actual or threatened large-scale 
loss of human life, human atrocities, ethnic cleansing or war crimes. 
 
The fact that the Permanent Five have veto power, as has been discussed earlier, and can block 
intervention and other UN actions for narrow political reasons is nevertheless recognized as a 
major impediment in cases of the possible implementation of the responsibility principle.727    
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Security Council is viewed by some states as 
unrepresentative and a poor proxy for ‘international will.’728  But it does not necessarily mean 
that any movement toward implementation will fail.  In fact I will argue in relation to Libya that 
it is a case where it has been implemented even with the veto capability.  
Those who argue in favor of a right of humanitarian intervention have frequently asserted that it 
predates the Charter.  Chesterman concludes that the notion of humanitarian intervention which 
emerged in the nineteenth century was not necessarily a legal right but was mainly a matter of 
politics, policy, or morality.729  My own argument is that for humanitarian intervention in the 
form of the Responsibility to Protect to be deemed as legitimate in the first instance, it must have 
                                                            
725 Chesterman 2001 supra note 195. 
726 Cooper and Kohler, supra note 645 at 134.  
727 See Romeo Dallaire and the Will to Intervene.  http://www.usip.org/events/mobilizing-the-will-intervene 
728 For more on the contingent nature of Security Council authority, see Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy, Power, and the 
Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council”, (2002) 8(1) Global Governance:  35-51. 
729 Chesterman, 2001 supra note 195. 
  245 
 
agreement by the United Nations Security Council, and must not take place as a unilateral or 
even regional action alone.  In order to reach such a decision, there must be an agreement among 
UN members that it is necessary. With anything less, the principle will lose its legitimacy.  This 
means that the situation must be deemed to be consistent with one of the four Responsibility to 
Protect categories of genocide, human atrocities, ethnic cleansing or war crimes. In summary, 
military intervention according to the principle of the Responsibility to Protect requires not only 
a consideration of its place as a moral principle but of the legal process.  
Independent actions tend to threaten the legitimacy of the UN in international relations.  In terms 
of the authority of the UN and legitimacy – at the international level these are sometimes at odds.  
The basis of authority is the state but the authority is usually seen as centralized and legitimacy 
rests within the UN framework even though there is no enforcement capacity.730 There is a real 
need for both authority and legitimacy at the international level.  To achieve this, one needs to 
unpack authority in connection with the UN – “its institutionalization, its role, its third-party 
status and its decentralized constitution,”731 particularly in the context of the sovereign equality 
of states and self-determination of peoples.   There is a contradiction apparent in that the state is 
being challenged at the same time as it remains the source of international authority.732     
In spite of its lack of pure authority, one of the organizations that helped to move the 
institutionalization of international authority in the past was the League of Nations which led to 
the development of the UN and the movement toward a system of global governance.  “In this 
process, the UN, member states, and international institutions in general became involved in the 
regulation of international interactions among states, regional organizations, civil society, the 
                                                            
730 Coicaud supra note 707 in Charlesworth, 2010 at 67 
731 Coicaud ibid in Charlesworth, 2010 at 68. 
732 Coicaud ibid in Charlesworth, 2010 at 70. 
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private sector, and individuals in a multitude of domains.” 733 This helped to lead to the growth 
of NGOs and a more horizontal and interactive form of authority.   Factoring in civil society 
expertise and opinion contributes to the credibility of the UN.  The UN increasingly factors in 
inputs from the outside world.   
Since the early 1990s the UN Security Council has gained more authority and occupies a greater 
role in managing humanitarian crises and peacekeeping involving the use of force.  Ian Hurd 
refers to the Security Council as a prime location of “international sovereignty.” 734 It can thus be 
seen as a governing authority with a power over states.  The UN is unique in terms of its role as a 
normative, moral and political entity.  “This authority and the function associated with it have 
the overall purpose of determining, communicating and fulfilling, where possible, the various 
facets of international legitimacy in service of the socialization of the international realm.”735  
Doubts are still expressed, however, about the absence of due process in the UN, its exclusive 
membership, and the hegemony of some states.736 Nevertheless, it holds the potential to express 
a global version of good will for the entire international community.737 Thus, the negotiations 
and disputes occurring among various actors in the disaggregated world order helps to determine 
legitimacy.738   
III. Legitimacy Applied 
 
In order to assess the Libyan intervention, the next portion of the Chapter establishes a 
framework against which to test the Responsibility to Protect actions.  This framework is based 
                                                            
733 Coicaud ibid in Charlesworth, 2010 at 73. 
734 Ian Hurd, “After Anarchy, Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council” p. 187 in Coicaud in 
Charlesworth, 2010 supra note 656 at 78). 
735 Coicaud ibid in Charlesworth, 2010 at 74. 
736 Coicaud ibid in Charlesworth, 2010 at 78-79. 
737 Coicaud ibid in Charlesworth, 2010 at 80. 
738 Coicaud ibid in Charlesworth, 2010 at 85. 
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on a number of known and recognizable criteria in relation to military force.   Evans, for 
example, suggests there are five criteria that are required to determine whether a certain situation 
is indeed a proper case for a UN-mandated mission:739  
 Seriousness of Harm: Is the threatened harm to state or human security sufficient to 
 justify the use of military force?740Is there a threat of genocide and other large-scale 
 killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law? 
 Proper purpose: Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to 
 halt or avert the threat in question?  
 Last Resort:  Has every non-military option been explored?  
 Proportional Means: Are the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military action 
 proportional to the threat? 
  Balance of Consequences: Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being 
 successful? The consequences of the action should not be worse than the consequences of 
 inaction.741 
Similarly, Wheeler and the Just Cause framework claim that the responsibility to intervene is 
justified when the following six ‘precautionary principles’ have been met: (just cause, legitimate 
authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.)  And again, 
similarly, the ICISS report itself establishes five tests:  right cause, right intention, right 
authority, last resort, proportionate means, and reasonable prospects to support moral principles.  
Table 3 below outlines these three positions.  As such, they represent three different, but 
reasonably parallel guidelines that have been proposed in the literature to determine the 
legitimacy of humanitarian interventions.  
 
 
                                                            
739  Gareth Evans, “Responsibility to Protect:  From an Idea to an International norm” p. 22 in Richard H.Cooper, 
and Juliette Voinov Kohler Responsibility to Protect The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century (New York :  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
740 Evans 2009 ibid at 23. 
741 Evans 2009 ibid at 23- 24. 
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Table 5.  Military Intervention Framework 
Just War Framework and 
Wheeler 
Evans  ICISS Report 
1. just cause (a ‘supreme 
humanitarian 
emergency’),  
2. last resort,   
3. proportional use of 
force; and  
4. a high probability of 
achieving a 
humanitarian outcome 
1. Proper Purpose; 
2. Seriousness of Harm; 
3. Last Resort; 
4. Proportional Means; 
5. Balance of 
Consequences 
 
 
1. right cause; right 
intention;  
2. last resort;  
3. proportionate means; 
4. reasonable prospects to 
support moral 
principles 
5. right authority; 
 
Taken together, these constitute a framework for assessing the appropriateness of a 
Responsibility to Protect intervention in a particular case: just or right cause and proper purpose 
including motivation and intent; last resort; proportional means of use of force; balance of 
consequences – a high probability of achieving a humanitarian outcome; right authority; and, 
added by myself, due process.  Anthony Arend and Robert Beck add an additional criteria for a 
military intervention to meet if it is to be exempted from the ban on force in Article 2(4); i.e., it 
must not involve a regime change. This concern bears great significance in the case of Libya, and 
is a common criticism.  Regime change will thus be discussed in more detail later when we apply 
the legitimacy framework.  However, I do not include this qualification in my own determination 
of legitimacy and I will explain why I do not. 
Just cause occurs only in those extraordinary situations where large numbers of civilians in 
another state are in imminent danger of losing their life or facing appalling hardship, and where 
the indigenous forces are not able or willing to stop the extreme violation of human rights.742  
Right or just cause exists when the only hope of saving lives depends on outsiders coming to the 
                                                            
742  Wheeler 2000 supra note 298 at 4. 
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rescue and involves those sorts of human atrocities that ‘shock the conscience of mankind.’743  In 
assessing the just or right cause, I would suggest it is important to also consider motivations and 
intent.  We can also consider these in relation to the final outcome and the criterion of ‘success’ 
and ask “Is it the ostensibly humanitarian ‘outcome’ of the intervention or the humanitarian 
motivations of the interveners that legitimate the act?”744   Does it matter about the motivations if 
the outcome is good?  What if it is conducted with moral zeal but results in worsening that 
situation for those in need? 
In reaching a determination of last resort, all other appropriate avenues must have been explored. 
Forms of conflict resolution such as mediation, negotiation, sanctions and the like must have 
been considered and/or tried and failed.  In terms of the balance of consequences, one expects 
that on balance more lives will have been saved by the intervention than were taken.  We also 
note that it can never be known in advance “that more lives will be saved by intervention than 
will be lost by it...”745  It is wrong, therefore, to judge a humanitarian intervention only by its 
outcome.  As long as there is no contradiction between the motives and the character and 
conduct of the intervention, even a failure can be defined as humanitarian, but not necessarily a 
success.746  This will be an important point when we discuss the intervention into Libya. 
Justifications for the action that are often put forward may include one or more of the following:    
the anti-interventionist regime is out of sync with modern notions of justice -- I would suggest 
this is not sufficient reason to intervene but it is potentially influential; without air strikes there 
would have been a large refugee movement that threatened the peace and security of other 
regions; thousands more civilians would have died; all peaceful means have been tried (this is 
                                                            
743  Wheeler 2000 ibid at 34. 
744  Bellamy 2004 supra note 688 at 217. 
745  Wheeler 2002 supra note 298 at 36. 
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really a reference to last resort); it is better to uphold basic principles selectively than not at all -- 
this usually addresses criticisms that the application of the Responsibility to Protect is 
inconsistent and that there is no absolute standard; and, the NATO action was supported -- air 
strikes largely conformed with international humanitarian law.747 
Criticisms, on the other hand, may include arguments that the intervention was not morally 
justified; i.e., caused more harm than good; did not use the alternative means that were available; 
violated international humanitarian laws by bombing of civilian targets; there was little support 
for action in the third world; it was not necessary; there was not just cause; and, there was not a 
situation of a deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate 
response.748    
IV. The Libyan Intervention, 2011 
 
As the thesis intends to illustrate, it is one thing to have the Responsibility to Protect approved at 
the international level, as it was in 2005, and followed up and supported in several venues 
including the UN.  It is another thing entirely to see it implemented in its third pillar form.  Such 
an implementation, therefore, has historical and legal significance.  The Libyan intervention 
makes it a landmark international case for study.  To bring the principle to fruition has taken a 
myriad of players and has required a major international momentum.  Now that such an 
implementation has occurred, we are in the unique position of being able to assess its legitimacy 
according to some or all of the criteria established above.  The Libyan intervention proves it can 
happen. 
                                                            
747 Chapter 10.  B.S. Chimni, Sovereignty, Rights, and Armed Intervention:  A Dialectical Perspective, 2010 supra 
note 435 at 318. 
748 Chimni 2010 ibid at 319. 
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The first step in the three part Responsibility to Protect doctrine is to prevent, using diplomatic, 
economic, and humanitarian measures, and, only if necessary, the last resort is to take more 
coercive measures authorized by the Security Council. A range of these measures were adopted 
through the Human Rights Council, General Assembly, Security Council, Arab League, African 
Union, and Gulf Cooperation Council in the case of Libya.  At the next level, if the first set of 
coercive measures fails, it becomes time to react.  The response from Libya, which was 
essentially to ignore softer measures, pushed the UN to react in a stronger and harder way. The 
continuing threat to the population pushed the international community to react.’  The 
Responsibility to Protect intervention in the Libyan case was invoked extensively by civil 
society, the media and government officials including the Security Council, the General 
Assembly and the Human Rights Council (HRC) as the conflict escalated.   What follows is a 
series of analyses, op-eds, interviews and articles outlining arguments in favor (and opposed) to 
the Responsibility to Protect in the case of Libya, which responds to many of the points raised 
and questions asked in the framework introduced in the beginning of this chapter on assessing 
‘legitimacy.     
This account of the Libyan humanitarian crisis and the determination of the legitimacy of the 
subsequent action on the part of the UN will cover the activities of the UN, regional 
organizations, influential individuals and member states to bring about humanitarian intervention 
in Libya. The text will show how actions, commentary, political and moral pressure and analyses 
can be considered through a lens of legitimacy and how they respond to the major framework of 
just cause, last resort, right authority, proportionality and reasonable prospects as outlined earlier 
as well as the sixth criterion of due process.   
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The context for the UN action in the case of Libya corresponds to the three pillar approach of the 
Responsibility to Protect described previously749 -- states must protect their populations from 
mass atrocities.  When necessary it is the responsibility of the international community to assist 
states in protecting populations.  The international community must respond in a timely and 
decisive manner to imminent threats of mass atrocities with a broad range of measures, including 
both peaceful and military measures, when states are unwilling or unable to meet their 
responsibility.  
In Libya, the progression moved rapidly as the situation itself gave little opportunity for 
preventive or softer measures.  Very little warning of the uprising was known and therefore the 
crisis situation almost unpredictable.  The result was a rather swift response catapulting the UN 
into a ‘third pillar’ type of reaction.750 These steps were climbed rapidly.  The political crisis in 
Libya, which began on February 14, 2011 with peaceful mass protests, caught the attention of the 
international community. Security forces opened fire on the peaceful crowd in Tripoli beginning 
February 20, 2011, killing and injuring an unknown number of persons.   
The situation seemed to be approaching a full scale civil war with a split between forces loyal to 
one side or the other. The country also appeared to be dividing along tribal and regional 
lines. There was clearly no quick or easy way out.  While it was at this point recognized that 
imposing a no-fly zone, bombing airfields or arming the rebels could tilt the balance of power in 
the rebels' favour, it was considered unlikely that it would defeat the Gaddafi regime. There were 
also fears it might create a difficult dilemma regarding whether the international community 
should become more involved or watch a protracted stalemate.  It could also bring in Libya’s 
                                                            
749 Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s The Report of the Secretary General, “Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect”, 12 January 2009. 
750 The Report of the Secretary General, 2009 ibid. 
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neighbours and compromise prospects for democratic development in other areas, making any 
decision complex and extremely challenging.  
On February 23, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Communique dispatched a 
mission to Libya to investigate the conflict.751  The United Kingdom and Switzerland froze 
financial assets, and imposed travel bans and sanctions.752 The US government also began to 
move warships toward Libya.  France, the UK and the US started to discuss the possibilities of 
imposing a “no fly zone” with the approval of the Security Council.753  Three human rights 
organizations, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), Human Rights Watch, and 
INTERIGHTS, submitted a joint request to The African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on February 24, 2011, asking it to impose measures against the Libyan government that 
would end its human rights abuses, including the killing of hundreds of people who participated 
in largely peaceful protests by state security forces and mercenaries.754  Ban Ki-moon, the UN 
Secretary-General, advised on February 25 that more than 1,000 people had been killed and that 
massive waves of refugees fleeing to neighboring countries amounted to a humanitarian 
crisis.755  He reported on crimes committed in Libya, warning that fundamental issues of peace 
and security were at stake.756  Ms. Pillay (High Commissioner for Human Rights) advised “that 
under international law, any official at any level ordering or carrying out atrocities and attacks 
                                                            
751 African Union Peace and Security Council February 23, 2011. 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PSC%20Communique%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Libya.pdf 
(accessed July 24, 2011). 
752 New York Times, “U.S. Prepares Military Options on Libya.”  
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753 France International News “Rebels Fend Off Attack by Libyan Forces in East Libya” March 2, 2011. 
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755 Ban Ki-moon, “Remarks to Security Council Meeting on Peace and Security in Africa” UN News Centre, 
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could be held criminally accountable and widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian 
population could amount to crimes against humanity.”757 
 
Ban Ki-moon, in a speech to the Security Council on Peace and Security in Africa, stated that his 
Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect had:  
reminded the national authorities in Libya, as well as in other countries facing large-scale 
popular protests, that the heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit 
pledged to protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement.758 
The Human Rights Council met on February 25, 2011 and opened a special session on “the 
situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”759 It was reported that actions taken by 
the Libyan authorities were illegitimate and unlawful under international law.  
 
The Group of Friends on the Responsibility to Protect on February 25th also expressed its grave 
concern regarding human rights violations committed in Libya, possibly leading to crimes 
against humanity if the violence against civilians continued.760  In doing so, it reiterated 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome document (A/RES/60/1), and the 
responsibility for individual countries and the international community to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  The Group of Friends 
called upon the government of Libya to meet its Responsibility to Protect its population and all 
                                                            
757 United Nations Human Rights “Human Rights Council situation of human rights in Libya” February 25, 2011 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10766&LangID=E (accessed July 25, 
2011). 
758 Remarks to Security Council Meeting on Peace and Security in Africa, Office of the Secretary General, 25 
February 2011 supra note 756. 
759 United Nations Human Rights “Human Rights Council debates situation of human rights in Libya” February 25, 
2011 http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10766&LangID=E (accessed July 
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760 The Group of Friends is an informal cross regional group of UN member states that share a common interest in 
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the relevant bodies of the United Nations to take appropriate measures to realize the international 
community’s commitment to the Responsibility to Protect.761  
The Canadian politician Irwin Cotler and Jared Genser, writing in the New York Times on 28 
February 2011, argued the firm response to the situation in Libya was aided by Gaddafi’s 
targeting of civilians, his comments demonstrating both his intent and disconnection from reality, 
and the large defection of his ambassadors, military and civil servants.762  Such action was giving 
the international community more and more reason to believe that there was sufficient, necessary 
or ‘just cause’ to take more dramatic action.  Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister, 
President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group and author of ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All’, wrote in the  Financial Times, 27 
February 2011 that states cannot deny their Responsibility to Protect their people from crimes 
against humanity. When a state fails to protect its citizens it is the responsibility of the 
international community to take timely and decisive collective action through the United Nations 
Security Council.   However, these measures fall short of the threat or use of military force 
which he concluded would be necessary to stop the killing.  He also understood this was a very 
difficult call since declaring a no-fly zone is not a soft option and would mean being prepared to 
shoot down jets and helicopter gunships that breach it.  Sanctions, embargoes and the diplomatic 
isolation of Mr. Gaddafi were considered to be only a minimum of what was then required; 
however it was understood military options should always be a last resort, but cannot be 
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excluded in extreme cases.763  Romeo Dallaire and Hugh Segal in the Ottawa Citizen 25 
February 2011 also joined the appeals.764   
The international community was aroused by the words pronounced by Gaddafi, "I will fight to 
the last drop of my blood," and his references to protesters as "cockroaches" and blaming Libya's 
unrest on foreigners.  Gaddafi threatened to "cleanse Libya house by house."   Dallaire and Segal 
agreed Canada, with a loud and clear moral voice, must abhor what U.S. Senators John McCain 
and Joe Lieberman had described as "crimes against humanity."  It must demonstrate its 
Responsibility to Protect Libyans by endorsing a recommendation that an international arms and 
military technology embargo to prevent the sale and further delivery of equipment or support to 
Libyan security forces must be imposed, at the same time avoiding commercial sanctions that 
would adversely affect civilians.765 
Having concluded that there were grave problems in Libya with the actions of the government, 
the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution S-15/2 which required:766   1) the Libyan 
government to cease all human rights violations; 2) an international commission of inquiry to be 
dispatched to Libya; and recommended 3) that the General Assembly suspend Libya from the 
Council.767  On March 1, the General Assembly unanimously suspended Libya’s membership in 
the Council.768 Some key features of this resolution are that it called upon the Government of 
Libya to: meet its Responsibility to Protect its population, to immediately put an end to all 
                                                            
763 Reference to article Rachman, Gideon Better for Libya to Liberate Itself Financial Times February 28, 2011 
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human rights violations, to stop any attacks against civilians, and to fully respect all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.  "It 
must release all arbitrarily detained persons"; “... ensure the safety of all civilians and refrain 
from any reprisals against people who have taken part in the demonstrations; and, guarantee 
access to human rights and humanitarian organizations including human rights monitors.”769 
 
An interim opposition government was established in Libya under the leadership of former 
Justice Minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil770 in order to temporarily communicate with foreign 
governments and to act as a transitional Head of Government after the departure of Gaddafi.771 
The Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC) got together for the first time on 
March 5, 2011 as the opposition.  This Council declared itself the sole national representative of 
Libya and got the attention of the world. France, on March 10, became the first country to 
acknowledge the Transitional National Council.772 Over time they began to be recognized by the 
rest of the international community as well.  The Parliament of Europe also adopted a Resolution 
recognizing the Interim National Council as officially representing the Libyan opposition.773 The 
Resolution asked for financial and human resources to be made available to support a robust 
international humanitarian operation.774 
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http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0227/Opposition-declares-new-Libya-government-as-Qaddafi-
hangs-on/(page)/2 (accessed July 23, 2011). 
772 “France Recognizes Libya’s Rebel Council as Sole Representative” BNO News, March 10, 2011. 
773 European Parliament Resolution 10th March 2011 on the Southern Neighborhood and Libya in particular. 
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 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported on 1 March, 2011 that 
70,000 to 75,000 civilians fled to Tunisia and a similar number to Egypt; with tens of thousands 
stuck at the Tunisian border.775 The UNHCR had been attempting to help the refugee 
population;776 but the security situation surrounding Tripoli was considered too dangerous for 
humanitarian agencies to assess the need for medicine and supplies.777  Luis Preval, Institute for 
Security Studies,  advised that people fleeing from Libya are “protected by the non-derogable 
right of non-refoulement” and as a result cannot be forcibly returned to a territory where their life 
or physical safety are at risk for  political reasons.  
The 1951 Convention on the International Status of Refugees, the European Convention of 
Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR) and a 
whole set of EU Directives are unequivocal in establishing the right of individuals not to be 
forcibly expelled, whether directly or indirectly, back to the place where they may suffer 
persecution. This right has been widely and consistently interpreted by national and 
international courts as an absolute right.778  
 
Preval called on the EU to ensure the ability of those citizens fleeing in the case of an enactment 
of the Responsibility to Protect.  
 
 The UN’s Human Rights Council on 11 March named a panel of experts to visit Libya in order 
to prepare a full report to the Council in June. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Amnesty International were also concerned about those 
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stranded within Libya with reports of intensifying violence toward the opposition.779  On 13 
March, Human Rights Watch advised that Gaddafi’s “security forces were brutally suppressing 
all opposition…UN agencies were shut out from Libya preventing humanitarian access.”780  
On March 12th The Arab League made a critical decision to request the UN Security Council to 
impose a no-fly zone to protect civilians from Gaddafi.781  The Secretary General of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council on March 8 referred to “crimes against humanity.” 782  The League of Arab 
States had already suspended Libya as a member on 22 February 2011 and reminded the Security 
Council that the protection of large-scale violence against civilians was within its remit.  It called 
on the Council to take responsibility. The Arab support for a no-fly zone was an important factor 
in the decisions that were made in the UN and helped a great deal to counter accusations of the 
motivation of self-interest of Western states.  
It was felt the UN Security Council needed to impose sweeping sanctions on Gaddafi, his family 
and those in the regime responsible for the repression, by freezing assets.  It was also agreed that 
it should also refer the leaders of Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for an 
immediate investigation into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity and establish a 
no-fly zone under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and enforced, perhaps by NATO, over Libya to 
prevent air attacks against civilians.  They applauded the Arab League's suspension of Libya 
from participating in its meetings and noted positively the number of Libyan diplomats and high-
level aides who had resigned and continued to defect.   The Responsibility to Protect is about the 
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world responding when a civilian population is under attack - either from its own government or 
because its government lacks the means or will to protect it. Libya was a clear examples of a 
civilian population under threat.   
As indicated, the early legitimate measures intended to isolate Gaddafi within the United Nations 
rules and regulations were slow, and proved to be insufficient to protect civilians against 
Gaddafi’s forces in the long run. As an important next step and in response to the growing 
humanitarian crisis the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 (2011) on 
February 26, 2011.  Under Article 41 of the Charter’s Chapter VII, the Council authorized all 
Member States to seize and dispose of military-related material banned by the text and to 
facilitate humanitarian and related assistance in Libya. In the Resolution the Security Council 
imposed an arms embargo, asset freezes, and travel bans.  In a striking move, the Resolution also 
referred the case to the International Criminal Court.783, 784  Resolution 1970 explicitly invoked 
Libya’s “responsibility to protect” and requested that the International Criminal Court investigate 
reports of crimes against humanity. The Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo decided on 
March 2, 2011 to launch an investigation.785  The Council also decided to establish a new 
committee to monitor sanctions, and to respond to violations, and to designate the individuals 
subject to the targeted measures which were listed in an Annex to the Resolution.786  Marianne 
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Ducasse-Rogier wrote regarding the significance of the resolution.787  She stated in the case of 
Darfur, Kenya, Guinea and Ivory Coast, where civilian populations were the target of human 
rights' violations, the Responsibility to Protect was seldom invoked.  This, for her, suggested 
why UN Security Council Resolution 1970 was so significant.788  By referring the situation in 
Libya to the ICC, it also sent a clear signal to leaders that the UN Security Council will bring the 
Responsibility to Protect to the forefront in the punishment of gross human rights abuses through 
the Courts, another avenue available to the international community. The UNSC Resolution on 
26 February 2011 explicitly invoked the Responsibility to Protect and began the process of the 
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect principle in its “hardcore” form.  The Resolution 
cited the Libyan regime’s responsibility to protect its own population.  The UN had to be 
cautious at the same time not to open itself to criticism that it was taking Libyan sovereignty 
lightly or that it was promoting a ‘neo-colonialist project’.789   
At the same time warnings were being sent to the Gaddafi government.  On March 7, 2011 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa and reminded 
him that authorities in Tripoli “must uphold their responsibility to protect the country’s citizens 
and to heed the Libyan people’s legitimate aspirations to live in dignity and peace.”790 
 International anxiety grew and it became clear to those outside that the numbers of refugees and 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were rising as the humanitarian crisis worsened in spite of 
Resolution 1970. On March 11, UNHCR advised that 230,000 people had fled the violence thus 
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far.791  Scores of anti-government protesters were arrested and some detainees were said to have 
been subjected to torture.  The location and fate of many detainees was unknown.  
The International Crisis Group on 10 March 2011 called for a complete ceasefire to be followed 
by negotiations to secure a transition to a post-Qaddafi, legitimate and representative 
government. In their view, nothing should be allowed to pre-empt or preclude the search for a 
political solution with military intervention used only as a last resort, with the goal of protecting 
civilians at risk. Nevertheless, on March 8 NATO began a 24-hour aerial surveillance over Libya 
to help determine whether to institute a no-fly zone over Libya.792 A no-fly zone is considered a 
hard option because it involves taking out air defences, bombing runways and destroying aircraft 
that breach it.793   Colonel Gaddafi accused the West of colonial intentions.794 
On Monday 13 March 2011 the Security Council began deliberations on a draft UN Security 
Council Resolution led by the UK and France. The crisis in Libya brought about a world-wide 
debate regarding member states’ commitment to the 2005 agreement on the Responsibility to 
Protect and action beyond that taken to date.   There were growing calls for a no-fly zone and 
Security Council approval under Chapter VII and military enforcement capabilities. Had the 
international community now reached a point where more drastic and harder measures must be 
employed as a last resort? It was duly noted that military intervention should be viewed as a last 
resort under the Responsibility to Protect, and other measures available to the international 
community were discussed, including surveillance and monitoring, humanitarian assistance, 
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enforcement of the arms embargo and sanctions. One of the key criteria was that any intervention 
should have a clear legal basis from the UN, and in this case should occur in cooperation with 
African and Arab States.  
A no-fly zone would mean banning military flights by government forces through Libyan 
airspace. Military flights violating the ban would then risk being shot down by international 
forces.  Gaddafi, of course, would use this to say that external actors were supporting insurgents 
(another frequent criticism of international intervention). The question was who would impose 
such a zone; the most likely possibility being the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It 
was also understood such action would have to be passed by a United Nations resolution.795  A 
speech made by Gaddafi saying that “he would rather die a martyr than to step down along  with 
his  calls for his forces to attack and “cleanse Libya house by house until protestors surrender,” 
raised the concerns of the international community even further.  It was clear that the Libyan 
government planned further killing of the civilians.’  The responsibility to protect the Libyan 
people clearly needed to be shifted from Libya to the international community.  
The Human Rights Network –Uganda recommended that:  
 African states should refer to the principle of ‘no-indifference’  in Article four of the 
 AU Constitutive Act and immediately intervene in ending massacres of civilian 
 population in Libya;  Libyan authorities and the belligerents should allow immediate 
 access for international human rights monitors and humanitarian agencies; and, the 
 UNSC should draw on its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by taking 
 appropriate non-military and military action to restore peace and security for the people 
 of Libya.796  
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Genocide Alert, based in Koln, Germany, launched an email campaign calling for action in 
Libya directed at the German government (who has a seat on the Security Council); i.e. 
Chancellor Merkel and foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, as well other relevant politicians in 
Germany.797 
 Another article published by Genocide Alert referred to the international community's 
responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities committed by Muammar Gaddafi. The 
article pointed to the Responsibility to Protect’s three pillars, including the responsibility to 
prevent, and measures that could/should be taken to prevent mass atrocities.  It suggested that if 
these efforts had failed, however, more comprehensive measures needed to be taken.798  
Ramesh Thakur wrote in The Star on 13 March 2011 regarding the situation.799   In 
contemplating the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in Libya, and one might say in 
consideration of reasonable proposals, Thakur’s article addressed three criteria:  “military 
capacity, legal authority and political legitimacy.” He was certain that military operations would 
entail four activities: “surveillance and monitoring, humanitarian assistance, enforcement of the 
arms embargo and enforcement of a no-fly zone.”800 He understood that only the West had the 
military capability needed.  He noted the rebels had been calling for a no-fly zone.  One concern, 
he had, however, was with regard to mission creep and the fear of the interveners being seen as 
Western imperialists.  He recommended legal authorization from the UN Security Council 
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should be restricted to the four military tasks listed above. The United States  were very reluctant 
to support such a resolution, but he suggested their opposition could be overcome if and as it 
became clear that the Arab, Islamic and African nations, as well as the mass of defecting Libyan 
diplomats, supported prompt and effective action to protect Libyan civilians, oust Gaddafi and 
promote democratic reforms.801   In the case of Libya the inclusion of Arab bodies was an 
important issue in the legitimacy of Security Council’s decision.    
Some, however, argued that the proposal crossed the boundaries of legitimate humanitarian 
intervention, touching on taboo areas in military humanitarian intervention in the form of 
proposals for regime change. For example, in ‘Foreign Policy’ James Traub wrote on 11 March 
2011 that effective action was impossible in Burma, Sudan, Zimbabwe and elsewhere so long as 
the neighbors insisted on protecting an abusive tyrant.   
The goal, of course, would not be to induce Qaddafi to come to the negotiating table -- a 
Hitler-like Götterdämmerung is much more likely -- but to damage and demoralize his 
forces and thus tip the scales between the government and the rebels. 802  
 
This, as we can see, verges on recommendations for regime change, although it is not explicitly 
stated.  Taub was also in favor of force as the ‘right thing’ because force could stop Gaddafi, ‘a 
ruthless tyrant’ from killing his own people.  It would also be to America's benefit because the 
United States would be liberating Arab peoples and would gain the approval of the Arab world. 
He stressed the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference had all called for a no fly zone over Libya.803   
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Iftekhar Ahmad Chowdury and Yang Razali Kassim wrote on March 9 about the situation in 
Libya.804 They argued the efforts to bring about ‘regime change’ in Libya need not be a ‘back–
door’ endeavour. There is a real need to end the human sufferings of the Libyan people. 
Considering the Responsibility to Protect, all peaceful means to resolve the crisis have proved 
futile. Collective action through the Security Council can be supported legally, morally, and in 
practical terms. It is a situation ripe for the application of the principle of the Responsibility to 
Protect. 
 One aspect in support of the lack of total neutrality occurred in the first resolution, naming and 
blaming Gaddafi, and announcing the call for his arrest. In a BBC interview, Gareth Evans 
argued the moral case for the Responsibility to Protect. It was his view that a no-fly zone would 
be extremely effective in addressing the imbalance of power, while arming people on the ground 
would risk escalating the conflict.   
In response to the escalation of violence between government forces and the armed opposition, 
international civil society groups, including ICG,805 Human Rights Watch806and the Global 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect807 beyond the U.S. alone also increased urgent calls for 
action, noting the compelling obligation of the international community to prevent and halt mass 
atrocities.  The Gulf Cooperation Council met on 7 March and requested that the “UN Security 
Council take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over 
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Libya.” They also condemned the "crimes committed against civilians, the use of heavy arms 
and the recruitment of mercenaries" by the Libyan government.808 
The Arab League barred Libya from taking part in its meetings and also called on the Security 
Council to impose a no-fly zone on Libya to protect the Libyan people and foreign nationals 
residing in Libya, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring States.  
It also commended other states like Oman and Bahrain for the non-violent way they were dealing 
with their own protests.  These statements were very important since Western countries and 
NATO had indicated they would not use coercive options without approval from regional 
organizations.809 
 As a result of the increased pressure from the international community and rising threats to the 
civilian population and follow-up to Resolution 1970, the Security Council  on 17 March voted 
on Resolution 1973, calling for a no-fly zone as well as a ceasefire. The resolution also included 
an arms embargo, travel bans and asset freezes.810  The resolution emphasized the responsibility 
of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and considered that the widespread and 
systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian 
population amounted to crimes against humanity. The resolution authorized  Member States 
acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, “to take all necessary measures, (…) to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack (…) while excluding a foreign 
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occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory…”  as a means of ensuring 
proportionality.  Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that Resolution 1973  
affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community's determination to fulfill 
its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own 
government.811  
Boots on the ground and a foreign occupation force were, however, expressly excluded.  
Coercive military action was therefore allowed to take two forms, namely “all necessary 
measures” to enforce a no-fly zone, and “all necessary measures … to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”812  ‘All necessary measures’ in this instance 
allowed for the removal of the perpetrator, Gaddafi, which was ultimately necessary for success 
since no other less coercive measure had been successful.   
The language of this resolution was clear in prescribing the scope and limits of what should be 
done. In the case of enforcing the no-fly zone, Resolution 1973 allows the destruction, by aircraft 
or missile, of any loyalist jet or helicopter that takes off, any pro-Gadhafi forces’ anti-aircraft 
batteries or missile-launch sites, and the disabling of any airstrip. And, as for the wider mandate 
to protect civilians, the Resolution allowed airborne attacks against tanks or troop columns 
advancing on Benghazi or other rebel-held towns, and any concentrations of forces within those 
areas that pose a direct and immediate threat to Gaddafi’s opponents.  Any military action 
designed specifically to target or ensure a rebel victory in a civil war, or even to achieve a more 
open and responsive system of government in Libya was not explicitly in the terms of the 
Resolution.  In fact, neither is it part of the moral first principles of the “Responsibility to 
Protect” doctrine approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005. One or more of these results 
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might, conceivably, occur but it cannot be its stated objective.  Three African countries on 
the Security Council - Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon - supported the resolution.  The support 
of Arab States most likely prompted China, Russia, Germany, India and Brazil to abstain, 
permitting the Resolution to pass.813 
In spite of news that Libyan authorities declared a cease-fire, fighting continued. Most of Libya 
remained off limits to aid workers and thousands of people escaped to neighboring countries.814  
On 24 March, the UN Human Rights Council reported that “hundreds of persons have been taken 
to undisclosed locations where they might have been submitted to torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatments or executed.” 815  Such treatment would certainly constitute crimes 
against humanity. Two days after the Resolution was adopted, on Saturday 19 March, a military 
operation called Operation Odyssey Dawn (a coalition of American, French and British forces) 
launched airstrikes against Libyan air defenses, tanks, armored personnel carriers and other 
military hardware.  The coalition now also included Denmark, Canada, Italy, Qatar, Belgium, 
Spain, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates.816   Plans were also being made to have NATO 
take over the mission.817 
 President Obama authorized the U.S. Armed Forces to enforce the no-fly zone and expressed 
pride in being part of a coalition that were “prepared to meet their responsibility to protect the 
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816 UN News Centre, “Speedy Decisive International action to protect civilians in Libya is vital” 24 March 2011 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37885&Cr=Libya&Cr1= (accessed 24 March 2011). 
817 Al Jazeera “NATO to police Libya No fly zone” 25 March 2011 http://english.Al Jazeera.net/news/africa/2 
011/03/2011324221036894697.html (accessed 29 July 2011). 
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people of Libya and uphold the mandate of the international community.” On 24 March, the US 
announced that it was transferring command and control to NATO with the limited mandate of a 
no fly zone.818  
The endorsement of Resolution 1973 represents a historic event in support of the Responsibility 
to Protect principle agreed to in 2005 and sets a major precedent for the UN Security Council 
and the Responsibility to Protect.   Gareth Evans, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 March 2011 
responded to Resolution 1973 with caution, however, regarding the aspect of proportionality.819    
Evans was careful to point out that while the result of the military action may be to kill Gaddafi 
or force him into exile, or to ensure rebel victory in a civil war, or to achieve a more open and 
responsive system of government in Libya, it is not the  explicit legal objective  of UN 
Resolution 1973.  It also follows legally and morally from these first principles that once the 
threat to civilian populations has ended the military action should stop.820 
Needless to say, controversy began to take place over the implementation and enforcement of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandated no-fly zone in Libya.  Some, including the 
African Union (AU), have argued that more than just a no fly zone had been imposed which 
exceeds the intentions and objectives of UNSC resolution 1973.  Concerns were raised that the 
protection of civilians by "any means necessary" allowed for mission creep and ulterior motives 
including the possibility of regime change along with self-interest. If it were to be shown that the 
                                                            
818 Al Jazeera Ibid. 
819 Gareth Evans was Australian Foreign Minister from 1988 to 1996.  
820 Gareth Evans, “When intervening in a conflict stick to the UN Script,” National Times, 24 March 2011. 
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/when-intervening-in-a-conflict-stick-to-un-script-20110323-1c6kz.html 
accessed July 30, 2011.  
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no-fly zone attacks were causing too many civilian deaths the credibility of the action would be 
seriously undermined.821  
Concerns were being raised by the UNHCR that States may be considering steps to arm the 
rebels, or take actions toward regime change which go beyond Resolution 1973 which made 
clear that measures using "all necessary measures" to protect civilian areas from attack by 
Libyan government forces should only take place while civilians were under threat. 822  In terms 
of civilian protection it is notable that NATO officials warned rebels that if they endangered 
civilians they may also be subject to attack. In that sense, Resolution 1973 does not distinguish 
between civilians who support Gaddafi and those who support the rebels.823 
Ian Davis, Director of NATO Watch, wrote in NATO Watch, 31 March 2011, that concerns 
continued to be expressed regarding the fact that what started out as an action that observed the 
majority of the norms of international law and multilateral consultation was now in danger of 
changing. 824  US, French and British muscle and talk of regime change, arming the rebels and 
even assassinating Gaddafi could break international consensus.  Reference to Resolution 1973 
itself, however, established an imbalance.  While of course the intent of the United Nations 
resolution is to be neutral in its saving of civilians, the use of the term “all necessary measures” 
and the call for the arrest of Gaddafi for crimes against humanity suggest the intervention was 
slanted toward the opposition forces.825  This does not conflict, however, with it being the last, 
                                                            
821 Allafrica.com “Libya: Ambiguities over the interpretation  of UN Resolution 1973 causing global consternation” 
23 March 2011 http://allafrica.com/stories/201103230883.html 23 March 2011 (accessed July 30, 2011). 
822 UNHCR “North Africa Situation” http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4d7755246.html (accessed August 1, 2011). 
823 Tom Shanker, and Charlie Savage “NATO warns Libyan Revels Not to attack civilians” New York Times, 
March 31, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/world/africa/01civilians.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&ref=world (accessed 
August 2, 2011). 
824 Dr. Ian Davis,  NATO Watch, March 31, 2011 
825 Dr. Ian Davis, ibid. 
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and ‘legitimate’ resort in my view, nor does it extend beyond the principles of the Responsibility 
to Protect and the UN resolution.   The intervention and the subsequent regime change itself can 
be defended according to the Responsibility to Protect and according to the means necessary to 
protect civilians.  Ramesh Thakur, on 21 March 2011 suggested that Security Council Resolution 
1973 was the first UN-sanctioned combat operation since the 1991 Gulf War.826  I would add 
that it was a successful intervention.  As I will argue below, genocide was averted.  Also, many 
Libyan diplomats defected and joined the calls for the protection of Libyan civilians and the 
ousting of Gaddafi to allow for democratic reforms. 
V. Consequences of the Intervention 
 
 
 As part of these deliberations the Security Council expressed confidence that the action would 
succeed.  While not necessarily part of the framework, one of the real challenges in determining 
the legitimacy of this intervention comes in assessing whether the military action was a success.  
When analyzing the outcome, there will always be questions about whether the number of deaths 
would have been higher or lower if Libyans had been left to their own devices, which is virtually 
an impossible question to answer. More importantly, however, will be to recognize it as “an 
‘intervention based on principle’ and not as the ‘petro-imperialist’ plot that Gaddafi claim[ed] it 
to be.”827  There is also the question of how much weight should actually be placed on the 
outcome if the intervention is ‘right’.  And what if the outcome is good but the intentions were 
self-serving?  One of the frequent questions will be whether the intent was to change the Libyan 
regime.  If in fact it was, even though regime change is not considered a legitimate goal of 
                                                            
826 Ramesh Thakur, The Toronto Star” 21 March 2011. 
827 Brian Whitaker, “The Difference with Libya” Guardian.co.uk 23 March 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/libya-bahrain-yemen-un-responsibility-protect (accessed 31 
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humanitarian intervention, will getting rid of Gaddafi be considered in the final analysis as a 
success if it was ultimately the only way to protect civilians from a brutal dictator who was 
eventually  replaced by a democratic governing body.  I suggest that when a military intervention 
occurs as a last resort, and when all other conflict resolution ‘neutral’ strategies have been 
explored or tried, the intervention may be pushed into a less neutral zone.  If, for example, as in 
Libya, the state is the perpetrator of the looming genocide – the interveners may be forced to take 
sides.   
The final stage of the Responsibility to Protect military action regards rebuilding. The Libyans 
were likely to need support – but not interference. This stage requires a political-diplomatic 
approach, which allows for the transitional government to govern themselves. Some might 
consider pushing the Responsibility to Protect beyond the boundaries of the resolution would be 
self-defeating. Gareth Evans, for example, in The Daily Star 25 March 2011 claimed that 
“legally, morally, politically and militarily,” the military intervention in Libya had only one 
purpose – to protect Libyans from Gaddafi. When that job is done the military intervention 
should end.  Regime change should be implemented by the Libyans themselves. 828  
According to the chosen framework, the question of whether Resolution 1973 and subsequent 
action according to due process is still important to a determination of its legitimacy.  I have 
suggested that no determination of the legitimacy of a Responsibility to Protect action can be 
complete without a legal assessment.  We can establish the legality of the intervention according 
to the fact that it was passed by a UNSC resolution and follows the legal interpretation of the 
Responsibility to Protect according to Articles 138 and 139 of the UNGA agreed to in 2005. 
International humanitarian law governs the conduct and responsibilities of nations and 
                                                            
828 Gareth Evans, The Daily Star, 24 March 2011 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/#axzz1I1JpCHaa (accessed 31 July 
2011). 
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individuals during war and conflict, in relation to one another and to protected persons 
(civilians).  It constitutes the legal corpus of the Hague Conventions (1989 and 1907) and the 
Law of Geneva (1863).  Together they set the basis for jus ad bellum, the right to the use of force 
in the context of humanitarian intervention and jus in bello, the legitimate modalities for the use 
of force, together forming international law governing acceptable practice to be followed in war 
and armed conflict.   The most important provision of the Geneva Conventions in terms of 
humanitarian intervention is the fourth convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War (first adopted in 1949, based on parts of the 1907 Hague Convention).  With the 
adoption of additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the two streams of law converged.  
One of the indicators of the future support for the Responsibility to Protect can be gleaned from 
the public reaction as revealed through the media and other sources.   
Hans Geiser, a former UN diplomat, wrote in the Trinidad Express Newspaper 27 March 2011 
that the Resolution regarding "the Responsibility to Protect" is a historic event.829 
Juan Cole argues, as I do, the intervention in Libya was prosecuted in a legal way: it was 
demanded by the people being attacked, it included the support of the Arab League and was 
authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution.  The risk of a civilian mass murder 
was real.830  
Geiser argues that the Security Council has taken legitimate enforcement measures specifically 
in line with and in support of the principle to protect innocent civilians and is not in violation of 
the Charter provision and therefore does not render the resolution null and void. “We are 
                                                            
829 Hans Geiser, “A Chink of the armour in sovereignty” Trinidad Express Newspaper March 27, 2011 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/commentaries/A_chink_in_the_armour_of_sovereignty-118752319.html (August 6, 
2011) [Geiser 2011]. 
830 Juan Cole “An open letter to the Left on Libya” Informed Comment March 27, 2011.  
http://www.juancole.com/2011/03/an-open-letter-to-the-left-on-libya.html in 
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reminded that one of the main roles of the UN in relation to the Charter is the progressive 
development of international law, and this is precisely what took place.”831 According to the 
Charter Article 27/3 an affirmative vote by nine members is required for decisions including the 
concurring votes by the permanent members, and in fact this took place.832   
However, the Responsibility to Protect does not create a legally binding obligation in itself.  
Rather, it appeals to the “ethical conscience.”833  Needless to write, compelling moral action is 
more uncertain than a legal obligation as the thesis has argued throughout.  Although the 
Responsibility to Protect has not yet reached the status of lex lata, each legitimate case can be 
said to contribute to customary law.   
Its status as soft law this helps to explain why the international community fails to act in certain 
cases today and in the past.  The protection of human rights is not always viewed as a compelling 
argument.  One approach is to try to argue that it is in the state’s self-interest to act; however, 
this only tends to aggravate non-Western nations by suggesting to them that self-interest is the 
basis of the Western states’ action rather than actions based on moral premises….creating a 
Catch-22 situation.834 In terms of determining legitimacy, as suggested, the extent of any UN 
endorsement for the Responsibility to Protect in any resolution must be very clearly passed at the 
UN on the basis of humanitarian principles.   
 
One of the main questions, however, is how such agreement is achieved.  The success of a 
Responsibility to Protect decision requires a combination of knowledge of the specific situation, 
history, an appreciation and respect for the ethical and moral principle involved and collective 
                                                            
831 Geiser 2011 supra note 829. 
832 Geiser 2011 ibid.  
833 Coicaud Chapter 2 in Charlesworth, 2010 supra note 656 at 64. 
834 Coicaud Chapter 2 in Charlesworth, 2010 ibid at 66. 
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legitimate action. The legal issues are important but can only be resolved in the transnational 
environment with the assistance of the global network of key players. Without sufficient 
resources to take effective action, the knowledge of mass human rights abuses may not be a 
sufficient deterrent.   
Daniel Pipes, the Director, Middle East Forum, 7 March 2011 raised an important point by 
asking whether the Libyan intervention would set a precedent and become common law. Would 
it mean that international forces all over the world would intervene when governments attack 
their own populations? In considering this question, we need to remember that approval for the 
Responsibility to Protect was approved to be on a case by case basis. Most, I believe, would not 
want to see a law which allowed it to be implemented on a basis of convenience or custom 
alone.835 At the same time the fact that it is made on a case by case basis, leading to what can be 
perceived as inconsistencies, is not a justification for shelving it, especially if one wants to 
establish its legality.  Irwin Cotler stated in his New York Times Op-Ed, “Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect” that the situation in Libya “is a test case for the Security Council and 
its implementation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. …It is our collective responsibility 
to ensure the Responsibility to Protect is an effective approach to protect people and human 
rights.”836 
                                                            
835 “Does the UN Have a Responsibility to Protect Libyans?”  The Mark March 7, 2011. 
http://www.themarknews.com/articles/4244-does-the-un-have-a-responsibility-to-protect-libyans (accessed July 14, 
2011). 
836 New York Times “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/opinion/01iht-
edcotler01.html?_r=3 (accessed July 23, 2011).  Irwin Cotler is a member of the Canadian Parliament and a former 
minister of justice. Cotler and Jared are co editors of the forthcoming “The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of 
Stopping Mass Atrocities in our Times.”   
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On March 2, 2011, Ramesh Thakur commented on Libya.837  He noted the language of the 
Responsibility to Protect refers to state inability or unwillingness as the catalyst for the 
international Responsibility to Protect to be called to action.  Often the state itself is in fact the 
perpetrator of atrocities when security forces, meant to protect people, are instead let loose in a 
killing spree.   That was the situation in Libya, where many had already been killed and a 
carnage was feared. Reminding readers of the history of the Responsibility to Protect, Ramesh 
Thakur concluded it provided the normative and political arguments necessary to deal militarily 
with Gaddafi's human rights abuses.  The UN and the West needed to overcome the stain of 
being passive spectators in Rwanda and Srebrenica.  He argued the crisis had exceeded the threat 
level and the world needed to respond to the challenge. “Libya is the perfect opportunity to 
convert the noble sentiments and words into deeds.”838  
Tim Dunne wrote in the Interpreter on 3 March 2011, and referred to Srebrenica as a place where 
the world permitted atrocity crimes to occur.839  Dunne expressed optimism that the UN Security 
Council Resolution of 26 February calling for 'decisive action' and 'tough measures' against the 
Gaddafi regime was a move in the right direction.  This was the first time in his view that the 
Responsibility to Protect was invoked in its hard core form in a Security Council resolution 
against a specific country. As an illustration of the role of the international community in 
furthering the norm, Dunne takes note of a strongly worded letter to the US president, calling for 
                                                            
837 Ramesh Thakur, “UN Must Prevent Libyan Slaughter” March 2, 2011. 
http://www.therecord.com/opinion/editorial/article/495508--un-must-prevent-libyan-slaughter (Accessed July 26, 
2007).  
838Ramesh Thakur, “It’s time for the UN to hold Gaddafi responsible and invoke doctrine of ‘responsibility to 
protect’ March 1, 2011 http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/946306--we-have-a-duty-to-stop-
libyan-slaughter (accessed July 26, 2011). 
839 Professor of International Relations and Director of Research in the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect, University of Queensland. 
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decisive action.840 It was signed by forty policy analysts, and included prominent neo-
conservatives associated with the George W. Bush Administration such as Robert Kagan, 
William Kristol and Paul Wolfowitz, who was deputy-defence secretary under Bush. The letter 
demands that the US and NATO develop operational plans to command Libyan waters and air 
space. 
Questions have been raised about how the engagement in Libya will affect long-term support for 
the Responsibility to Protect.  Another question pertains to the consistent application of the 
Responsibility to Protect to other contexts as mentioned.  An important point to remember is that 
all states have an obligation to protect their own citizens from atrocities, and the Responsibility 
to Protect has a number of measures available (diplomatic, economic, political), with the use of 
force being used only as a last resort.   
Sheri P Rosenberg841 wrote on 4 April 2011 regarding the situation in Libya.842 When economic 
sanctions and travel bans failed to stop Gaddafi’s “no mercy” policy the Security Council moved 
to military action as a last resort.  Although it is still being questioned by some, there seems to be 
little doubt that the world powers were motivated to and intended to protect innocent lives during 
the threat of massacres in Libya.  The approval of this action, however, has served to raise 
controversy again over military intervention which is perceived as another instance of 
imperialism.  
                                                            
840“Foreign Policy Experts Urge President to take action to halt violence in Libya”   Foreign Policy initiative website 
February 25, 2011 http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/foreign-policy-experts-urge-president-take-action-halt-
violence-libya-0 (accessed July 26, 2011).  
841 Professor Sheri P. Rosenberg is a UNAOC Global Expert and the director of the Holocaust and Human Rights 
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842 Sheri P. Rosenberg, “The Responsibility to Protect”:  Libya and Beyond” April 11, 2011 http://gulf-
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Critics need to be reminded that the Responsibility to Protect is a moral principle that is not 
exclusively about military intervention. The R2P doctrine makes it clear that protecting 
populations from mass atrocities involves a progressive action by states, including preventing 
mass atrocity, reaction to the threat or occurrence of mass atrocity, and, if military action is taken 
as a last resort at the final stage the goal is to build a durable peace.  And there are indeed times 
when military action as a last resort, as was the case in Libya, becomes the only way to stop a 
potential bloodbath and avoid another Rwanda.  Rosenberg reminds the reader that the moral 
principles imbedded in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine should be seen not only as military 
action, however, but as prevention.  And again, military intervention must remain as “the 
exception not the rule.”843 On April 1, 2011, Michael Abramowitz844 stated that actions by the 
international community reveal an important shift in thinking over the past two decades 
regarding preventing mass atrocities.845  The last twenty years has shown changes in policies by 
civil society and governments that support the world’s  collective capacity to respond to 
genocide or threats of genocide which include the creation of an Office of Genocide Prevention 
at the United Nations; a new International Criminal Court in The Hague, the adoption of a 
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations (invoked in Libya); and steps by 
individual governments to strengthen their ability to detect and react to potential genocide.  One 
                                                            
843 Rosenberg, 2011 Ibid. 
844 Michael Abramowitz directs the Committee on Conscience at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, which co-
convened the US Genocide Prevention Task Force. 
845 Scott Wilson, “Obama: U.S. had responsibility to act in Libya” The Washington Post March 28, 2011. 
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such step has been taken by the United States in the creation of the US Office of the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.846 
David Chandler has written widely in this area. 847  On 19 April 2011 he suggested in Today’s 
World, the bombing of Libya cannot readily be grasped in the traditional terms of the state 
interests of Realpolitik  In 2011, the debate over the ‘humanitarian’ bombing of Libya 
demonstrates that we have moved into more of an emerging global cosmopolitanism of human 
security. 848  Chandler argues this is humanitarian intervention in a different political or legal 
framework than in the 1990s. The Libya campaign should not be posed as intervening in state 
sovereignty, but rather should be posed in the post-humanitarian language of capacity-building 
and good governance, with the purpose of strengthening the Libyan state through enabling the 
forces of democracy.849 The last chapter of the thesis will address itself to the matter of 
governance and what it means for a world order based on responsibility rather than the 
sovereignty of the nation state alone. 
VI. The Significance of the Libyan Intervention  
 
 Much has been written already of the significance of the Libyan intervention and the future of 
the Responsibility to Protect and of Libya. A meeting of leaders from thirty-five governments 
and NGOs took place in London, England on 29 March, 2011, to discuss implementation of 
Resolution 1973, the humanitarian needs of the Libyan people, and the future of 
                                                            
846 Michael Abramowitz, “Libya intervention shows shift in thinking about mass atrocities”  The Washington Post 
April 1, 2011 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/libya-intervention-shows-shift-in-thinking-about-mass-
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847 Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, London and editor of the Journal of 
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Libya.850 Conference participants agreed that Gaddafi’s government must be held accountable 
for its brutal use of force.851 A contact group was considered with close coordination to be 
maintained with the UN, AU, Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and 
EU.   
The Transitional National Council was also present and provided a statement entitled “A Vision 
of Democratic Libya” which expressed the Council’s commitment to “a civil society that 
recognizes intellectual and political pluralism and allows for the peaceful transition of power 
through legal institutions and ballot boxes; in accordance with a national constitution crafted by 
the people and endorsed in a referendum.”852  It was suggested, however, that without a 
negotiated agreement allowing for an orderly transition to a post-Qaddafi legitimate political 
order, the future would be uncertain. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, to examine 
the situation in Libya post conflict in depth and I have not included it in my criteria for 
legitimacy or success.  The last chapter, however, will address the need for general concerns of 
justice after a conflict ends (ius post bellum) and future governance. 
 I have taken the Libyan intervention as an appropriate case study of the implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect in an international as well as a global governance environment which 
includes a multitude of actions.  When Special Adviser Edward Luck was asked if the military 
intervention in Libya provides an example of the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, 
he confirmed it was and that Resolutions 1970 and 1973 of the United Nations Security Council 
                                                            
850 International News “New Libya Contact Group to provide political direction” 
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league (access August 1,2011). 
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referenced it. He also indicated this was indeed the first time that the Security Council employed 
the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to implement the Responsibility to Protect.    From 
Andrew Thompson’s view, for example, Libya came the closest to “meeting the test.”  He clearly 
saw Libya as an historical example of the implementation of R2P.  He commented “On balance, 
if you are looking for a case on which to hang the Responsibility to Protect, Libya comes the 
closest.”853  From my own analysis, I would agree with these conclusions. 
To help with reaching a conclusion with regard to the legitimacy of the intervention, those 
interviewed as part of the qualitative study of the Responsibility to Protect were also asked to 
gauge whether the Libyan intervention was legitimate and whether it was a success.  In the first 
instance, respondents were asked their opinion on whether the Libyan intervention could be 
regarded as a success for the Responsibility to Protect.  A definition of success was not provided 
and the respondents were primarily left to create their own criteria.  While in some cases there 
may be some overlap between the question of successful intervention and legitimacy, the two 
questions were treated somewhat independently.  Some of the suggested terminology for 
defining success entailed the measurement of success, including ‘meeting the goal or mandate of 
the action’, or ‘meeting the test’.   
On the whole, measuring success was regarded as close to impossible.  Nevertheless, Mark Sedra 
clearly saw a positive; i.e. that,   
the intervention did avert potential massacre.  There was a clear danger to a lot of 
civilians and it was imperative to act.  It was a fairly limited intervention with no ground 
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forces.  In that sense it was successful in spite of the overarching question of how you 
judge success.854  
Ian Davis saw the Libyan intervention as “leaning towards the success end of the spectrum”, 
although he hesitated to go so far as to call it a “model intervention.”855 
One route to providing a judgment was to ask whether further mass atrocities were prevented 
including the slaughter of civilians in Benghazi.856  Another criterion used to define success was 
the multilateral nature of Security Council endorsement.  The matter of regime change was 
perhaps the most controversial and generally judgments were clouded.  Those interviewed 
generally felt that regime change was not a cine qua non for the Responsibility to Protect and 
that it should only happen if a country is failing to protect its citizens or is perpetuating the 
violence.   
Nami Kikoler looked at it from both a practical and a moral perspective.   
The reality is that in certain situations there are times when the leadership may 
themselves be a serious threat and there may be a need for regime change, but the 
Responsibility to Protect should not be used as an excuse to invade or oust the leader of a 
country.  We also shouldn’t care about the governance structure per se and whether a 
government is democratic or not, but we must care about atrocities.857   
Andrew Thompson even went so far as to read “regime change” into the resolution.  From his 
point of view the reference to “all necessary means” opened that door.  Respect for human rights 
law and trials is important for a definition of a successful government, and Andrew Thompson 
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commented for this to be a successful government to replace Gaddafi the government must 
uphold respect for human rights.  “Trials and so on are necessary,” he said.858 
 Kyle Matthews suggested the principles of just war are important.  “Military force can only be 
used when you have a reasonable expectation of success.”859  Timeliness was also a 
consideration.  Naomi Kikoler concluded “On the whole it had probably been a positive effort. It 
shows that the international community and the Security Council can work together and act 
quickly.”860 One of the measures in the case of Libya (difficult if not impossible to quantify) was 
whether mass human rights violations were prevented.  “In spite of the difficulty in determining 
this, many referred to this as a criterion of success.  Andrew Thompson, for example, asked 
“Were mass human rights violations prevented?  On balance ‘yes’.  How do we know when there 
is a human rights violation taking place? – the answer for the Council was when NGOs send out 
early warnings as well as UN agencies that sound the alarm.”861 
David Welch commented affirmatively “If the main goal was to keep the Libyan government 
from slaughtering civilians then it was a success.  They were rolling toward Benghazi.  The 
opposition did not have trained fighters.  They did in fact protect civilians so they met their 
mandate.” 862 Naomi Kikoler agreed with this view, saying there was likely to have been a 
massacre in Bentghazi.  She also stated   
I think we generally feel that lives were saved in Benghazi.  It is important to emphasize 
the fact that the international community responded in large part because they believed 
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civilians were at risk of mass atrocities.   They responded in a timely and decisive way.  
There are lessons to be learned from the international response.863 
Just War criteria were often referred to in relation to success. Timeliness was also a 
consideration.  In my view, success, apart from legitimacy of the action, is determined by the fact 
that thousands were likely saved which was the primary objective of the intervention.  It is not, I 
stress, a matter of what happens later, after the objective has been reached.  In other words, this 
definition does not include an indeterminate period of time. 
VII. Was the Libyan Intervention Legitimate? 
 
There is an important passage in the ICISS report that deals with legitimacy. 
The authority of the UN is underpinned not by coercive power, but by its role in the 
application of legitimacy.  The concept of legitimacy acts as the connecting link between 
the exercise of authority and the recourse to power.  Attempts to enforce authority can 
only be made by the legitimate agents of that authority.  Collective intervention blessed 
by the UN is regarded as legitimate because it is duly authorized by a representative 
international body; unilateral intervention is seen as illegitimate because self-
interested.864 
Most of those interviewed agreed that the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in 
Libya could be regarded as legitimate.  However, they had some concerns regarding the role of 
the ICC and the change in regime which somewhat clouded the issue for them.  Jillian Siskind 
stated in terms of the legitimacy of the intervention “The Libyan government was obliged to 
protect its own people and was therefore in violation of international law when it did not.  Many 
states were willing to intervene to protect Libyan citizens.”865 Kyle Matthews suggested the 
                                                            
863 Naomi Kikoler interview, supra note 857. 
864 Article 6.9 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect I.1.5 International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) December 2001, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, at 11. http://www.idrc.ca  
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principles of just war are important.  “Military force can only be used when you have a 
reasonable expectation to succeed.”866   
Andrew Thompson referred to the six tests in the original ICISS document and commented that 
there was  
an imminent threat of a massacre; reasonable prospect of success -- Libya is not a big 
country so without boots on the ground NATO could neutralize Gaddafi resources; the 
right intention – the aim of the intervention in Libya was to prevent large scale loss of 
life; and, the right authority.  Only with a very liberal reading of the resolution, however, 
could regime change be read into it.  Russia agreed to a no fly zone, although they never 
agreed to getting rid of Gaddafi.867 
The efficacy of the reference to the ICC was questioned, however, with reference to the Libyan 
intervention as to whether it helped or hindered the intervention.  Ian Davis suggested  
On the one hand the ICC is one aspect of international law and accountability that brings 
the perpetrator to trial.  On the other hand, the decision to bring Gaddafi to trial in the 
Hague backed him and his supporters into a corner.  It meant he had to find a refuge in a 
country which does not support the ICC process, or be provoked into fighting until the 
finish, which may have prolonged the conflict.     
 “On balance,” he said “I would still rather see an indictment where appropriate.”868 
Kyle Matthews exhibited some skepticism regarding the legitimacy of killing Gaddafi in relation 
to the mandate.    
While the Security Council resolution itself was saying all necessary means, I think that 
is different from saying we are going to go and kill Gaddafi - yet the compound was 
targeted.  I think they were trying to locate him and take him out of the picture.  There is 
evidence for that.  The Security Council resolution was left vague deliberately.869 
On the other hand, he ultimately showed support for the action by stating  
                                                            
866 Kyle Matthews, Interview, Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Montreal, Quebec, 
November 12th, 2012.  
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Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to UN reported on military convoys moving toward 
Benghazi to an assault against thousands of people.  I think when you have a leader that 
refuses to step down, uses military force to commit violence against unarmed civilians 
and that goes to the public radio and TV channels and says he plans to destroy them you 
have an obligation to act.  The real issue we have to think about and ask ourselves ‘Can 
we leave someone like this in power?’ ‘Will civilians be protected if someone like this is 
left in place?’870   
Jillian Siskind also expressed some concern as to the possibility that “when states are putting 
their own citizens at risk, regime change may be the only logical recourse available.  I agree with 
Siskind on this point, as indicated earlier.  The problem is that regime change brings with it a 
whole host of other difficulties.  In a situation like Libya there was very little choice as to who is 
going to take over power. Ian Davis in fact commented “If we are going to support rebels we 
need to understand this group might be left in power.”871 
Bill Graham felt that getting the Arab League and the UN on side was a way of gaining proper 
legitimacy. He raised some important questions that he said surface when we think about 
legitimacy; for example, what sort of interventions do we want?  What are we building in terms 
of instruments?  What are we going to do if we do not intervene?  It is not just a military matter.  
There is reconstruction - diplomacy, and policies to stabilize and rebuild societies.  What justifies 
intervention?  What are the threshold criteria?  What is the effect of technology?  Why not just 
send a drone?  What does that do to the issue of international legitimacy?  All of these questions 
are appropriate for us to ask.872 
Jillian Siskind accepted that there was a legitimate reason to intervene. “We can criticize it now 
seeing the problems in hindsight, but ultimately it was a legitimate action.”873  For David Dewitt, 
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those countries that voted in favour of the resolution to set up a no fly zone in Libya did so 
because they had weighed the evidence that supported the findings of a significant level of mass 
violence.  One could argue that an implementation of the Responsibility to Protect must be based 
on clear evidence according to a strict set of criteria that large numbers of people have been 
systematically abused and the regime is unable or unwilling to stop it.  Alternatively, It must be a 
systematic policy not to act and by not acting allowing the continuation of some structural 
violence.874   
Mark Sedra considered just war theory and noted the intervention “involved Arab League 
support regional support and broad support of the UN Security Council.”875  Carolyn McAskie 
clearly believed the Libyan intervention was legitimate.  She added that actions with a view to 
creating peace and security were legitimate in her view.  This is also the intention of the framers 
of the Charter.  If the Security Council is charged with working on behalf of the broader 
membership to intervene and decides this is the place to do that it has to be a legitimate decision.  
She added “That does not prevent it from being a bad decision.”876    
Marion Arnaud also supported the notion that authorization is legal if it is granted by the 
Security Council.  This is what it takes in international law.  A Security Council resolution 
makes it legal.  The application of the no fly zone in Libya was ultimately legitimate.  Were the 
tactics broader than the mandate?  Was it about regime change?  How do you separate it from 
“all necessary measures”?  One wonders why the Security Council included language like that 
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which left the door open for multiple interpretations.  There are very different arguments on 
these points. 877 
VIII. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The conclusions that I draw from this analysis and the opinions of those professionals 
interviewed is that, given the circumstances in Libya, with its own leader killing protesters and 
threatening more killing in actions amounting to war crimes and human atrocities, the movement 
toward hard and coercive intervention according to the Responsibility to Protect principle had 
just cause.  The agreement to implement the military operations in Libya had the right intention 
to protect civilians from a state that was already killing and was about to slaughter masses of its 
citizens.  The resolution was agreed to as the last resort and was proportionate.  It was also a 
legal process with the right authority invoked.  The Resolution also enforced sanctions while 
explicitly excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.  
Also, by considering the possible underlying motives of those making the decision, my analysis 
concludes the action was motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns rather than the self-
interest of states. 
In considering ‘right authority,’ I conclude that in addition to the formal approval of the UN 
Security Council there existed the backing of the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the requests from the Libyan rebel leaders 
themselves and a myriad of civil society representatives.   The confluence of these different 
organizations and people established the legitimacy of the authority for the military operations.  
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On the matter of proportionate means, the purpose of a no fly zone and of excluding a foreign  
occupation was to maintain proportionality between the regime’s violence and that of the rebels 
and to  allow Libya to remain in charge of its own destiny without the presence of boots on the 
ground.   Nevertheless, it does seem that there is a fine line in this case between efforts to stop 
Gaddafi from slaughtering civilians and the apparent support of the rebels’ efforts toward regime 
change.  I would suggest on the issue of force to prevent mass atrocities, it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, for external bodies to maintain neutrality and a complete balance of impartiality.  In 
this sense it is not what we would like to see as conflict resolution.   It is a difficult task from the 
air to police conflicts neutrally; siding with the rebels may have been the only intervention 
strategy that made operational sense. However, it is likely the Security Council never would have 
officially endorsed intervention on behalf of the rebels, so intervening governments felt 
compelled to cast the entire operation in terms of neutral civilian protection.  This dynamic 
introduces a significant legitimacy problem for the Responsibility to Protect.878  This is in fact 
one way in which the International Criminal Court can be helpful. It is, of course, necessary to 
have evidence.   It is not like mediation or negotiation as forms of conflict resolution where the 
third party does not take sides. 
 
A remaining criterion in assessing the intervention is “the reasonable prospects for success.” 
Gaddafi and his forces remained committed to maintaining their power, even as it diminished.   
The outcome moved quickly in the direction of the NTC.  It seems that the situation was assessed 
and determined to be doable.  Obviously the outcome, the cessation of the killing and the 
prevention of genocide as the criterion for success supports this. 
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After the intervention, the National Transitional Council (NTC) began the transition process and 
assumed governance responsibilities, discussing the formation of a unity government in Libya 
and the re-building of the country.  The UN Security Council approved a US-led proposal to 
unfreeze $1.5 billion (US) in August to begin the process of re-building the country in the past-
Gaddafi era. 879  The Arab League also officially supported the rebels as Libya’s new 
authority.880 NTC leader Mahmoud Jibril declared on 24 August that there would be free 
legislative and executive elections in Libya in eight months.881 
 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in remarks on 24 August 2011, acknowledged that over the 
past year the Responsibility to Protect had become an operational reality. According to Ban Ki-
Moon, our responsibility as an international community is to help the people of Libya realize 
their aspirations.  The United Nations would be involved in ensuring post-conflict assistance in 
all key areas, including economic recovery, elections, human rights, transitional justice and the 
drafting of a new constitution.882   
Yet the historical context presents difficulty for the task of rebuilding.  The new Libyan 
leadership faces four decades of an autocratic regime that failed to build genuine state 
institutions. The challenge is to establish an “inclusive and representative transitional governing 
body; address immediate security risks; and find an appropriate balance between the search for 
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accountability and justice and the imperative of avoiding arbitrary score-settling and revenge.“883 
Libya’s rulers will need to urgently turn their attention to political legitimacy, security, law and 
order, and transitional justice and reconciliation.   Significant international work should go into 
helping provide sustenance and shelter to those in need.884 
In places where they haven’t existed building institutions is a complicated enterprise.  It is clear 
that those  other than the U.S. and Europe will have to take on many of the development and 
diplomatic tasks required for a transition from authoritarian ways to a more open and fair society 
if that is the direction to be maintained.    Libyans do have access to oil resources, but rebuilding 
needs skills and capacity in a variety of economic, social and governance tasks.885 
 
Rachel Gerber (The Stanley Foundation) suggests saying “It’s not your business” is no longer an 
acceptable argument to give the international community when it comes to internal violence 
targeted at civilians.   The Responsibility to Protect is proving to be a dynamic policy framework 
that is meant to adjust and adapt as best it can to complex situations involving human atrocity.  It 
has been shown that compelling moral sentiments can be moved to meet the messy realities of 
the world and they should continue to do so. 
Although many have classified the campaign in Libya as a mistake because of the complexity, 
we need to understand and accept intervention to protect civilians inevitably involves some error. 
Civilian protection is not a simple endeavor. Translating a sense of responsibility into effective 
policies requires an ability to adapt and create.   It is more reasonable to say we have 
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accomplished more by doing than by a response of inaction in the face of mass violence.  Some 
governments seem to understand this problem, and remain committed to preserving the 
Responsibility to Protect.886  My own position on the Responsibility to Protect emphasizes this 
even more. In my view the doctrine represents a critically important advance in human security.  
It was developed in response to tragedies such as Rwanda and Bosnia and other such human 
catastrophes and we cannot afford to let our commitment lapse or be destroyed by unnecessary 
fears or wrongheaded interests.  
		
As a primary mover in the Responsibility to Protect, what now is the role for Canada in Libya 
and elsewhere?  According to the World Federalist Movement Canada, the international 
community applauded Resolution 1973 as an illustration of the application of the doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect and as a necessary measure to prevent a humanitarian crisis in the city 
of Benghazi. The World Federalist Movement Canada stated that  Canadian parliamentarians, 
and any renewed House of Commons motion, should develop ‘benchmarks’ for success for 
Canada, NATO, and the international community in Libya.887 Furthermore, Canada, through its 
government, civil society and industry, can help with drafting a constitution, advising on the 
creation of an inclusive, pluralistic parliamentary system, supporting human rights, and 
generating economic growth so that young Libyans at last have a future.888 Lloyd Axworthy 
expressed his support for the UN-mandated operation in Libya in combination with popular 
democratic forces within Libya.  He sees this as a “resetting of the international order toward a 
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more human, just world.’  It means immediate and appropriate action as called for in the 
Responsibility to Protect.”889 
 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, former Director of Policy Planning for the State Department in the U.S.,     
notes intervention in Libya has not been perfect, delivering indirect and patchy protection and 
putting the region’s long term stability in the hands of fractious, inexperienced and untrained 
rebels is uncertain. 890  I believe the main challenge for the norm is to give credit to the United 
Nations (and NATO) for success in Libya. This determination of success is not intended to be 
measured by events taking place in Libya after the initial intervention in 2011 and the change in 
leadership.  A lot has happened since then and it is not the intention of the thesis to analyse the 
results of any post bellum action.  However, this is certainly a question for further research and 
consideration of the obligations of this and any Responsibility to Protect intervention. 
 
One of the concerns that have been raised as a result of the application of The Responsibility to 
Protect in the case of Libya is why the Security Council has only intervened in Libya when there 
are other situations that involve violence to the civilian population to the extent of human 
atrocity.  For example, Brian Whitaker asks why Libya and not Yemen or Bahrain or other 
places with all the popular uprisings that are happening in the Middle East and with all the 
civilians being killed or injured.  I would suggest Syria today is and has been of the most serious 
concern.891 While the international community is contemplating its Responsibility to Protect the 
thousands of civilians at the mercy of its leader, any sort of resolution has been criminally slow.   
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One suggestion is that the lack of respect for Muammar Gaddafi was a source of motivation in 
Libya.  Certainly his outright threats to kill his opposition contributed to the decision. But that 
would not seem to be the only reason for treating Libya differently.  The support of the Arab 
States was also a contributing factor, along with the fact that the rebels themselves asked for a 
no-fly zone. The veto has also been used to block action in the Security Council regarding Syria 
and tensions have only increased between Russia and the West. It is known that Russia has clear 
interests in Syria.  But these are simple answers on my part – the conflict in Syria is a tragedy 
that deserves a comprehensive analysis which must be left for another time.  
In response to the question of what it was in Libya that prompted the Resolution, Luck said in an 
interview “there seemed to be crimes against humanity, that is, widespread and systematic 
attacks on the population with the knowledge of the authorities.” 892 The air attacks on peaceful 
protesters were outrageous. Nevertheless, the Security Council tried sanctions first - but the 
Gaddafi regime kept advancing. Finally, there was valid reason to believe that “a bloodbath in 
Benghazi was imminent” which fulfilled the first test – here was just cause.  
It is clear, nevertheless, that the Responsibility to Protect cannot be universally applied and that 
mistakes and adjustments will have to be made when it is applied. 893 A debate on the 
Responsibility to Protect within the UN General Assembly last September suggests that 
governments recognize this and remain committed to preserving the Responsibility to Protect, as 
in my view they should.894 
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In another interview with Edward Luck, Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect, 
conducted by Bernard Gwertzman and reported in the Council on Foreign Relations on 
September 2011, Luck commented on Libya.  He stated Libya represents an important precedent 
-- with respect to Resolution 1970895 which talked about sanctions, and sending Gaddafi and 
some of his people to the International Criminal Court, and then in Resolution 1973896 which 
talked about all necessary measures to protect populations -- all of which invoked the 
Responsibility to Protect. The principle was agreed upon and it was clear that a government that 
attacks peaceful protesters with military force is not a condition of normal governance and is not 
acceptable.  
What is yet to be seen is how Libya evolves after the military intervention in the long term and 
whether it is able to control its own destiny at the time.  European Council President Herman 
Van Rompuy stated “Reconciliation and transition must be a Libyan-led process.897  NTC leaders 
also met with Special Advisor to the Secretary-General for Post-Conflict Planning for Libya at 
the start of September, and requested UN post-conflict assistance in elections, transitional 
justice, and reconciliation.898 On 26 August, 2011 Ban Ki-moon met with representatives from 
the African Union, European Union, Arab League, and Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
and asked them to help deliver a democratic transition to a new government.899  The NTC moved 
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forward.900 Human Rights Watch called for countries to help secure resources and urge the NTC 
to train police, build judicial institutions, and protect all individuals, particularly those vulnerable 
to revenge attacks.901  Nevertheless, we do know today serious problems remain. 
As stated, it is not the task of this thesis to analyze the status of Libya after the ending of the 
conflict but rather only to assess it as a case of the implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect under extreme circumstances.  I leave that as a follow up research study to the thesis.  A 
judgment of the legitimacy of the intervention should not, however, be based  on the long term 
results of the intervention, although I do recognize there is a responsibility on the part of the 
interveners not to simply walk away. The intervention in Libya was designed to avert the 
threatened massacre of regime opponents in the capital of Benghazi and was successful in 
meeting its mandate. Although the sole criterion is not whether lives were saved, and the other 
legitimacy criteria employed are also important, the fact that the motivation was humanitarian 
and a large number of lives were indeed saved is in my view one the weightiest of the six 
criteria.  Until recently, insistence that the UN could not intervene in any matter that was 
“essentially within the jurisdiction of any state” prevented the intervention into state-generated 
violence against civilians by the UN Security Council.902  The Libyan intervention constitutes a 
dramatic new benchmark for its application.  
 
 David Hillstrom  raised the  broader point that there is now a tangible case through the process 
and the consequences of accepting ‘the Responsibility to Protect’  as a guiding principle in 
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international affairs which can be subjected to scrutiny (as I have done in this document).903  He 
recommended solidifying the framework for the Responsibility to Protect further with a written 
legal document to govern future decisions.  
This chapter has developed a framework for the assessment of the legitimacy of a military 
intervention after the action has taken place.  The objective was to test the Libyan intervention 
against this framework within the current international legal and political environments.  It 
concludes that Libya stands up to such a test.  Whether future changes in process may occur, the 
final question on Libya will be on what the decision in favor of the Responsibility to Protect 
means for and to the international community as a collective and as part of an emerging form of 
governance. In response to questions of non-interventions elsewhere, one could argue “just 
because you can’t do the right thing everywhere doesn’t mean you shouldn’t do the right thing 
somewhere.”904 
Linked to the question of the assessment of the prospects for success, as suggested, is the 
question of the future of the Responsibility to Protect principle itself.  There are clearly weighty 
implications for the norm of the Responsibility to Protect moving forward.905  However, in my 
view criticism of the Libyan intervention should not deter the international community from in 
the important work it has done with regards to the Responsibility to Protect and the protection of 
civilians from mass atrocity.  Instead, the intervention should be used to learn the strengths, 
weaknesses, pitfalls and successes of the Responsibility to Protect action. 
Tim Dunne, Research Director for the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
in August 2011 focussed on what he labelled as the  ‘revolution in moral consciousness’ that is 
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 symbolized by  the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).   Libya can be used as a 
successful example of the Responsibility to Protect mandate with the transfer of full sovereignty 
– over land and air – back to the Libyan people.906  Maligned by some, seen as a positive step 
forward in atrocity prevention by others, one may conclude the Responsibility to Protect was 
transformative and prevented further atrocities at that time.  The effort to build a new Libya 
whose government is representative, which meets the basic aspirations of its people and avoids 
the settling of past scores remains critical.  The magnitude of this challenge ought not to be 
underestimated.  After the end of the no fly zone and the application of the Responsibility to 
Protect Lloyd Axworthy wrote that the hard work for the international community was just 
beginning in Libya.  He suggested the third crucial element, rebuilding Libya on a democratic, 
stable foundation – was yet to come (although as pointed out this was not specified as a goal of 
the resolution and therefore not part of the analysis).907 
Chapter ten brings the discussion to a close and moves on to consider the future of the 
Responsibility to Protect.  It also identifies gaps in the literature where further research and 
investigation would be beneficial. 
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Chapter Ten: After the Fighting Stops 
 
The real and lasting victories are those of peace  
and not of war.  (Buddha) 
 
This dissertation has considered the evolving norm of the Responsibility to Protect with respect 
to its two main aspects. The first is that states have a Responsibility to Protect their own 
populations from mass atrocities – specifically genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. This duty is founded in international law in a range of established international 
and regional human rights conventions and is endorsed in the General Assembly’s 2005 World 
Summit Agreement. No state denies this duty.908 Nor do they deny that the society of states may 
rightfully hold states to account for the performance of this duty under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. The second aspect is that bystander states of the ‘international community.’  “.. have not 
simply a right but a collective responsibility to assist host states in protecting their populations 
and to act to protect these populations in situations where the host state is manifestly failing to do 
so.”909  While the full principle was approved in the World Summit Outcome document in 2005, 
it remains difficult to implement.    
The issue has been whether the principle of the Responsibility to Protect is working - is it being 
accepted and endorsed as either an international norm, soft law (lex ferenda) or international 
hard law (lex lata) in a global governance environment; and what are the impediments to and 
factors that support and enhance its implementation?  Are there cases where it has been 
implemented and what factors support it or have stood in its way? Which factors are most 
                                                            
908 Luke Glanville, “The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders” (2012) 12:1 Human Rights Law Review,  1-32,  
at 3 [Glanville 2012]. 
909 Glanville 2012 ibid at 3-4. 
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influential?  And, ultimately, is it a principle worthy of endorsement or is it a flawed principle, 
no longer deserving of continued support?   
The research and discussions have referenced the tension between the principles of state 
sovereignty and state responsibility to the individual; the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention; the self-interest of states and altruistic principles; the inclusion of nongovernmental 
actors as players in global governance and the balance of power between states and NGOs in the 
international community; and, finally the UN and its institutional authority for resolving 
conflicts. The research investigates the significance of each issue as it influences the evolution of 
the norm in transnational law and any attempts to implement the principle of the Responsibility 
to Protect. Through the analysis of its history and development along with the case study in 
Libya 2011, my study serves as an analysis of how a fundamental and yet controversial 
international norm can be created, promoted, accepted and ultimately implemented in a 
transnational environment, regardless of the many impediments that stand in its way. It also 
illustrates how a concept or idea can be transformed to eventually become law. 
Even though the Responsibility to Protect has been controversial, we have seen from this study 
that it has gained considerable support over the past decade, and has been successfully utilized at 
least once, and invoked many more times.  With the aid of NGOs, norm entrepreneurs and the 
United Nations it has rightfully established itself within an international set of legal norms that 
holds human rights as sacrosanct. 
Further, the Responsibility to Protect is evolving.  It has not yet reached the level of customary 
law or lex lata.  As soft law, it is not only a legal and political doctrine, it is also a moral one 
which stands to protect civilians in conflict in the case of the failure of states to protect their own 
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population.  It is based on human rights principles and humanitarian legal principles concerned 
with the rights of the individual.  Nevertheless, in the efforts of the international community 
obligations to protect civilians in failing states, the response is frequently impeded by politics 
and the self-interest and sovereignty of states.    The development of international law in the case 
of the Responsibility to Protect has been highly dependent on norm entrepreneurs, some of 
whom were or are in government or international organizations and many who were not tied to 
any government structure.  In consequence, NGOs are often in a better position to advocate for 
moral values, being less constrained by political interests.  As a result of their support and 
activity, NGOs become an important aspect of global governance in instances of internal conflict 
situations that threaten the peace and stability of states and of the human rights principle.  
Regardless of impediments, the Responsibility to Protect is implementable.  It is not a flawed 
principle but an essential one in today’s environment of intra state conflict.  State sovereignty 
must give way to state responsibility when citizens are in extreme jeopardy.  The United Nations 
is the appropriate seat for international decisions regarding the Responsibility to Protect.  
Key theoretical findings are that the logic of appropriateness, idealism, constructivism, 
liberalism, solidarism and structuralism provide better and more plausible explanations of the 
international community’s need to rely on moral values than do the logic of consequences, 
pluralism, or realism. In addition, the way that actors perceive the motivations of other decision 
makers influence their own decisions and may work to impede their efforts to save civilians.  
The development of the norm of the Responsibility to Protect has been described from a 
theoretical perspective through the former theoretical perspectives as well as through the lens of 
norm entrepreneurship as well as through the accounts of critical scholars involved in the early 
stages in the formulation and writing of the ICISS report and its ultimate acceptance by the 
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United Nations General Assembly have been sought and taken into account. The analysis of 
these theoretical premises illustrates that different perceptions of the norm can influence how 
actors respond when making decisions regarding the implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect. The study also demonstrates how the norm goes on to survive in today’s global 
environment through a community of actors, including but not limited to the UN and their 
adherence to certain basic humanitarian principles.  
 Key methodological findings are that we can reach a deeper understanding of how norms work 
if we investigate not only the actions but the thinking and motivations of significant actors who 
contribute to their development and implementation. 
I. The Sovereignty/Responsibility Debate 
The norm of state sovereignty has been the cornerstone of international law and states have the 
right to self defense and non-intervention.910  Thus any discussion of the Responsibility to 
Protect must contend with state sovereignty.  The dissertation describes how this foundation has 
shifted from the absolute right of the state to the responsibility of the state toward its own 
citizens and those of other states. By accepting responsibility, states forfeit their rights when they 
are not exercising their sovereignty according to established rules.  This normative shift has 
accompanied a shift in the nature of conflict itself - from interstate conflict being most common 
in the past to the current situation with armed intrastate conflict being the main source of 
violence - making the responsibility to protect civilians an even more relevant principle.  
In considering the sovereignty/responsibility debate and legal context for the development of the 
norm, I consider the new and shifting principle of responsibilities within the UN with respect to 
                                                            
910 Currie, John 2008 supra note 19. 
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self-determination, sovereign equality, protection of fundamental human rights, and the 
prohibition against the invasion into another state’s territory through forceful intervention. This 
latter principle has been a strong force for the maintenance of the status quo and the authority 
and the rights of the state. While sovereign states bear primary responsibility for their own 
citizens, they have not taken and do not always take responsibility for them consistently.911   As a 
result, in embracing the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, states agreed that if a state fails 
in its responsibility to its own citizens, the responsibility and authority shifts to the international 
community. 
The sovereignty/responsibility debate is often couched in the concept of humanitarian 
intervention and is caught on the horns of the frequently conflicting principle of sovereignty and 
state interest versus the normative ideal of the protection of civilians under threat.912 In part, 
because the main state players are often Western countries, the Security Council, NATO, the 
CSCE, the EU and the G-7/8, concerns are often expressed regarding the self-interest of states in 
the context of the suspicion of Western interventionism. An underlying assumption in some of 
the scholarly and political debates is the realist perspective that interested parties cannot be 
trusted or relied upon to act in the interest of other national citizens and not in their own 
geopolitical interests. This conflict particularly plays itself out in the international arena at 
                                                            
911 Anne Orford, “Lawful Authority and the Responsibility to Protect” in Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer and 
Vesselin Popovski, Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2012) at 248-9.  
Also while the early Minority Treaties and diplomatic protections were recognized as important for minority rights 
and as an important step in the protection of minorities and human rights by bringing the subject to an international 
forum., they were subject to much criticism and considered unenforceable and thus tended to be ignored along with 
the decline of the League of Nations in the 1930s. The League Council, charged with enforcing the various minority 
treaties, often failed to act upon complaints from minorities. See Carole Fink, "The minorities question at the Paris 
Peace Conference" in The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years, Manfred Franz Boemeke, Gerald D. 
Feldman, Elisabeth Gläser (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1998.  
912 Humanitarian intervention in the thesis is defined as intervention without the authority of the UN and has been 
differentiated from the Responsibility to Protect military intervention with Security Council authorization.   
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meetings of the Security Council where the states find themselves prone to deadlock as a 
manifestation of the imbalance of power among states and states own self-interest. The quest for 
a disinterested regime, which seeks a neutral, principled and unbiased international organ 
represents a serious challenge.  
I have suggested that ‘universal’ norms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
various conventions, including the Genocide Conventions and the Geneva Convention to name a 
few, that have already become part of the ethos of the United Nations and international law, and 
have been endorsed in recent legal, cultural and social history have laid the foundations for the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine. In doing so I have expressed a view that these norms overall 
should take precedence over actions taken in self-interest by western and non-western states 
alike.913 However, how the Responsibility to Protect and the self-interest of states along with 
state sovereignty  plays out in cases of human atrocity and whether the principle becomes a 
reality when the international community is faced with the death of thousands of civilians is a 
major subject of the thesis. 
Some try to resolve the sovereignty/intervention contradiction by transcending the parochial 
interest of state politics, perhaps using the notion of cosmopolitan interest, and the notion that a 
fair interventionist regime is in everybody’s interest in the quest for global governance.914 I take 
                                                            
913 For example, the  UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various conventions, including the 
Genocide Conventions and the Geneva Convention to name a few. 
914 See Thomas W.Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty” (October 1992) 103 Ethics: 48-75; Richard Bellamy, 
and Dario Castiglione “Between Cosmopolis and Community:  Three Models of Rights and Democracy within the 
European Union” in Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler Re-imagining Political Community 
(California:  Stanford University Press, 1998) p. 152; and Patterson, Dennis “Cosmopolitanism and Global Legal 
Regimes” EUI Law Department (unpublished and undated). 
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the position that adherence to the human rights legal agreements and ultimately moral values are 
required to trump self-interest if the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is to be implemented, 
particularly since its legal status is unclear and there are no mechanisms to enforce it.  I go 
further still to say this principle is necessary in a world where conflict frequently reflects the 
deadly potential of the mass murder of innocents.  I even take a further step by demonstrating 
that this approach can in fact be effectively applied. 
Barriers frequently remain, however, and must be challenged. There is no doubt that the notion 
of state responsibility outside its borders represents a shift, and frequently an unwelcome shift, 
from the principle of state sovereignty, autonomy and the principle of non-intervention.  The 
action in the Security Council particularly illustrates how important sovereignty remains as states 
vote for or veto resolutions which may affect their responsibilities for civilians at risk.    
Along with this shift from state sovereignty to a conception of state responsibility is a shift in the 
underlying principle of state rights to non-interference.  This shift may be considered as a move 
away from states acting purely in their self-interest to a more humanitarian purpose involving the 
consideration of the individual, human rights and the rights of civilians to be protected from 
humanitarian atrocities, genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. While there may be debate 
about the universality of these principles and the adherence to their supremacy across the 
international and transnational network, they have come to form a principal set of operational 
categories within the legal and normative complexity of their environment. 
While the Responsibility to Protect is now imbedded in humanitarian international law, it has not 
achieved the status of codified law and there is no mechanism to enforce it.  Since it must be 
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invoked on a case by case basis, there exists the possibility  that it could become customary law 
but to date the only clear instance of its application in its hard core form has been in Resolutions 
1970 and 1973 of the Security Council in the case of Libya in 2011. Security Council resolutions 
have been cited to illustrate the instances of the Security Council’s reference to its terms in other 
instances as well.  I have found, by conducting an analysis of the application of the principle in 
Libya that there is little doubt of its having been effective in shortening the conflict.  I thus 
regard it as representative of a successful case of the implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect. Chapter Nine examined not only the legality but the legitimacy of its enactment in 
Libya.  By applying a just war theoretical framework plus the principles imbedded in the 
Commission’s original report, along with the criteria of legality, the thesis has demonstrated the 
legitimacy and success of the action in Libya at the time of the 2011 crisis. Considerations of not 
only the legality of the actions but the legitimacy of the actions help to define the authority of the 
Responsibility to Protect and future possibilities for the implementation of the norm in a 
somewhat weak legal context.  
The reference in the Outcome Document to a case by case basis, however, weakens the legality 
of the responsibility to protect as far as requirements of generality, clarity and constancy over 
time are necessary for customary law.915  Calls for a more representative Security Council speak 
to the concern about generality.  Clarity requirements are also addressed by calls for criteria to 
judge when action needs to be taken.  Further guidelines beyond the general significance to the 
four general categories would significantly enhance the legality of the norm by subjecting case 
by case decisions to over-arching criteria that identify the extreme and exceptional cases.  This 
                                                            
915 Jutta Brunnee, and Stephen J. Toope, The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force:  Building Legality? 
(2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect, 191-212. 
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would enable a reasoned judgment.916  The wording ‘on a case-by-case basis’ would seem to 
reflect the hesitation on the part of the international community to commit the Council to a firm 
duty to act.  
An important aspect of the development of the norm is that states are not the sole actors and to 
some extent share their power with civil society and nongovernmental and non-state actors in a 
global context.  
The thesis has demonstrated that nongovernmental actors (NGOs) are a very important part of 
not only the development of the norm but in its being kept alive in the current transgovernance 
context.  In some ways NGOs have more freedom and flexibility than states in acknowledging 
the necessity of action, in dealing with state governments and non-armed state actors and in 
ascertaining the views and problems of people on the ground.  They have been important actors 
in the development of the Responsibility to Protect norm and continue to be critical in its 
sustainability today. The thesis identifies certain key actors and documents their historical 
participation through the application of the theory of norm entrepreneurship.  Key organizations 
and senior staff have been selected and approached in an effort to provide a thick description of 
their role as norm entrepreneurs in the evolution of the norm.  
 
II.  The Theory and the Practice 	
 
In particular, I have considered the Responsibility to Protect in terms of its legality and 
legitimacy by applying the literature in the fields of legal theory, international relations, 
international law and political science and as a form of norm entrepreneurship which includes the 
                                                            
916 Jutta Brunnee, and Stephen J. Toope, The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force:  Building Legality? 
(2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect, 191-212 at 205 [Brunee and Toope 2010]. 
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significant contribution of NGOs and civil society. This is intended to increase our understanding 
of the functions, origin and meaning of the relevant rules and institutions and to encourage the 
consideration of future developments and institutional designs that will be able to deal with 
anticipated prospects for a peaceful resolution (or at least an approved agreement in the form of a 
legal document.) 917  The focus on the Responsibility to Protect as a centrepiece of multilateral 
efforts is justified by the central role the ICISS and the UN and other norm entrepreneurs have 
played in the creation and dissemination of a new norm.  In this case the new norm is one where 
state responsibility trumps individual state sovereignty and pure state self-interest.  
In order to consider an emerging norm a success, concrete measures must be implemented 
multilaterally (that is, states must change their behavior in tangible ways).  As Glanville argues, 
“While the legal force of key international statements on the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle 
may be weak at best, the international court of justice and the international law commission have 
offered bold declarations in recent years which do point towards the gradual development of 
legal duties for the extraterritorial protection of populations.”918  The concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect has been used recently by NGOs, states, and international organizations 
in response to crises in Libya, Syria and Yemen and has been referred to in numerous UN 
Resolutions as documented earlier in the thesis as material evidence of its evolution. (See 
discussion on resolutions Chapter Eight )..  
Peter Uvin  argues that  changes in discourse do have an impact on the real world by helping to 
determine what actions are considered as acceptable and by creating incentives and by 
                                                            
917 Ratner, and Slaughter 2004 supra note 376 at 376. 
918 Luke Glanville, supra note 908 at 908. 
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influencing what expectations dominate. 919 The thesis has focussed on those changes in 
discourse that particularly surround the Responsibility to Protect.  Even though there are no 
enforcement mechanisms, norms can effect critical action.920 
III. Moral and Legal Issues in International Relations 
Although complicated, it is necessary to pursue processes and outcomes in the implementation of 
the Responsibility to Protect are key. Issues such as ‘trust,’ and ‘justice’ also emerge as 
important when considering processes and outcomes. One overriding question in implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect decisions in order to respond to crises is how to deal with negative 
beliefs - misperceptions, suspicion, mistrust–not only between powerful states in the Security 
Council but between groups in conflict within the country in need of assistance. The key to 
success in both cases involves the development of trust and an appreciation of differences and 
perspectives between powerful states in the Security Council and between groups within the 
conflict situation. Powerful opponents may have their own factions within. Agreements, for 
example, must be seen to be “just and practical to the parties involved and to the society at 
large.”921   
According to Buchanan’s moral theory of the ’Natural Duty of Justice,’ we all have a duty to 
help ensure that all people have access to institutions that protect their basic rights (basing this on 
each person’s obligation to treat every person equally in terms of concern and respect.)922 This 
raises the question of how we factor in the wishes of the local population and the rights of 
individuals within that society after the fighting ends (ius post bellum). The intellectual tradition 
found in democratic liberalism does address some of these issues. Tidwell speaks to his 
                                                            
919 Peter Uvin, “On High Moral Ground:  The incorporation of Human Rights by the Development Enterprise” Vol. 
XVII (2002) Praxis The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies. 
Van Rompuy, Herman “Message to the Paris Conference on Libya”, 1 September 2011, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/124490.pdf (accessed 27 September 2011). 
  
921 Senator George J. Mitchell, Supra note 372. 
922 Buchanan, 2003 supra note 373.   
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perception of democratic liberalism by suggesting some of the same principles apply; e.g., the 
notions of representation, good governance and the maintenance of legitimacy. 923,924  
 
In terms of the Libyan conflict, giving consideration to the non-state actors’ issue of self-
determination requires principles of democracy and the rights of persons to be governed by 
democratic norms. In some way this resembles Buchanan’s moral theory of the ’Natural Duty of 
Justice’925 and raises the importance of including the wishes of the local population in the 
process of ending the conflict and asks how we go about doing that. The question of the forms of 
governance in multi-ethnic societies, and the matter of global security and sovereignty need to be 
a primary consideration. If we consider the role of the United Nations in particular, we realize 
the necessity of its participation in all stages of the Responsibility to Protect. 
 
IV. The Role of the United Nations, the Security Council and the Legal Status of the 
Responsibility to Protect 
 
“The High-Level Panel Report, the Report of the Secretary General, and the Outcome Document 
postulate that coercive collective action is to be undertaken through the Security Council.”926 The 
main documents concerning R2P do not deal with the question, however, regarding 
compliance.927  
                                                            
923 Alan C. Tidwell, 1998/2003 Conflict Resolved?  A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution (Continuum: 
London).xi for his comments on “positive peacemaking. [Tidwell 2003]. 
924John Burton, (1986) History of CR Linus Pauling (Ed.) World Encyclopedia of Peace, Vol. 1,  
Oxford. Permagon Press at 6 [Burton 1986]. 
925 Buchanan 2003 Supra note 373. 
926 High Level Panel Report, para. 203 (“by the Security Council”), Report of the Secretary-General, para. 135 
(“Security Council may”), Outcome Document, para. 139 (“through the Security Council”). 
927 Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect:  Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?”  (2007) 101 Am. J. Int’l. 
99.  
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The veto in the Security Council as described in the thesis can be one of the more entrenched 
impediments to the use of the principle in circumstances of serious conflict. The fact that there is 
no overarching authority in international law and particularly no mechanism to oversee and 
enforce decisions made in the UN Security Council continues to hinder the implementation of 
the Responsibility to Protect. This leads to what I believe to be a key impediment to the 
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect – the existence of the veto and its use to support 
or obstruct the passing of crucial resolutions in the Security Council. The self-interest of states 
and realist perspectives still underlie much of the political reality in terms of failure of the 
Security Council to act when a crisis erupts. In an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust, it is 
very difficult for states with the right of veto in the Security Council to come to an agreement. 
The history and reasons for the veto have been presented in the thesis and alternatives that might 
aid in achieving the appropriate power balance are considered in this Chapter.  Old and new 
shadows of mistrust overhang divisions between the East and the West and between the North 
and South, with long term suspicions hampering the vote even in serious situations where many 
civilians are suffering and in fact dying in large numbers.  
In the case of Libya and the resulting resolutions, Russia and China abstained and the resolution 
passed. In the case of Syria in 2012, Russia and China have virtually vetoed all efforts to 
implement any aspect of the responsibility of the international community to protect the 
thousands of civilians who were being killed.  The basis of the disagreement would seem to be 
the self-interest of those states, but also their lack of trust of the other countries’ intentions or 
motivations towards humanitarian principles – including even those softer sanctions such as 
economic embargoes. Fear of regime change and imperialist motivations fuel opposition to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
  313 
 
intervention and there is no arbiter or mediator to bring them to a resolution of their differences. 
The thesis raises the problem of the capricious use of the veto in the Security Council. The ICISS 
report recommends  
a code of conduct for the use of the veto with respect to actions that are needed to stop or 
avert a significant humanitarian crisis. The idea essentially is that a permanent member, 
in matters where its vital national interests were not claimed to be involved, would not 
use its veto to obstruct the passage of what would otherwise be a majority resolution.928 
   
The history of the veto and the reasons for its persistence as presented in Chapter Five helps to 
show why the veto is important.  It also suggests fair decisions need not be prevented or 
impeded. The Security Council needs to have the unhampered opportunity to make a decision 
and not abdicate from its responsibility to protect. 929  I myself do not advocate for the 
elimination of the veto, only for its judicious use.  Eliminating the possibility of a veto in the 
case of genocide or human atrocities is also an unlikely and highly controversial option, which 
would require strong advocacy in the face of state sovereignty.  Ideally it should not be necessary 
for the principle to be effective.  
 While the Responsibility to Protect is not yet a legal prescription, there is some general 
agreement that it is based on established legal obligations and legal doctrine in international law, 
as well as being dependent on the mobilization of political will. At the moment there is no 
punishment for inaction and thus R2P can only be operationalized if states are inclined to do 
so.”930  In the event that a situation erupts of intra-state crisis and the state is unwilling or unable 
to address it, there is no guarantee that the international community will respond through the 
                                                            
928 ICISS Article 6.21supra note 6. 
929 Conference on Council reform in May 1994, co-sponsored by Global Policy Forum and the International NGO 
Network on Global Governance. 
930 Frank Berman, “Moral Versus Legal Legitimacy’ in Charles Reed and David Ryall (eds.) The Price of Peace 
(Cambridge, U.K. Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 161. 
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Security Council.931  The sanctioning of action appears to ‘depend more upon a coincidence of 
national interest than on procedural legality.’932  Antonio Cassese states and the thesis accepts 
the argument that the Security Council tends to remain selective.933  The ICISS proposed a ‘code 
of conduct’ to overcome this selectivity.934  The use of the veto weakens the potential for 
consistent decision-making and the calls for the non-use of the veto also raises legality 
considerations.935     
Ultimately, the Responsibility to Protect will not emerge as a global legal norm unless there is 
consistent practice.936  Nevertheless, the responsibility to protect has been increasingly supported 
by globally-shared understandings in spite of its critics and the Outcome Document along with 
civil society support and Security Council resolutions and all the other material evidenced in this 
dissertation provides a platform for efforts to build up its legality.   One might question whether, 
if the Security Council fails, the burden shifts back to individual states? What happens to the 
three substantive components of the Responsibility to Protect (responsibility to prevent, react, 
rebuild) as a positive duty to act under international law.   
 The need to create a Council where the voices of less powerful members can be heard and can 
have a serious influence is great. The credibility and legitimacy of the Council as a source of 
international law is often raised. In spite of this the number of formal Council meetings have 
grown significantly to the point that the Council is now virtually in daily session. Paul suggests 
enlarging the Council with non-permanent members in order to achieve better representation of 
                                                            
931 Aidan Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect in International Political Discourse:  Encouraging statement of intern 
or illusory platitude?  December 20, 2011 Vol. 15 No. 8 The International Journal of Human Rights 1331-1348. 
932 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? supra note 195, 165. 
933 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2005), 347 [Cassese 2005]. 
934 ICISS, supra note 6. 
935 Lon Fuller, “Human Interaction and the Law” in Lon Fuller, The Principles of Social Oder.  Kenneth Winston 
(ed.) (Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 1981) p. 235 [Fuller 1981]. 
936 Brunee and Toope 2010 248 supra note at 916. 
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regions, and of diverse kinds of states – poor as well as rich, small as well as large, which can 
then create a Council that can act credibly and legitimately.937  Those who support the status quo 
often insist that the most powerful countries must be given special privileges at the UN, to keep 
them involved in the organization. Critics argue the power balances have shifted. Many 
reformers, like Colombia, New Zealand, Zimbabwe and Malaysia, would like to limit or do away 
with the veto and even with permanent membership itself.938 
The power of the veto has been intensely controversial since the drafting of the UN Charter in 
1945. Yet, without the veto privilege the United States and Russia would probably not have 
accepted the creation of the United Nations. Many years later there is still an active debate 
regarding the role of the Security Council, its membership and its work.939 In a speech to the UN 
General Assembly a bloc of small countries put forward a recommendation that urged the 
Permanent Members (P5) of the UNSC to agree to refrain from using their veto power in the 
case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.940,941  The idea of this kind of 
restraint on the Council’s veto power in situations of mass atrocities was in fact expressed in the 
ICISS 2001 report. The Report stated 
...it is unconscionable that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave 
humanitarian concern. Of particular concern is the possibility that needed action will be 
held hostage to unrelated concerns of one or more of the permanent members – a 
situation that has too frequently occurred in the past. 942 
                                                            
937 James A. Paul, General Analysis on the Security Council Veto (Global Policy Organization) August 23 2011 
(http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-as-an-institution/the-power-of-the-veto-0-
40/general-analysis-on-the-security-council-veto.html. [Paul 2011]. 
938  Hasmy Agam, Deputy Secretary General of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a speech to the General 
Assembly. 
939 Paul 2001 supra note 937. 
940 May 18, 2012 “A Responsibility not to Veto?  The S5, the Security Council and Mass Atrocities” ICRtoP blog. 
941 4 April Speech to the UNGA, 2005 World Summit supra note 69. 
942 ICISS Report supra note 6 Article 6.20, page 51. 
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The ICISS report itself recommended that the UNSC agree to a “code of conduct” with regards 
to their veto power.  
Citizens for Global Solutions (CGS), an ICRtoP member, has further explored the idea of a code 
of conduct, and their recommendations were presented in the UN Secretary-General’s (UNSG) 
2009 report. Ban Ki-moon stated 
Within the Security Council, the five permanent members bear particular responsibility 
because of the privileges of tenure and the veto power they have been granted under the 
Charter. I would urge them to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the veto 
in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to 
protect, as defined in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome, and to reach a mutual 
understanding to that effect.943  
The majority of the five Permanent Members are ‘western’ and four out of five are 
‘industrialized’ countries. The four-fifths of the world living in the 'non-western' part has only 
one voice –  China – among the Permanent Members. It would seem important that the Council 
should be more broadly representative. A single veto-wielding power can stop an international 
response dead in its track and could totally frustrate the will of the overwhelming majority of the 
international community.944   
It could be argued that this is evidenced recently by the situation in Syria where China and 
Russia have employed their veto powers more than once to block Council’s attempt to resolve 
the crisis. In the document regarding the responsibility not to veto, this vote against action in 
Syria is “widely believed to have been employed as an expression of their respective national 
interests in the situation, and their concerns over the implementation of Resolution 1973 in 
                                                            
943 Ban Ki-moon UN Secretary-General’s (UNSG) 2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect supra 
note 78.  
944 Paul 2011 supra note 937at 18.  
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Libya.”945 Russia argues differently.  Draft texts need to be approved by each permanent member 
before any draft resolution can be adopted. In fact many draft resolutions are never presented to 
Council for a vote owing to the knowledge that a permanent member would vote against its 
adoption. It is unlikely, however, that any of the P5 would accept a reform of the UN Charter 
that could be detrimental to their own national interests.  
The veto was put in place to provide the Council with both executive and diplomatic functions. 
However, the law can be abused by the permanent members when interpreting resolutions, and 
casting vetoes which permits them to abdicate the responsibilities for peace and security. This 
undermines the authority of the Council.946  “In general terms of legality and legitimacy Security 
Council approval is the golden fleece that powerful states seek to justify not only coercive non 
defensive action, but also other actions that infringe on a state’s sovereignty.”947  The Security 
Council is concerned to establish a “positive peace, a peace where protection of human rights is 
combined with security.”948  The Council is a political body which receives its discretion from 
the Charter. Legally precarious decisions also erode the authority of the Security Council.  
Strong support also exists for the status quo. One coalition – Uniting for Consensus – which was 
led by Italy, South Korea and Pakistan opposed any additional permanent members.  In the 
meantime, in response to public demand Canada continued its support of the UN and its efforts 
toward making it more representative of the world’s regions while at the same time opposing the 
addition of new permanent members.949 Concerns about inconsistency also undermine the 
                                                            
945 “A Responsibility not to veto,” May 18, 2012. 
946 Nigel D. White, “The Will and Authority of the Security Council after Iraq,” 17 (2004) Leiden Journal of 
International Law. 645-672 at 646 [White 2004]. 
947 White 2004 ibid at 650. 
948 White 2004 ibid at 651. 
949 Adam Chapnick, “UN Security Council Reform and Canadian Foreign Policy:  Then and Now:  (2006) 13.1 
Canadian Foreign Policy, 81 at 89 [Chapnick 2006]. 
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legitimacy of the Council and of the binding character of its resolutions. Some reformers hope 
that if the General Assembly asserts its own role in the UN system, it can help balance the power 
of the permanent members in their Council. They also encourage citizen groups and political 
movements to voice their concerns. 
The ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution by the General Assembly, and the interpretations of the 
Assembly's powers that became customary international law as a result, was expected to bring 
greater flexibility. By adopting A/RES/377 A, on 3 November 1950, over two-thirds of UN 
member states declared that, according to the UN Charter, the permanent members of the UNSC 
cannot and should not prevent the UNGA from taking any and all action necessary to restore 
international peace and security, in cases where the UNSC has failed to exercise its "primary 
responsibility" for maintaining peace.950 Such an interpretation sees the UNGA as being awarded 
"final responsibility"—rather than "secondary responsibility"—for matters of international peace 
and security, by the UN Charter.  
 
In spite of the original Commission’s willingness to accept the Security Council’s failure to 
reach a decision on the Responsibility to Protect and in its place to see the alternative of a 
coalition action, I have expressed my concern that the legitimacy of such an action would be lost. 
In my view, only the UN should be able to authorize military action on behalf of the entire 
international community. It is recognized of course that the UN does not have its own military in 
which case NATO is likely to be called upon to act, but this is not the same as unilateral or even 
coalition action taken outside the UN authority.   
                                                            
950 A/RES/377 3 November 1950 http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/55C2B84DA9E0052B05256554005726C6 
Uniting For Peace 
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If the Responsibility to Protect were to become hard law, it would significantly affect decision-
making in the Security Council.  Brunee and Toope claim “Security Council decisions would 
have to meet the requirements of the responsibility to protect, and would be measured against the 
criteria of legality.”951  However, Stahn suggests  
 If the responsibility to protect were indeed a primary legal norm of international law, it 
would be logical to assume that such violations should entail some form of legal sanction 
in case of noncompliance.  This specific type of violation, the breach of a positive duty, is 
not addressed as such by the regime of the Law of State Responsibility.  Nor has it been 
conclusively determined whether and under what conditions inaction by an international 
organization may entail international legal responsibility.  One might argue that a state’s 
noncompliance with a duty ‘to protect’ might trigger a certain right, or even duty, of third 
parties to protest against this inaction.  Yet it is difficult to imagine what legal 
consequences noncompliance by a political body like the Security Council should 
entail.952 
It is clear that while changes may be desired and must be pursed, they are difficult to bring into 
fruition. This increases pressures for unilateral or coalition actions to occur which undermine the 
legitimacy of the Responsibility to Protect and the Security Council itself.   
 
It is for this reason that I reemphasize the importance of making the moral choice in the absence 
of hard law – states need to act cooperatively and in the interests of the civilians placed in serious 
jeopardy.  In essence a code of conduct already exists in the form of the Responsibility to Protect 
– it requires states to act responsibly toward others and not to allow their self-interest to obstruct 
their decision making. 
 
 
 
                                                            
951 Brunee and Toope 2010 supra note 916 at 212. 
952 Stahn 2007 supra note 70 at 117-8. 
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V. Conflict Resolution  
If we consider the Responsibility to Protect in a broader theoretical context and according to the 
report of the Commission there is an opportunity to consider the place of conflict resolution in 
the implementation of the principle in the international and transnational milieu of today. In 
doing so I remind the reader that not all applications of the Responsibility to Protect need be 
military in nature.  Conflict resolution ranges from doing nothing in the face of conflict to war.  I 
would like to consider the Responsibility to Protect as a tool or mechanism within this range that 
has been created and maintained by the international system to deal with conflict within a 
specific set of circumstances.  
There can be no doubt that the UN, like its forerunner the League of Nations, has sought (with 
limited success) to create alternative methods for resolving disputes. It has offered some glimmer 
of alternatives to the traditional models of handling conflicts; for example, the UN Charter 
provides for the use of mediation and conciliation in the resolution of disputes, but it has failed to 
provide any true systematic method for their resolution. Also, the track record of the UN in 
resolving conflicts has been poor and it has been argued that the organization has provided a 
model showing the alternatives to be avoided.953 
One of the most serious challenges for the international community is dealing with internal 
conflict or state failure or both when accompanied by mass atrocities. This is the kind of 
situation the Responsibility to Protect was designed to address.954  Within the theoretical 
framework of conflict resolution and the ICISS spectrum of prevention, reaction and rebuilding,  
concerned states and international actors must focus on techniques, skills and methods of  
                                                            
953 Tidwell, 2003 supra note 955 at 2. 
954 Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual and Stephen John Stedman Power and Responsibility:  Building International Order 
in an Era of Transnational Threats, (Washington DC:  Brookings Institution Press, 2009) at 192 [Jones 2009]. 
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prevention,  management, resolution and transformation. The means of prevention and resolution 
to conflict can vary immensely, depending on the type, complexity, duration, and level of 
violence, among other factors, that pertain. Some conflicts are about justice and right and wrong 
and require a public and adjudicative resolution through the ICC or other such legal acts while 
other conflict situations can potentially be resolved by the parties themselves-- some require a 
cease fire, a treaty, a handshake or an apology.955  Many, while they may require much time, 
communication, external assistance, expertise and intervention by outside parties, are not 
necessarily beyond settlement without coercion. The Responsibility to Protect uses military 
intervention as a last resort when other methods such as sanctions, mediation, negotiation and 
conflict resolution techniques do not work.  
When attempting to reach such a decision, the international community must ask a number of 
basic questions:  what are the sources of the conflict; do the parties have the will and the 
capability to end the conflict themselves; what methods exist for handling or resolving the 
conflict; and, what action is recommended (maintaining the status quo and a management 
position being considered as one form of action)? 956   Other questions include: what stage is the 
conflict at; is it “ripe” for intervention; are outsiders involved; and, what type of conflict is it? 
These questions are illustrative of the approaches that scholars and practitioners in conflict 
resolution may take. Their consideration in the prevention or resolution of conflict before it 
reaches a point of genocide or war crimes becomes part of the Responsibility to Protect’s 
contemplation of action.  
                                                            
955 see Alan C.Tidwell, 1998/2003 Conflict Resolved?  A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution (Continuum: 
London).xi for his comments on “positive peacemaking.” [Tidwell 2003]. 
956 Tidwell 2003, ibid. 
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 Much has been written on methods or techniques for resolving disputes and conflicts.957 These 
approaches can come into play at an earlier phase of conflict or later, when such methods have 
failed, intervention has occurred and the conflict is ending.  Conflict resolution can also be relied 
upon after the fighting has stopped and parties need to regroup and address next steps.  While the 
discipline of  International Relations has and continues to be focused on sovereign states, power, 
politics, and the military, Zartman considers how conflict resolution can provide a counter 
balancing measure with its emphasis on the means of resolution and transformation.958  As the 
field of conflict resolution has moved forward, there is more of a trend toward looking at long 
term perspectives, including the prevention of intractable conflicts and the transformation of 
protracted conflicts into tractable ones.959  In the case of the Responsibility to Protect, a range of 
dispute resolution tools can be employed before reaching a decision to intervene militarily, as 
well as after any military intervention ends.  However, while the importance of techniques such 
as negotiation and mediation must not be ignored, it is not within the scope of the thesis to 
consider them in depth. Further attention to this area is certainly essential and would be fruitful 
for further work on the Responsibility to Protect, bearing in mind that too many frustrated and 
prolonged attempts to settle the conflict without the threat of coercion can result in thousands 
more deaths in the interim  - Syria being a case in point. 
                                                            
957 See Gareth Evans, “International Conflict Resolution” (Mar 2005)  2 New Zealand International Review; 6-11; 
Pierre Hassner, “Intervention in Local Conflicts:  Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution Since the Cold War” 
53.5 (Oct/Nov 2011) Survival 185; Eileen Babbit, “The Evolution of Conflict Resolution:  From Cold War to 
Peacebuilding” (Oct 2009)  25.4 Negotiation Journal; 539-550; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “The Next Generation:  
Creating Peace Processes in the Middle East” (Oct 2009) 25.4 Negotiation Journal  569-586. 
958 I. William Zartman, Ed. (2007) Peacemaking in International Conflict (Washington, D.C.:  United States 
Institute of Peace, 2007) at 41 [Zartman 2007]. 
959 Zartman, 2007 ibid at 35. 
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VI. Rebuilding After the Violence Stops 
With respect to the UN and the international community, it is also important to consider what the 
scholars of the field and the practitioners seem to have neglected concerning the Responsibility 
to Protect. As described earlier in the work, there are three components to the principle as it was 
proposed by the ICISS report:  (1) prevention (2) reaction and (3) rebuilding. Much of the 
analysis has been geared toward the most controversial aspect of the principle, that of ‘reaction’ 
as it was approved in the UN document, but little attention has been paid to the third dimension 
of ‘rebuilding’. A critical dimension of conflict resolution comes when the fighting stops. Here 
we ask:  What is the responsibility of the international community?  This aspect of intervention 
has been raised in Chapter Nine of the thesis in relation to Libya.  I would suggest that no action 
determined to be a legitimate military application of the principle is complete if it has not given 
consideration to post-conflict peacebuilding. The application of the Responsibility to Protect also 
involves a responsibility to address conflict in the long-term, which in my view is the follow up 
to intervention that has not been given sufficient attention by those advocates for the 
Responsibility to Protect.960  While responsibility for practical and political reasons must be 
limited, this is an area that deserves further investigation and consideration while carefully 
walking the line between imperialism and welcome support. 
The question of responsible action takes us back again to the original report.  What happens after 
the fighting has stopped?  Should the international community now be absolved of any further 
responsibility?  Needless to say, of course, ‘rebuilding’ or ‘peace building’ is controversial as a 
further form of intervention with the threat again to some of neocolonialism and “mission creep.” 
In discussing the responsibility of the interveners to rebuild, I again return to the 
                                                            
960 Stein, Janice Gross, ed. 1989 Getting to the Table:  The Process of International Prenegotiation. Baltimore:  
John Hopkins University Press in Zartman 2007 supra note 958 at 35.  
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recommendations of the ICISS report itself. Article 5.5 refers to the Secretary General’s 
description of the nature of and rationale for post-conflict peace building in his 1998 report 
which gives a description of a clear post-intervention strategy. The Security Council defines 
post-conflict peace-building as activities that are taken after the conflict has ended to ensure 
peace and prevent a new round of armed confrontation.961  The Secretary General notes this 
involves more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace building 
effort is needed to address the various factors which have caused or may be stimulating conflict. 
Peace building is a complex undertaking which may involve the development of national 
institutions ensuring fair elections, promoting human rights where abuses have existed, providing 
programs that allow for the reintegration and rehabilitation of citizens, as well as establishing 
development conditions. Although peace building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and 
development activities in countries emerging from crises, it does aim to reduce the risk of 
violence again being triggered and “contribute to creating conditions most conducive to 
reconciliation,   reconstruction and recovery.”962 
In article 5.6, the ICISS notes that the Secretary-General’s report goes on to describe in more 
detail what is needed in the aftermath of conflict and/or intervention: 
 Societies which have emerged from conflict have special needs. To avoid a return to 
 conflict while laying a solid foundation for development, emphasis must be placed on 
 critical priorities such as encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect for human 
 rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity; ensuring the safe, 
 smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; 
reintegrating ex-combatants and others into productive society; curtailing the availability 
of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and international resources for reconstruction 
                                                            
961 The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa Report of 
the Secretary General 1998.  
962 Article 5.5 ICISS Report supra note 6. 
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and economic recovery. Each priority is linked to every other, and success will require a 
concerted and coordinated effort on all fronts.”963 
 
The Report itself raises matters of concern such as reconciliation and the resettlement of refugees 
that are important areas for research which need to be expanded upon in relation to the 
Responsibility to Protect and rebuilding.  The availability of small arms is a contentious issue 
also, not only in terms of disarmament, but as an area deserving of attention prior to and during 
any conflict which demonstrate the potential for escalation.   
Hartzell and Hoddie suggest civil war analysts frequently attribute the arming of sub-state actors 
as due to feelings of insecurity. Non-state actors tend to be unwilling or unable to trust 
government authorities and thus take up their own arms.  The response of the authorities, 
however, is that they are not sure whether this is in defense or a sign of an impending attack, and 
as a result prepare themselves for attack, leading to a spiraling arms race and the potential for 
war.964   International relations scholars refer to this phenomenon as “the security dilemma” and 
it is most often used to describe intrastate conflicts.  In the post-conflict period, each group is 
wary of the other in terms of their motivation to hold troops and weapons in reserve, preventing 
them from taking the necessary disarmament steps (a form of security dilemma). 
Three critical areas that form the basis of a rebuilding strategy are security, justice and economic 
development.  Post-conflict societies need security and freedom from violence for all their 
members, regardless of where they stood in relation to power. “Adequate security forces are 
needed to uphold the peace and enforce law and order immediately after a conflict.” 965 
Ultimately peace builders must turn over responsibility to local actors but they may need help in 
                                                            
963 1998 report on The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in 
Africa in ICISS Report Article 5.6. 
964 Caroline Hartzell,; and Matthew Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security:  Comparing Theoretical approaches to the 
process of disarmament following civil war” 27:01 Contemporary Security Policy, 155-167 at 155 [Hartzell and 
Hoddie].  
965 Jones supra note at 954 at 196. 
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setting up problem solving mechanisms.966   In post-conflict situations, revenge killings and even 
reverse ethnic cleansing may occur. Avery important issue in the post military intervention phase 
relates to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of local security forces. 
Reintegration takes time but is necessary and represents an element of restoring the country to 
law and order. This must be accompanied by rebuilding national armed forces and police, 
“integrating as far as possible elements of the formerly competing armed factions or military 
forces. The reintegration process is especially important in the reconciliation and the re-
establishment of the state once the external forces leave.”967 
Walter and Hartzell provide two competing approaches for resolving civil war.968 Walter’s 
solution is in peacekeepers/peace enforcers and third party assistance. The form the third party 
would take depends on the context of the peace agreement. If power is fairly balanced, third 
parties only need to verify compliance. If power imbalances exist, third parties will need to 
secure the safety of weaker parties with military capacity. Hartzell and Hoodie characterize this 
“as a neorealist means of resolving civil conflict” since it relies on the threat of force. Power 
rather than trust is the key.969 For Hartzell and Hoddie the solution is in the construction of 
power sharing and power dividing institutions, disarmament and rebuilding state authority with 
greater emphasis on peace agreements.  
Barbara Walters suggests that lack of success of civil war settlements are frequently due to the 
inability of parties to the conflict to adhere to the peace agreements. Too many settlement treaties 
                                                            
966 Jones ibid at 196. 
967 The ICISS Report supra note 6 Article 5.9. 
968 Barbara Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlements” (1997) Vo. 51 International Organization,, No. 3, 
353-364; Caroline Hartzell, “Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Civil Wars,” (1999) Vol. 43, No. 
1. Journal of Conflict Resolution,  3-22; Caroline Hartzell, and Matthew Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace:  Power 
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include opportunities for exploitation.970 There are four dimensions of government power that 
need to be addressed: political (positions within government itself), military (authority within the 
armed forces), territorial (opportunities for self-governance among regional groups) and 
economic (access to government resources). Hartzell and Hoodie hypothesize that the more there 
are power sharing institutions the better disarmament will work.971   
The second area, justice and reconciliation, requires a properly functioning judicial system, 
including both the courts and the policy, which sometimes makes it necessary to have 
transitional arrangements for justice. Another issue is that the legal rights of refugees or 
returnees from ethnic or other minorities. Laws must require protection of proper rights. A 
number of areas must be developed; for example removing administrative and bureaucratic 
obstacles for those returning, ending the culture of impunity for known or suspected war 
criminals and the fair use of property laws.972 Refugees will require access to health, education 
and basic services, and they must be allowed to participate in improved systems of “promoting 
good governance, and long-term economic regeneration of the country.”973 
The third area -- the overall recovery of the country -- is an important part of peace building. Just 
as the Responsibility to Protect is concerned with human rights in its protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, so too is the responsibility to rebuild. 974   Development helps to raise the 
populations of developing countries out of poverty. Marks looks at development  
as a sub branch of international human rights law dealing with the legal norms and 
processes through which internationally recognised human rights are applied in the 
                                                            
970 Barbara Walters, in Hartzell and Hoddie 2003 ibid.  
971 Hartzell and Hoddie 2003 ibid at 161. 
972 Article 5.17 ICISS supra note 6. 
973 Article 5.18 ICISS ibid. 
974 Stephen P. Marks, “Human Rights and Development” Sarah, Joseph and Adam McBeth (Eds.) Research 
Handbook on International Human Rights Law (Cheltenham:  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010) at 167. 
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context of national and international policies, programmes and projects relating to 
economic and social development.975 
   
Development and human rights come together in efforts to rebuild communication.  
I also addressed the matter of rebuilding in my interviews. The responses varied.  A number of 
interviewees expressed skepticism toward the concept of rebuilding while others were far more 
supportive.  Kyle Matthews, for example, pointed out the significance of resources to post-
conflict rebuilding: 
Libya has enormous oil wealth, and foreign workers have fled. There is a lack of civilian 
knowledge with no checks and balances, no civil society. They are going to have 
elections but they have no experience in building political parties. It will be necessary to 
prevent abuses and another strong man from taking power.976   
In my interview with Jillian Siskind, she suggested that rebuilding has to start before the military 
operation with work on the ground, and support for opposition groups. It requires the 
development of democracy building exercises, human rights groups, and civil rights 
organizations – all those things are needed to build a society from the ground up. She also noted 
NGOs play a key role in the rebuilding exercise. 977 
Naomi Kikoler felt it was important to take the long term into account and to take measures to 
ensure a country does not fall back in terms of these kinds of crimes. She suggested the 
Responsibility to Protect has to be more than just a crisis response at the moment, although she 
acknowledged just being able to respond to crises is a positive thing.978 
                                                            
975 Marks 2010 ibid at 168. 
976 Kyle Matthews, Interview, Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Montreal, Quebec, 
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Some of those interviewed expressed some caution regarding rebuilding and were not 
enthusiastic about the idea of the Responsibility to Protect maintaining responsibility for the post 
conflict period. 
David DeWitt, for example, suggested:  
 There is a responsibility, even an obligation in R2P action. There is a logic to the three parts 
but it seems they are very different things, not only in terms of action but in terms of intent. 
The decision to intervene is based on the failure to prevent so that the situation escalates 
until there is a legal determination that it is appropriate under R2P for the international 
community to intervene using particular kinds of instruments. It is a very different decision 
to then say ‘Now we are providing the resources to contribute to rebuilding.’  It is by 
definition clearly a different set of instruments with different goals. Unless it comes with 
some clearly specified criteria about completion it can be problematic. It is potentially a 
never end sink. It must be justified.979 
Mark Sedra went on to say: “If you tear down someone’s house you are responsible to build a 
new structure.”980  Over time it becomes the responsibility of the occupant to get furniture and do 
renovations. He also affirmed Libyans’ own responsibility after the 2011 intervention toward 
peace building.  
Libyans have to put in the security and justice institutions... If Libya falls apart in ten 
years it is not the fault of the Responsibility to Protect. The immediate response was to 
protect. Is it part of the Responsibility to Protect’s responsibility to support the 
reconstruction effort?    That sets a pretty high standard.”981  
David Petrasek also spoke with skepticism toward rebuilding, suggesting: 
 Asserting the principle in terms of prevention and rebuilding is just a smokescreen in 
 order to sugar the pill. In terms of UN post-conflict efforts and all the rebuilding efforts 
 and all the work done to prevent a situation from becoming genocide, none of it has been 
 strengthened by R2P. What they wanted to do was assert the principle to use force. I do 
 not know anyone who thinks it is good...982   
                                                            
979 David Dewitt, interview, Centre for International Governance and Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario, November 2, 
2011.  
980 Mark Sedra, Interview, CIGI, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario November 2, 2011. 
981 Mark Sedra interview ibid. 
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He went on to answer the question of whether rebuilding is really part of the Responsibility to 
Protect. In his view this takes it too far: "... we might like to see democracy and unless we get 
that we think we have failed so that we go in with all of our government structures. It does not 
seem to me that is what is intended by R2P."983 Clearly, as suggested earlier, post-conflict 
peacebuilding is a controversial topic which requires much additional thought, research and 
cautious contemplation regarding the role of the Responsibility to Protect after the immediate 
crises is responded to successfully.  
VII. Responsible Sovereignty 
As we can see, sovereignty issues arise not only at the military intervention stage with the 
presence of the intervener but also at the post-conflict stage. Any reconstruction and 
rehabilitation program must take sufficient account of local priorities and local personnel and the 
ability of the country to resume responsibility for its own government. Nevertheless, I believe it 
is important to help in the months that follow. International authorities must take steps “to set up 
a political process between the conflicting parties and ethnic groups in a post-conflict society that 
develops local political competence within a framework that encourages cooperation between 
former antagonists.” 984 The local community must resume responsibility, however, to maintain 
the legitimacy of the government and the ruling parties.  This does not necessarily mean 
democratization, however. 
 
There are always those who will be suspicious that intervention has been a form of neo-colonial 
imperialism. This suspicion is one of the most significant impediments to the implementation of 
the norm and we must work to reassure those skeptics that the motivations of the international 
                                                            
983 David Petrasek interview ibid. 
984 Article 5.30 ICISS supra note 6. 
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community are not tainted with ulterior motives.   Chapter Nine of the thesis laid out the 
threshold and the precautionary criteria that must be satisfied in the Responsibility to Protect 
cases – just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects and 
shows how the determination of legitimacy needs to be made by the wider international 
community for the Responsibility to Protect to evolve as a lifesaving principle. The principle 
behind the Responsibility to Protect norm is that the international community accepts 
responsibility for conflict situations elsewhere that threaten global security.985  
Rebuilding international order requires responsible sovereignty, a principle which means states 
have obligations and duties towards their own citizens as well as other sovereign states.   
Responsible sovereignty is a core principle in restoring international order which implies an 
obligation to help weakened states to obtain the capacity to govern for themselves – in other 
words a ‘responsibility to build.” 986  Jones et al note that during the Cold War the United 
Nations and regional organizations generally did not try to prevent or mediate civil violence 
within states. Now they suggest the UN should have not only a leadership role in mediating an 
end to the violence but should be involved in post conflict peacekeeping. 987  Jones cautions that 
countries recovering from civil war are at risk of conflict breaking out again within the first five 
years of following the peace agreement.”988 Therefore responsible sovereignty means keeping 
the peace and mediating the conflict along with institutions that operate according to the rule of 
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law.989 The role of regional actors is also important in this regard. Regional groups can be more 
effective than the UN in preventing a further outbreak of conflict. 990 
One problem in peace making is how to interact with non-state actors.991 Many of contemporary 
conflicts are between states and non-state armed groups (NSAGs), and within NSAGs. What has 
not been addressed is the role of NGOs in dealing with NSAGs in the Responsibility to Protect 
and in the protection of civilians. Non-state armed actors may be defined as “groups that are 
armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not under state control.”992 The 
identification of a legitimate non-state entity to negotiate with can be a problem. In the case of 
Libya the NTO was recognized fairly early on and in Syria there is now some movement to 
recognize various constituents of the opposition. In my view the identification of a non-state 
entity broadens the range of options available to deal with the conflict (although the role of the 
state and the determination of its ability to protect its own civilians is also of great significance).  
An important area, not explored at this point but pinpointed for further research, is the difference 
between the interactions of states versus NGOs with non-state armed actors (NSAGS).   NSAGs 
usually operate outside of the national legal framework in fragile or failed states and are not 
acknowledged as legitimate actors. Nevertheless, they frequently acquire control over a large 
portion of the population. Sometimes they even become the de facto government.  
Differentiating between ‘acceptable protagonists’ and ‘unacceptable terrorists’ is a complex 
issue. NSAGs usually want to be part of a peacemaking enterprise, and those that have been 
                                                            
989 Jones 2009 ibid at 172. 
990 Jones 2009 ibid at 181. 
991 Jones 2009. 
992 Claudia Hofmann, “Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Action” 13(3) Sept. 2006 International 
Peacekeeping, 196-409 at 397 [Hoffman 2006]. 
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identified as ‘acceptable’ should be involved in disarmament and demobilizations efforts.993  One 
of the complexities, however, is that if the interveners engage in formal talks with them, this will 
likely give them recognition and legitimacy. On the other hand, NGOs have more freedom to 
communicate with them and there is increased opportunity for interaction between NSAGs and 
NGOs with regard to education and monitoring processes.994  Unlike states, NGOs can engage 
non-state actors without their being attributed with international status. They can also help to 
solve problems by using a ‘soft humanitarian approach’ on such issues as landmines, weapons 
and child soldiers. 
When peace has been achieved it is often followed by peacekeepers. This may provide a 
platform for post-conflict stabilization or peace building.995 Peacekeeping operations can play a 
significant role in efforts towards security and reconstruction. Military alliances like NATO can 
provide cooperative frameworks. The United Nations has no stand-by forces.996  People will 
inevitably need to be trained in new forms of governance. The main challenge is to put together 
something that can be sustained according to the rule of law after the peacekeepers leave. 
Economic alternatives also need to be available, and armed groups need to be demobilized and 
reintegrated into society.997   According to an index of state weakness in 2008, many of the failed 
states are among the poorest in the world.998 NGOs may also became involved in peace building 
and the development of good governance. Jones draws particular reference to the Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue based in Geneva (HD Center) and the European Union, and their 
                                                            
993 Hoffman 2006 ibid at 397. 
994 Hofmann 2006 ibid at 397. 
995 Jones 2009 supra note 954 at 184. 
996 Jones 2009 ibid at186-87. 
997 Jones 2009 ibid at 188. 
998 Rice and Patrick, Index of State Weakness, in Jones 2009 ibid at 240. 
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contributions.999  What this means in terms of responsibility is that there is a further moral 
obligation, and a soft legal position of responsibility to others.  
Civil society also needs to become more openly and actively involved to protect the society from 
power abuses. The root issues that led to the outbreak of the violence may be “exclusion from the 
political process, corrupt justice systems, massive poverty, resource disputes and income 
equality.”1000   The UN has a Peacebuilding Commission which was formally created in 2005 in 
order to coordinate peace building activities; however, it maintains no oversight over peace 
building and has limited personnel which weakens its role in conflict management systems.1001  
The UNDP is designed to provide support for the rule of law, governance and political 
transitions and to form a bridge between the UN’s Peacekeeping Operations, the World Bank, 
and other development organizations.1002  Finally, any reforms in the UN peacekeeping measures 
– prevention, mediation, peace building – must take care to preserve north-south shared interests 
in conflict management.1003   
I realize these are tough and costly decisions in light of what may already be happening in the 
U.S. and elsewhere – a kind of intervention fatigue can set in prompted not only by a lack of 
domestic support and resources but by criticisms of Western bias towards intervention in Muslim 
countries.  Hopefully, however, the United Nations and international legal agreements to protect 
human rights will continue to spur the international community in the crucial direction of ‘saving 
strangers.’ 
 
                                                            
999 Jones 2009 ibid at 176. 
1000 Jones 2009 ibid at 189. 
1001 Jones 2009 ibid at 192. 
1002 Jones 2009 ibid at 265. 
1003 Jones 2009 ibid at 203. 
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VIII. Gender Violence and the Responsibility to Protect 
As I review the literature on the Responsibility to Protect, I find another important area that 
merits further research; i.e. that of women in conflict and the Responsibility to Protect. While 
much has been written already on gender violence in international criminal law and the centrality 
of women’s bodies since 2011 and in the study of women in Afghanistan, the literature on the 
Responsibility to Protect and that of gender violence do not speak to one another.  I am 
particularly interested in addressing what I see as the Responsibility to Protect and its relevance 
to rape and sexual abuse as a form of genocide, and the responsibility to intervene in order to 
protect women during war.  The International Tribunal for Rwanda, established in 1994 by the 
UN, for example, found rape to be genocide, which is defined as Common Article Three and 
Protocol II in the Geneva Conventions dealing with war crimes in internal conflicts.  In the trial 
of Jean Paul Akayesu  the Trial Chamber held that rape, which it defined as a “physical invasion 
of a sexual nature committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive, and sexual 
assault, constitute acts of genocide insofar as they were committed with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a targeted group.” 1004  The trial court found that sexual assault formed an 
integral part of the process of destroying the Tutsi ethnic group. In this case, rape was systematic 
and had been perpetrated against Tutsi women, manifesting the specific intent required for those 
acts to constitute genocide.  This has helped to advance the world’s legal treatment of rape and 
sexual violence.1005  Clearly women need to be recognized as an important part of states’ 
responsibility in the areas where they are most vulnerable. 
 
 
                                                            
1004 The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T). 
1005 The New York Times, September 5, 1998 “When Rape Becomes Genocide.” 
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IX. Concluding Comments 
In doing this work, the thesis has demonstrated the significance of sovereignty as the basis of 
international law after World War II.  It has also shown the way in which it has evolved in 
relation to the Responsibility to Protect and in the context of global governance. Sovereignty has 
come to be more invested in people than the state.1006 Human rights have gained significance in 
the responsibility of sovereign states toward their own and others. Can we say this is a universal 
value?  While modern legal theorists may reject the universality of international laws (and 
sometimes even their validity) we might ask what country is prepared to defend their own or 
others sovereign right to commit war crimes, genocide, human atrocities or ethnic cleansing. An 
important dimension of transnational governance discussed in the thesis is the role of not only 
hard governance in the form of international organizations like the UN, but soft power or soft 
governance in the form of NGOs and their influence in information gathering, and advocating for 
the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. The thesis has provided the reader with the 
views of many of these NGOs on issues pertaining to law, morality, justice, and the place of 
military intervention and beyond.  
Concerns have been raised regarding the Responsibility to Protect as a neo-colonialist enterprise 
-- two questions in particular are pertinent to ask in this regard:  If humanitarian intervention is a 
neo-colonialist form of intervention, how should we respond to a Srebrenica (Bosnia, 1995) or a 
Rwanda?  Surely no legal principle such as sovereignty should be permitted to provide a shield 
against crimes against humanity. Should a state’s political independence and sovereignty provide 
a licence to kill their own citizens?  The answer is obviously ‘No.’ The better answer in fact lies 
                                                            
1006 Dennis Patterson, Cosmopolitanism and Global Legal Regimes EUI Law Department (unpublished and 
undated). 
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at the heart of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect – it requires the international 
community to cooperate when the necessity arises and to come to responsible decisions to avoid 
atrocities and gross human suffering. 
In summary, after much research, analysis and thought, I have become committed to the need for 
and validity of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect in all three of its aspects:  
prevention, reaction and rebuilding.  I consider myself a champion of the need to protect 
civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and human atrocity when states are unable 
or fail to do so.  At the same time, I recognize the work necessary to address the tough issues that 
face its implementation and encourage further efforts to imbed the principle firmly within the 
processes and structures of the United Nations, and international law, particularly in terms of 
human rights, conflict prevention and resolution and the protection of civilians.  This work is 
necessary to aid in the legal operationalization of the doctrine in future.   
The supportive work of NGOs and the dedicated work of these bodies in the global environment 
becomes even more important - we ought to nurture and encourage them.   I also encourage the 
pursuit of options for member states to implement the principle domestically in order to build 
their society’s resilience to the occurrence  of atrocity crimes. I also support new initiatives, such 
as the ‘Accountability, Coherence and Transparency’ (ACT) which was launched by a group of 
states to partly address, within the broader work on Council reform, the much contested proposal 
of the use of the veto by calling on the P5 to refrain from using this power negatively in 
situations where the Responsibility to Protect crimes and violations are imminent or ongoing and 
urgent action is required. Time, procrastination and opposition can mean thousands of lives lost 
while the members of the Security Council consider their next election or what best serves their 
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interest - - time on which the lives of many innocent men, women, children and the elderly 
utterly depend. 
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APPENDIX A:  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. What are your primary objectives? 
2. How do you go about achieving them? 
3.  What are the criteria for membership in your organization? 
4. What do you think is the motivation for members to join? 
5. What is your relationship with the State? 
6. What role does loyalty to the state play? 
 
They were asked, regarding impediments and the place of moral principles:  
 
7. What do you think are the impediments to the implementation of R2P? 
8. How do they impede? 
Regarding the question of legality/legitimacy and the moral imperative, interviewees were asked: 
 
9. Is intervention (and R2P) a moral entity or a legal entity and what does this mean in 
terms of implementation?  
a. What role does human values, ethics play your work; 
b. In that of the state – do the views differ? 
To understand in greater detail the role of NGOs in global governance, interviews included the 
following questions: 
 
10. How do you go about trying to influence decisions at the national, international level? 
11. What kind of documents, texts do you use? 
12. Do you feel your work makes a difference? 
13. Why did you become involved? 
14. What is your interaction with other 
a.  NGOs;  interest or civil groups 
b. the UN; other global governance organizations (ggos) 
c. your government? 
15. Do you feel you contribute to democracy and legitimacy at the transnational level? 
 
To discover how the different aspects of R2P (prevention, reaction, rebuilding) are viewed 
and/or advocated for, interviewees were asked 
16. What is your position on the three different aspects of R2P? 
17. Do you focus on all, one or two, and which ones; Why? 
18. What is your role in rebuilding? 
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19. Who should be involved in the reconstruction – the UN, those who did the damage, 
neighboring states? 
20.  What about the ICC?  How important is the ICC in the implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect? 
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APPENDIX B:  LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
Dr xxx 
Date 
Dear Dr. xxx,      
I am writing to you with regard to my research to be carried out through the auspices of the 
Osgoode Law School at York University in Toronto to request permission to conduct an 
interview with you regarding my doctoral thesis topic.   It is anticipated that this interview would 
take approximately one hour or less of your time. 
The dissertation research involves a study of the emerging international norm of ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) which states that citizens must be protected in cases of human 
atrocities, war crimes and genocide where states have failed to do so. It includes questions on 
the role of non-state actors, the United Nations, and past and current government individuals who 
have knowledge of the past and current support for the principle. 
This research project has been reviewed and approved for compliance to research ethics 
protocols by the Human Participants Review Subcommittee (HPRC) of York University. If you 
wish, the details of our interview would be kept confidential and your comments would remain 
unattributed.  At the completion of my doctoral work, the records of your interview would be 
destroyed.  Once completed, you would be entitled to read the thesis and any other work that I 
produce related to this topic.   
I would like to assure you that participants have the right not to answer any question or  to 
withdraw at any time.  If a participant chooses to withdraw from the study, all data generated as a 
consequence of their participation shall be destroyed.  
 If you have any questions with regard to this request and my current status, please feel free to 
contact Lisa Bunker Manager, Graduate Studies Osgoode Law SROSS 867 Osgoode Hall.  She 
can be reached by email at lbunker@osgoode.yorku or my supervisor, Dr. Annie Bunting. 
Should you have any ethical concerns the regarding the ethical concerns of this research, you 
may address them to the Manager of the Office of Research Ethics, York University, 309 York 
Lanes, phone 416-736-5914.  
I look forward to talking with you on November 10th.   
Sincerely, 
 
Carolyn H. Filteau 
PhD Candidate, Osgoode Law School 
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Email:  chfilteau@sympatico. 
 
Participant’ Signature      Date:  
__________________________                                            __________________________  
Researcher’s Signature     Date: 
__________________________                                             __________________________ 
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APPENDIX C:  SAMPLE THANK YOU LETTER 
 
Dr. xxx 
 
 
Date  
 
Dear xxx, 
 
Thank you so much for talking with me on xxx  and for sharing your thoughts and experience 
with the Responsibility to Protect. I really enjoyed our conversation and came away with new 
insights and a much richer understanding of the situation as it is playing out in the "real world" 
of international relations.  You also provided some new perspectives and very helpful ideas that 
will benefit my research - which I will be most happy to share with you when the thesis is 
complete. Your thoughts about the Libyan and other on the ground situations are especially 
useful to me.    
 
Once again, many thanks for your candour, the subtlety and the completeness of your responses. 
 It has been a great pleasure to talk to you and I thank you for leaving open possible future 
discussions.  .  
 
Kindest regards,  
 
Carolyn Filteau 
PhD Candidate 
Osgoode Law School 
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	 	 APPENDIX  D:   INTERVIEW DETAILS       
 
Amnesty International – New York and Geneva http://www.amnesty.org/en/contact/542 
‐ London http://www.amnesty.org/en/contact  
‐ Article   http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/011/2011/en/569f0509-
c3db-433f-b023-89aea68dde8e/mde190112011en.pdf 
Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. University of Queensland  
 
Berghof Conflict Research http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/en/about/geschichte  
 
Canadian Centre for International Justice  
Office in New York, Geneva and Others. 
Rue de varenbemi, 5th floor 
1202 Geneva, Switzerland 
Tel: 41 22 312 2550 
Email:  geneva@ictj.org 
 
Canadian Institute for Applied Negotiation (CIAN) http://www.ciian.org/contact_us1.shtml 
Dacre, Ontario   
 
Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights (CLAIHR) 66 Wellington Street West, 
Toronto Ontario  Jillian Siskind, President   
 
Carnegie Council  New York http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/about/staff/index.html 
 
Centre for Global Ethics and Politics http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/R2P.Ministerial2011.pdf  
Thomas Weiss,   Prof. Carol C. Gould, Director, The Ralph Bunch Institute, 365 Fifth Avenue, 
Suite 5203, New York, N.Y. 10016-4309 Telephone 212 (817) 1940  
Centre for International Innovation in Governance (CIGI) http://www.cigionline.org University 
of Waterloo, previously Ramesh Thakur –Louise Frechette   David Dewitt, David Welch, Mark 
Sedra http://www.cigionline.org/person/mark-sedra 
Centre for Mediation Dialogue  http://www.hdcentre.org/  GENEVA  Switzerland  
Citizens for Global Solutions. “Creating a U.N. Emergency Capacity: The United Nations 
Emergency Peace Service,” Citizens for Global Solutions, Washington, DC 
<http://www.globalsolutions.org/issues/uneps>   
 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court - http://www.iccnow.org/ -  
 
Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES), Argentina 
  378 
 
East Africa Law Society, Tanzania 
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Villa Moynier, Rue Lausanne 120B - CP 67 - 1211 GENEVA  21 
Academy Secretariat :   Tel. +41 (0) 22 908 44 83   -  info@adh-geneve.ch 
Students Office :   Tel. +41( 0) 22 908 44 88   -  students@adh-geneve.ch 
Fax +41(0) 22 908 44 99  Sent email January 10, 2012 to info adh  
 
Geneva Centre for Security Policy – Geneva, Switzerland http://www.gcsp.ch/About-
Us/Contact  
Khalid Koser. 
 
Genocide Intervention Network. “Conflict at Risk Network,” Genocide Intervention Network,  
 http://www.genocideintervention.net/contact_us Washington, DC   
http://www.genocideintervention.net/responsibility_protect. 
 
Global Action to Prevent War New York Global Action to Prevent War 
866 UN Plaza, Suite 4050 
New York, NY 10017 
www.globalactionpw.org 
melina@globalactionpw.org 
+1 212 818 1815 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the City University of New York 
http://globalr2p.org/   365 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5203, 212-817-2104 New York - Article 
http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/Libya_Time_for_Decision_14_March_2011.pdf 
http://globalr2p.org/contact/  Telephone 212-817-2104 
Jaclyn D Streitfeld-Hall Research Associate 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies  
365 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5203 
New York, NY 10016-4309 
www.globalr2p.org   
Also Book Launch Ralph Bunche Inst. Dec. 5th 5:00 PM Church Center 777 UN Plaza.   
 
The Graduate Institute, Centre for Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Geneva 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/ccdp  
 
Human Rights Watch  New York 
Human Rights Watch Geneva Contact    http://www.hrw.org/en/contact-us#Geneva    
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Initiatives for International Dialogue, The Philippines 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.  
 
International Commission Jurists – GENEVA – Secretary General, Louise Doswald Beck  
 
International Committee of the Red Cross  GENEVA http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-
are/contacts/index.jsp Jelena Pejic Legal Adviser  
 
International Council of Voluntary agencies  Geneva 
http://www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org/ghp.html  http://www.icva.ch/secretariat.html  
 
International Crisis Group  http://www.crisisgroup.org/  Headquarters in Brussels but offices 
elsewhere as well Louise Arbour, President and CEO  
ICG New York - http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about/contact.aspx 
420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2640, New York (see map) 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about/contact.aspx  email newyork@crisisgroup.ca  
International Parliamentary Committee for prevention of genocide. Art Eggleton recommended 
by Jillian Siskind http://www.aegistrust.org/Parliamentary-work/appg-genocide-prevention.html 
and the UK http://www.aegistrust.org/Parliamentary-work/parliamentary-campaign-to-
strengthen-uk-law-on-international-crimes.html   
International Refugee Initiative, New York and Uganda 
Kairos Canada. “Strategic Direction and Program Plan for KAIROS 2006-2010,” Kairos Canada, 
slide 7, http://www.kairoscanada.org/  Doesn’t look useful 
 
Kofi Annan Foundation Geneva http://kofiannanfoundation.org/contact 
Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. 
<http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/about_w2i.htm>Frank Chalk, Director of MIGS, Professor of 
History, Concordia University http://www.migsr2pconference.com/speakers   
W2i Project Kyle Matthews email: kylematt@alcor.concordia.ca  The Will to Intervene Project 
(MIGs S– The Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies) 
http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/W2I_Project.html  
Tel.: (514) 848-2424 ext 5729 or 2404 
Fax: (514) 848-4538 
Kyle Matthews 
Senior Deputy Director 
The Will to Intervene Project 
The Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies 
Concordia University 
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1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd West 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
H3G 1M8 
 
NATO Watch UK Contact Ian Davis http://www.natowatch.org/contact  
Dr. Ian Davis 
Director, NATO Watch 
17 Strath, Gairloch 
Ross-shire IV21 2BX, UK 
Tel: +44 (0)1445 712649; e-Fax: +44 (0)700 601 7404 
Mobile: +44 (0)7887 782389 
Skype: iandavis1960 
email: info@iandavisconsultancy.com 
www.natowatch.org  
Oxfam International  Different countries – Canada in Ottawa Sent email October 20, 2011 
International Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect ICRtoP Listserv  Web: 
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org 
Marion Arnaud 
Senior Outreach Officer 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect  
708 Third Avenue, 24th Floor 
New York, NY 10017 
212.599.1320 x8528 
fax 212.599.1332  
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org 
 
Contact New York  http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/contact-us c/o World 
Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy, 708 Third Avenue, 24th Floor, New York  Tel:  
1-212-599-1320   
Responsibility to Protect,” World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy, 
<http://www.wfm igp.org/site/igp/programs/r2pcs>  (accessed November 2 2010). New York   
rtop-included-in-security-council-resolution-on-the-protection-of-civilians-initiative-for-
international See ten years after conference in Toronto  ICR2P http://www.wfm-
igp.org/site/igp/programs/r2pcs  
 
 IDRC 
 http://www.idrc.ca  http://www.idrc.ca/EN/AboutUs/Contact/Pages/default.aspx   
 
Interparliamentary Group – London http://www.bgipu.org/contact.htm Referred by Kyle 
Matthews He can give you contact. 
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Project Ploughshares – Waterloo Ernie Regehr, former executive director.  Current ED is John 
Siebert.  Based in Menonite Community in Waterloo http://www.ploughshares.ca/ contact 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/contact 
 
The Stanley Foundation. Iowa,  http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/ Rachel Gerber  
 
Tom Lantose Human Rights Commission  – Washington DC referred by Kyle Matthews 
http://tlhrc.house.gov/contact.asp  
 
The West Africa Civil Society Institute, Ghana 
United Nations Association in Canada, Toronto and elsewhere http://www.unac.org/en/index.asp    
http://to.unac.org/contact-us/ 
 
UN Office of the High Comissioner for Human Rights GENEVA 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_United_Nations_High_Commissioner_for_Human_R
ights 
 
The United States Institute of Peace http://www.usip.org/contact Washington, D.C. Contact 
Jason Gluck re Libya Peace brief email:  jgluck@usip.org; telephone 202-429-3886 
 
University of Cardoza - University of Cardoza School of Law.  New York Evidentiary standards.  
Trying to come up with evidentiary standards and legal criteria.  .  Contact Daniel Stewart This 
project founded by the Australian Government.  Sharon Rosenburg.   
W2i Project The Will to Intervene Project (MIGs S– The Montreal Institute for Genocide and 
Human Rights Studies) http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/W2I_Project.html  
 
World Federalist Movement Canada.  Ottawa   
http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/contact.html  
World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy, New York and The Hague – speak to 
Bill Pace, 708 Third Avenue, 24th Floor, New York 100171 212 599 1320  CALL 
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Individuals 
1) David Dewitt, Vice-President of Programs, Center for International Governance 
Innovation, 57 Erb Street West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 6C2  
ddewitt@cigionline.org; telephone 519-885-2444 x 292   
2) David Welch Balsillie School of International Affairs, 67 Erb Street West, 
Waterloo, On N2L 6C2   
3) Lucie Edwards, Balsillie School of International Affairs,  
4) Carolyn McAskie  
Wakefield, QC 
5) Elissa Golberg 
Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the 
Conference on Disarmament | Ambassadeure et représentante permanente auprès 
des Nations Unies et de la Conférence du désarmement 
elissa.golberg@international.gc.ca 
 
Assistant:  Violette Talbot violette.talbot@international.gc.ca 
Telephone | Téléphone: 41 (0) 22 919 9216  
Facsimile | Télécopieur: 41 (0) 22 919 9254 
Avenue de l'Ariana 5, 1202 Genève, Suisse 
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada 
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APPENDIX E:  GLOSSARY 
 
ACT    Accountability, Coherence and Transparency 
AU    African Union 
CGS    Citizens for Global Solutions 
CIGI  Centre of International Governance 
CLAIHR Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights 
ECOSOC  Economic and Social Council 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GCSPS    Geneva Center for Security Policy Studies 
HD    Center for Humanitarian Dialogue 
HRW    Human Rights Watch 
ICC    International Criminal Court 
ICG    International Crisis Group 
ICISS  International Commission on the Responsibility to Protect 
ICR2P    International Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect 
ICRC    International Committee of the Red Cross 
IGO    International Organizations 
IMF    International Monetary Fund  
KLA  Kosvo Liberation Army 
MIGS    Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies 
MS    Member State 
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO  Nongovernmental Organization 
NSAG    Non-state armed groups 
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OIC    Organization of the Islamic Conference 
OSCE    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
P5  Permanent Members 
PDD  Presidential Decision Directive 
PESD  Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self defense 
TWAIL Third World Approaches to International Law 
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN    United Nations 
UNA  United Nations Association 
UNAMIR  UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda  
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNMISS  United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan 
W21    Will to Intervene Project 
WFM-IGP World Federalist Movement- Institute for Global Policy 
WMD  weapons of mass destruction 
